ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS

Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Edited by Andrew Silke

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

This new Handbook provides a comprehensive, state-of-the-art overview of current knowledge and debates on terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as providing a benchmark for future research.

The attacks of 9/11 and the 'global war on terror' and its various legacies have dominated international politics in the opening decades of the 21st century. In response to the dramatic rise of terrorism, within the public eye and the academic world, the need for an accessible and comprehensive overview of these controversial issues remains profound. The *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism* seeks to fulfil this need. The volume is divided into two parts:

- Part I: Terrorism: This section provides an overview of terrorism, covering the history of terrorism, its causes and characteristics, major tactics and strategies, major trends and critical contemporary issues such as radicalisation and cyber-terrorism. It concludes with a series of detailed case studies, including the IRA, Hamas and the Islamic State.
- Part II: Counterterrorism: This part draws on the main themes and critical issues surrounding counterterrorism. It covers the major strategies and policies, key events and trends and the impact and effectiveness of different approaches. This section also concludes with a series of case studies focused on major counterterrorism campaigns.

This book will be of great interest to all students of terrorism and counterterrorism, political violence, counter-insurgency, criminology, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR more generally.

Andrew Silke is Professor of Terrorism, Risk and Resilience at Cranfield Univerity, UK. He is author or editor of many books on terrorism, including, most recently, *Terrorism: All that Matters* (2014), *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism* (Routledge 2013) and *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (Routledge 2010).

'The *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism* offers the best overview of current terrorism research on the market today. With over fifty concise and accessible chapters by leading specialists in the field, the book is a godsend for instructors and a reference work for students, professionals, and scholars alike.'

– Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and University of Oslo, Norway

'The *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism* is an immensely valuable collection that is impressive in terms of scope, variety, and depth of knowledge. Editor Andrew Silke has assembled top experts in the field to analyze key contemporary issues as well as a broad range of important case studies.'

– Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University, USA

'A standard complaint in the social sciences is that more research is needed. This does not apply to terrorism research; there is too much of it – although of uneven quality. What was needed is a synthesis of knowledge from various disciplines. Andrew Silke's *Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism* does just that. It is a comprehensive compendium that should be on the shelf of every library.'

– Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief, Perspectives on Terrorism

'Andrew Silke has pulled together an extremely timely and comprehensive single volume that offers much-needed insight. Readers will profit from its extensive and state-of-the-art treatment of the very latest trends in both terrorism and counterterrorism.'

– Kumar Ramakrishna, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

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THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Andrew Silke

Introduction

Terrorism and counterterrorism have always been challenging subjects to study. Emotive, controversial and sometimes even dangerous, throughout the 20th century the study of both has lurked on the fringes of scientific research. There were few scholars willing to commit their careers to the area, funding was extremely limited and inside and outside academia there were plenty who questioned whether terrorism and counterterrorism were even appropriate subjects for scientific study, and questioned too the motives of any researcher willing to explore such controversial issues.

It was only after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 that terrorism moved from the fringes of scientific interest to a subject of major attention. Controversy remained, but the funders of research were now taking it seriously as a subject of interest. Prior to 9/11, research on terrorism had usually been conducted on shoestring budgets. Ultimately, a lack of funding and a shortage of researchers stifled the ambition of research plans. Expensive and time-consuming methodologies and analysis could only rarely be contemplated. Instead, making do with what was available, researchers favoured methods and approaches which could be accomplished with the meagre resources at hand. The result was that, although quite a lot was still written, much of it was of limited quality, often adding little or no new data to the field. Adding to the mire, much of the research was often conducted by authors with only a limited understanding of the existing literature on terrorism, with a result that a lot of dead-end research was unnecessarily repeated and some of the rest was incredibly poorly linked with the rest of the field.

Much of this changed in the aftermath of 9/11. There was a massive surge in research interest on terrorism and counterterrorism and as Figure 1.1 highlights, a dramatic and instant change. The figure shows all the scholarly works recorded by Google Scholar which had at least one of the following terms in the title: terrorism, terrorist, political violence, radicalisation, radicalisation or insurgency. This, though, should not be seen as a complete tally of the relevant research. A book or an article which focused on a particular terrorist group or conflict but which did not use any of the search terms in its title would be missed. Nevertheless, the graph demonstrates that almost overnight, terrorism went from an exotic curiosity to a subject of apparently strategic international importance. Research budgets were massively increased and substantial funding was made available for a wide range of studies. Major new research centres and institutes



Figure 1.1 Scholarly publications on terrorism and counterterrorism, 1980–2016.

were established at many universities, while the handful of existing centres were able to grow significantly in size and scope.

Terrorism and counterterrorism entered university course curriculums across the globe and became widely taught. Today it is rare to find any medium-sized university in the West which does not offer at least one module on terrorism in its syllabus. Before 9/11, it was a rarity.

Figure 1.1 also illustrates that the surge in interest has largely been sustained in the years following 2001. New research continues to be published at a formidable rate. Almost 35,000 scholarly works have been published since 9/11 with 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' in the title. That number jumps to 635,000 if you also include those works which mention terrorist or terrorism somewhere in the text. It averages at over 100 scholarly works published each and every day since 9/11: books, journal articles and theses. Keeping track of such a blizzard of research and analysis is a massive challenge in itself. And yet, despite this incredible flood of output, a recurring fear among researchers is that the study of terrorism and counterterrorism is actually failing.

Challenges in understanding terrorism and counterterrorism

A variety of factors drive this fear of failure, but the reason most often cited is that the research methods used to study terrorism and counterterrorism are too weak. A vocal recent critic is Marc Sageman (2014), who argued that research on terrorism has stagnated. In a stark overall analysis, he concluded that:

> Overall, the post-9/11 money surge into terrorism studies and the rush of newcomers into the field had a deleterious effect on research. The field was dominated by laymen, who controlled funding, prioritizing it according to their own questions, and self-proclaimed media experts who conduct their own 'research.' These 'experts' still fill the airwaves and freely give their opinions to journalists, thereby framing terrorist events for the public. However, they are not truly scholars, are not versed in the scientific method, and often pursue a political agenda. … The voice of true scholars is drowned… it is hard to escape the judgment that academic terrorism research has stagnated for the past dozen years because of a lack of both primary sources and vigorous efforts to police the quality of research, thus preventing the establishment of standards

> of academic excellence and flooding the field with charlatans, spouting some of the vilest prejudices under the cloak of national security.
>
> *(Sageman, p. 8)*

This was not the first time that experienced researchers had hit out at the poor quality of large amounts of terrorism research. In an early famous review of research, Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that most researchers were not producing substantively new data or knowledge. Instead, they were primarily reworking old material which already existed. In the 1980s, only 46 per cent of the researchers said that they had ever managed to generate data of their own on the subject of terrorism. For the majority of researchers, all of their writings and analyses were based entirely on data produced by others.

Figure 1.2 comes from a review at the end of the 1990s which showed that researchers remained very heavily dependent on easily accessible sources of data. Only about 20 per cent of articles provided substantially new knowledge which was previously unavailable to the field. The field thus was very top-heavy with what are referred to as pre-experimental research designs. Unfortunately, these are 'the weakest designs since the sources of internal and external validity are not controlled for. The risk of error in drawing causal inferences from pre-experimental designs is extremely high and they are primarily useful as a basis... for exploratory research' (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p. 147).

There was some improvement after 9/11, but a 2009 review still found that only 35 per cent of articles in the core terrorism studies were providing new data (Silke, 2009). Most of the rest were again essentially rehashing knowledge that was already there. This leads us back to Sageman's stagnation argument, which recognised that while a great deal was being written on terrorism and counterterrorism, the heavy reliance on weaker methodologies and limited data analysis meant that the field was failing to make meaningful progress.



Figure 1.2 Methods in terrorism research (Silke, 2001).

There was a polemic edge to the stagnation argument and many serious and experienced terrorism researchers countered that Sageman had overstated the case (e.g. Taylor, 2014; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014). Yes, there were a lot of mediocre studies, but there were also definite signs of progress. Indeed, some have argued instead that the study of terrorism and counterterrorism is actually in a golden age: a period of unparalleled research activity where a wide range of progress is taking place, even if somewhat more slowly and hesitantly in some areas than others (e.g. Schmid, 2011; Silke and Schimdt-Petersen, 2017).

To a degree, patchy progress is a reflection of the multi-disciplinary nature of terrorism studies. It has long been recognised within the field that terrorism studies is a strongly inter-disciplinary subject area (Silke, 2004), and while it has often traditionally been dominated by the political sciences, there have been very significant contributions from other areas, including psychology, criminology, economics, anthropology, history, religious studies, etc. (e.g. Schmid, 2011; Horgan, 2017; LaFree and Freilich, 2016). The interdisciplinary nature of the field is generally widely viewed in positive terms, helping to ensure an extensive range of perspectives and methodologies can be brought to bear. One challenge, however, is the risk of disciplinary silos developing, with researchers from one discipline being poorly aware of potentially useful and relevant findings from others.

Richard English (2016, pp. 148–149) highlighted that breaking down such silos was one of the major challenges now facing the future of terrorism research:

> Sometimes, what we know about terrorism and how to respond to it can only be seen most clearly if we read along continua and across disciplines and beyond a narrowly-defined field of work. There has recently been something of an eirenic turn in the wider scholarly literature relevant to terrorism and counter-terrorism; but this is only properly visible if one reads well beyond the terrorism studies literature itself, and if one digs deeply into diverse disciplines… in order to see this scholarly insight properly, we have to read across methodological boundaries and, equally importantly, to address the problem that some people still too narrowly define the boundaries around the study of terrorism (and discuss terrorism research as if it occurs overwhelmingly in a very small set of journals and titles). Much of the best work on terrorist violence and terrorist actors is not published in terrorism studies journals, or in books with 'terrorism' in the title. Instead, it addresses the contextually, historically, culturally located emergence and dynamics of political violence which many would consider to be terrorism. To ignore this wider literature limits the profundity and accuracy of the conclusions that can be reached.

Adding yet another hurdle for research to grapple with is the troublesome issue of how terrorism is defined. To put it bluntly, there has never been a widely agreed definition of terrorism, and some writers have concluded that 'it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon' (Shafritz, Gibbons and Scott, 1991). The failure to find a widely acceptable definition of terrorism is tied to the political use of the word. Fundamentally, 'terrorism' is a pejorative term with a range of negative meanings. These concerns tie into the long-standing truism that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.' Individuals such as Nelson Mandela, for example, were labelled as terrorists for many years, and yet Mandela went on to become an internationally respected statesman.

Terrorists rarely describe themselves as 'terrorists'. While on trial in 1878 for shooting a Russian police general, Vera Zasulich proudly proclaimed in court, 'I am a terrorist, not a murderer' (Bergman, 1983), but subsequent inheritors of her legacy have shied away from the

label. Instead, later generations of 'terrorists' portrayed themselves as soldiers, freedom fighters, volunteers, partisans or the resistance (at least in their own minds if nowhere else). Normally they were equally bitter about any effort to describe them as criminals.

The dividing lines between terrorism, guerrilla warfare and insurgency, for example, have never been clear-cut. For some, inevitably, the terms are completely interchangeable. For others there are important and powerful differences. The common thread running across all three is the use of violence for political purposes, but little else is agreed about, and many governments tend to be quick to apply the label 'terrorist' to an opponent if they can possibly get away with it.

Uncertainty over what terrorism is not only has political implications, but also has real consequences for research. For example, if you are interested in understanding the root causes of terrorism, one study might have a very narrow focus only exploring instances of terrorism perpetrated by lone actors; another might focus instead on conflicts which could be regarded as insurgencies or civil wars; while a third study might try to look at the state use of terrorism. All three studies might in theory be looking at 'the causes of terrorism', but what each means by 'terrorism' is very different. Inevitably, the studies come to different conclusions. Similar problems apply in terms of research on counterterrorism: exactly what type of terrorism is being countered? This is not always clearly spelt out with the inevitable result that there is often confusion and mixed findings around the impact of counterterrorism too.

Persistent concerns about the impact of how terrorism was defined within research partly contributed to the development of the sub-field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) in the 2000s. Formally established in 2007, CTS argued that a variety of issues had not been adequately addressed by mainstream terrorism research. A particular concern was that research tended to see terrorism as something only non-state actors did. As Jackson (2009, p. 70) noted:

> An important consequence of these conceptual practices are that terrorism comes to be understood and studied solely as a form of violence carried out by non-state groups, and terrorism by states remains unstudied and mostly invisible… When state terrorism is discussed, it is usually limited to descriptions of 'state-sponsored terrorism' by so-called 'rogue states'. Further, the subsequent silence on the direct use of terrorism by state actors within the Terrorism Studies literature underpins a mostly unspoken belief that Western liberal democratic states in particular never engage in terrorism as a matter of policy, but only occasionally in error or misjudgement.

A linked concern for CTS was how:

> much of the literature defines the 'terrorist' as the main or exclusive security problem and inquiry is largely restricted to the assembling of information and data that would solve or eradicate the 'problem' as the state defines it. This focus ignores both terrorism being a social phenomenon which is typically the outcome of a long dynamic process, and the potential contribution of the state itself to the creation of the conditions in which terrorist action by non-state actors occurs.
>
> *(Jackson, Gunning, and Smyth, 2007)*

Controversy around the appropriate role of research with regard to terrorism is not new. Terrorism is an emotive subject, and many researchers have traditionally not been overly concerned with remaining objective and neutral in how they view the subject and its perpetrators. Indeed, it has been noted that many researchers seem confused by their roles. As Schmid and Jongman (1988, p. 179) pointed out, the researcher's 'role is not to "fight" the terrorist fire; rather

than a "firefighter," [the researcher] should be a "student of combustion"'. But such objectivity is often relatively rare in the field (not especially surprising when most of the research is paid for by one side in the terrorism equation). Most researchers do seem to believe they are fulfilling – or are meant to fulfil – a firefighting role. The result is that research is often largely driven by policy concerns, and the area has often fallen into a trap where it is largely limited to government agendas.

Outline of this volume

Given the focus of much of the chapter so far, one would be forgiven for assuming that research on terrorism and counterterrorism must inevitably then be in a shocking state, ruined by weak research methods, conceptual confusion and political bias. And yet, that would be far too pessimistic. While there are problems, overall, terrorism research is still remarkably vibrant and prolific, and amid the herd of mediocre studies in many areas, there are still real gems which offer findings of genuine progress and insight. Overall, it is likely that future scholars will look back at this period as an important and transformational phase in our understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. The study of terrorism itself has been catapulted from academic obscurity to a mainstream multi-disciplinary subject, now widely taught at most universities. The field produces an unprecedented level of research and writing. Never before in history have the issues of what causes terrorism and how it should be combatted attracted such wide international attention and controversy.

Bearing in mind this rich and varied context, the need for an accessible and comprehensive overview on these controversial issues remains profound. This then was the motivation behind the current volume: to provide a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as a detailed survey of key historical and contemporary terrorist groups and major counterterrorism campaigns. The volume intentionally adopted a wide focus, highlighting both key trends as well as cutting-edge topics and emerging critical issues. A wide net was cast internationally, to deliberately bring a rich range of conflicts and case studies from across the globe. Ultimately, this handbook is intended to provide a comprehensive, state-of-the-art overview of our current knowledge, as well as hopefully providing a benchmark for future work.

Terrorism

The first part of the book opens with a chapter from Anthony Richards, who tackles the ever-present issue of defining terrorism. We have already touched on the significant impact this has for research, and Richards highlights both the major problems in reaching a widely agreed definition but also some of the best avenues forward. Gary LaFree follows with a closely linked chapter examining the conceptualisation of terrorism and in particular what this means in terms of measurement – a cornerstone of research. As one of the key figures behind the Global Terrorism Database, LaFree is extraordinarily well-placed to highlight the implications even small changes in definition and measurement have on our assessment of trends and the impact of counterterrorism policies.

Having set the conceptual framework for the first part of the volume, Leonard Weinberg then takes us on a swift tour of the history of terrorism. Too often, the history of terrorism is assumed to have begun on September 11, 2001. Weinberg comprehensively destroys that myth, and in what is rightly the longest chapter in the volume, he outlines the rich and complex evolution of terrorism over the past 100 years.

One of the fundamental questions facing terrorism studies is, what causes terrorism? One of the key writers on this subject, Tore Bjørgo, together with myself, tries to pull together the evidence around what factors drive terrorist conflicts. The findings challenge many widely held assumptions and also drive home that we need to be sophisticated in terms of how we think about causes and the different levels at which they work.

At this point, the volume moves into discussion and analysis of different types of terrorism. I open with a chapter on state terrorism. Too often there is an assumption that terrorism only applies to non-state actors, but as the CTS school would argue, states can and have engaged in terrorism. How we examine state terrorism again raises important questions about how we define and conceptualise terrorism in general.

The most successful terrorist groups over the last 100 years tended to all come from the nationalist and separatist camp. James Forest provides an overview of the characteristics of this type of terrorism and discusses some of the more well-known examples, such as the IRA in Northern Ireland and the ETA in Spain. Leena Malkki follows with an analysis of left-wing terrorism: a significant force in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, but even stronger in other parts of the world, such as Latin America. George Michael then assesses their counterparts on the right-wing, drawing attention to (among other things) how the right-wing concept of 'leaderless resistance' fed steadily into the rise of lone-actor terrorism. This theme is developed further in the following chapter by Noémie Bouhana and her co-authors, who review what we know about lone actors today. Historically, the far right may have set the scene on lone-wolf terrorism, and while they remain present, it is increasingly Islamist-inspired lone actors who are of growing concern.

In different ways, radicalisation and recruitment are the major themes of the next three chapters. Zoey Reeve opens with an overview on what we know about terrorist psychology and the radicalisation process. Had this book been written 20 years ago, we would not have mentioned the term 'Radicalisation', though we would certainly have talked about individuals being recruited or joining terrorist groups. The growth of the concept of radicalisation as the framework for how we understand how people become involved in terrorism is one of the major developments in terrorism studies in recent years. Deborah Browne follows with an assessment on how children and teenagers in particular are drawn into terrorism, extremism and political violence. Finally, Katherine Brown and Elizabeth Pearson explore the increasingly important role played by social media and the online environment, both in terms of facilitating and hindering radicalisation.

Next, Joshua Kilberg focuses on terrorist group structures, a subject with important implications in both assessing the nature of the threat posed by terrorism but also in assessing the likely effectiveness of various counterterrorism measures. Sarah Marsden is also concerned with effectiveness, but this time in terms of assessing, what impact does terrorism have? Intense debate has raged on this question in recent years and Marsden assesses the different ways in which terrorism 'works'. Linked to this, in the subsequent chapter Thomas Baumert and Mikel Buesa explore the economic impact of terrorism. Their conclusion is that terrorism can be a remarkably effective low-cost form of conflict. For modest outlays, terrorist violence can inflict disproportionately high costs on opponents. Building further on this theme, James Windle outlines how terrorists raise the money needed to fund their campaigns and how this can link into organised crime and even in some cases to the watering down of political ideals when some movements become increasingly motivated by profit.

David Malet's chapter on foreign fighters represents yet another topic that if this book had been written 20 years ago would probably have been overlooked. Today, however, foreign fighters are a major international issue and the focus of enormous attention.

The remaining chapters in this section look at particularly prominent terrorist tactics. Assaf Moghadam starts off with an overview of suicide terrorism, an exotic curiosity in the 20th century, but a mainstream terrorist tactic in the 21st. Moghadam assesses how and why that transformation occurred. In contrast, hostage-taking has been a mainstream terrorist tactic for much longer. Margaret Wilson provides a review of the history of hostage-taking, outlining the dynamics and objectives typically seen when terrorists use this tactic. Gary Ackerman then provides a clear-headed assessment of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. In an age of mass casualty terrorism, the use of CBRN weapons by terrorists poses sobering questions which can be easily inflamed and inflated in public imaginations. Ackerman, however, provides a sensible and informed assessment of the threat and challenges here. Another area often subject to hype and hysteria is the threat of cyber terrorism. Again, Marcus Rogers provides some sensible analysis in a chapter that links well with Brown and Pearson's earlier analysis on the role of social media.

The final section of Part 1 focuses on case studies of particularly significant groups: Al-Qaeda; Boko Haram; Hamas; Hizbollah; Islamic State; Provisional Irish Republican Army; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; and Red Army Faction. Most terrorist groups are eventually defeated, and indeed most are usually defeated relatively quickly. One survey found that 90 per cent of terrorist groups were defeated within one year of their first attack (Rapaport, 1992). Of those few who managed to survive the first year, nearly half were finished off within the next 10 years. Thus, on that measure, the eight groups explored here are not typical terrorist groups: all have endured for a considerable amount of time, some for more than decades. Their longevity, however, allows for a deeper analysis of the driving forces behind each movement and also an assessment of the changing dynamics and fortunes of their respective campaigns of violence. In each of the eight cases, the authors try to cover relatively similar issues: the origins and history of the group; ideology and strategy; key figures and critical events. They also aim to give an overall assessment of the major trends and issues in the conflict.

Counterterrorism

In the second part of the collection, the focus shifts to counterterrorism. The policies, strategies and tactics that states use to combat terrorism and deal with its consequences are referred to as counterterrorism. Counterterrorism can take many different forms, and it is not specific to any one agency or department. It can be carried out by government departments, the military, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency responders and many other groups and bodies. Ronald Crelinsten opens this section with an important chapter to remind us that just as we have to think about how we define and conceptualise terrorism, we need to do exactly the same when approaching counterterrorism.

Subsequent chapters explore some of the main approaches to counterterrorism. Historically, two main frameworks have dominated thinking on counterterrorism: the criminal justice model and the military model. Lindsay Clutterbuck opens with the criminal justice framework and a particular focus on the role of policing in counterterrorism. Clutterbuck draws particularly on the UK experience and how policing evolved to tackle terrorism over many decades. Michael Boyle follows with the military framework. This draws heavily on recent experiences from the 'war on terror', and not for the last time, for example, particular attention is focused on the use of drone warfare in counterterrorism. Next, Julian Richards explores the crucial and often hidden role of intelligence in counterterrorism, before finally Clive Walker gives an overview on how legislation has been used to attempt to deal with terrorism (again, with a particular focus on the UK).

Having examined some of the major approaches and frameworks, the next series of chapters explore more focused issues. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Bart Schuurman concentrate on the key

issue of popular support. There is often a general acceptance that terrorism conflicts are, at their core, a battle for hearts and minds. What this means in practice, however, is often poorly thought through and sometimes only haphazardly linked to a wider counterterrorism strategy. Efforts to tackle the financing of terrorism can in some regards be more straightforward, though as Marc Parker points out in the next chapter, efforts to do so can often be incredibly slow and only tackled after the failures of other approaches. Joshua Freilich and his co-authors then explore the issue of how to deter and prevent terrorist attacks from taking place. Their review shows that a variety of measures can be taken, but that the consequences are not always positive.

The role of prison and detention in counterterrorism has often been overlooked. It is perhaps a strange oversight given that such a large proportion of terrorists will at some point eventually spend time behind bars. Jacqueline Bates-Gaston examines some of the issues this raises. Drawing on the rich experience in Northern Ireland, she outlines some of the risks, challenges and opportunities prison presents. Kurt Braddock follows directly on from this by exploring terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation. Most terrorists eventually leave violence behind. Our understanding of why they move on has often been very poor. In this chapter, Braddock outlines what we know about how terrorists disengage and what this then means for those who are interested in encouraging militants and their supporters away from campaigns of violence.

Rory Finegan takes us back to the subject of targeted killings and explores whether their use is an effective or counter-productive strategy in counterterrorism. The chapter explores not only the current era of drone strikes but also historical cases from Northern Ireland, Spain and elsewhere.

Finally, and appropriately, Lyndsey Harris and Rachel Monaghan explore issues around ethics and human rights in counterterrorism. Too often these have been overlooked in analysis and discussions, and far too often they have been sources of profound concern in how states have waged campaigns of counterterrorism.

The final section of Part 2 provides case studies on the counterterrorism experiences of particularly significant countries. Thirteen detailed case studies are explored: Argentina; Canada; China; France; Great Britain; India; Iraq; Israel; Italy; Spain; Russia; the United States of America pre-9/11; and the United States of America since 9/11. The challenges faced across these different regions are not the same, and how each has responded to terrorism has varied enormously. Part of the purpose of this range of chapters is to illustrate this variety and to drive home that there are multiple ways in which states can respond to the terrorism puzzle. Some of the case studies take a narrow focus, for example, the Argentinian case explores the disastrous impact of the 'dirty war' in the late 1970s and early 1980s and how it weakened rather than strengthened the state that resorted to it. The Italian case study focuses particularly on the collapse of the left-wing terrorist groups in the 1980s, and how that was achieved primarily through criminal justice avenues. Most of the other chapters provide overviews of the history of terrorism and counterterrorism in the particular country, examining and assessing some of the political, military, legal and other policies that the governments have used in dealing with the terrorism. Valuable and important efforts are made to assess the effectiveness of different policies, what ultimately enjoyed some success and what were the political and social costs of the failures.

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PART I

Terrorism

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2
DEFINING TERRORISM

Anthony Richards

Introduction

Defining 'terrorism' has been an issue that has confounded both policymakers and academics. For some, there is little point in expending any further time on what they see as a forlorn exercise, yet for others the lack of progress on an agreed definition leaves a sense of unfulfilled obligation. From a policymaking perspective, the logic is that if one is to generate international cooperation against terrorism, then there surely needs to be international agreement as to what it is that one is countering. From an academic perspective, one might think that an understanding as to 'what terrorism is' and what its parameters are is fundamental to all terrorism-related research. Yet, 'terrorism', like all social science concepts, is a social construction, and so it is inherently incapable of a concrete definition that 'speaks truth' (e.g. Jackson, 2007). This does not mean, however, that it is not possible to generate a universally agreed conceptualisation of the phenomenon at a given time in a contemporary context. Notwithstanding the difficulties in achieving this, it is probably fair to suggest that most scholars of 'terrorism studies' do see themselves as studying a distinctive form of political violence that merits separate scrutiny, hence the burgeoning field of 'terrorism studies'. So while a concrete definition that speaks 'the truth' is beyond us, what is it that is *analytically* distinctive about the phenomenon that all can potentially agree upon and that can be captured in a general conceptualisation of terrorism?

This chapter will outline some of the reasons why pursuing an agreed 'definition' of terrorism has been seen as so important before summarising the main obstacles that have confronted such an endeavour. The chapter will then suggest potential avenues that may allow us to view the concept more analytically as a distinctive form of political violence.

Why has 'defining' terrorism been seen as so important?

The policymaking context

From a policymaking perspective, a powerful reason for endeavouring to generate a universally agreed definition of terrorism is that, if one accepts that international cooperation is essential in countering it, then logically there needs to be international agreement as to what it is that is being countered. The argument is that terrorism is more international than it has ever been, that a cooperative international approach is therefore indispensable to an effective response, and

that, in turn, an internationally agreed understanding as to what it is that is being countered is therefore imperative.

Moreover, without an agreed definition, there is scope for states to unilaterally decide what counts as terrorism and what does not, and the remits of 'counterterrorism' are often, and sometimes dangerously, determined accordingly. Given its pejorative connotation in practice, the term can be employed subjectively as one sees fit – often as a superficial label and a 'useful insult' to describe the activities of one's adversaries whether or not they have committed acts of terrorism (Gearty, 1991, p. 6). The Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, for example, cautioned that:

> The rubric of counter-terrorism can be used to justify acts in support of political agendas, such as the consolidation of political power, elimination of political opponents, inhibition of legitimate dissent and/or suppression of resistance to military occupation. Labelling opponents or adversaries as terrorists offers a time-tested technique to de-legitimize and demonize them. The United Nations should beware of offering, or being perceived to be offering, a blanket or automatic endorsement of all measures taken in the name of counter-terrorism.
>
> *(As quoted in Schmid, 2011, p. 56)*

The word 'terrorism', then, particularly post 9/11, can be deployed to discredit opposition movements, and draconian measures can be invoked accordingly. Saul (2007, pp. 201–2) draws our attention to the following examples:

> Some States have deployed the international legitimacy conferred by [the UN Security] Council authorization to define terrorism to repress or de-legitimise political opponents, and to conflate them with al-Qaeda … Thus China bluntly characterizes Uighur separatists in Xinjiang as terrorists; … and India seldom distinguishes militants from terrorists in Kashmir. In Indonesia, insurgencies in Aceh and West Papua have been described and combated as terrorism, as have a Maoist insurgency in Nepal and an Islamist movement in Morocco. Israel has compared Palestinians with al-Qaeda, with Ariel Sharon calling Arafat 'our Bin Laden'. … In the Maldives, an opposition politician was convicted of terrorism offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for peacefully protesting against rights violations by the government. … Similarly, in Uzbekistan 15 men were convicted of vague terrorism offences for organizing public demonstrations, at which the government indiscriminately fired upon the crowd.

As Saul (2006, p. 2) earlier argued, 'the more confused a concept, the more it lends itself to opportunistic appropriation'.

Perhaps there can be no better example of the subjective use of 'terrorism' than in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict where either side have committed acts of 'terrorism' depending upon which side one sits. For as long as there is a failure to imbue some kind of analytical quality into the *activity* of terrorism, then the facile 'one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter' mantra will continue to endure. It is facile because, as Leonard Weinberg (2005) has rightly argued, it confuses the goal with the activity – and if we cannot adequately conceptualise the activity, then the tendency will be to use 'terrorism' according to who the perpetrators are or what the cause is, rather than *what it is* that they are doing.

An academic perspective

From an academic perspective, arguments for instilling some sort of analytical quality into 'terrorism' are also compelling. If one is to research 'terrorism', then there is surely a need to be clear about what your subject matter is and what its parameters are. Yet, terrorism studies has been accused of being 'widely recognized as theoretically impoverished' (Crenshaw, 1992, p. 1), even in the contemporary context of what is otherwise a burgeoning literature on terrorism since 9/11. Any sustainable theory building as to 'what terrorism is' has, even within academia, been subject to the political exigencies of the day. For example, rather than measuring each act of violence against a carefully considered set of criteria in order to determine whether or not they constitute acts of terrorism, there has been an inclination to conclude that every act carried out by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, for instance, must be an act of terrorism *by virtue of who the perpetrator is*. Schmid (2011, p. 64) refers to the 'faulty circular reasoning' behind the view that 'once a group has been designated "terrorist", all acts of violence by members of that group are "terrorist"'. By not using 'terrorism' to describe any 'non-terrorist' violence by such groups is not, however, to exonerate this 'other' violence – the concern here is to apply terrorism dispassionately and analytically according to the criteria that one has established for an act of violence (or its threat) to be considered terrorism.

All other terrorism theories are, of course, contingent upon what one means by terrorism in the first place. How can we theorise about the causes of terrorism, the motivations for terrorism, countering terrorism and disengagement from terrorism without an adequate theory as to what terrorism is? In Schmid's (2011) survey of expert respondents, the 29 terrorism research priorities that were identified are all in some way or another contingent upon what one means by 'terrorism'. How one conceptualises terrorism is also integral to attempts to compile chronologies and databases of terrorist incidents in order to determine what acts of violence (or threats of violence) can and cannot be included in such data-gathering exercises (e.g. Jenkins, 1981). Conceptualising terrorism, then, importantly and usefully sets the parameters for terrorism research.

The prospects for conceptualising terrorism

The obstacles to an agreed conceptualisation of terrorism are formidable enough for some to deem the quest a pointless exercise. Although writing on the aspiration for a (more concrete) *definition* of terrorism, Walter Laqueur (2003, p. 238) wrote that although 'terrorism is an unmistakeable phenomenon… the search for a scientific, all-comprehensive definition is a futile enterprise', while Edward Said remarked that, because of its unfocused and selective use, 'it becomes so universally applicable that it loses any force whatsoever', and so, 'it is best to drop it' (cited in O'Lear, 2004, p. 132). The argument is that so negatively-loaded is the use of the term 'terrorism' in practice that the mere use of the word itself would inevitably hinder objective research.

The subjective application of 'terrorism'

Perhaps the most fundamental obstacle of all, then, to an agreed conceptualisation has been the frequent deployment of 'terrorism' as a pejorative label, rather than as an analytical concept. Thus 'terrorism' has often been applied (or not applied) according to where one's interests lie. Indeed, there are those who suggest that the discourse of 'terrorism' was itself invented in order to provide a useful means through which to discredit those who would threaten the status quo,

that 'terrorism' was conceived of as an inherently negative label to demonise those who rebelled against the authorities. Michael Blain (2007, pp. 50–51), for example, has argued that 'the emergence of terrorism as a concept and political problem was associated with the development of modern liberal democracies' and that 'the invention of a discourse of terrorism was a strategic response to danger, and could be deployed through basic regulatory practices of subjection'.

Thus, from this perspective, one has to consider whether 'terrorism' has merely been a convenient rhetorical label for violence that has not actually, in truth, been qualitatively distinctive from other forms of political violence. It is this line of thinking that underpins and helps to sustain the 'one person's freedom fighter is another's terrorist' mantra, for the same 'practice of subjection' takes place here: the idea that there is nothing intrinsically different or unique about the *activity* of terrorism, that it is merely the violence perpetrated by those we disagree with, and that it is often simply violence that is illegal or seen as illegitimate by the prevailing power holders. The international community has, therefore, found it difficult to agree upon the meaning of terrorism when it often depends upon who the perpetrators are. Interwoven with this is the debate over the extent that states should be included as culpable within a definition of terrorism. Schmid (2004, p. 389) has noted that 'the two main issues that obstruct progress [on the definition] are … "state terrorism" and the "struggle for national liberation" – both of them related to the Palestinian question and to the question of Kashmir'.

The challenge, then, is to determine what it is that is analytically distinctive about the *activity* of terrorism, regardless of who the perpetrator or what the cause is, and how this can then be captured in a conceptualisation that applies to all cases. And what elements should be included in such a conceptualisation? This is a far from simple task, evident in Schmid and Jongman's (2005) academic consensus definition that includes no less than 16 components.

The meaning of terrorism

Despite the difficulty in generating international agreement on a definition of terrorism, in the last 50 years there does appear to have been a degree of academic consensus as to what the core essence of terrorism is – that terrorism and its 'shock value' entails the intent to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. While warfare in general or state terror may at times have a similar purpose, *this is the sine qua non of terrorism*. Primoratz makes the distinction clear: 'all uses of political violence effect some degree of fear', but in 'terrorism proper, the causing of fear and coercion through fear is *the* objective' (cited in English, 2009, p. 5).

Any conceptualisation of terrorism, then, in this author's view, should revolve around this core psychological dimension. The next step is to focus on the *activity* of terrorism itself that makes it a distinctive form of political violence (if indeed one believes it is), rather than on the perpetrator or cause that would only serve to deflect us from analytical scrutiny of the action that we are concerned with. Terrorism, then, should be understood as a particular *method* of political violence, rather than conceptualised according to who the perpetrator is or what the cause is. This 'method' does not allude to the different types or methods of the violence itself (for, as argued elsewhere, it is the author's view that there is no such thing as an act of violence that is in and of itself inherently terrorist (Richards, 2014)) but to the intent behind the act of violence or the threat of violence, namely to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims.

By suggesting that we move away from cause or perpetrator-based conceptualisations of terrorism does not, of course, mean that there aren't ideologies that explicitly endorse and justify the use of terrorism, such as those of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. But there are many nationalist, religious, left-wing, right-wing, and single-issue (anti-abortion, animal rights, environmental)

ideologies that are not inherently violent, although terrorism has often been employed in their name. When conceptualising terrorism, therefore, there is no one doctrine, violent or otherwise, that can claim ownership of terrorism – it is a *method* of violence that has at some time or other been perpetrated in the cause of doctrines within all of these categories.

Viewing terrorism as a method rather than as inherent to any particular type of cause helps us to consider the phenomenon more objectively. Thus, if an act of violence satisfies one's criteria as to what constitutes an act of terrorism, *then terrorism it is and remains*, regardless of who the perpetrator or what the cause is. This more analytical approach can potentially help us to transcend the unhelpful but persistent terrorist/freedom fighter mantra. If an act of violence or the threat of violence satisfies one's conceptualisation of terrorism, then it makes no analytical sense to call it something else simply because one empathises with the cause. It is why Yasir Arafat was wrong when he declared that:

> The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist … lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist …
>
> *(Hoffman, 2006, p. 26)*

The difference between the terrorist and the non-terrorist *does not* lie in the reason for which one fights, as Arafat proclaimed. Otherwise we are conceding that terrorism really is 'violence that we don't like' (or whose cause we disagree with) and that there is in fact nothing qualitatively distinctive about terrorism compared with other forms of political violence. Thus, any attempt to either instinctively deny the use of terrorism because of the 'worthiness' of the cause, or indeed, conversely, to conflate terrorism with certain causes that one finds unpalatable, obfuscates endeavours to elevate terrorism as an *analytical* concept.

The approach advocated here, then, sheds light on the supposed conundrum as to whether Nelson Mandela 'was a terrorist or a freedom fighter'. The question has been commonly posed but is based on a false premise – that if you are a terrorist you cannot then be a freedom fighter, and vice versa. Yet, the reality is that one could adopt the method of terrorism as a means of fighting for freedom, just as one can conversely adopt peaceful methods for nefarious goals. If Mandela was responsible for directing acts of violence that satisfies one's criteria for terrorism then, once more, terrorism it was and remains, even if the goal was freedom from apartheid rule in South Africa. This is not a negative or moral judgement but a dispassionate and analytical one. Similarly, if the French resistance carried out acts of terrorism against the occupying Nazi forces according to one's conceptual criteria, then it makes no analytical sense to seek out a more 'positive' label for that activity just because one agrees with the cause.

If one conceptualises terrorism as attacks on civilians and non-combatants then it is, of course, much easier to view terrorism as an inherently negative phenomenon.[1] As the author has noted elsewhere, there has been an inclination to conceptualise terrorism within the context of the broader framework of international norms to do with the protection of the 'innocent', 'civilians' or 'non-combatants' (and hence the proposition that terrorism be viewed as the peacetime equivalent of a war-crime) (see Richards, 2014). From a policymaking perspective, it is understandable, and perhaps even logical, that the application of these norms should inform a conceptualisation of terrorism – that what marks acts of political violence out as terrorism is the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants.

Yet, providing the core essence of terrorism is satisfied, namely to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims, I would suggest that terrorism can be carried out

against *anybody*,[2] including non-civilians and combatants. While it is reasonable to suggest that the 'shock value' obtained through attacks against civilians and non-combatants in peacetime environments might best serve the purpose of generating a wider psychological impact, and therefore that the 'terrorist message' is adequately 'heard', terrorism can, in this author's view, be carried out against anyone, providing the target serves as a sufficient 'message generator' to a broader group or 'audience'.[3] Indeed, a brief survey of Easson and Schmid's 250 definitions of terrorism appears to endorse the view that terrorism is not just carried out against civilians or non-combatants. Most of the definitions in their compilation do not make explicit reference to civilians or non-combatants as being victims (approximately 70 of the 250 make reference to 'civilian', 'non-combatant' or 'innocent' victims, with about half of these appearing in post-9/11 definitions).[4]

The acknowledgement that terrorism can be carried out against combatants as well as non-combatants has important implications – not least that, in certain circumstances, there may be terrorisms that one sees as justified, providing they do not target civilians and non-combatants. If this is the case, then it is possible for us to argue that terrorism is not inherently negative and that this may importantly enhance its potential as a more neutral analytical concept. Whilst we might abhor the terrorism of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, we might simultaneously endorse the terrorism of the French resistance against Nazi occupation, or of the Kosovo Liberation Army against the Milošević regime (Richards, 2014). The KLA targeted Serbian military and police, often in its early days relying on hit and run targets that were designed to have a wider psychological impact by '[denting] the self-confidence and prestige of the Serbian Military', and [breaking] the myth of their invincibility' (Mulaj, 2008, p. 1111). Would the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, have objected if acts of terrorism were carried out against troops loyal to the Assad regime in Syria, or against pro-regime militias such as the notorious Shabiha? And *it makes no analytical sense* to seek out alternative and more 'positive' labels than 'terrorism' for the same activity just because we might agree with the cause. To reiterate, the notion that anyone can be a victim of terrorism, and that there therefore may be terrorisms that one sympathises with, as with viewing terrorism as a method, also lends itself to a more neutral approach that might enhance the prospects for 'terrorism' as an analytical concept.

In other words, a comprehensive (and more honest) conceptualisation of terrorism needs to incorporate the possibility of terrorism that one might endorse as well as the 'bad terrorism', and international approaches to the phenomenon should arguably reflect this. It is, then, another question as to *which forms of terrorism* should merit more urgent response (i.e., that which targets civilians or non-combatants). Any moral repugnance against some particularly brutal forms of the phenomenon should not deviate us from including the less contemptible (or even noble) forms from a general conceptualisation of the term as a whole.

There is then something of a paradox of at times explicitly declaring a zero-tolerance approach to terrorism in all of 'its forms and manifestations' and yet simultaneously exhibiting an implicit sympathy for some terrorisms – for example, those against oppressive regimes and that refrain from targeting civilians or non-combatants (e.g. Carlile, 2007). What about, for instance, acts of terrorism that do not target civilians (or non-combatants) but are carried out *in defence or pursuit of* 'freedoms, rights and liberties … [that] … serve as the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' (European Commission Sixth Framework Programme Project, 2008, p. 89)? Saul (2007, p. 208), for example, considers that the international community might regard 'some terrorist-type violence as "illegal but justifiable"… where it was committed in the "collective defence of human rights"'.

Components of a conceptualisation of terrorism?

When considering what components to include in a conceptualisation of terrorism, one should acknowledge that these are themselves also contested terms. There is, for example, no universal agreement as to what we mean by 'political' or 'violence'. Moreover, such a conceptualisation must apply to *all* cases, and so including elements that usually, often or predominantly apply is, of course, hardly being analytically precise. There may, therefore, be some merit in also *describing* terrorism over and above conceptualising it (e.g. see, Jackson *et al.*, 2011, pp. 115–20).

It is not the intention here to assess the various potential elements (for excellent reviews, see Schmid and Jongman, 2005; Schmid, 2011) but rather to include those components that the author views as indispensable to the meaning of terrorism. Schmid (2011, p. 73) has argued that 'the art of making a good definition is to include as few elements as possible but also as many as necessary'. Perhaps the most commonly included elements are: violence, the threat of violence, intended psychological impact and political motive. Hence my conceptualisation is limited to simply this: *terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive*. This, in my view, is common to *all acts of terrorism*. If the primary aim is not to generate this wider psychological impact, then it is not terrorism. And to reiterate my earlier reference to Primoratz: although 'all uses of political violence effect some degree of fear', in 'terrorism proper, the causing of fear and coercion through fear is *the* objective' (cited in English, 2011, p. 5).

This conceptualisation is, of course, not without its problems, not least, to reiterate, what the parameters of 'violence' and 'political' are (indeed, this is true for any such endeavour that uses these words). Does, for example, poisoning or contamination constitute violence (the OED's definition of 'violence' seems to exclude these by limiting it to the use of 'physical force' (www.oed.com))? Should 'harm' therefore be more appropriate for inclusion rather than 'violence' (e.g. Shanahan, 2010)? How can we disentangle the political from other motives that may be grounded in economic or religious grievances? Should the conceptualisation above therefore be expanded to include economic and religious motivation? How *serious* does an act of violence need to be to constitute terrorism? Can attacks on property be called terrorism? Other considerations include whether or not an act of violence has to be part of a campaign of violence to be called terrorism, and whether, as Hoffman (2006, p. 42) argued, 'to qualify as terrorism, violence must be perpetrated by some organizational entity.'[5]

The problem of proving intent

If terrorism is ineluctably about the *intent* to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims, then perhaps the most fundamental challenge for my (and many others') conceptualisation of terrorism is, how can one prove intent behind an act of violence? This is where the real subjectivity lies, or at least where it should lie, when deciding what constitutes terrorism – how do we know, and who decides, what the intent is behind an act of violence? While the broader political motive might be evident, what is it that specific acts of violence are designed to achieve? One can perhaps propose that there are three levels or tiers of motivation behind a terrorist attack – the first is to generate a wider psychological impact, the second is to exploit this impact for certain ends (for example, to disorientate or to advertise), and the third is the broader political goal.

Examples of the avowed intent behind acts of violence that qualify them as acts of terrorism might include Ayman al-Zawahiri's assertion that 'with the available means, small groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and the Jews' (cited in Ramsay, 2012), and

bin Laden's endorsement of 9/11 first and foremost as an exercise in communication when he apparently spoke of 'those young men' who 'said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed other speeches made everywhere else in the world', and that 'there is America, full of fear from north to south, from west to east. Thank God for that' (cited in Nacos, 2003). Or in the right-wing Italian New Order's proclamation that: 'We have wanted to demonstrate to the nation… that we are capable of placing bombs where we want, at any hour, in any spot, where and when it pleases us' (cited in Leites, 1979, p. 12).

Conclusion

'Terrorism' is a social construction, and so one cannot, by definition, speak truth on the meaning of the concept. This is the case, however, for all social science concepts and, as such, they are all incapable of having fixed and indisputable definitions. Yet, generating contemporary understandings and meanings of such concepts is important and is often a vital part of human development. For example, it is surely imperative to try to generate a common understanding as to what constitutes 'human rights' and its parameters in order to continue to develop international human rights regimes. Similarly, notwithstanding the social construction of 'crime', an understanding as to what constitutes crime is essential as the foundation for domestic and international law that forbids 'criminal' behaviours. It is also important that we should continue in the quest to determine what it is that is *analytically* distinctive about 'terrorism', not only to limit its use as a superficial, rhetorical and polemical label, but also to strengthen the theoretical foundation of terrorism studies.

Notes

1 Though Schmid (2011, p. 95) uses the hypothetical example where the seizure of the family of a genocidal dictator might be undertaken in order to prevent further 'mass victimization', and where therefore in this case, 'terrorism [against civilians] would be the lesser evil' (depending upon how one defines civilians).
2 Or *anything* if one argues that attacks on property can also be acts of terrorism.
3 Schmid (2011, p. 80) asserts that the 'very core of terrorism' is that 'the direct victim of violence (or threat thereof) is different from the ultimate target (audience)', and that 'for this reason *anyone* can, in principle, become a victim of terrorism' (italics added).
4 There are others that use more general terms, such as 'targeting a population' or a 'group', and there are a few that emphasise the arbitrariness and/or indiscriminate nature of terrorist acts (see Schmid, 2011).
5 Though he later seems to imply that the activity of the lone 'Unabomber', who killed three people through sending letter bombs, was terrorism (though 'not terrorism as most commonly understood') (Hoffman, 2006, p. 155).

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3

CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING TERRORISM

Gary LaFree

Challenges in conceptualizing and measuring terrorism

Many commentators have noted the difficulty of conceptualizing and measuring terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Hoffman, 2008). These difficulties can be seen on both conceptual and methodological levels. On the conceptual level, terrorism has never received a universally accepted definition that distinguishes it from other forms of political violence and crime. This was brought home to me in a recent trip to India, where a member of an audience in Uttar Pradesh, upon hearing my lecture on terrorism, complained that I had not distinguished "good terrorists" from "bad terrorists." The interlocutor was referring in particular to the Communist Party of India—Maoist, which not only engages in a fair amount of behavior that many would classify as terrorism, but at the same time participates in nonviolent legitimate political and social activities. And this is not an isolated example. Quite a number of groups that are credited with terrorist attacks—ANC, PRI, IRA, Hamas, Hezbollah, to name a few—simultaneously engage in legal nonviolent activities. Indeed, many of the most prominent terrorist groups in the world—including the Shining Path, ETA, the IRA, the LTTE, and the FARC—often conceive of themselves as freedom fighters and have a loyal constituency who may denounce terrorism but are, indeed, relying on these groups to advance their political agenda. This fundamental characteristic of terrorism no doubt explains in large part why international organizations such as the United Nations have not succeeded in adopting a universally-accepted definition (European Commission, 2008:3–4).

Defining terrorism is no less complex for scientists. Schmid and Jongman's (1988:5) survey found 109 different research definitions of terrorism. More recently, Sheehan (2012) compared 12 definitional elements used in five of the most influential unclassified terrorism event databases. He found that none of the five databases included all of the 12 elements in their definition, and there were major differences across the databases in terms of how many definitional items were included. One database (RAND) included nine of the elements, two databases (GTD, ITERATE) included seven, one (WITS) included six, and one (TWEED) five. Only two elements were included in terrorism definitions for all five databases (perpetrators are sub-state groups or clandestine agents, and the act is outside the context of legitimate warfare or a coup d'état). Two additional elements were included in the terrorism definitions of four of the five databases (use of violence and intended to influence or coerce an audience). The remain-

ing eight elements were divided between different combinations of three or fewer of the five databases.

On the methodological level, measuring terrorism is challenging because the main parties to terrorist attacks either lack accurate information, do not share a common view of what terrorism is, or have information that they are unwilling to share. In general, criminal behavior includes three different types of human observers. First, offenders are obviously able to provide first-hand knowledge. Second, social control agents, including police, prosecutors, judges and even witnesses, may possess a good deal of information about crimes. And finally, for most crimes (except so-called victimless crimes like drug offenses or prostitution), victims may also be able to report on their crime-related experiences. In criminology, these three types of human contact with crime have resulted in data that come either from offenders (self-reported surveys), social control agents (official data), or victims (victimization surveys).

As my colleagues and I have noted elsewhere (LaFree, Dugan, and Miller, 2015: ch. 2), all three of these data sources are problematic when it comes to terrorism. Most active terrorists are obviously unwilling to participate in interviews. Even if willing to participate, getting access to known terrorists for research purposes raises evident logistical challenges, and when offenders are willing to participate, their self-reports may be biased and incomplete. Terrorism data from official sources like police are challenging because anti-terrorism statutes vary widely across countries, and in many cases individuals who have committed terrorist acts are convicted not of committing terrorism but rather for other related offenses, such as weapons violations and money laundering (Smith, Damphousse, and Jackson, 2002). Thus, Dzhokar Tsarnaev, the surviving bomber in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing case, was charged not with terrorism but with one count of using an improvised explosive device and one count of malicious destruction of property by means of an explosive device resulting in death (LaFree, Dugan, and Miller, 2015).

Victimization surveys have been of little use in the study of terrorism. Despite the attention it gets in the global media, terrorism is much less common than more familiar types of violent crime like robbery and homicide. This means that even with extremely large sample sizes, few individuals in most countries will have been victimized by terrorists. Moreover, because victims of terrorism are often chosen at random, they are unlikely to know the perpetrators, making it difficult to produce details about offenders. And finally, in many cases, victims of terrorism are killed by their attackers, making it impossible for them to share their experiences. For all of these reasons, terrorism data that relies on the reports of victims is likely to be of limited use.

Moving from definitions to reality

There is a famous expression by American poet John Godfrey Saxe (1869; and commonly misattributed to German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck) that "laws are like sausages. Better not to see them being made." The creation of data on terrorism from open sources is equally messy. To illustrate these complexities in the rest of this essay, I take apart the separate components of the definition of terrorism currently used by the team that collects the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

GTD background

The GTD began in 2001, when a research team from the University of Maryland was able to secure the original hard copies of unclassified data on terrorist attacks collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS), which by then contained more than 67,000 cases

from 1970 to 1997 (LaFree, 2015). As this chapter was being prepared, the GTD includes more than 140,000 terrorist attacks from around the world for the period 1970 to 2014. The first version of the GTD was developed about a decade ago, and in recent years updated versions have been made available to the public each year (LaFree *et al.*, 2015). Early versions of the GTD were based mostly on individual news outlets such as the Associated Press, Agence-France Presse, and the BBC. Over time, data collection has relied increasingly on existing media aggregators such as Lexis/Nexis, Factiva, and the Open Source Center. At present the data collection process begins with a universe of 1.6 million articles published daily worldwide in order to identify the relatively small subset of articles that describe terrorist attacks. Data collection uses customized search strings to isolate an initial pool of potentially relevant articles, followed by more sophisticated techniques to further refine the search results.

When we first digitized the original PGIS data we adopted its definition of terrorism:

> … threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.
> *(START, 2015:8)*

After the PGIS data were reinterpreted to create the GTD, we developed plans to extend the data beyond 1997. In general, these plans were guided by a desire to preserve as much as possible the definition of terrorism used to create the PGIS legacy data, but at the same time to make the definition as accurate and useful as possible for researchers and policymakers. Accordingly, we added three inclusion criteria to the case selection process, but to provide maximum flexibility for users who might approach the data with differing definitions of terrorism, we included all cases that meet at least two of these criteria. The three new criteria are:

> *Criterion 1*: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
>
> *Criterion 2*: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
>
> *Criterion 3*: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

Because the GTD includes cases that meet only two of these criteria, it is possible to analyze the extent to which each of the three criteria is met.[1] Taken together from 1970 to 2014, 18,776 attacks (13 percent of the total) recorded in the GTD are missing one of the three criteria. Criterion 3—whether the action was outside legitimate warfare—is by far the most likely to be missing, accounting for nearly 86 percent of the attacks where one of the criteria is missing. Criterion 1—whether the perpetrators have the intent of attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal—accounts for nearly 9 percent of the attacks with one criteria missing. And finally, the other 5 percent of attacks missing Criterion 2—evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience.

In addition, as the GTD data collection process matured, the team increasingly recognized the fact that there is often definitional overlap between terrorism and other forms of crime and political violence, including insurgency, conflict between rival groups, hate crime, and organized crime. Moreover, in some cases the available information is insufficient or conflicting. In response, the GTD team added a filter called "doubt terrorism proper," which signifies that while the analysts' concerns are not sufficient to exclude the case, they have enough uncertainty about the case to single it out. For all cases from 1998 to 2014 where doubt terrorism proper is indicated, the GTD analysts also provide an alternative designation: (1) insurgency/guerilla

action; (2) other crime type; (3) intra/intergroup conflict; or (4) lack of intentionality. The first three categories are self-explanatory; the fourth indicates a situation where the analyst is not sure that the motives of the perpetrators constitute intent to commit a terrorist act. Of the four types, by far the most common is insurgency, accounting for 79 percent of the 21,517 total cases recorded between 1998 and 2014. Next most common are other crime types, accounting for nearly 15 percent of the total. Inter/intragroup conflict involves 5 percent of the cases of doubt terrorism proper, and lack of intentionality is responsible for one-half of 1 percent.

In 2013, the team added a fifth type of doubt terrorism proper: that the event was committed by a state actor (rather than a non-state actor). This designation is indicated by GTD analysts in only 99 attacks from 2013–2014—about 0.4 percent of the total.

To illustrate the complexity of conceptualizing and measuring terrorism in the rest of this chapter, I consider how the various elements of the original PGIS definition of terrorism and the added criteria have been operationalized by the team that produces the GTD. For convenience, I follow through the various elements of the definition above from front to back and then consider the implementation of Criteria Two and Three; I will discuss Criteria One as one part of the original terrorism definition.

Threatened or actual use …

The GTD definition of terrorism not only includes the actual use of violence but also threats to use violence. This seems defensible in that terrorism sometimes involves threatened as opposed to actual use of violence. For example, aerial hijackers who seize an aircraft and say they will blow it up unless their demands are met may *threaten* violence without actually using it. But in practice, the inclusion of threatened violence in the GTD depends heavily on specific situations. Thus, while our GTD team routinely includes threats that are a part of an evolving situation where some action has already been taken by the perpetrators—like an airline hijacking or hostage-taking—the team routinely excludes cases where threats are made but no known physical action has been taken. For example, the GTD has never included threats such as bomb hoaxes made by phone or threats against the life of world leaders that are (as far as can be discerned from media sources) never acted upon. So in this sense, the argument that the GTD includes threatened violence is conditional based on the specific situation.

Illegal force and violence …

The next part of the GTD definition of terrorism requires that an act involve illegal force and violence. Violence would seem to be a relatively objective measure of terrorism, but in practice it is often ambiguous. In everyday use, violence generally implies physical force that is directed at injuring or killing another human being (*Oxford Dictionary*, 2015). So we might decide that any attack on humans is violent and therefore fulfills this part of the definition, and any attack on property is nonviolent and so cannot be terrorism. But this is not nearly as clear-cut a distinction as it may at first appear. For example, we have just seen that violence can be threatened rather than actualized in some terrorist situations—like aerial hijacking or hostage-taking. And the line between attacks on property and attacks on humans can be surprisingly complicated. To begin with, some attacks on property are actually meant to kill or injure people. Thus, the GTD includes 113 cases where the weapon is given as "sabotage equipment": for example, an individual or group removes the bolts from a railroad track with the intent of derailing the train and killing its passengers. While the attack itself is on property rather than humans, its effects can still be extremely lethal.

In other cases, attacks are specifically aimed at property but through some miscalculation end up killing or injuring people. Both the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) rarely plan their attacks with the idea of injuring people (Varriale-Carson, LaFree, and Dugan, 2012). But there have been cases where ELF members have put spikes in trees to prevent loggers from cutting them down, and by accident a lumberman has hit one of the spikes with a chainsaw and has been seriously injured (Varriale-Carson *et al.*, 2012). More generally, what separates a nighttime attack on a laboratory facility that is unoccupied and kills no one from a similar attack on the same facility that is mistakenly thought to be unoccupied and does kill someone? To help clarify these distinctions between attacks against people and property, the GTD codebook (START, 2015:8) requires that "the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, *including property violence*, as well as violence against people." But this provision does not eliminate all ambiguity, and of course in many cases the data to draw such fine-grained distinctions are unavailable.

Non-state actors …

Another definitional requirement of most terrorism event databases including the GTD is that the acts recorded be limited to "non-state actors." In general, this requirement is meant to distinguish the political violence committed by groups and individuals from the violence committed by nation-states. This requirement is not an argument against the importance of state-based terrorism—which McCauley (2006) and others (e.g., van Creveld, 1991) have persuasively argued likely kills more people than non-state terrorism—so much as a frank admission that it is easier to collect terrorism data on non-state than state actors. Nonetheless, distinguishing non-state terrorist attacks from others raises at least three serious challenges.

First, what is a state, and who determines this? For example, because the Palestine territories are not officially recognized by most governments of the world as a state, distinguishing state from non-state terrorism there is likely more complex than in other parts of the world. Similar complications arise in other contested areas, including the relationship between France and Corsica, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, and the United States and Puerto Rico. And of course, it is exactly in these contested areas where terrorist attacks are likely to be especially common. For example, LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015:Table 8.1) estimate that from 1970 to 2012, nearly 8,000 attacks identified in the GTD were connected to separatist groups operating in the Palestinian territories, Corsica, Northern Ireland, or Puerto Rico.

Second, it is frequently complex to determine whether a terrorist attack is being directed by a state or by a terrorist organization that is either directly aligned with a state or simply happens to be useful for state leadership. For example, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler (2014) demonstrate how governments frequently use right-wing militias to achieve government policy objectives. Many of these right-wing attacks get classified as terrorist attacks in the GTD. This was especially common for right-wing terrorist organizations operating in Latin America in the 1980s. In some cases, governments simply looked the other way and allowed them to operate (Avilés, 2006). In other cases, governments may have actually provided material support to such groups to further their own political ends. For example, the GTD includes many cases attributed to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, in Spanish), a Colombian para-military and drug trafficking group that was an active belligerent in the Colombian armed conflict during the period from 1997 to 2006. The AUC was responsible for attacks against the FARC and ELN rebel groups but was also widely believed to receive significant support from Colombian politicians and members of the Colombian military (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1997–2005).

And this phenomenon is not limited to right-wing groups. We could argue that nearly all left-wing terrorist organizations until the collapse of the Soviet Union were to some extent under its influence and in some cases received active financial and tactical support. Likewise, the GTD includes attacks by the "Contras" in Nicaragua that were clearly being supported to some extent by the United States. And certainly many have pointed out (e.g., Stepanova, 2008; Flanagan, 2009) that radical extremist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah receive direct and indirect support from various countries.

Finally, there can be ambiguity in deciding when a state becomes a state. For example, while the GTD was being collected, the world's countries experienced important changes, including the unification of East and West Germany; the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia; and the independence movements of Eritrea and South Sudan. Distinguishing acts by state and non-state actors during these transitions includes an added layer of complexity. More recently, the Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL) has proclaimed itself to be a state and has begun levying taxes, setting up social services, and even undertaking the development of a national currency (Lister, 2015). At what point should terrorism databases conclude that a developing political entity is indeed a state and therefore its acts represent state-based rather than non-state-based attacks?

As previously noted, in 2013–2014, the GTD identifies 93 cases where analysts were concerned that the attack might have involved a state rather than a non-state actor. In looking through these cases, it is clear that many take place in countries undergoing civil war or substantial conflict and violence: the top five countries in order are Syria, Ukraine, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Iraq. The typical pattern is an attack where no group claims responsibility and there are either few available details or contradictory details, as illustrated in this 2014 case from the Ukraine (#07070059):

> Assailants fired a mortar shell at a car in Iuansk City, Ukraine. The driver of the car was wounded in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.

With so little information to go on, the GTD team was unsure whether rebels or the government were responsible for the blast.

To attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal …

The PGIS data that we used to create the GTD from 1970 to 1997 included this phrase in its definition of terrorism, and because we were interested in maintaining consistency with the data collection over time, we retained this phrase in the GTD definition. However, the fact that the definition lists economic, religious, and social goals as well as political ones has required us to think seriously about the implications for our data collection efforts. Most basically, it isn't entirely clear how economic, religious, or social goals differ from political goals. In general, we have included attacks that appear to be motivated for these other purposes only if they also seem to have a political purpose. So a bank robbery (economic), an attack on a place of worship (religious), or an assault on another person (social) are generally excluded from the GTD unless we can also find evidence of a political motive.

At base, implementing this part of the definition of terrorism is especially challenging because it requires insights into the motives of the perpetrators, which may be falsely reported, distorted, or simply unavailable in media sources. Yet as we saw above, this distinction is so central to the GTD classification of terrorism that it is included as Criterion 1 of the three required criteria for terrorism in the Codebook (START, 2015:8). Just after the statement that the act must be

aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, the GTD Codebook warns analysts that "In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change" (START:8). A few pages later, analysts are reminded that this criterion is not satisfied in those cases where the perpetrator(s) "acted out of a pure profit motive or from an idiosyncratic personal motive unconnected with broader societal change" (START, 2015:13).

As can be seen from these instructions to GTD analysts, one of the main reasons why this requirement is so critical is that it endeavors to distinguish terrorist acts from other types of criminal acts. For example, if a group of attackers robs a bank to make themselves richer, it is an ordinary bank robbery; if the same group robs a bank to support a politically-motivated violent social movement, it is terrorism. Complicated examples abound. According to the GTD, kidnapping or hostage-taking for purely economic gain is ordinary crime; kidnapping or hostage-taking to further a political goal is terrorism. Selling drugs (or other banned or regulated products) only for profit is ordinary crime; doing so to support a terrorist cause is not.

As noted above, starting in 1998, GTD analysts indicate whether they had some suspicion that the attack being coded was not terrorism but rather some other type of crime. From 1998–2014, a total of 2,208 attacks in the GTD were coded as possibly involving in part or in total a crime other than terrorism. When analysts coded an event as potentially involving a crime other than terrorism, 35 percent of the time they also indicated that the attack may not have met Criterion 1—attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. The top five countries where GTD analysts were concerned that the incident involved crime other than terrorism were surprisingly diverse, with Pakistan having the most cases and the United States the second largest number (India, Algeria, and Iraq round out the top five). While the countries are diverse, the underlying reasons for the ambiguity are fairly similar. The most common issue encountered is evidence from the open sources that is contradictory. A typical example from Pakistan in 2014 is described as follows (Case #02110014):

> Assailants attacked police officers protecting a polio vaccine team in the Parowa area, Khber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan. One police officer was killed and another was wounded in the attack. No group claimed responsibility.

This case was flagged as potentially non-terrorism because there was also credible media information in the case indicating that the police may have been targeted because fighting tribal members thought they were about to be arrested.

In a 2013 U.S. case (Case #05200075) where the GTD team was concerned that the event might not have been terrorism, there was also a dispute over the facts about the case presented in the media:

> A letter containing ricin was mailed to the Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg. The letter caused no injuries as it was intercepted before it could reach Mayor Bloomberg. The letter, which was one of three sent to pro-gun control political and social figures on May 20, 2013, warned of future attacks if Bloomberg and other gun control advocates pursued legislation to limit gun ownership. Shannon Richardson, an American television actress, was arrested on June 7, 2013 in connection with the attack.

The case was contradicted when Ms. Richardson later claimed that she had sent the letters to the Mayor and others in order to frame her husband.[2]

Of course, decisions in cases like these are no doubt affected by the context in which they occur. For example, if a kidnapping is attributed to a known terrorist organization, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), it may be easier for the GTD team to conclude that it is a terrorist act than if no attribution of responsibility is made. This no doubt explains why 84 percent of the cases where GTD analysts are uncertain about whether an act is terrorism and decide that it might be an ordinary crime are also cases where no perpetrators have been identified.[3] And it is important to note that linking an attack to a criminal organization may have the opposite effect. For example, attacks perpetrated by well-known criminal organizations like the Mafia may be less likely to be interpreted as terrorism even when they fulfill the other definitional requirements.

Through fear, coercion, or intimidation …

The final part of the GTD definition of terrorism, that the act involve fear, coercion, or intimidation, is also built into the GTD coding procedures as Criterion 2: "There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims" (START, 2015:8). The first challenge with this definitional requirement is that terrorist attacks are often complex, involving multiple perpetrators. What do we do if some perpetrators use fear, coercion, or intimidation, but others do not? The GTD coding manual provides direct guidance on this issue: "It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met" (START, 2015:8).

Starting in 1998, the GTD team identified 105 cases where there is concern that the intentionality requirement has not been met. Interestingly, only 3 percent of these cases were missing one of the three criteria. The top five countries in terms of cases where the GTD team was not totally confident that the act qualified as terrorism because of the intentions of the perpetrators were: Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Ukraine. For example, a 2014 case (#03250064) in Pakistan reads as follows:

> An explosive device was discovered and safely defused on the roof of a bus at Shah Abdul Latif University in Khairpur City, Sindh Province, Pakistan. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.

The intention of the perpetrators to commit a violent act is thrown into doubt in this case because a spokesperson for the University denied that there were bombs on the roof of the bus and described the whole incident as a hoax.

A 2014 case in India (#06070025) where intentionality was an issue reads as follows:

> A grenade detonated at the General Bus Stand in Anantnag town, Jammu and Kashmir State, India. Seven people, including two police officers, were injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.

The media source goes on to say that the cause of the blast is still unknown and under investigation, and local witnesses reported that it was a grenade blast, while police suspected that it may have been an accidental explosion caused by a battery.

Outside the context of legitimate warfare

One of the challenges faced by all terrorism event databases is to try and distinguish terrorist attacks from ordinary warfare. The GTD team includes Criterion 3 to distinguish violence "in the context of legitimate warfare activities" (START, 2015:8) from acts that are "outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law." In particular, GTD analysts look for violations of humanitarian law that "deliberately target civilians or non-combatants" (START, 2015:8). But distinguishing legitimate warfare from collateral damage, insurrection, or civil war is often challenging. And these challenges frequently arise in situations where access to credible media sources is especially limited.

From 1970 to the present, the GTD team identified 16,058 cases (11 percent of all cases) where Criterion 3 is not met. The five top countries that do not meet Criterion 3 are El Salvador, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Pakistan: countries that have experienced many years of war and political conflict. The main reason why these cases are flagged for Criterion 3 is the concern that the attack is in fact conventional warfare rather than terrorism. For example, a 2014 case (#12020008) from Iraq reads as follows:

> Assailants kidnapped a lieutenant colonel in Baajah area, Shirqat District, Saladin Governate, Iraq. This was one of three similar abductions in the area on the same day. The outcome of the kidnappings is unknown. No group claimed responsibility for the incidents; however, sources attributed the attacks to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

This case was flagged for not meeting Criterion 3 because it appeared that the lieutenant colonel was in an active military situation.

Many of these cases are also likely to be flagged by GTD analysts from 1998 to 2014 under the "doubt terrorism proper" variable. As noted above, insurgency from 1970 to 2014 accounts for 79 percent of the alternates given by GTD analysts who were concerned that a case might not qualify as terrorism. Not surprisingly, the countries where insurgency or guerilla action was most likely mentioned as an alternative to terrorism were countries racked by civil war, including El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan. For example, a 2014 case (#03210034) in Iraq was described as follows:

> An explosive device detonated near the convoy of lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Saleh in Baiji District, Saladin Governate, Iraq. Three people, including Saleh and two soldiers, were killed in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, sources suspected that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was involved in the attack.

The GTD analyst designated this as potentially insurgency rather than terrorism because despite the unsubstantiated connection to ISIL, the attack targeted military personnel in an active combat zone.

Overall, the GTD records 347 cases from 1998–2014 as potentially being intra or intergroup conflict rather than terrorism. In 16 percent of the cases where analysts indicated that the act might instead by intra or intergroup conflict, they also indicated that it did not meet Criterion 1—the requirement that attacks have a political, economic, religious, or social motivation. The lead countries for cases where intra or intergroup conflict events were suspected are Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Lebanon, India, and Sri Lanka. Most of the cases in the UK have to do

with battles between the Provisional IRA and various branches of the Ulster Volunteer Force. A case in 2002 (#06020002) describes the following incident:

> An outbreak of sectarian violence in Belfast between members of the Provisional IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force in East Belfast led to 3 Protestant men being shot.

The GTD team indicated that this case was ambiguous because the media reports also noted that the attack may have been the result of conflict between the two sectarian groups.

While the context is different, the underlying circumstances are similar in a 2014 (#05190067) Pakistan case:

> Assailants opened fire on two Sunni Tehreek workers in the Orangi Town neighborhood, Karachi city, Sindh Province. The two workers were killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility.

The GTD team was concerned that this might not be a case of terrorism because other media sources speculated that the attack may have been related to recent fighting between a religious party and an ethno-political party.

Conclusions

This chapter should make it clear that conceptualizing and recording terrorist attacks is a complex task. No worldwide, universally accepted definition exists. Traditional sources of information are problematic. Open source information that is available is frequently contradictory or incomplete. The behavior that most would recognize as terrorism often overlaps with insurgency, guerilla activity, ethnic cleansing, hate crime, and organized crime, among others. Distinctions between state actors and non-state actors are often murky. Information on perpetrators and their motives is frequently missing.

But indeed, developing accurate counts and descriptions of any type of criminal violence is challenging. For example, cross-national data on homicides, likely the most reliably measured type of ordinary violence, is limited to a large extent to highly industrialized democracies (Baumer and Wolff, 2014; LaFree, Carrillo, and McDowall, 2015). Reliable cross-national data on other types of violent crime—robberies, rapes, assaults—are only available for a handful of countries, and differences in legal definitions and reporting requirements make direct cross-national comparisons difficult or impossible (Aebi, 2004). Even within a single country, collecting detailed information on the characteristics of violent crimes is challenging. For example, in 2012 the proportion of homicides cleared by arrest or "exceptional means"[4] in the United States was only 68 percent (FBI, 2012). Also, these are arrests, not convictions, which for most crimes are substantially lower. And of course, clearance rates are far lower for most other crimes. For example, FBI national clearance rates in 2012 were 13 percent for reported burglaries and 12 percent for reported auto thefts.

Indeed, in at least one respect, developing cross-national estimates of terrorism may be easier than developing cross-national estimates of any other types of illegal violence: unlike most other types of illegal violence, many of those who commit terrorist acts are actively involved in publicizing them. As Jenkins (1975:16) observed many years ago, "terrorism is theatre" and "terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press." In fact, the media are so central to contemporary terrorist groups that some researchers have argued that the birth of modern terrorism is directly linked to the launch of the

first television satellite in 1968 (Hoffman 2008:136–37). This invention meant that for the first time in human history, stories could be transmitted almost instantaneously from local sources anywhere in the world back to network news headquarters and on to the public. It seems increasingly unlikely that a major terrorist attack—particularly one claiming many lives—can any longer elude the attention of the global media.

Thus, while conceptualizing and measuring terrorism is complex, in the early part of the twenty-first century, worldwide data on terrorism is arguably the most comprehensive type of information on illegal violence that exists. At a time when homicide statistics are still only available for a subset of mostly Western industrialized countries, and valid cross-national data on rape, assault, and robbery are simply unavailable, terrorism estimates now exist for every country in the world.

Notes

1 Once the new criteria were established and GTD analysts began collecting post-1997 data, the team reviewed the earlier data and endeavored to apply retrospectively the three criteria to the legacy data.
2 Eventually Ms. Richardson was convicted of mailing ricin-laced letters to Mayor Bloomberg, President Obama, and Mark Glaze, the director of Mayors Against Illegal Guns. On July 16, 2014, she was sentenced to 18 years in prison (*Huffington Post*, 2014).
3 This estimate is based on an analysis of the full GTD, 1970–2014.
4 Exceptional means include cases where the alleged offender dies before legal processing.

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4
A HISTORY OF TERRORISM

Leonard Weinberg

Despite the appearance of terrorist violence at various times in the distant past, modern terrorism is widely believed to have begun during the last third of the 19th century. Since that era, terrorist activity appears to have come in a succession of 'waves' (Rapoport, 2004). One question well worth posing is whether or not today's Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL) and related bands bear sufficient similarity to, say, the anti-Czarist Russian revolutionaries of the 1880s to warrant their being placed under the same label?

Some scepticism seems warranted. Many of those who fought to bring down the Russian autocracy did so in the name of social democratic rule or, at a minimum, giving the people a voice in government. On the other hand, ISIS and the contemporary jihadi groups regard democracy as a heresy, an attempt to replace God's rule by secular control. There is also the matter of targeting.

Certainly in the Russian case, aspiring terrorists often agonized over whether they should in good conscience kill members of a high official's family if he became vulnerable to a bomb attack while out in public. As Albert Camus put it, 'at the same time these doers of deeds, who so completely put their lives at risk, would involve the lives of others only with the greatest fastidiousness of conscience' (quoted by Ternon, 2007, p. 161). Do these would-be assassins of grand dukes, princes and other lofty figures belong to the same family as today's suicide bombers and specialists in the decapitation of helpless captives? Today's terrorists are willing to kill large numbers, the more the better, of civilians without regard to their ages and origins. To repeat the question, are we really dealing with the same phenomenon?

Our answer must be 'yes'. In both the 1880s and our time, terrorism involves the extraordinary use of violence directed against civilian or non-combatant targets for purposes of making 'propaganda by deed' and engaging in a type of coercive diplomacy – aimed at compelling governments and other institutions to do what the terrorists want them to do. Intent trumps scale.

Now we should consider the events and problems confronting the world from say, 1875 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Terrorism analysts recognize the serious difficulties involved in identifying the 'causes' of terrorism. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, terrorism typically involved attacks carried out by single individuals or commonly small groups of individuals operating on a clandestine basis. Does it make sense to employ the macro-measures available through large N aggregates of information in order to explain

the behaviour of tiny groups or single assassins, to explain bomb throwing, or why single 'lone wolves' turned to terrorism rather than other types of political expression (see Crenshaw, 2011)?

There are a number of background conditions without which 'the Age of Attentats' (i.e., the last third of the 19th century) would have been unlikely. Since the French Revolution, young radicals throughout Europe had dreamed of duplicating its achievements. What were the ingredients that would combine to make such a revolution possible? Revolutions in support of popular rule had been attempted and failed in 1848. In 1870, in the wake of the Franco/Prussian war, Parisians had taken to the streets to prevent the return of authoritarian rule and had been violently crushed by the French military. For many would-be revolutionaries it seemed as if the era had passed when a professional military could be defeated by popular mobs storming public buildings (e.g. Bilington, 1980).

It was also during this period that trade unions began their struggles on behalf of workers' rights. Their employers and government officials to whom they were usually responsive opposed these struggles. Agitation and protest were often met by violence and repression.

The experience of Russia

Imperial Russia seemed to be a special case, at least in comparison to the Western world. There had been few reforms aimed at liberalizing the government system and containing the powers of government. The country's enormous peasantry had only been freed from slave-like conditions in the 1860s. The Czars were defined as instruments of God's will. Industrial development was at its earliest stages.

It was during this period that the Russian intelligentsia gave rise to a group of writers who voiced support for revolutionary violence and the application of terrorism. "The concept of systematic terrorism and its use in revolutionary strategy first appeared between 1869 and 1881 in the writings of the Russian revolutionaries" (Laqueur, 2004, p. 51). Sergey Nechaev's 'Catechism of the Revolutionary' became the most widely discussed of these statements. This 'catechism' called for the 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week revolutionary, someone willing to abandon his personal life in exchange for an all-consuming commitment to revolutionary violence.

Nikolai Morozov and G. Tarnovski were two followers of Nechaev who published books in 1880 (from exile) calling for the use of terrorism as a means to topple the Russian autocracy. Morozov and Tarnovski were both members of the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya), Russia's first clandestine group committed to terrorism. Many of its youthful members had become disillusioned with the revolutionary potential of Russia's peasants when a campaign to 'go to the people' (under the label Land and Liberty) failed to win many converts to the cause.

In the wake of this setback, the People's Will central committee considered options and alternatives (1878–79). During these discussions, some members said that the killing of key figures in the autocracy would represent a new form of revolutionary struggle, a more scientific means of winning power. (It's worth noting that Russian university students studying chemistry and other sciences were drawn to the organization.) Instead of mass violence, terrorism represented a means of toppling the regime by selectively killing its most dangerous officials. In addition to this theoretical perspective, the desire for revenge was never far from the surface. If the Russian secret police and other security tortured and killed members of People's Will, they should meet the same fate (Laqueur, 1977).

The scientific aura of this new form of revolutionary struggle was matched by a new scientific achievement: the development of dynamite. Prior to Alfred Nobel's invention of the explosive, would-be assassins had to rely on handguns and fulminate of mercury. Both these means had major disadvantages. Knives and handguns required close proximity to the target,

while fulminate of mercury was unstable, as likely to kill the perpetrator as his intended victim. Dynamite, on the other hand, was a stable compound that could be used at some distance from the intended target.

From the late 1870s forward, the People's Will launched a campaign of terrorist violence, meaning assassinations, against Russian officialdom. This campaign reached its peak with the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. Following his murder, the new Czar's regime staged a widespread crackdown on the People's Will. Not only were five of the six assassins publicly hung, but security forces arrested many of the organization's cadre, sentencing them to long prison sentences and exile in Siberia.

Despite an undercurrent of terrorist activity in the years following the People's Will's project, it was only in the years following the turn of the century that a new and substantial terrorist campaign was launched.[1] In this case, the initiative came from the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs). Created in 1901 by independent Populist groups of locals and exiles, the SRs formally adopted terrorism (meaning assassination) as part of its programme for bringing an end to czarist rule. As in the case with People's Will, revenge was clearly a motive in some of the SRs killings.

For the most part, the SRs limited itself to the assassination of high-ranking czarist officials in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Its major achievement was the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei, governor general of Moscow (1905), and the Russian interior minister V. Plehve (1904). These acts were carried out by the SRs semi-autonomous Combat Organization, whose membership, as it turned out, included a number of police spies (Geifman, 1993).

After the failed Revolution of 1905, the Czar conceded the people a parliament, or Duma. On the basis of this gesture, the SRs leadership declared an end to its terrorist campaign – since the Russian people now had a voice. This democratic gesture was short-lived. The Czar dissolved the Duma in 1906 and, predictably enough, the SRs resumed their terrorist operations. But this resumed campaign of terror was itself cut short by government repression involving large numbers of arrests and executions. The SRs revolutionary project came to an end in 1907.

This is not to say, however, that Russian terrorism came to an end. Throughout the Russian Empire, independent groups, including Polish, Armenian, Ukrainian and Jewish groups, carried out a large number of attacks all aimed at liberation from the yoke of czarist oppression.

The revolutionary terrorism that emerged over the last decades of the 19th century was hardly confined to the Russian Empire. Nationalism became a potent source for violence. Armenian nationalists (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) carried out attacks on Ottoman Turkish targets in their desire to achieve national independence. The Ottoman Empire was also the target of terrorist attacks staged by IMRO (Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), whose goal was the region's independence from Muslim rule. Indian nationalists also carried out a series of assassinations and assassination attempts in London and Bengal.

But it was the struggle for Irish independence from Britain that won the most attention. In 1882, Lord Cavendish, the newly appointed Governor General, and his secretary were stabbed to death in Dublin by nationalist extremists. These killings were followed by attempted jail breaks and dynamite attacks carried out in England and elsewhere in the Empire. Under the name of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Irish nationalists in the United States supplied their counterparts with dynamite and other weaponry (Coogan, 2000).

Anarchist terrorism

During the 1890s and for the first two decades of the 20th century, most of the terrorist activity that caught the public's attention was carried out by groups and individuals on behalf of the anarchist ideology of revolutionary anarchism or 'propaganda by deed'. As proposed by such

writers as Mikhail Bakunin, Pyotor Kropotkin, Karl Heinzen, Johann Most, Errico Malatesta and others, anarchism came to represent an alternative framework for social revolution than that proposed by Karl Marx and his disciples.[2]

Space does not permit a full explication of anarchist ideas, but here are at least some of them. States and capitalist enterprises are inherently oppressive institutions and need to be replaced by free associations of workers and peasants. How is this goal to be achieved? Violence in the form of 'propaganda by deed' will be the means for sparking social revolution. The oppressed masses will be inspired to seize power based on the exemplary actions of individuals and anarchist 'circles'. Their targets would be prominent figures, captains of industry, political leaders, religious leaders and royalty representing the prevailing order.

These ideas had particular salience in France, Italy, Spain and, to a certain extent, the United States: situations where existing labour strife and landlord/peasant conflict provided ready-made audiences for propaganda by deed. Accordingly, individual anarchists carried out a long series of widely publicized assassinations during this era of 'Attempts'.

In the 1890s and the decade-and-a-half leading to the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, anarchists killed a long list of prominent figures. Usually motivated by some combination of anarchist ideas about freedom and the desire for revenge against those linked to the repression of strikers seeking improved pay and working conditions, anarchists carried out the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister, Italian King Umberto, the President of France Carnot, Empress Elizabeth of Austria-Hungary and American President William McKinley. In addition, there were at least two attempts to assassinate the German Kaiser (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007).

Prominent figures in business were also frequent targets. Often they were targeted by anarchists when they acted to break strikes launched by farm workers, miners and industrial workers. Perhaps the most widely discussed of these events was the 1892 attempt by Alexander Berkman to assassinate Henry Clay Frick, President of the Carnegie Steel Corporation. This gesture was brought on by Carnegie's brutal breaking of a strike by steel workers at the company's Homestead (Pennsylvania) Works.

Anarchist activity in France represents a transition from terrorist attacks on single individuals to attacks carried out on a largely indiscriminate basis. Not that the latter lacked for terrorist attacks on individuals. Illustratively, in March 1892 an anarchist bombed the homes of a trial judge and public prosecutor he held responsible for the beating and torture of other anarchists while they were being held in prison.

In addition to an abundance of such cases, anarchist terrorism in France took on a new aspect, involving the idea of objective or group responsibility for working class oppression. In 1893 Auguste Valliant hurled a bomb on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. Casualties were limited but Valliant was executed nevertheless. In retaliation, another anarchist, Emile Henry, threw a bomb in a crowded restaurant adjacent to the Gare St. Lazare railway station. Henry's rationale was that all bourgeois were guilty of crimes against the working class. Here we have the idea of objective criminality; if you belong to a category in the population identified with working-class oppression, then you become fair game for terrorist attack (Law, 2004).

As intended, the wave of anarchist terrorism created widespread fear throughout the Western world. The daily mass circulation newspapers, themselves a relatively new phenomenon, sounded the alarm. The press abounded with stories of a vast anarchist conspiracy to tear down civilization. Governments in Europe and North America were quick to enact new legislation against anarchist activity and sought international cooperation to fight this plague. To the extent the anarchists wanted to sow widespread fear to the point of hysteria, they had achieved their objective. On the other hand, none of this terrorist violence incited the masses to revolution, and no governments collapsed as a result of the 'attempts' (Jensen, 2004).

On the other hand, the immediate cause that triggered the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 was the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, the Archduke of Austria-Hungary, by a Serbian nationalist, a member of the Black Hand, whose aim was his country's independence from Vienna.

Far-right terrorism

To this point in our analysis we have not paid attention to terrorism committed by groups on the far right of the political spectrum. The interwar period (1919–1939) provides an opportunity to compensate for this omission.

We should begin by noting that racist and anti-Semitic ideas became sources of terrorism before the turn of the century. After the Civil War in the United States, the Ku Klux Klan waged a terrorist campaign throughout the South aimed at preventing newly freed slaves from exercising the right to vote and the normal liberties available to U.S. citizens. Nocturnal raids carried out by hooded Klansmen were the organization's stock in trade. In Imperial Russia, the police helped to organize the 'Black Hundred', a loosely linked group of anti-Semites who blamed the country's Jewish population for popular discontent and for fomenting revolution (Laqueur, 1977, p. 16, 37). The Black Hundred gangs specialized in launching pogroms, raiding villages in the Jewish Pale of Settlement, killing and looting as they went along.

It was the two decades between the two world wars that witnessed the full-scale development of terrorism carried out by groups on the far right. And if anything is to blame for far-right terrorism, it was the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia that unintentionally set off this right-wing backlash.

The Russian Revolution, with its threat and promise of worldwide social revolution, scared many throughout Europe and the United States. The advent of fascism in Italy (1922) and Nazism in Germany (1933) were in no small measure the result of popular fears of communism. These worries were not limited to the two right-wing dictatorships. In Eastern Europe especially, small fascist-like paramilitary groups surfaced that combined elements of traditional Catholic religious belief, hatred of Jews (as bearers of the communist infection), and fascist ideas about authoritarian rule (e.g. Sugar, 1971; Carsten, 1967; Feldman and Turda, 2008).

Accordingly, in Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, paramilitary bands grew up committed to preventing the spread of communism, nationalism and the promotion of authoritarian solutions to their countries' problems. The outstanding cases are those of the Hungarian Iron Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard (or Legion of the Archangel Michael) and Yugoslavia's Ustasha movement.

In terms of their violence, these groups typically combined street-corner brawling with various types of terrorism. In the case of Romania, a largely pre-industrial peasant society, followers of the Iron Guard leader Codreanu carried out assassinations and assassination attempts during the 1930s. Members of parliament were frequent targets. The Iron Guard was successful in murdering the country's prime minister in 1938 (Barbu, 1969; Carr, 1964).

In interwar Yugoslavia, the Ustasha was essentially a Croatian nationalist group that sought to achieve independence from the Serb-dominated government in Belgrade. It expressed admiration for Italian fascism and Hitler's regime. Mussolini shared an interest in a Yugoslav breakdown for reasons of a hoped-for Italian expansion into the Balkans. The fascist dictator was not above providing subsidies to Ustasha and offering training to its operatives on Italian soil.

In fact, in 1934 Ustasha operatives managed to assassinate Yugoslav King Alexander, along with the French foreign minister, while he was in Marseilles on a state visit. The event produced worldwide publicity and prompted the League of Nations to draft two international conven-

tions on terrorism. However, World War II broke out before these conventions could be transformed into international law.

The role of terrorism during the War itself is a little beyond the scope of this account. Suffice it to say that assassination and sabotage were carried out with some frequency, often by resistance or partisan groups against Axis targets. The occupying Nazi forces reacted with great brutality, as in the aftermath of the 1942 killing of SS deputy leader, Reinhard Heydrich, in Prague. Hitler responded by having all the adult males in an adjacent village killed and the women and children scattered to other communities. In Florence, Italy, in 1944, anti-fascist resistance fighters assassinated the philosopher and former fascist minister of education, Giovanni Gentile, without any subsequent reprisals.

National/separatist terrorism

In the years following the end of the War, colonies and other possessions of the major European powers, Great Britain and France most notably, sought to achieve national independence. In some cases, this goal was achieved as the result of largely peaceful popular protests, as in Ghana (1957) or India (1947) and the Philippines (1946). In other instances, though, independence had to be won by what came to be known as wars of 'national liberation'. In most cases, these conflicts involved the use of guerrilla tactics in the countryside by national liberation armies or 'fronts'. This was true, for example, in Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) and Vietnam (formerly part of French Indo-China) (Laqueur, 1976).

Most of the fighting followed, more or less, the theories of Mao Tse-Tung, China's revolutionary leader, but in some places urban terrorism played a central role in these armed struggles. The National Liberation Front's (FLN) fight against French rule in Algeria (1954–1962) involved the use of terrorist violence against French civilians in the country's major cities and, occasionally, on the French mainland (e.g. Crenshaw, 1978).

In the British Mandate of Palestine, both Jewish and Arab forces carried out terrorist attacks on each other's communities. But in terms of post-war resistance to continued British rule, it was two Zionist groups that took the lead. The Irgun, led by future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and the so-called Stern Gang (or LEHI – Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) carried out spectacular acts of terrorism against British targets. In 1946 the Irgun detonated a bomb at the King David hotel in Jerusalem, an attack that killed 96 people. Earlier (1944), Stern Gang operatives assassinated Lord Moyne, the British Resident for the whole Middle East, near his headquarters in Cairo (Bowyer Bell, 1977).

There were a number of other places where terrorism played a significant role in these anti-colonial struggles. In Cyprus, a highly urban environment, insurgents under the leadership of Colonel Grivas carried out attacks against British civilians in the major cities, Nicosia in particular. The British abandoned the port of Aden in 1964 following an outbreak of terrorism – so that it then became part of Yemen, or South Yemen.

Elsewhere, terrorism was used with some success by the communist Viet Minh in their largely guerrilla-based conflict with French forces in their struggle to free Vietnam from colonial rule (Karnow, 1983). On the other hand, the British were successful in defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya (1948–1960). The pro-Chinese insurgents in this case, operating under the name of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), were largely composed of the country's Chinese minority. So that the independence fight became associated almost from its beginning with a widely disliked segment of the Malay population. The MNLA's campaign involved the killing of foreign plantation owners and attacks on English residents of the major cities. Unlike the French in Vietnam, the British military was able to develop a sophisticated

counter-insurgency strategy based on separating MNLA cadres from the Malayan civilian population (Nagl, 2004).

Events occurring in the 1960s stimulated a new wave of terrorism. The key events appear clearly to have been the following: The American involvement in the Vietnam War triggered a massive series of protests throughout the Western world. The United States and its NATO allies were denounced for their effort to maintain an independent South Vietnam, under American domination, at the expense of a vast majority of the Vietnamese people. A serious split occurred between China and the Soviet Union over the future direction of the worldwide communist movement. Mao Tse-Tung accused the Soviet leadership of abandoning the revolutionary cause in favour of peaceful-coexistence with the West. The effect of this dispute was the separation of pro-Chinese elements from the large communist parties and trade unions in Latin America and parts of Western Europe, Italy most conspicuously.

In Latin America, thousands of university students and other young people had been inspired by Castro's Revolution in Cuba (1959). Some sought to replicate his achievements in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and elsewhere. These attempts at waging guerrilla warfare were not successful. The 1967 defeat of the legendary Cuban revolutionary leader Che Guevara and his small band of followers in the Bolivian Andes symbolized this failure. For some Latin American revolutionaries these setbacks required a new strategy. The new approach involved the establishment of the 'urban guerrilla'. Latin America's vast cities could serve as the settings for attacks on state institutions, banks and foreign-owned businesses. Cities were also the centres of the mass media. Television coverage, for example, would be far more.

Another important condition that made for a major outbreak of terrorism was the June 1967 Arab/Israeli war. Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other Palestinian groups had hoped to provoke a war between Israel and the Arab countries surrounding it. Their expectation was that such a war would result in Israel's destruction. The Palestinian struggle groups succeeded in promoting a conflict, with Syria and Egypt taking the lead. But the outcome was not the intended one (Oren, 2002). The aptly named 'Six Day War' produced a striking victory for the Israelis with its armed forces occupying the Sinai Desert (including the Gaza Strip), Syria's Golan Heights and the entire West Bank of the Jordan, including total control of Jerusalem.

In the aftermath of this 'disaster', the various Palestinian groups came together to decide what was to be done. The result was an umbrella organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), under which a substantial list of Palestinian groups linked themselves. The PLO's initial goal was to launch a 'People's War' against Israel in the manner of the FLN in Algeria and the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Another factor that aided in setting off a new wave of terrorism was the civil rights movement. A Republican (largely Catholic) group in Northern Ireland sought to stage peaceful marches in the manner of Martin Luther King's non-violent Civil Rights Movement in the United States. These protests were often met by violence by the province's majority Unionist (Protestant) population, in Belfast and Londonderry especially. So that from 1969 forward a newly revived IRA sought to achieve Northern Ireland's separation from Great Britain using terrorist means.

Ideological terrorism

At first, opposition to America's role in the Vietnam War (1965–1974) took the form of popular protests, ones typically lead by university students on both sides of the Atlantic. These protests became widespread in the United States, France, what was then West Germany and Italy (e.g. Hoffman, 2006; and for a more conspiratorial view, Sterling, 1981).

As these mass movements evolved in the late 1960s, they often developed distinctive ideological appeals. In Italy, for example, the student protests became identified with the extra-parliamentary Left – which meant some combination of Maoism, Trotskyite thinking, and Third World national liberation thought. By the early 1970s, the mass protest movements began to subside. What was left in their place were dozens of small terrorist bands committed to the cause of violent revolution.

The most prominent of these were the Red Brigades and Front Line in Italy, the Red Army Faction and June 2nd movement in West Germany, Action Directe in France and the Weather Underground in the United States. The groups involved specialized in kidnapping, bank robbery and murder of prominent individuals (e.g. a former Italian prime minister). They hoped to ignite a red revolution in the countries in which they conducted their affairs. The more realistic figures in these small groups (the largest, the Red Brigades, numbered no more than a few hundred members at the height of their operations) recognised that to win more than just extravagant publicity, they needed to develop links to Third World organizations in order to inflict real damage on the world's wealthy countries. The prime candidates for these cooperative arrangements were the Palestinians.

Let us recall that after the 1967 fiasco, the PLO had become an umbrella organization for some dozen groups, and that in terms of policy it was committed to a 'People's War' aimed at the liberation of all of Palestine from Zionist control. To that end, PLO groups, operating from bases in Jordan, launched guerrilla attacks on Israeli targets located in the occupied West Bank. With a handful of exceptions, these attacks were not successful. At this point in the history of this protracted conflict, West Bank Palestinians were rarely amenable to having their communities used as PLO guerrilla bases. Furthermore, in September 1970 the Jordanian government expelled the PLO groups from the country. The latter then set up secure bases in Lebanon, most with their headquarters in Beirut.

At this point (1969–1970), a number of the PLO-linked groups turned to terrorism. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinians (PFLP) and a breakaway faction the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation (PDFLP) began to carry out terrorist attacks on Israeli soil. But the attacks that drew the most attention were the long series of airline skyjackings. On occasion Palestinian skyjackers took over a commercial airliner in mid-flight and demanded the plane be flown to a destination of their choosing. In other instances, terrorists attacked airport waiting rooms and attempted to kill as many passengers as they could manage. Also, with some backing from the Assad regime in Syria, Palestinians planted bombs aboard airliners (e.g. Swiss Air flight bound for Tel Aviv) timed so that they would explode in mid-flight (Ruben, 1994).

By all odds, though, the most spectacular of Palestinian attacks occurred during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Some half dozen members of 'Black September' (a unit of Yasser Arafat's Fatah organisation) took hostage 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team within the Athlete's Village. The hostage takers demanded money and the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the Israelis' lives. With the whole world watching on television, Black September killed an Israeli on the spot. Then the German government, acting in coordination with the Israeli one, agreed to the prisoner exchange. This agreement was in fact a ruse. When the Palestinians and Israeli athletes reached the Munich airport, they were met by two helicopters parked on the tarmac, there ostensibly to fly the Black September fighters to safety. Instead, German sharpshooters attempted to pick off the Palestinians while freeing the athletes. The results, though, were a disaster. All but one of the Palestinians were killed but, before dying, the terrorists set off bombs that killed all the Israeli Olympians.

The Munich terrorist attack was an exclusively Palestinian enterprise. Other episodes, however, involved collaboration between European revolutionaries (usually German) and the PLO

groups. Along with members of the United Japanese Red Army, the Europeans received terrorist training at PLO bases in Lebanon and what was then the People's Republic of South Yemen. This training bore some fruit in the form of joint terrorist attacks on Israeli and various European and conservative Arab targets. Among the most spectacular of these joint enterprises was the 1976 seizure of OPEC headquarters in Vienna; and, also in 1976, the seizure of an Air France Tel Aviv to Paris flight and its diversion to Entebbe, Kenya, where German guards separated the passengers by religion. Jews were intended to receive 'special treatment'. Then in 1978 there was the diversion of a Lufthansa flight over the Mediterranean to an airport at Mogadishu in Somalia. The largely Arab skyjackers demanded the release of prominent German terrorists in prisons in the Federal Republic.

The attack on OPEC and the kidnapping of the organization's oil minister were successful. Led by the European-educated Vladimir Sanchez (aka 'Carlos the Jackal'), the terrorists were paid a substantial ransom for the hostages' release after a flight to Libya. In contrast, Entebbe and Mogadishu were highly publicized defeats for the terrorists. In both cases, highly trained special forces killed most of the terrorists without much loss of life for the passengers. On the other hand, the imprisoned German terrorist committed suicide after learning of the skyjacking.

In Europe, the 1980s witnessed the end of revolutionary terrorism. In the Italian case, this was largely the result of improved counterterrorism policies involving the creation of new police units specially designed to defeat the Red Brigades and other terrorist formations. In Germany, the other major case, it was the end of the Cold War and the complete discrediting of the Marxist-Leninist project that led the revolutionaries to cease fire.

The situation with the Palestinians was more complex. In 1982 the PLO was driven out of its bases in Lebanon by an Israeli invasion. The leadership relocated in Tunis. Earlier, some Palestinian groups, e.g. Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council, had broken away from the PLO to wage separate attacks on a variety of targets, not all of them Israeli. In any case, the PLO's use of terrorism had yielded massive publicity but not led to more tangible gains. For its part, the United States sent out diplomatic feelers to the PLO leaders. In exchange for American recognition, the United States demanded the PLO give up its use of terrorism. Despite some fits and starts (e.g. the Achille Lauro incident), Arafat and the rest of the PLO leadership agreed to the demand. This agreement led to a series of international conferences leading to the 'Oslo Accords' in 1996, which produced Israeli/Palestinian mutual recognition and an expressed willingness to a negotiated end to the long-standing conflict.

Terrorism in Latin America

During the late 1960s, and subsequently through most of the balance of the century, Latin America was the locale for the most widespread episodes of 'urban guerrilla' activity. The Tupamaros in Uruguay were among the first to launch an insurgency. Despite the existence of democratic rule, the Tupamaro leadership insisted its aim was to 'unmask' its real authoritarian character. Accordingly, the group's initial operations included kidnapping and bank robberies. It even stole money from a gambling casino and distributed the proceeds to the poor. It then made the fatal error of attacking members of the police and military. By 1972 they had had enough. The military removed the civilian government and imposed rule by a junta of officers who removed the proverbial 'kid gloves' and destroyed the Tupamaros without all that much difficulty.

Brazil offers a similar case. Following a military coup in the mid-1960s, the country came alive with Marxist urban bands in the country's major cities. Inspired to some extent by Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, Brazilian revolutionaries launched a series of bank

robberies and kidnappings (foreign businessmen were favourite targets in Rio, Sao Paolo and other major cities). As in the case of Uruguay, once the ruling junta decided to act decisively, the urban guerrilla groups were dismantled without too many problems (Laqueur, 2004, pp. 370–76).

Argentina provides a more complicated situation (Gillespie, 1982). Despite being a highly sophisticated modern society, Argentina's 20th-century history was one of oscillation between military dictatorship and democracy. The years with which we are concerned, the late 1960s through the early '80s, were particularly volatile even by Argentine standards. Popular protests broke out against the ruling junta. Crowds in Buenos Aires and other major cities demanded the return from exile of Juan Perón. Although himself a military officer, Perón ruled the country (1944–1954) as a populist politician who gave voice to the 'shirtless ones', Argentina's impoverished masses. Shortly after the death of his wife, Eva Perón, Perón was forced into exile and replaced by still another junta. By the early 1960s, the country's economic situation had deteriorated. The 'shirtless ones' demanded the return of Perón from his Spanish exile. Among the most vocal and violent of the 'Peronistas' were the Montoneros (originally a Catholic youth organization) and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). To achieve their socialist objectives and a return of Perón's national leadership, they initiated an urban guerrilla campaign – bank robbery, kidnapping, murder – which had reached a fever pitch by 1967. At this point, the military agreed to cede power and a democratic president, Hector Campora, was duly elected. This gesture, though, did not stifle demands for a return of Perón. The demand was granted, and Perón, treated as a conquering hero, returned to Buenos Aires. In 1968 new presidential elections were held that confirmed his popularity. Perón chose as his running mate his wife Isabel, someone without any political experience.

The Montoneros were delighted by the results of the balloting. The Trotskyite ERP, on the other hand, was far less pleased and, in fact, continued its terrorist attacks, although at a somewhat reduced level. It quickly became clear to the Montonero leadership that Perón had little interest in implementing their radical agenda, beyond a few modest reforms. Consequently, the Montoneros resumed their own terrorist operations. In the middle of this increasingly chaotic situation, Perón died of a heart attack in 1972. In his place, Isabel, his widow, became Argentina's new president. Between 1972 and 1976, Argentine terrorism reached unprecedented proportions. At this point, the military intervened once again and deposed Isabel Perón. An interservice junta then ruled Argentina for the next six years. During this period, the military waged a 'dirty war' against all those it considered even vaguely sympathetic to the revolutionary cause. Suspects were snatched off the street, detained at various military bases, tortured and then killed in a variety of excruciating ways. Some thousands of people were killed in this fashion.

The 'dirty war' only ended when a real war began. In 1981, Argentina invaded the British-occupied Falkland Islands, 1500 miles off its east coast. After negotiations failed, the Thatcher government in London sent an expeditionary force to push Argentine forces off the islands. This task was accomplished within a short time. Popular protests in Buenos Aires led to the military's resignation and the restoration of civilian rule.

The other countries in Latin America where urban guerrilla campaigns were of considerable significance were Peru and Colombia. In the former case, terrorist activity coincided with the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1980. The two principal groups were the Marxist Tupac Amaru and most especially the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). The Sendero was by far the most important. Led by a charismatic philosophy professor, Abimael Guzmán, from a small Andean university, it formed what was originally a revolutionary student organization. But under Guzmán's (aka Commandante Gonzalo) leadership, the Sendero became a formidable organization combining guerrilla activity in the Andes with terrorism in Lima and Peru's other cities. Scott Palmer (2007, p. 95) summarizes the situation:

> Over the first ten years of the radical Maoists people's war, more than twenty thousand Peruvians were killed, $10 billion worth of infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, some five hundred thousand internal refugees were created. … And there was a decline in gross domestic product of thirty per cent and a cumulative inflation of more than two million percent. By 1990 discouraging indicators suggested that a Shining Path victory was close at hand.

As it turned out, however, a Sendero victory was not close at hand. In 1991, Guzmán was arrested by the police while visiting a friend in Lima. From that point on, the Shining Path went on a tailspin from which it never recovered. This is at least one case where the decapitation of the leadership completely changed the dynamics of an insurgency.

Traditional analyses of terrorist groups stress they are typically small-sized and are not interested in the conquest of territory. Neither of these generalizations apply to the Shining Path nor to its counterparts in Colombia. In both cases, memberships numbered in the thousands and, particularly in Colombia, insurgents were able to conquer and retain control of significant territory for many years (Waldmann, 2007, p. 228). The two insurgent groups that posed the most serious and long-term threat to the government in Bogota were the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). During the 1960s, at least six revolutionary groups emerged to challenge the rule of the country's dominant democratic political parties. For some, Castro served as an inspiration, for others, less so. The FARC represented a breakaway faction of Colombia's communist party, and ELN was initially inspired by Liberation theology.

Two factors help to explain the size and duration of Colombia's insurgency. First, the country has a long history of political violence. For example, between 1949 and 1958, some 250,000 people were killed in what came to be known as *La Violenza*, a conflict between the country's two major political parties. In the private sphere, Colombia's homicide rate was among the highest in the world. To add more complexity to this situation, the country is poorly integrated geographically. Some areas are inaccessible to government forces from Bogota and the major cities.

As a result, it was relatively easy for insurgents to seize and maintain control over territory from which to launch attacks on large landowners and government forces. FARC and ELN were also able to take advantage of the country's drug business. FARC especially was able to offer 'protection' to small coca farmers whose land fell within the group's domain.

Over the years, a succession of Colombian governments have pursued a variety of policies aimed at bringing this long-term conflict to a peaceful end. These have included a mix of carrots and sticks. Peace negotiations have taken place on a number of occasions. In recent years, these have led the ELN to put down their weapons. FARC, the hardest case to resolve, finally agreed in 2016 to give up on the idea of violent revolution and return to the democratic political fold.

European nationalist/separatists

The two other cases that require our attention in this era are those of Northern Ireland and the Basque region of northern Spain. From the early 1970s on, Northern Ireland suffered from its 'Troubles'. These Troubles involved an armed struggle between republicans, largely Catholic, and unionists, largely Protestants, over the province retaining its links to the United Kingdom. The Provisional IRA sought to force the British out through a campaign of terrorist bombing and shooting representatives of Her Majesty's government along with a variety of symbolic targets in Ulster and various locations in Britain itself. Loyalists were intent on preventing the success of the republican goal of a united Ireland and amalgamation with the Republic of Ireland. Accordingly, they launched their own terrorist operations under such labels as the Ulster Defence Association.

By 1972 the violence had reached a boiling point. The government in London was so concerned that it sent British Army units to the province in order to restore law and order. But the presence of army units had the opposite effect, with the Provisional IRA depicting them as an army of occupation which required armed resistance.

Until the mid-1990s there was little reduction in the level of violence. At that point, the IRA leadership reached the conclusion there was little further to be gained by the continuation of its terrorist campaign. After some initial hesitation, peace negotiations were begun involving political parties representing the two communities in Northern Ireland, along with representatives from London, Dublin, the United States and Norway. The negotiations proceeded in fits and starts. Finally, the discussions produced the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The arrangement provided for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom while the Catholic minority in the region was given a greater stake in its government and administration. The Good Friday settlement almost broke down over the question of 'decommissioning' the IRA's weapons. Eventually the organization's leaders, headed by Gerry Adams, agreed to turn in its large cache of weapons so that the Good Friday Agreement could be fully implemented.

The struggle in the Basque region of Spain was over national independence. In this case, a group, Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), was formed in 1959 when the Franco dictatorship, with its repressive security apparatus represented by the Guardia Civil, was still in place and where virtually all types of Basque cultural expression were prohibited (e.g. speaking Basque in public was regarded as a crime) (Clark, 1979). After Franco's death in 1975, Spain went through a successful transition to democracy. The country's new democratic constitution provided a measure of autonomy for the Basque provinces and other regional communities throughout Spain. The ETA leadership concluded that local autonomy and the opportunity to participate in the Cortes were far from satisfying their concerns. ETA took the opportunity afforded by the new democratic Spain to launch a terrorist campaign aimed at complete independence. ETA developed clandestine units in Bilbao, San Sebastian, Pamplona and other Basque communities, and at least for a while, ETA leaders were also able to seek sanctuary in the two southern French provinces adjacent to the Spanish border.

ETA carried out a long list of assassinations, kidnappings and bombing attacks throughout Spain, and by 2010 ETA had killed close to 1000 people. Kidnapping wealthy industrialists was a favourite tactic. From time-to-time the government offered various concessions involving enhanced Basque autonomy in the context of a unified and democratic Spain. ETA developed its own political party, *Herri Batasuna*, to contest elections and pursue a place in parliament. Over the years, ETA suffered a number of defections, usually based on a faction's willingness to end the violence and participate in the political process.

Negotiations to end ETA's armed struggle proceeded in fits and starts. Some discussions were held secretly and later openly. But ETA terrorism persisted, despite the government's willingness to re-integrate ETA members into Spain's normal social and political life. Eventually, ETA's strength declined. Its leaders were no longer able to find safety in France – the French government became much more willing to arrest ETA members on the run from the Spanish police. By 2012, ETA not only declared a permanent cease-fire, but its modest number of activists indicated that it was dissolving itself (Reinares and Alonso, 2007).

The new terrorism: transnational groups

By the mid-1990s it appeared to some observers that terrorism itself was in decline. The Cold War had ended. The Palestinians and Israelis had agreed to the Oslo Accords calling for mutual recognition with outstanding differences to be resolved peacefully. The various Latin American urban

guerrilla groups were on the wane as one country after another had restored their democracies as revolutionary terrorism had proved to be a dead end. As it turned out, however, peace was not at hand. The world was confronted by what some observers labelled 'the new terrorism'. What was 'new' about the new terrorism?

Religion or religion plus nationalism were at the heart of the matter. Analysts of modernization in the 1950s and '60s had anticipated a decline in religious practice as the 'new nations' of the Third World underwent the sorts of economic and social changes as had occurred in the industrialized democracies of Western Europe and North America in earlier times. Instead, as we shall see, there were dramatic religious revivals in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. It was in the context of this religious revival that new terrorist organizations appeared whose aims were often both transnational and nationalist.

Another feature of the 'new' terrorism was the willingness of the new organizations to kill on an indiscriminate basis. The 'old' terrorist groups had wanted 'a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead'. The 'new' terrorists were proud of their work and wanted to achieve maximum publicity, but they also wanted to kill as many people as possible. Analysts were worried that the new terrorists would employ weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, radiological – to murder on a mass basis (e.g. Stern, 1999). As it turned out, however, the most emblematic form of attack for the new groups was suicide bombing; acts that were carried out with relatively primitive explosives (Neumann, 2009).

The earlier generation of terrorist groups employed hierarchal forms of organization with basic decisions being made by a handful of leaders at the top of the group. The new terrorists, instead, developed horizontal networks, some national, as with the new Palestinian groups, others transnational, as with al-Qaeda. These networks involved the use of nodes. Decisions regarding if, when, and where to attack were made by semi-autonomous local bands. So that security forces able to dismantle one small group would not be able to destroy the entire web-like organization. Some observers even described these new forms of operation as 'leaderless' because of their highly decentralized decision-making.

What were the circumstances that gave rise to the new terrorism? There were two major events which provided the initial impetus for its emergence. Both occurred in 1979. The first was the decision made by the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan as a way of maintaining the country's communist regime in power. The Soviet commitment to a communist Afghanistan produced calls for a 'defensive jihad' by clerics throughout the Muslim world. Second, the religiously-inspired revolution in Iran that succeeded in deposing the Shah led to the creation of a militant theocracy headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Shiite communities throughout the Middle East and beyond began receiving support from Tehran in order to emulate the Iranian success.

We are now some decades distant from these two events. Yet religiously inspired terrorism, unlike its secular predecessors, has not declined in magnitude. Why not? Two additional developments come to mind. The American invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003 unintentionally created a jihadi backlash against the foreign control of part of Dar al Islam. And second, the Arab Spring of 2011, again, unintentionally, led to the replacement of brutal dictatorship by a vacuum of power and the ascent of terrorist organizations in countries such as Yemen and Libya.

Perhaps the best place to begin our summary of the new terrorism is with the group that has received the most attention: al-Qaeda (or the "Base" in Arabic). Arab opponents of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan responded to the appeals of Muslim clerics by gathering in Peshawar in Pakistan, a small city close to the Afghan border. From this locale they supplied fighters, weapons and other supplies to the mujahideen confronting Red Army forces in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia

and the United States filtered aid to these jihadi with assistance from the Pakistani security forces, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). To help the growing number of Arab volunteers, a Palestinian cleric, Abdullah Azzam, formed an aid organization to help newly arriving jihadi. One of these volunteers was a wealthy young Saudi, Osama bin Laden. Another figure was the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri. In addition to his medical background, Zawahiri had led an Egyptian terrorist group, al Jihad, involved in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. He had served time in prison for his involvement.

The attempt to expel the Russians was successful. The Red Army withdrew its forces in 1989. The effect of the Kremlin's decision was three-fold. First, the Soviet defeat convinced Azzam, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and others that irregular warfare carried out by Salafist jihadis could overcome a highly trained but weakly motivated armed force. Second, there was a blowback effect. Veteran fighters returned to their countries of origin in the Middle East and North Africa prepared to use what they had learned in the Afghan struggle to address intolerable situations at home. Their reactions were not long in coming as Salafist jihadi groups were formed in Algeria, Yemen and elsewhere. Third, Azzam, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and others in Peshawar created a group prepared to render aid to Muslims suffering oppression throughout the world. The name they attached to this new 'pioneering vanguard' was al-Qaeda (see Wright, 2006).

A debate developed among the leaders of this new group over tactics. All agreed on the need to eliminate the corrupt and secular regimes that dominated the region. Was the principal target to be the 'near enemy', i.e. the Middle Eastern dictatorships, or the 'far enemy', namely the United States and its allies? The United States was regarded as the premier force keeping the Arab dictatorships in power. The debate was resolved when Abdullah Azzam, an advocate of the 'near enemy' was assassinated in 1989 by unknown assailants, along with his two sons.

In the summer of 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden offered to have his Afghan veterans expel the invaders. Rather than accept his offer, the Saudi royal family sought and received American military support to expel the Iraqis. In 1990–91, the United States and its allies succeeded in doing just that. Bin Laden was infuriated, accusing the Saudis of inviting infidels into the land of the two holy sites (Mecca and Medina). From the Saudi perspective, bin Laden and his followers were trouble-makers. The country's leaders then sent this young sheik into exile.

He relocated to the Sudan, a country which had recently come under the control of Islamists. From this location, bin Laden and many of his fighters trained to carry out attacks on the United States, the 'far enemy'. At this time, other Salafist groups appeared in various spots in the Middle East and North Africa, combining religious fervour, anti-Americanism and nationalism. Between 1993 and 1998, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were involved in the 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. A local warlord had succeeded in convincing American-led and UN sanctioned peace-keeping forces to leave the country after a few American helicopters were shot down with weapons supplied by al-Qaeda. The quick departure of American forces led bin Laden to the conclusion that the United States was a 'paper tiger' whose presence in the region could be ended without all that much difficulty. al-Qaeda elements had attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Mubarak, and in 1998 al-Qaeda operatives had detonated bombs at the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al Islam, attacks that produced many deaths and injuries. In addition, a man, Ramzi Youseff, with family links to an al-Qaeda leader, had set off a bomb in the garage of the World Trade Center in New York. These and other terrorist attacks led American and Egyptian governments to demand that bin Laden and his followers be expelled from the Sudan. Under pressure, the Sudanese government agreed. So that in 1996, bin Laden and the al-Qaeda core moved to Afghanistan.

Most of Afghanistan at that time had fallen under the control of the Taliban, a group largely composed of Pashtun fighters who had gone through training at one of the numerous madrasas (religious schools) located inside Pakistan. In exchange for some subsidies, the Taliban offered bin Laden and the growing al-Qaeda organization sanctuary. As it turned out, this meant the formation of training camps in and around the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar. These training camps literally drew thousands of would-be jihadis from all parts of the Muslim World and beyond. In 1997, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri promoted the formation of a collection of different Jihadi groups under the name of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. In turn, the Front issued a fatwa or religious ruling calling for attacks on Americans wherever they might be found. No distinction was to be made between military personnel and civilians.

Space does not permit a thorough discussion of al-Qaeda-directed attacks. In the years following the issuance of bin Laden's fatwa, al-Qaeda terrorists carried out a number of spectacular attacks, events which captured public attention on a worldwide basis. Far and away the most infamous of these acts was the well-planned attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon carried out almost simultaneously on September 11, 2001. These terrorist attacks involving the mid-air seizure of commercial airliners killed close to 3,000 people, more than had died at Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the mass media took notice of the fact that al-Qaeda had developed a network of jihadi organizations throughout much of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. In some instances, the links were direct. In others the groups were independent aggregations whose leaders found it advantageous to express their support from al-Qaeda central.

In the wake of 9/11, the United States and its allies launched a 'war on terrorism'. In practice, this meant removing the Taliban from power in Kabul and the destruction of al-Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders took refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas. This success did not bring an end to al-Qaeda-linked terrorism. Illustratively, within a year of the 9/11 events, an Indonesian group, Jemaah Islamiyah, attacked tourist nightclubs on the island of Bali, leaving scores dead (Gunaratna, 2014). In May 2003, in Morocco, at the other end of the Muslim world, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb carried out a series of attacks in Casablanca on government buildings and Jewish targets.

Between these events and the death of bin Laden in 2011 at the hands of the U.S. Navy's SEAL Team Six unit, al-Qaeda and its affiliates carried out or attempted to carry out a large number of terrorist attacks. The most spectacular of these were the following: the bombing of Jewish and British facilities in 2003, killing 61; the April 2004 bombings of commuter trains at the Atocha railway station in Madrid which killed close to 200 passengers; the July 7, 2005 attacks on the London underground which left 56 dead, along with a long list of plots and schemes to attack European and especially American targets which were thwarted by the authorities before they could be brought to fruition. The Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was particularly inventive in this regard. AQAP bomb makers managed to plant an explosive on the person of a young Nigerian student. This student was supposed to detonate the bomb on Christmas Day 2009 while aboard a Northwest Airlines flight above Detroit. However, the device failed to detonate properly and the student was overpowered by passengers and crew.

While these AQ and AQ-affiliated attacks were underway, in March 2003 the United States launched Operation 'Enduring Freedom'. The United States, along with a British expeditionary force, invaded Iraq with the intent of deposing Saddam Hussein and his brutal Baathist dictatorship. The Anglo-American intent was to bring democratic rule to the country. The result, however, was quite different. Iraq's minority Sunni population, to which Saddam belonged, regarded the invasion as a threat to their position in Iraqi society. It was in this context that an

al-Qaeda-linked group (*Tawhid wal Jihad*, or al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)) formed and began to carry out attacks against Shiite holy sites in Baghdad and the southern part of the country, in Karbala and Najaf. Under the leadership of a former Jordanian street criminal, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, this group also carried out attacks on American and United Nations (UN) targets.

Al-Zarqawi's group was particularly brutal and blood-thirsty, killing fellow Sunnis as well, so that al-Zawahiri sent him a message suggesting that he stop these attacks on Muslims (Brisard, 2005). (This message followed an AQI attack on tourist hotels in Amman, Jordan.) Al-Zarqawi was defiant and almost reached the point of declaring his group's independence from al-Qaeda. The debate was resolved, for a time, when Zarqawi was killed by an American bombing raid on his headquarters in April 2006.

The American military was successful in persuading Iraq's Sunni leadership to join the fight against the jihadist terrorists so that by 2010–2011, the Obama Administration and the British government began the phased withdrawal of their forces from the country. The departure of these foreign military elements did not usher in a period of peace and tranquillity. To understand what happened next, we have to describe the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring

This 'Spring' first flowered in Tunisia towards the end of 2010 when an unemployed young man committed suicide over the hopelessness of his situation and the corruption of the government. The mass media and especially the new social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) provided extensive coverage of the popular protests that followed the suicide. Within a breath-takingly short time, Tunisia's corrupt dictator departed the scene. Protests then erupted in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and Syria. For a time, Western observers believed that these Middle Eastern countries would undergo successful transitions to democracy. Except for Tunisia, these optimists proved wrong. No more so than in Syria.

Largely peaceful protests broke out in Damascus, Aleppo and other Syrian cities in 2012. The minority-led government of Bashir al-Assad responded to these demands for freedom with great brutality, shooting and killing the street demonstrators. The protests then turned violent, and a full-scale insurgency was launched. The Assad military employed chemical weapons against the insurgents and managed to kill hundreds of civilians along the way. Despite these war crimes, Assad received material support from Russia, Iran and the latter's Lebanese client, Hezbollah. Among the variety of groups committed to the overthrow of the Syrian dictatorship was the Salafist/Jihadi al Nusra Front, a group with links to AQ. It quickly acquired its own reputation for brutality involving the killing of civilians.

What today we identify as the Islamic State (IS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), represents a merger, proclaimed in 2013, of the Syrian al Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq. Its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, holds a Ph.D. in Islamic studies and claims descent from the Prophet (Stern and Berger, 2015). Baghdadi's goals for ISIS represent a sharp departure from al-Qaeda's under Zawahiri's leadership. While AQ has stressed the importance of attacking the 'far enemy', ISIS has established a transnational 'caliphate' by conquering territory in parts of what are now Syria and Iraq. The goal is to recreate what Islam looked like as it expanded in the centuries following the death of the Prophet.[3]

In other words, ISIS has combined the use of conventional military forces with terrorism in an attempt to dismember the already existing states in the region. It has broken free of AQ and in recent times has won the allegiance of other jihadi organizations in Libya and elsewhere – which al Baghdadi conceives as 'provinces' of the new caliphate. One of the curious features of ISIS is that it seeks, as a Salafist organization, to recreate the Muslim world as they imagined it to

be more than a thousand years ago, but still shows adroit use of the new social media, Facebook and Twitter. ISIS uses these internet tools to recruit new members from all over the world, including Western Europe and the United States. Its displays of the beheadings of captives and other manifestations of brutality are intended to sow fear among audiences and to inspire others to carry out similar murderous acts in their own countries.

On the other side of the Sunni/Shiite divide, Iran has served as patron for a number of Shia militias in Iraq. Drawing recruits from the poor and dispossessed youth from the slums of Baghdad and Basra, the Mahdi Army, led by the charismatic Muqtada al-Sadr, carried out attacks on American targets seeking to coerce the United States into withdrawing from the country. Also supported by the Iranians' Revolutionary Guards Corps is the Badr Brigades (Nasr, 2006). It would not be accurate to label these militias as terrorist groups, although on occasion they have committed acts of terrorism. They are essentially Iranian-backed private armies there to defend the Shiite community and its holy sites. As of 2017, they are participating in an armed conflict with ISIS, whose ideology stresses the heretical nature of Shia belief.

The new terrorism: national manifestations

In addition to the new transnational terrorism, there are a wide variety of groups whose aspirations are more limited in scope. These groups target single states, and although they may operate across borders, their attention is more narrowly focused. The cases are too numerous to be included in this brief history of terrorism. So the following accounts will be limited to a handful of cases.

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict

The various groups under the PLO umbrella were largely secular in nature. This is not true of the new terrorists. Religion is at the core of their doctrines. When the first Intifada (popular protests aimed at ending Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) erupted at the end of 1987, the PLO leadership was in Tunis and had little role in promoting the new Palestinian activism. Instead, a significant role was played by two offshoots of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The latter limited itself to terrorism, while Hamas developed an extensive infrastructure, one including schools, clinics and other social services. Both groups were and are committed to the destruction of the Israeli state. Their claim is that all of Palestine is part of the House of Islam and that no secular authority has the right to negotiate its division. The founding documents are openly anti-Semitic, regarding Jews as sources of cosmic evil.

Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad played crucial roles in the Second Intifada (or Al Aqsa Intifada) that broke out in 2000 following the collapse of negotiations over the Oslo accords. The immediate precipitant was a visit of Ariel Sharon, then a government minister, to the Temple Mount and in the immediate vicinity of the Al Aqsa mosque. This gesture was regarded as an affront by many Muslims, and the Sharon tour was followed by riots and protests – which the Israeli government blamed on Yasser Arafat and the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA). Over the next few years, the Palestinian uprising included a number of spectacular terrorist attacks. Many of these involved suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad followers on public buses, restaurants and hotels. After one such attack, the bombing of the dining room at a seaside hotel in Netanya during a Passover Seder, the Israeli military invaded West Bank cities (Jenin, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah) seeking to end the terrorism.

This reoccupation of the West Bank cities succeeded in the sense that it produced a substantial reduction in the frequency of suicide bombings of public busses and other Israeli targets;

so that by 2004 the Al Aqsa Intifada was essentially over. Under considerable pressure from the UN as well as the United States, Israeli forces withdrew from the major Palestinian communities (because of its religious significance, an army unit remained in Hebron). The Israeli government added to these developments by building a wall throughout the West Bank aimed at preventing more Hamas and Islamic Jihad infiltration into the country.

In addition to having a militant component, the Qassam Brigades, devoted to the 'armed struggle' against Israel, Hamas created an extensive infrastructure to draw Palestinians into its fold. It also became a political party and participated in Palestinian elections in 2004 and 2006. Hamas outpolled Fatah (the dominant force in the PLO and then the Palestinian Authority). These elections confirmed Hamas' popularity, especially in the impoverished Gaza Strip (see Levitt, 2006; Gleis and Berti, 2012; and Berti, 2013). As far as Gaza is concerned, the Israeli government led by Ariel Sharon ended its occupation in 2006. There then ensued a struggle for power between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas for control over Gaza. Hamas won the struggle and achieved control over Gaza. It used this control to pursue its goal of attacking Israel and launched a campaign of firing rockets and missiles into Israeli towns close to the border. These attacks led the Israelis to retaliate by bombarding towns throughout Gaza in what appears to be a futile effort to destroy Hamas.

Hamas has been the beneficiary of foreign support. Iran in particular has been generous in supplying Hamas with money and weapons. The patron-client relationship has cooled lately because Hamas is a Sunni organization, while Iran's Shiite rulers have sought to buttress regimes in Damascus and Baghdad which have a clear bias in favour of their co-religionists. This cannot be said for Israel's northern enemy: Hezbollah.

Hezbollah (or the Party of God) is a Shia organization that first appeared in the context of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Another major stimulant was the Iranian revolution. Many Lebanese Shiites were inspired by the victory of the Ayatollah Khomeini's victory over the American-backed Shah. Young Lebanese Shiite clerics contemplated a similar outcome for their own country. Towards this end, a group of Iran's Revolutionary Guards travelled to Lebanon's Beqaa valley in 1982 in order to train Lebanese Shiites in paramilitary tactics to fight their enemies. Hezbollah was the outcome of this collaboration (see Ranstorp, 1994; Norton, 2007).

Since its inception, the organization has played a role in domestic Lebanese political life. It presently is represented in both the country's parliament and cabinet. But it is its role in violence that compels our attention. As of 2015, Hezbollah's fighters have entered Syria and are seeking to defend the Assad dictatorship against ISIS, the Nusra Front and the several other Sunni groups attempting to end its rule. Hezbollah's major foreign involvement, though, has been its struggle against Israel. When the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in 1982 in an attempt to eliminate PLO bases in the southern part of the country, Hezbollah's leaders committed their organization to forcing the Israeli occupiers from the country. Using a combination of suicide bombings and guerrilla tactics throughout southern Lebanon, Hezbollah succeeded in coercing the Israeli government of Ehud Barak into withdrawing from the area. Hezbollah, under the leadership of Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, was not content with this outcome, and with extensive support from Iran, Hezbollah has pursued a long-term goal of destroying the Jewish state.

To this goal, Hezbollah fighters launched a series of raids into northern Israel (the disputed Shebaa Farms area), often involving the kidnapping and killing of the country's soldiers. These raids became so troubling that it led the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to launch a full-scale attack on Hezbollah forces in July 2006. The conflict lasted for more than a month. The result was mutually destructive. Using Iranian-supplied missiles, Hezbollah bombarded northern Israel, including the city of Haifa before a UN-brokered cease-fire took hold. Since

that war, the Iranians have resupplied Hezbollah with missiles and other instruments of modern warfare.

The new terrorism: Central and South Asia

For some observers, terrorism and the Middle East are virtually synonymous. If we scan the countries of the Indian sub-continent plus Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, we cannot help but notice that this region has experienced an exceptionally high level of nationalist and religiously inspired terrorism over the last few decades (e.g. Marks, 2007; Lewis, 2014). Let us review these cases at least briefly.

On the island nation of Sri Lanka, the principal ethnic division has been between the majority Sinhalese population, largely Buddhist, and the minority Hindu Tamils. During the long period of British rule, the Tamils enjoyed a preferred status vis-a-vis the colonial power. When Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, Sinhalese leaders sought to reverse the situation by restricting the Tamils' place in government and public life in general. Consequently, the Tamils developed their own set of resentments. Initially the expression of these resentments was channelled through their parliamentary representatives in parliament. This parliamentary approach proved ineffective, and a political space was created that was to be filled by armed insurgent groups. After a struggle for supremacy among these, one became dominant: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The LTTE was led by a ruthless and charismatic figure, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the LTTE launched a formidable military campaign against the government in Colombo. Prabhakaran's aim was the creation of an independent Tamil state to be run along Marxist-Leninist lines. To this end, the LTTE became a formidable military force, one receiving support from the large Tamil population of Southern India along with exiled communities elsewhere.

Over the years there were several attempts to reach a negotiated settlement, including one pursued by the Indian government in the 1990s. None of these attempts succeeded for more than a few months. The LTTE carried out multiple bombings in Colombo, the assassination of civilians throughout the country, along with a conventional military challenge to the Sri Lankan army in and around the Tamil heartland, the Jaffna Peninsula. By the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the Sinhalese majority had become sufficiently aroused to elect a government whose leadership was committed to the use of unlimited force to end the LTTE rebellion. The Sri Lankan army launched a brutal multi-year campaign (2007–2009) that achieved the LTTE's complete defeat – killing Prabhakaran in the process. Along the way, the military committed numerous war crimes against the Tamil civilian population.

The reason it appears appropriate to consider the LTTE's campaign under the label 'new terrorism' is that it pioneered the use of suicide bombing tactics. In fact, the organization developed a special unit, the Black Tigers, whose job it was to kill themselves while assassinating others. Rather than be captured alive, Black Tigers wore around their necks amulets containing quick-acting cyanide tablets to swallow in the event of their imminent capture. Both a Sri Lankan president and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were victims of successful female Black Tigers (aka 'Birds of Paradise') suicide attacks.

India presents us with a variety of terrorist threats, some old, some belonging to the 'new terrorism' genre. So far as the 'old' terrorism is concerned, a Maoist group, the Naxalites, have waged an armed struggle against the government and Indian capitalism from the area around Calcutta for many decades. Tribal groups in north-eastern India have also carried out terrorist attacks from time to time. In addition to these manifestations of 'old' terrorism, India provides us with at least two examples of the 'new'.

Religion was at the heart of the Sikh rebellion of the 1980s and early 1990s. The highest concentration of Sikhs is located in the state of Punjab in north-western India, although there are significant populations in New Delhi and other locales. The Sikh terrorist campaign was ignited by a series of defeats and humiliations suffered by the dominant Akali Dal political party and by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh religious leader. Electoral defeats and gestures interpreted as insults to the religion itself prompted Bhindranwale to create a terrorist group intended to redress Sikh grievances (Marwah, 2002).

Following a series of terrorist attacks on Hindus as well as a dissident Sikhs, in June 1984 Bhindranwale led his followers into the Golden Temple, the Sikh holy site, located in Amritsar. In response, the Indian government launched Operation Blue Star. The Indian Army invaded the Golden Temple complex and killed some hundreds of Bhindranwale's followers, along with the leader himself. Retaliation was not long in coming. Later in 1984, two of her Sikh body-guards assassinated Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In turn, Hindu gangs in New Delhi and elsewhere rioted and carried out anti-Sikh pogroms, killing scores of innocents.

All this turmoil led young Sikhs to organize various terrorist bands, including Khalistan Commando Force, the Babbar Khalsa, the Khalistan Liberation Force and the International Sikh Youth Federation (Wallace, 2007). Their goal was an independent state for the Sikhs. According to a data collection compiled by Paul Wallace, between 1981 and 1994 close to 12,000 people were killed during the conflict, the majority of whom were Sikhs themselves (6,177 versus 3,871 Hindus). Along the way, in 1985 a few Sikhs in Toronto planted a bomb aboard an Air India flight bound for London. When the bomb exploded over the Atlantic, a few hundred pas-sengers were killed, making it one of the worst airline disasters in history.

By 1988 the Indian authorities had managed to learn from experience. Operating under the name Operation Black Thunder, the Indian military and police launched an attack on the terrorist groups while minimizing civilian casualties. They also promoted outreach programs in Sikh communities throughout the Punjab. Also, the moderate Akali Dal underwent a revival so that by 1992 it achieved a major electoral victory in the region. The drive towards independence waned, as did the terrorism. Today there are occasional acts of Sikh violence supported, appar-ently, by Pakistani groups operating from across the border.

Pakistan itself has long been a centre – if not *the* epicentre – of terrorism on a worldwide basis. For some decades, the government in Islamabad has instrumentalised terrorist groups to challenge India's control over the state of Jammu/Kashmir. Because of a decision made by the Hindu maharaja of the state when India and Pakistan became independent in 1948, the state with a Muslim majority became part of India. Since that formative period, India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the control of Jammu/Kashmir. Instead of conventional war – India and Pakistan are now both nuclear powers – the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has provided covert assistance to groups that cross the border or 'line of control' to stage terrorist attacks on Indian targets. The most noteworthy of these groups are the Lashkar-a-Taiba (LeT – Army of the Pure), Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the militant wing of a political party, Jama'at-i-Islami.

LeT achieved prominence by its December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in which a dozen people were killed, an event that almost precipitated a war. But it was the November 2008 attack on the city of Mumbai that caught the world's attention. A LeT commando came ashore at the port and proceeded to kill some 172 people over the next 60 hours. Launched from Pakistan and then directed by a Pakistani jihadist, the targets included two major tour-ist hotels, the city's principal railway station and a Jewish welcome centre (Fair, 2014). In what was essentially a suicide mission, all the attackers, with one exception, were killed during this terrorist action.

Pakistan has also gone into the terrorist export-import business. Residents of Great Britain, the United States and other Western nations have received training in Pakistan and then returned to their home countries in order to carry out terrorist attacks on, for example, the London Underground (2005). Foreign nationals who have visited Pakistan have also been targeted for attack, as for example, the execution in 2001 of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl.

Pakistan's northern tribal areas (e.g. North and South Waziristan, Baluchistan) have served as sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives who fled Afghanistan to regroup following American and British attacks. Radical clerics in these tribal areas have also trained and supported Afghan Taliban as they returned to the fray across the border. And we should remind ourselves that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was able to establish a residence in Abbottabad, really a suburb of Pakistan's capital, and live there undisturbed until he was killed by American special forces in 2011.

Terrorist groups have also been active on the domestic scene (Gall, 2014). Pakistan's Shiite minority has repeatedly been attacked by Salafist Sunni groups. In Peshawar in particular, Shiite mosques have been attacked and bombs have been detonated in Shiite sites in Karachi, and scores have been murdered. Perhaps the most spectacular act of domestic terrorism was the 2007 assassination of Pakistan's former President Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan to campaign for the next presidential election. Bhutto had made many enemies, including the country's then-military dictator, General Musharraf. But her murder was committed by members of a terrorist group, the so-called Haqqani Network.

What makes Pakistan's situation particularly troubling to outsiders is that in addition to all this violent conflict, the country is also a nuclear power. And in the West, at least, there is concern about the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of one of the Jihadi groups.

Future prospects

Using current developments to predict future ones has its limitations. Nevertheless, there are several trends at work in terrorist violence that seem likely to persist and even grow in the immediate future. First, lone-wolf terrorism seems to be enjoying a growth spurt. Either self-starters who have simply become radicalized on their own or mediated and sponsored by some terrorist group, the lone wolf presents a growing threat particularly to the Western democracies, as recent events in France and Europe suggest. Second, there is a seemingly contradictory trend at work too. Terrorism increasingly has become part of the repertoire of large scale insurgencies such as the one launched in Iraq/Syria by ISIS. Third, the new or newer social media should continue to play an important role in the dissemination of terrorist propaganda, as well as with the recruitment of terrorists-to-be. Finally, there appear to be other trends at work. Once upon a time, the subject of terrorism – during the Cold War for example – was of limited interest to Western publics. These publics and elite political decision-makers had other things on their minds. Now, after 9/11 and subsequent mass casualty attacks, terrorism and the threat thereof appears to be close to the leading issue confronting the United States and the other democracies.

There is also the matter of prevalence to consider. Terrorist attacks seem to be spreading around the world from Western Europe and West Africa to Indonesia and at virtually all points in between. This sense of terrorism spreading throughout the world is, however, a bit deceptive. Once upon a time, there were home-grown terrorist groups throughout Latin America, Western Europe and North America. In Northern Ireland, the Basque country of Spain, Croatia, Sri Lanka and the Indian Punjab, terrorism was used to promote separatist causes. In addition, not all that many years ago, the Western world abounded with revolutionary groups seeking to bring

down capitalism and the political order associated with it. These terrorist groups have largely passed from the scene.

Contemporary terrorism is now largely confined to the Muslim world. Much of it involves the reactionary goal of recapturing the past of Islam. Within this framework, there is a war against the West (e.g. Jews and Crusaders), its values and sympathetic governments in Egypt and elsewhere. The other conflict is sectarian in nature; for example, the struggle between Sunnis and Shiites for control of Iraq and Syria. Terrorism seems unlikely to abate until there is some resolution of these destructive conflicts.

Notes

1 In the mid-1880s, the short-lived Terrorist Faction was organized under the leadership of V. I. Lenin's elder brother (see Burleigh, 2007, pp. 55–56).
2 For excerpts from some of the relevant writings, see Laqueur (2004, pp. 50–119).
3 In this regard, ISIS has come to resemble a human Jurassic Park in the sense the observer gains a picture of what the Islamic world looked like some 1500 years ago, replete with slave markets, suicide attacks, decapitations and other types of body mutilation (see Weiss and Hassan, 2014).

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5
ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Tore Bjørgo and Andrew Silke

Introduction

Identifying the 'causes' or 'root causes' of terrorism, and then removing or reducing these causes in order to diminish the scourge of terrorism, has been a popular idea among many politicians and scholars. They may argue that only social and political changes and measures can, at a more fundamental level, eliminate or lessen the basic conditions which are causing people to see violence as the only option for change and eventually engage in terrorism. Certainly, understanding how and why terrorism begins can be a vital first step towards preventing new campaigns erupting in the future. There is also the real potential that understanding what has caused the violence in the first place will help identify effective solutions to current conflicts and give sensible advice on how to wind down ongoing violence.

Traditional counterterrorism, however, has been more focused on just treating the symptoms. Critics argue that 'root causes' are too remote from the alleged outcome, acts of terrorism, to be of any analytical or practical use. For example, millions are touched by the conditions which are claimed to give rise to terrorism, but only a tiny minority actually engages in terrorism. What is then the explanatory value of 'root causes'? Furthermore, some critics claim that talking about 'root causes of terrorism' could afford legitimacy to terrorists, as it alleges that there are some justifiable reasons for why people make use of terrorism (e.g. Bennett, 2002: 67–69).

Indeed, some have actively dissuaded research that is aimed at understanding the causes of terrorism. As a former police Chief Constable in Northern Ireland curtly noted, 'For me, understanding, comes dangerously close to authorising, sanctioning and approving' (Harnden and Jones, 1999). While explaining terrorism by causality alone is too simplistic (Horgan, 2014: 86), entirely abandoning efforts to understand the causes is not simply unscientific but socially deeply irresponsible. Terrorism is too important a subject – and affects the lives of far too many – for the difficult questions of how it is caused to be declared off-limits.

While recognizing that the causes of terrorism are an important subject, it is worth highlighting at an early stage some of the key problems faced by efforts to better understand these causes. First is the ever-present definition problem. Studies into causes vary in terms of how they define terrorism. This means that case studies which are considered legitimate for inclusion in one study are not considered as a relevant example of terrorism in another. The result, not surprisingly, is that studies reach different conclusions. Systematic reviews have to be alert

to how the different studies define the subject and the impact this has on the data used and the conclusions reached.

Second, this area suffers from the common problem of limited data on many key issues. Terrorism research has traditionally been beset by limited methodologies and often questionable raw data (e.g. Silke, 2009). This problem is also seen in research on root causes. A linked criticism is that the causes debate has traditionally been dominated by reference to a small number of case studies (notably the Northern Irish and Palestinian conflicts). The dominance of these case studies risks skewing the debate towards factors especially relevant in those contexts, but which might or might not fairly reflect general patterns and processes (Noricks, 2009).

A final significant problem is that efforts to understand the causes of terrorism need to be sophisticated in how 'causes' are framed. Causes can work at different levels, from the social to the individual, but some efforts lump these together, cherry-picking a few prominent factors. There can be structural background causes as well as more direct proximate causes, and it is important to take the trouble to distinguish between these.

Types of causes

There are several conceptual distinctions which may be of help to get a better grip on how causal explanations can inform our understanding of the emergence of terrorism. The notion of 'root causes' may be more useful if we distinguish between explanations of prevalence and explanations of incidents of terrorism. In this context, *prevalence* refers to the number of terrorist attacks in a country or area in relation to population size (e.g. by one million) during a certain time period (e.g. annual average of the previous 10 years). Thus, Pakistan has a far higher prevalence of terrorist attacks than, for example, Norway or Canada, and there are some fundamental political, economic, social and historical 'root causes' which may explain these differences (Engene, 2004). *Incidence* refers to each specific act of terrorism, carried out by certain individuals or groups of actors. There are obvious links between these two dimensions. Prevalence may be seen as an aggregation of individual attacks. The processes that lead to most individual attacks are also to some extent influenced by the structural and political conditions that facilitate a high prevalence of terrorist attacks. However, the connections between these two levels of explanation are complex.

What explains the high or low prevalence of terrorism in different countries or regions does not necessarily explain why a certain individual or group decides to carry out a specific terrorist attack. Although structural or political conditions may have a distinct motivational influence on some individuals who decide to engage in terrorism, others are mainly driven by more idiosyncratic or personal motives or circumstances (Nesser, 2015; Bjørgo, 2011). In most cases where individuals get involved with terrorist groups or acts of terrorism, their engagement may be understood as caused by a combination of structural or political conditions, on the one hand, and personal dispositions and experiences, on the other. To take this distinction further, it can be useful to differentiate between two different types of causes behind terrorism: *preconditions* and *precipitants* (Crenshaw, 1981; Bjørgo, 2005; Newman, 2006).

Preconditions are the conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of terrorism. These are usually relatively general and structural in character and can help to produce a range of social phenomena and expressions, of which terrorism is only one. Even if the preconditions exist, these are not in themselves sufficient to cause an outbreak of terrorism. Examples of the preconditions which may facilitate the emergence of terrorism include a lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law, illegitimate and corrupt national authorities (sometimes backed by foreign governments), discrimination based on ethnic or religious origin and a perception of social injustice.

Precipitants are a type of causes that far more directly influence the emergence of terrorism. These are the more specific incidents and situations that directly motivate or trigger an outbreak of terrorism. Such trigger events may be identified at macro as well as meso and micro levels, which is a further helpful distinction, though these three levels are connected in complex ways (Della Porta, 2013).

Macro factors relate to systemic conditions at the level of society, state, international relations or trans-national developments. Examples could be civil war or deep-rooted conflicts, invasion and occupation by foreign military forces, economic underdevelopment, bad governance and corruption penetrating the state at all levels, rapid modernisation or technological developments (like the rise of the internet and social media). Root causes of terrorism are often identified at this macro level (Bjørgo, 2005: 1–4).

Meso factors are conditions, developments and processes at an intermediate level, such as social movements, institutions, organisations and groups. Examples could be the activities of terrorist organisations, charismatic leaders who mobilize a mass following or peace movements.

Micro factors relate to individuals and face-to-face interaction in small groups. At this level of analysis we are interested in understanding why and how individuals and cliques of friends get radicalised and sometimes even engaged in violent activism – and what can be done to prevent this negative development.

An illustration of how these factors and different levels can link together can be seen in Table 5.1. This was provided by Schmid (2005), who pulled together a range of factors which can increase the likelihood of terrorism occurring. The table is useful because it highlights the complex range of factors that can be involved, a complexity which adds to the difficulty of reliably identifying the impact of any one factor.

The boundaries between the macro, meso and micro levels are not sharp. Moreover, it is important to understand how developments at the macro level (e.g. a military invasion or other major political development) may impact on the meso and micro levels, such as giving rise to militant movements and individual radicalisation (Della Porta, 2009: 67–68; 2013). Sometimes, events at meso (or even micro) levels may also have macro-level impact, such as the publication of the Mohammad cartoons in a Danish newspaper (discussed further below). Another example is how news and footage from civil wars in Somalia, Syria and Iraq have inspired young people from all over the world to volunteer as foreign fighters in these war theatres. Although factors and processes at individual and group levels obviously have been significant, internet-based social media have served to connect these levels in ways that make events taking place far away come very close to these individuals.

One example of a triggering event at the macro level is how the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 provoked young Muslims in countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark into planning, and, on occasion, carrying out acts of terrorism. A similar provocative event which started at the meso level was the publication of the Mohammad cartoons in Denmark (and later in other countries). This small event turned out to have macro-level impact, triggering a wave of riots and acts of terrorism in large parts of the Muslim world and in Scandinavia, targeting Denmark, the *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper and the cartoonists in particular. This is unlikely to have happened without the existence of some preconditions at the macro level, including built up frustration about how the West treats the Muslim world. In addition, a number of different actors saw they could benefit from whipping up and exploiting this atmosphere for their own purposes by inciting riots and terrorist attacks. The publication of the Mohammad cartoons can explain how the Scandinavian countries – from being one of the least terrorism-exposed regions in the world – by the turn of the decade were now among the parts of Europe most at risk (Hegghammer, 2012: 9). One important precipitant at the meso level is

Table 5.1 Indicators pointing towards the formation of terrorist groups and the occurrence of terrorist campaigns

Root causes	*Accelerators*
1. Lack of democracy	1. Counter-terrorist campaign causing many victims 'calling' for revenge and retaliation
2. Lack of rule of law	2. Humiliation of the group or its supporters
3. Lack of good governance	3. Threat
4. Lack of social justice	4. Peace talks
5. The backing of illegitimate regimes	5. Elections
6. High/rising distributive inequality	6. Symbolic dates
7. Historical experience of violent conflict waging	
8. Support for groups using terrorist means	*Decelerators*
9. Vulnerability of modern democracies	1. Moderate counter-campaign using legitimate means
10. Failed states/safe havens outside state control	2. Loss of charismatic leaders/key resources/territory for retreat
Proximate causes	3. Essential concessions towards the terrorist constituencies' political demands
1. Escalatory counter-strategy	4. Responsible media coverage
2. Expectations of support group (esp. regarding diaspora)	
3. Declining support/rising support	*Precipitants*
4. Declining media coverage	1. Risk assessments of attacks
5. 'Successful' rival groups	2. Logistical preparations
6. Problems of internal group cohesion	3. De-legitimation of the enemy
7. Group leader's personal image strategy	4. Disappearance of key persons
8. De-escalating low intensity conflict	5. Rising interest in potential targets
9. Escalating violent political conflict	6. Increase of internal violence
10. Entrance of new actor in existing conflict situation	

Source: Schmid, 2005.

the existence of charismatic leaders able to translate widespread discontent and frustration into a political agenda for a violent struggle.

Thus, provocative incidents and actions at the macro or meso level can be the triggering precipitants behind violent radicalisation at an individual level. However, millions of people are exposed to these provocative events as well as the more structural conditions. Comparatively few are triggered to engage in extremist activities and violence. It is still a puzzle why these few do engage and the large majority does not. There is obviously no single straightforward answer (or cause) to that.

Considering some key factors

Economic factors

The role of economic factors in causing terrorism is complicated. There is a widely held assumption that poverty is a strong key root cause of terrorism, but the research evidence on this is surprisingly mixed. Some studies find a significant link between poverty and terrorism (e.g. Lai, 2007; Azam and Thelen, 2008), but most have identified only weak or ambivalent connections (e.g. Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Freytag *et al.*, 2011). The general consensus is that while poverty might play a role in causing terrorism, it is a much weaker one than most would expect, and in fact other factors seem to play a much more significant part.

If poverty was a direct cause, then surely most terrorists could reasonably be expected to come from poor backgrounds, and terrorism itself should be more common in poorer regions?

Neither of these claims, however, is true. Terrorism occurs across a spread of countries ranging from the richest nations to the most deprived. Table 5.2 below shows the 10 countries which suffered the highest levels of casualties as a result of terrorism during the years 1986–2002. This list includes some of the world's richest countries which boast very high levels of GDP per capita. None of the countries on the list could be described as desperately poor (Piazza, 2006).

Further, it is widely recognised that relatively few terrorists come from the most deprived backgrounds of their own communities. On the contrary, they are much more likely to come from what constitutes the middle and upper classes of their communities (bearing in mind that the middle class in a refugee camp will be very different to the middle class in a British city). Surveys have also found that support for terrorism tends to be stronger among the middle and upper classes than among the lower class. For example, Krueger and Maleckova's (2003) survey of 1,357 Palestinian adults in the West Bank and Gaza found that support for terrorism against Israeli civilians was stronger among professionals (43.3 percent) than among labourers (34.6 percent). Similarly, there was more support among those with secondary education (39.4 percent) than among illiterate respondents (32.3 percent). Other surveys elsewhere in the Middle East found that people who owned a computer or mobile phone were much more likely to express support for terrorism than respondents who did not own these items (Fair and Shepherd, 2006). In a Lebanese Shi'a sample, Haddad (2006) failed to find a significant link between income and support for Hezbollah, with support being spread across different social classes. Personal religiosity was the most significant predictor of support, followed to a smaller extent by satisfaction with the performance of the Lebanese government.

Population size

The larger the population of a country, the more likely it is to suffer from terrorism. Indeed, research suggests that population size alone is currently the best single predictor of terrorism we have. The effects of all other predictors are massively increased if they occur in a country with a big population (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009).

Why does population size matter? Two issues are probably important. First, the bigger the population, the harder it becomes for the State to keep track of everyone, including potential extremists. Sprawling cities with massive populations provide melting pots for extremists and radicals to disappear into. Second, there is a simple numbers game in operation. While the overall

Table 5.2 Top ten countries suffering casualties due to terrorism, 1986–2002

Country	*Casualties 1986–2002*	*Average GDP per Capita US$*	*2001 Human Development Index Rank*
Kenya	5,365	1,211	123 (Medium)
United States	4,011	27,816	6 (High)
India	2,779	2,358	115 (Medium)
Israel-Palestine	2,257	12,651	49 (High)
Sri Lanka	1,815	3,365	81 (Medium)
Iraq	1,646	3,413	106 (Medium)
Russian Federation	1,314	8,377	60 (Medium)
Saudi Arabia	1,037	10,348	68 (Medium)
United Kingdom	984	19,627	14 (High)
Colombia	835	5,615	62 (Medium)

Source: Piazza, 2006.

number of people in any population who are prepared to become terrorists is generally tiny, as the size of that overall population increases, so does the number of potential terrorists. Terrorist campaigns can be carried out by isolated loners or disconnected small groups, so the risk rises as the overall population increases.

Civil liberties and human rights

The more repressive a state becomes, the more likely it is that terrorism will emerge. Repression can be measured in a number of ways but can include the loss of civil liberties, the restriction of freedom of expression and an increase in human rights abuses. In a study looking at the experience of 97 countries over a 20-year period, it was found that those countries which became increasingly repressive during this time were also the ones most likely to witness the outbreak of terrorist violence (Piazza, 2006). Overall, the level of human rights abuses in a country is a far stronger predictor of terrorism than any of the economic-related measures that have been proposed.

Lack of political representation

Countries which curtail or severely restrict democratic politics are much more likely to produce internal terrorism. A simple measure of how many political parties are represented in the law-making institutions of government provides a surprisingly good predictor of future terrorism. The lower the number of parties which are present, the more likely it is that domestic terrorism will occur (Piazza, 2006). Similarly, a lack of representation in other arenas (such as a lack of workers' trade unions) also shows a link with increased violent extremism. In short, the more curtailed political representation is in any given society, the greater the risk of domestic terrorism erupting in that culture.

Contagion and media effects

The outbreak of terrorism in one country increases the risk that terrorist conflicts will also erupt in neighbouring countries (e.g. Lai, 2007; Blomberg and Hess, 2008). The terrorist groups are not necessarily the same or directly linked, rather it seems that the example of the neighbour inspires radical groups in nearby countries to take violent action. Proximity to an existing terrorist conflict is thus a risk factor for neighbouring states. It is often assumed that the media plays a significant role in the contagion process, but the ability of the media to spread terrorism has not always been accepted by experts. Initial research on the subject failed to find a link between media coverage and a rise in terrorism. While it was often assumed that media coverage did lead to more terrorism, the evidence for this in the 1970s and 1980s was very weak (Picard, 1986). While an increase in the overall level of terrorism was not found in this early research, what was found was a clear contagion effect: terrorism *tactics* which received more coverage were more likely to be copied in the future. The overall amount of attacks was unchanged, but terrorist groups did show a shift towards the types of attacks which received more media attention (Weimann and Winn, 1994).

More recent research has suggested the effect is now even stronger possibly due to the impact of 24-hour news channels, the internet and social media. Reviewing terrorist attacks from 1998 to 2004 suggests that increased coverage is now followed by an increase in the overall amount of terrorism (Rohner and Frey, 2007). Further, the link seems to be reciprocal: more attacks leads to more coverage, and more coverage is then followed by a further increase in attacks.

Overall, the evidence available today suggests that both a contagion effect exists – increased media coverage of a particular type of terrorist tactic leads to an increase in similar types of attacks being carried out – and that a magnitude effect exists – more coverage is linked with more attacks happening overall. Exactly how strong these effects are is still not entirely clear, especially given the mixed nature of some findings. Nevertheless, given the intense interest the media often shows with regard to terrorism, the findings make for sobering thought.

Radicalisation and micro causes

Most research on micro causes is based on individual cases of people who actually became radicalized and engaged in terrorist activities. When rewinding their life stories, the turning points are often easy to identify, and are frequently found to be a personal crisis of some sort (e.g. the death of a family member, the loss of a job or other non-political events, cf. Nesser, 2010) or that they were socially and spiritually alienated and in some form of distress (Sageman, 2004: 98). However, when 'running the movie forward', it is virtually impossible to identify those few who turn into the pathway towards violent extremism from those rather similar persons who follow the mainstream.

Research on individual radicalisation and engagement in violent extremism points to the pivotal role of social relationships in these processes (Horgan, 2014; Nesser, 2015; Sageman, 2004). Although a few lone-actor terrorists engage in violent activities alone, even they are usually inspired by some kind of militant ideological community, virtual or in real life (e.g. Gill, 2015). However, for the majority of those engaging in militant activities, the social ties to radical individuals and groups are the means through which they become engaged in militancy and often come prior to their own radicalisation at the level of ideology and acceptance of violence.

One of the pitfalls of trying to explain the emergence of and engagement in terrorism through the notion of causes is that it tends to miss the importance of agency in these processes. The discussion on whether the emergence of terrorism can be understood mainly as an outcome of root causes or as an outcome of individual processes of radicalisation and choices relates to a more general debate in the social sciences over what is more important in shaping human behaviour – structure or agency. *Structure* may be seen as the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available, whereas *agency* is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Whereas some social theorists have argued for the primacy of structure over agency (e.g. the traditions of Karl Marx and structural functionalists like Emile Durkheim), methodological individualists, interactionalists and rational choice theorists (e.g. the tradition of Max Weber) have argued that structure is merely the aggregate of individual actions, and that social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions and the intentional states that motivate the individual actors. Other theorists try to demonstrate how agency interacts with structure (Giddens, 1984) or see the relationships between structure and agency as a dialectical one (Berger and Luckman, 1967). This is probably a more fruitful approach also when we try to understand the emergence of terrorism.

Some conclusions on root causes

The issue of root causes of terrorism will remain a significant source of both research and policy attention, if only because terrorist conflicts can be so bloody, protracted and expensive. As early as 2008, analysts estimated that the 9/11 attacks and the government reactions to them had cost the US economy over $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). In such a context, any insights

which provide some hope of avoiding (or detecting at an early stage) similar future conflicts will have appeal.

The challenges for making progress in our understanding of the root causes of terrorism as we go forward revolve around two key factors. First, we need shared clarity on what we mean by 'terrorism'. We are unlikely to arrive at a widely agreed definition of terrorism shared evenly across a spectrum of research studies, but we can at least have clarity on how each study defines terrorism and what groups and conflicts are considered within that study's framework (and which ones are excluded). This can do much to help distil some of the white noise in reviews of root causes. The second key element is a need for shared clarity on what we mean by 'causes'. As we have seen in this chapter, causes can operate at different levels from large-scale geo-political processes to mundane individual-level personal factors. The relative importance of different causes varies enormously depending on the perspective taken not only in research terms but also in terms of policy interventions.

In the end, terrorism is too important a subject for us not to be interested in what causes it. The past decade alone has seen considerable progress in identifying the role and significance of a range of factors. Coming decades are likely to see a deepening sophistication in our understanding of terrorism's causes, insight which will hopefully play a positive role in avoiding and ameliorating future conflicts.

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6
STATE TERRORISM

Andrew Silke

Introduction

Can states be terrorists? States certainly commit acts of violence, and indeed, state violence is routinely far more lethal and destructive than the violence carried out by non-state actors. In the 20th century, wars killed an estimated 231 million people, and the biggest death tolls usually occurred when fully fledged states slugged it out with each other (Leitenberg, 2006). Up to 15 million people were killed in the First World War. That slaughter was dwarfed by the Second World War which resulted in as many as 75 million deaths. Civil wars fought between governments and their opponents account for a hefty proportion of the remaining deaths, with, for example, the Chinese Civil War alone causing 6.2 million deaths between 1946 and 1950.

Formidable losses also occurred when states turned their power to repressing elements of their own population, usually in an effort to utterly crush dissent. Internal repression in the Soviet Union between 1920 and 1956 resulted in at least 35 million deaths, considerably more than the USSR suffered in its titanic struggle with Germany in World War II. Even this figure, though, pales when placed against those killed within China between 1950 and 1976, as government policies resulted in even greater suffering with the deaths of nearly 47 million people (many through starvation).

For some analysts, these campaigns of internal repression against their own citizens represent 'State Terrorism'. In trying to understand state terrorism, we find ourselves inevitably pulled back into the definitional debate on what terrorism itself is. Given that there is still no resolution on that issue (e.g. Richards, 2015), it's not surprising then there is also enormous controversy around the concept of state terrorism. Blakeley (2009, p. 15) suggested there were four key elements which determined if violence was state terrorism:

1. there must be a deliberate act of violence against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such an act if a climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state violence;
2. the act must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries and private security agents;
3. the act or threat of violence is intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim; and
4. the target audience is forced to consider changing their behaviour in some way.

The word 'terrorism' originally emerged to describe exactly such violence as outlined by Blakeley. The phrase first appears in the 18th century when the government of revolutionary France butchered up to 40,000 of its own citizens as part of a 'Reign of Terror'. The purpose of the slaughter was primarily to crush internal dissent. The chief architect of the campaign, Maximilien Robespierre, summed up the aims succinctly:

> We must smother the internal and external enemies of the Republic or perish with it; now in this situation, the first maxim of your policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people's enemies by terror.
>
> *(Robespierre, 1794)*

The 20th century has seen a bloody series of reigns of terror which have frequently escalated to outright campaigns of genocide. The scale of this violence has dwarfed that of non-State groups. Indeed, the enormous difference in scale has raised the question of whether it is sensible to try to analyse state terrorism and non-state terrorism within similar frameworks. Most critics of the concept of state terrorism focus on this point (e.g. Laqueur, 2003). For example, the purges, pogroms and genocides committed by the regimes of Adolf Hitler in Germany, Joseph Stalin in Russia and Pol Pot in Cambodia, are all cited by some as examples of state terrorism. However, is it realistic to consider the killing fields of Pol Pot and the concentration camps of Nazi Germany as being in the same league as, for example, the Provisional IRA's bombing campaign in the United Kingdom? Probably not. As Richard English (2016, p. 136) recently observed, while both states and non-state actors use terrorism, 'the dynamics and scale respectively involved in the two processes are divergent and therefore difficult to study synoptically.'

One of the best efforts to resolve the issue of how best to frame state terrorism, and how it can meaningfully relate to non-state terrorism, is provided by Dekmejian (2007). He argued that both should be seen as different points on a spectrum of violence, and his framework is described in Figure 6.1.

The key features which determine where an act or campaign of violence lies on the spectrum are, first, whether the state is the target or the perpetrator of the violence, and then, second, the question of scale. At one end of the spectrum are acts of violence Dekmejian labelled individual terrorism – or what would currently more likely be labelled as lone-actor terrorism. At the opposite end of the spectrum are acts of genocide committed by states against either internal or foreign populations. State terrorism under Dekmejian's model is not the same as genocide. Crucially, it is smaller in scale and tends to involve repression rather than wholesale extermination.

This spectrum is useful not only because it helps distinguish between different types of state and non-state terrorism, but also because it can reflect the important differences in scale, e.g. so that genocide is not carelessly classed in the same category as repression. The spectrum also reflects that the common usage of the term 'terrorism' has drifted away from its early origins. This has certainly happened with regard to terrorism which while unquestionably originally applied to something that governments did, has now in the wider public consciousness been increasingly viewed more as something non-state actors do. This shift to non-state actors happened early, and by 1868, for example, many American newspapers routinely described the violence carried out by the newly emerged Ku Klux Klan as 'terrorism' (Hurst, 1993). This change towards seeing terrorism as something non-state groups did gathered pace, and by the end of the 20th century, among the wider public the word was used almost exclusively within the context of non-state groups. Bearing in mind the endless controversy which sabotages efforts to reach a widely agreed definition of terrorism, we should expect that 'state terrorism' too will continue to resist easy definition.

Direction of Violence	Anti-state ←				→ State
Magnitude	Micro				Macro
Type	Individual terrorism	Subnational terrorism	Transnational terrorism	State terrorism against domestic and transnational opponents	Politicide and genocide
Perpetrators	Assassins Bombers	Ethnic nationalists Religious militants Ideological radicals Hybrid organisations	Transnational terrorist organisations and states	Secret police Special forces Military Paramilitary Other state sponsored forces	Secret police Special forces Military Paramilitary Other state sponsored forces

Figure 6.1 The spectrum of political violence.
Source: Dekmejian, 2007.

Characteristics of state terrorism

Many states have unquestionably engaged directly or indirectly in terroristic violence. A wide variety of governments, for example, have sponsored terrorist groups in different parts of the world over the past 50 years. In the 1980s, for example, Libya secretly shipped an estimated 130 tonnes of weapons and munitions to the Provisional IRA. This haul included at least five tonnes of Semtex-H explosive which became a key ingredient in IRA bombs over the following years (Bowyer Bell, 2000). Such a massive injection of weaponry virtually guaranteed that the IRA would have the means to continue their terrorist campaign for decades to come if they wished (and indeed, some of the Libyan munitions have fallen under the control of dissident republican groups today, though the old Semtex has lost much of its potency). Libya did not really care about the IRA's ultimate aim of a united Ireland, but fully realised that the IRA's violence would prove troublesome for the UK government. Indeed, the Libyans demonstrated their utter indifference to the politics of Northern Ireland by also supplying loyalist paramilitaries with weapons – weapons which would be used by the loyalists to try to kill IRA members and their supporters. Having supplied two sides of the conflict with weapons, the Libyans were content to sit back and watch sparks fly, knowing that the ultimate cost of the conflict would have to be borne by the British government (the real target of Libyan ire).

Libyan involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict illustrates an important point: many states have found that terrorist groups are a very useful way to wage a proxy war against powerful enemies. In the Middle East, both Syria and Iran have invested very heavily in sponsoring the Lebanese-based group Hezbollah (Gunning, 2007). In return for substantial funds, weapons and training, Iran and Syria have both been able to prod Hezbollah into attacking Israel. Israel is too formidable for either country to seriously consider attacking directly, but Hezbollah gives both states a useful proxy to harass Israel at low risk to themselves, knowing that major Israeli retaliations for any attacks will usually focus on Lebanon and Hezbollah.

States too also continue to engage in types of violence which, if they had been committed by a non-state group, would widely be seen as terrorism. Perhaps one of the best examples of this occurred in June 1985, when the Greenpeace ship 'Rainbow Warrior' was bombed by French secret service agents as it lay in harbour in New Zealand. The ship was attacked in order to stop it interfering with nuclear tests the French were planning in the South Pacific,

and one crew member was killed in the attack. The dead man, Fernando Pereira, was a photographer who drowned while trying to save his equipment. Two French agents were captured by the New Zealand authorities, though at least 11 others escaped (Veitch, 2010). The two who were captured were convicted of supplying the explosives for the bombing. Initially they were both sentenced to 10 years in prison. Diplomatic wrangling, however, saw France pay millions in compensation to the government of New Zealand, the family of the killed man, and eventually also to Greenpeace. As part of this process, eight months after their convictions, the two prisoners were secretly handed over to French control and were moved to a detention facility in the Pacific. Within two years, both were returned to France and unconditionally freed. This happened without any consultation with the New Zealand government, but realistically the duo's early release must have been anticipated as probable once they were handed over to French control. The event predictably soured relations between the two countries for some time, but it also raised very challenging questions around the legality and morality of state terrorism (Clark, 1988). For example, the United States refused to help New Zealand in its efforts to track down other members of the French team responsible for the bombing. There was also intense disappointment on the New Zealand side when it emerged that the United Kingdom had had intelligence that the bombing would happen but failed to warn New Zealand. The bombing and the lack of support from states New Zealand had traditionally regarded as allies had a significant impact on the country's foreign policy. Indeed, one of the initially unanticipated consequences of the bombing was a very distinct chilling of relations between the United States and New Zealand. The bombing contributed significantly to New Zealand introducing a Nuclear Free Zone law in 1987, a law which in effect had most impact with regard to nuclear-capable US Navy vessels which were subsequently denied entry to New Zealand ports.

A more recent campaign concerns scientists working as part of Iran's nuclear industry. Amid fears that Iran is actively trying to develop nuclear weapons, a number of her scientists have been killed in a series of high-profile attacks (Hecker and Milani, 2015). These assassinations were almost certainly the work of a foreign government, with Israel being the most likely culprit. In November 2010 Majid Shahriari, who was based in the nuclear engineering department of Tehran's Shahid Beheshti University, was killed when motorcyclists drove alongside his car and attached a magnetised bomb. Further killings followed. The attacks are clearly designed to undermine Iran's nuclear programme, both through the direct loss of the scientists who are killed and seriously injured, but also through the impact the killings have on Iran's wider scientific community. Surviving experts know they are under serious threat if they continue working within the nuclear programme. The campaign then represents classic terrorism: not only are people killed, but a stark message is sent to a much wider audience.

When does counterterrorism become state terrorism?

Other chapters in this volume examine in detail some of the grimmer and grittier aspects of counterterrorism. 'Dirty war' tactics in particular have frequently been labelled as de facto state terrorism by many critics. This raises the challenging question – at what point does counterterrorism descend into state terrorism?

The use of targeted killings – or extra-legal assassinations – provides a relevant case in point. This topic is dealt with in detail later in this volume, but to quickly highlight some of the issues, we can consider one of the more famous campaigns of systematic assassination. The killing of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics by Black September terrorists was one of the most high-profile terrorist incidents of the 20th century. Israeli governments have traditionally

been more open to using direct military force in response to terrorism, and their response to the massacre was predictably aggressive. Three days after the final shoot-out in Munich, Israel launched major military strikes against Lebanon and Syria. The Israeli air force bombed ground targets in both countries and also engaged in dog-fights with Syrian jets. On the ground, Israeli troops pushed into Lebanon to confront Palestinian terrorists near the border. It was the largest military action taken by Israel since the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but it was not the only action authorised by the government in reprisal for Munich.

Behind the scenes, the government quietly authorised Operation 'Wrath of God'. This was a deliberate and systematic campaign of assassination targeting all the individuals believed to be involved in the planning and carrying-out of the Munich attack. Wrath of God was not about capturing or imprisoning those responsible. It was purely and simply about killing those the Israelis could find and terrorising those they could not (Hunter, 2001). In order to accomplish this task, a specialist assassination unit – known as the kidon – was activated comprising just under 40 highly trained members.

Death warrants were issued for 35 people believed to have been involved with or connected to the Munich attack, and the kidon members were allowed enormous latitude in their operations. Less than five weeks after Munich, the first of the targets, Wael Zaitter, a cousin of Yasser Arafat and a principal organiser of PLO terrorism in Europe, was gunned down at his apartment near Rome. Over the following months, the assassination squads killed several more people on the list, and the following year in a major operation on 10 April 1973, a large commando raid was launched against Palestinians based in Beirut. Over 100 Palestinians were killed in the attack, including a number on the Wrath of God death list.

The attacks continued over the following years as the Israelis continued to hunt down those on the list. There was a major setback in July 1973 when kidon mistakenly killed Ahmed Bouchiki in Norway. Bouchiki was an innocent Moroccan-born waiter living in Lillehammer, Norway. Israeli intelligence, however, mistakenly believed that he was Ali Hassan Salameh, a senior PLO official and leader of Force 17, Yasser Arafat's personal bodyguard. Significantly, the Israelis believed that Salameh had been involved in the planning of the Black September attack against Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. After the unfortunate Bouchiki was shot dead by the hit-team, six members of the Israeli squad were captured by Norwegian police before they could flee the country. Five were convicted for their involvement in Bouchiki's murder (the two actual shooters, though, managed to escape safely to Israel). The five, however, received very light prison sentences given the circumstances, and all were released from custody within two years.

Wrath of God continued until 1979, when assassins finally managed to kill the elusive Ali Hassan Salameh with a car bomb in Beirut. One hundred thousand people came to his funeral, while the widow of one of the Munich athletes publicly thanked the assassins for what they had done (Taylor, 1993).

From the Israeli perspective, the killing of Bouchiki had been an accident. It was not the intention to kill civilians but only individuals who had some connection to militant Palestinian groups. In that regard, there are some echoes later in the 'Rainbow Warrior' bombing where the death of Fernando Pereira, too, had not been specifically intended. Nevertheless, having made the decision to use violence, both governments created the risk that lives were in peril.

Recent history throws up many other examples of similar tactics. The use of drone strikes to kill militants has become commonplace. Torture, rendition and detention without trial have all been regularly used in recent decades by liberal democracies which otherwise have a good track record for respecting human rights. This use has proved justifiably contentious and controversial,

but it begs the question, at what point do counterterrorism activities slip beyond the pale and become a form of terrorism in themselves?

Perhaps one of the most useful frameworks to help identify this tipping point is the one suggested by Alex Schmid, a researcher who has long grappled with the definition problem. Schmid draws attention to the fact that while there remains considerable ambiguity about what exactly constitutes terrorism, there does exist broad international agreement about what actions count as war crimes. He argues that this agreement should be exploited when attempting to identify what is terrorism and what is something else:

> I believe that Western policy-makers would do well to choose a restricted legal definition of terrorism as 'peacetime equivalents of war crimes'. Such a definition might exclude some forms of violence and coercion (such as attacks on the military, hijackings for escape and destruction of property) currently labelled 'terrorism' by some governments. However, a narrow and precise definition of terrorism is likely to find broad support than one that includes various forms of violent dissent and protest short of terrorist atrocities. Other, lesser forms of political violence (e.g., against property) will still be illegal by national laws. However, terrorist offences could be considered federal crimes against humanity, requiring special treatment.
>
> *(Schmid, 1993)*

Counterterrorism too could be assessed within a similar rubric. If a state was to carry out or sanction an activity in wartime that would count as a war crime, a similar act in peace-time – for example, the use of torture on prisoners – should be considered state terrorism. This might mean, however, that some contentious activities such as targeted killings and detention without trial would not be considered state terrorism. An additional complication comes from the overarching framework states try to adopt in countering terrorism. Most Western democracies, for example, favour a criminal justice model of counterterrorism, where terrorism is just another form of crime, and terrorists are regarded and treated as criminal offenders. In cases where states adopt an increasingly militarised approach to counterterrorism, the waters quickly get murkier. Tactics such as drone strikes, assassination, detention without trial, etc., start to enter the fray with the result that the state can quickly find itself distorted into unusual positions as it tries to create new categories to avoid leaving terrorists in just a criminal justice model or in a purely militarised model. The United States after 9/11 provides the most potent example, as government went to extraordinary lengths to keep domestic counterterrorism pitched firmly in a criminal justice approach, while international counterterrorism efforts were moved into a quasi-militarised framework (partly linked to ongoing military conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere). Leading, perhaps inevitably, to a range of high-profile abuses.

State terrorism within academic study

It is fair to say that state terrorism has traditionally been relatively ignored within terrorism research. In the five years prior to 9/11, for example, not a single article on state terrorism was published within the two leading terrorism studies journals. Indeed, in the entire 1990s only two articles on state terrorism were published by these journals (Silke, 2004). Critics of terrorism research have frequently flagged up the lack of research on state terrorism as being one the key failings of the field.

Herman and O'Sullivan (1989), for example, argued that the lack of research on state terrorism simply reflected that most research on terrorism is carried out solely for the benefit of

the state. This meant that a lot of important research questions were quietly (but systematically) ignored because the answers may be too uncomfortable for government. In their polemic book, Herman and O'Sullivan argued that research efforts are focused on providing support and encouragement for the authorities' view of the terrorist problem and what the government feels is the right approach to tackling extremism. The case is made that research and researchers who ask the awkward questions are frozen out of funding and thus find it difficult to carry out future work. In contrast, researchers who go along with the government line receive what little funding is available and are able to establish and sustain the few specialist institutes and centres devoted to the analysis and study of terrorism.

Concerns about the failings of much terrorism research contributed eventually to the development of the sub-field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). Emerging in 2007, CTS flagged that a variety of issues had not been adequately addressed by mainstream terrorism research. Attention was drawn in particular to the low quality of much research, but also to the dominant perspective of seeing terrorism as something only non-state actors did (e.g. Jackson, 2007). This left state terrorism relegated to the sidelines. As Jackson, Smith and Gunning (2009, p. 225) argued, there was 'a real need… to examine the nature and causes of state terrorism, particularly that by Western democratic states'. Elsewhere, Jackson (2009, p. 70) noted that:

> An important consequence of these conceptual practices are that terrorism comes to be understood and studied solely as a form of violence carried out by non-state groups, and terrorism by states remains unstudied and mostly invisible… When state terrorism is discussed, it is usually limited to descriptions of 'state-sponsored terrorism' by so-called 'rogue states'. Further, the subsequent silence on the direct use of terrorism by state actors within the Terrorism Studies literature underpins a mostly unspoken belief that Western liberal democratic states in particular never engage in terrorism as a matter of policy, but only occasionally in error or misjudgement.

The lack of research takes us back to the complicating problem of defining state terrorism, and again to how for some researchers, state terrorism is not a straightforward companion of non-state terrorism. Schmid (2011) highlighted that this meant that research on state terrorism might be covered much more extensively elsewhere, with human rights studies being raised as an example. Others have highlighted that CTS in general underestimated mainstream terrorism researchers' interest in state terrorism, and flagged up that some scholars portrayed as hostile to research on state terrorism actually published serious and substantial work on the subject. Paul Wilkinson, for example, was heavily critiqued for a pro-state bias in early CTS publications, but as a range of more recent reviews have highlighted, a closer examination of his work shows a strong awareness and concern with state terrorism along lines very compatible with a great deal of the CTS perspective (e.g. Lynch and Ramsay, 2013; English, 2016).

Conclusions

Placing state terrorism appropriately within the context of how we understand terrorism in general is incredibly difficult. As highlighted by Dekmejian and others, there are important differences between campaigns of violence orchestrated by states, non-state groups and individuals. Already murky waters are muddied even further when consideration is given to how some counterterrorism policies and tactics can themselves descend into apparent terrorism.

This chapter has highlighted a variety of frameworks to try to better understand state terrorism and how it relates to other types of political violence. As well as exploring some examples

from the history of the past 50 years, the chapter has also highlighted some ways forward for how we can think about state terrorism in the future. Finally, we have also considered the limits of trying to place state terrorism too closely in the same camp as other types of violence, and that ultimately, we need to try to recognise where state terrorism is distinctive, and what the consequences of that distinctiveness might be.

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7

NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

James J.F. Forest

Terrorist groups pursuing a nationalist or separatist ideology have much in common with other kinds of terrorists. They incorporate similar kinds of tactics as other terrorists, attacking government and non-government targets, killing and wounding scores of victims, all in the pursuit of political objectives. They are typically motivated to engage in terrorism by a range of sociopolitical grievances that could include injustice, government ineptitude, endemic corruption, and repression. However, there is one vital distinction to keep in mind: *territorial control* is far more important to nationalists and separatists than it is for any other category of terrorism.

Among most ideological types of terrorists—including anarchists, religious extremists (from Christian anti-abortionists to Islamic jihadists), right-wing, left-wing, animal rights and environmental extremists—we can find groups and individuals who portray their rationalization for violence in global terms, and may even consider themselves to be part of an international movement. In comparison, nationalists and separatists have a significantly domestic focus: the lines drawn on a geopolitical map, and the power to shape the future of a specifically defined territory, are of critical importance. Their demands for distinctive or unified statehood are generally how we distinguish this type of terrorism from others who are driven primarily by political philosophies or a desire for social or policy changes.

The ideologies of nationalism and separatism

The objectives of nationalist or separatist movements are often rooted in grievances such as injustice (real or perceived), discrimination, and marginalization suffered by a social or political minority. In some instances, a small proportion of a population within a country may suffer repression from the government and/or the majority population, and over time this leads to the rise of demands for an independent nation-state. As Byman (1998, p. 155) notes, "Brutal repression is often the handmaiden of successful nationalism." Discriminatory government policies could include limiting access to education, jobs, and land ownership based on ethnicity or religious affiliation. In some cases, we have seen policies that encourage unbalanced economic growth between urban and rural, and that disadvantage one specific segment of a population, leading them to become disenchanted with their political system and leaders and to want something different. Among poor rural peasants in parts of a country where public investment has been comparatively low, it is common to find disproportionate levels of unemployment and

illiteracy, human rights abuses, and a lack of political representation. These social and political contexts are often created or left unresolved by the state; in many cases, the state is portrayed as unjustly keeping the members of a particular group from something that they feel is rightfully theirs.

For example, it is not uncommon for Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basques in Spain, or Tamils in Sri Lanka to see themselves as a threatened or ill-treated minority, leading them to rationalize the need for a separate state of their own. The same holds true for Muslim groups in Kashmir, and Sikh separatist groups who were responsible for terrorist attacks in the Punjab region of northwest India for about 20 years, beginning in the early 1980s (Reinares, 2005, p. 121). One of the most well-known terrorist groups of all time—the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—was established in 1964 with the goal of liberating Palestine from Israel. Many of the early leaders of the PLO, including Yasser Arafat, were inspired by a leftist philosophy grounded in the principles of mass struggle, opposition, and revolution (Baracskay, 2011), but quickly recognized the value of promoting Palestinian identity as a means to bring about cohesiveness and a sense of shared destiny among the local population (Schiff and Rothstein, 1972). The group adopted a strategy of advancing Palestinian nationalism through terrorism, and in doing so was able to draw the world's attention to the conflict in the Middle East.

A tendency to portray the sociopolitical environment in terms of "us" versus "them" fuels suspicion and distrust towards those members of the system who have more power and influence than others. Some leaders of nationalist or separatist groups have promoted a belief in the superiority of their cultural heritage (history, values, language, traditions, and so forth) among the minority population they represent (Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003). Asal and Reythemeyer (2008, p. 437) describe this as "othering"—a "process of clearly articulating groups and individuals that have a lesser moral or ethical status than members of… the racial, ethnic, geographic, or language group they purport to represent." For some adherents of this perspective, a conviction of moral superiority leads to a sense of entitlement and special destiny, a better future that is being intentionally blocked by other members of society.

Nationalist and separatist movements are thus fueled by a range of strong emotions including fear, prejudice, and self-determination. Meanwhile, the values and principles of liberty and justice for all have been promoted by Western democracies, most prominently the United States, adding ideological fuel to the fire of those calling for independence. This was most poignantly seen during the anti-colonial movements during the first half of the 20th century, particularly in Africa and Asia. And yet, there are also significant constraints to how far the pursuit of independent nationhood may be acceptable to the international community. The way in which we as human beings have organized our macro-level ways of dealing with each other globally, often referred to as the "Westphalian nation-state system," was created in 1648 when representatives of European states signed a series of documents that became known as the Treaty of Westphalia. These documents established several principles and traditions that over time made nation-states the primary institutionalized actors in a global system of relations, while other non-state entities (especially religion) saw its power and influence significantly reduced.

Territorial integrity—with international political boundaries—was recognized by all delegates, and the overall objective of Westphalia was to craft a way of maintaining peace between these states. Two very important concepts to emerge from this period were national self-determination and sovereignty. In other words, it was agreed that a state should be allowed to make its own decisions; further, everything that takes places within a state's borders is considered to be its own business, and meddling in another country's internal affairs is considered to be a violation of its sovereignty. These principles underscore a wide variety of debates and decisions

made today at the United Nations, World Trade Organization, G20, and other organizations in which the members are nation-states.

Today's nationalist and separatist movements aspire to follow in the footsteps of the 34 new states that have been founded since 1990 (the majority of them created by the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). Some relatively new states were created by joining together two former ones, such as Germany (formerly East and West Germany) and Yemen (formerly North and South Yemen), while four successfully seceded and gained independence from their former states—East Timor (from Indonesia), Namibia (from South Africa), Eritrea (from Ethiopia), and South Sudan (from Sudan). However, as noted later in this chapter, political violence (including terrorism) has not played a prominent role in the successful creation of most new states over the past half-century.

In general, the political ideologies of nationalism and separatism are rooted in widely supported ideals of self-determination and supported by a historical record which indicates that independent statehood is not an impossible goal. However, the structural and political barriers to realizing the aspirations of independent statehood may seem virtually insurmountable for a small ethnic minority within a particular society. A group of people today who may aspire for a sovereign state of their own—like Basques in Spain, Kurds in Turkey, or Chechens in Russia—face tremendous hurdles in bringing that vision to reality. In the Kashmir region of India, various nationalist and separatist movements (many of which, but not all, have also been Islamist) have been seeking an independent state since the 1950s. In each of these cases, the governments of Spain, Turkey, Russia, or India do not have a vested interest in allowing self-determination and autonomous geographic territory for these ethnically identified groups within their countries. And the international community is often reluctant to recognize any self-declared "states" like the failed efforts of Somaliland or Kurdistan.

As a result of the significant obstacles to achieving independent statehood, some nationalist or separatist groups or movements have come to rationalize and justify violence as the only means by which they may acquire the power that will bring about the changes they seek. Among these insurgent groups and movements, the tactics and strategies of asymmetric warfare (including terrorism) have been embraced as necessary for confronting the more powerful government forces. The remainder of this chapter will focus on this small but important category of nationalist and separatist entities.

Political violence and terrorism among nationalist and separatist movements

In 1961, Frantz Fanon—a French Algerian doctor—published a groundbreaking book, *Wretched of the Earth*, that argues that Western powers had dehumanized non-Western people by destroying their cultures and replacing them with Western values. In his view, colonized masses suffered a perpetual identity crisis and were forced to deny their heritage. Therefore, he argued, the only course of action possible was guerilla warfare revolution—essentially, achieving freedom can be seen as inherently violent.

During the 1960s, the global environment was awash with various kinds of political activism and turmoil, with widespread protests in many countries demanding greater civil rights and self-determination. As noted earlier, injustice—real or perceived—is one of the most common characteristics of the grievances that animate nationalists and separatists.

Fanon's central argument about the necessity of violence became rapidly popular among a relatively small number of anti-colonial, nationalist, and separatist movements throughout the world, many of them fueled by an overarching concern about the contours of the geopolitical map and a burning desire for the power to control a specific, clearly defined physical territory.

Some have called for a wholesale redrawing of the map, with a new geopolitical entity carved out of an existing one. In other cases, nationalists have wanted to change an ethnically heterogeneous nation-state into an ethnically homogeneous one, essentially forcing out of the territory anyone who is not of a specific ethnic background.

Leaders of these movements portrayed the current situation as not only unjust but also intolerable, arguing that change, perhaps even violent change, is necessary (Homer-Dixon, 2002). Acts of violence were characterized as justifiable retaliation against the established government or members of the majority (Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003). As Fernando Reinares (2005, p. 120) notes, one of the underlying objectives of this violence has been "to affect the distribution of power and social cohesion within a given state jurisdiction." Leaders of these movements also promoted a strong sense of "othering"—drawing on the insecurities and fear among members of a community to argue that they were profoundly threatened by "others." This was most notably the case among a unique sub-category of nationalist groups known as "ethno-nationalist" or "ethnic terrorism."

Ethnic identity has often played an important role in the ideological aspirations, membership, and support networks of groups pursuing a nationalist or separatist political agenda. As Daniel Byman (1998) has illustrated in his research, "ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence carried out for ideological, religious, or financial motives," largely because the focus of ethnic terrorist groups includes "forging a distinct ethnic identity" apart from the state and "fostering ethnic mobilization." Groups in this category attempt to forge a national identity and mobilize an ethnically identifiable community; acts of political violence are used to make a statement about the group's identity, while also polarizing other members of that ethnicity and forcing them to either ally with the terrorists or oppose them (Byman, 1998). This focus on exclusivity and othering means that, almost without exception, membership in an ethnonationalist terrorist group requires being born with a specific ethnic identity.

In responding to these acts of political violence, governments have sometimes resorted to a form of (mainly unproductive) harsh punishment towards an ethnic group. This, in turn, can mobilize more support for the terrorist group among the broader population (Byman, 1998, p. 155). Some ethnic nationalist groups have even determined that provoking a harsh response from the government can be a beneficial goal to pursue: force the government to lash out blindly, they argue, and create a backlash that would increase popular support for our call for self-determination. For example, Byman describes how the Jewish extremist group Irgun sought to conduct operations against the British occupying forces of Palestine in an effort to compel the British security forces to intern, interrogate, and otherwise harass the Jewish population as a whole. As noted earlier, the grievances that animate many of these nationalist groups are already often grounded in perceived injustice, discrimination, and marginalization suffered by a minority within a population. Thus, a group's incorporation of this "provoking" strategy can emphasize their own perceived justification for violence among a broader population. Further, in some extreme instances—like the Kurds in Iraq under Saddam Hussein—an ethnic group has suffered brutal repression, and thus in their eyes the only solution for their survival is a nation-state of their own.

Nationalist (and especially ethno-nationalist) groups can also tap into potential fundraising and recruitment streams through their diaspora in other countries. They will routinely attempt to convince members of their diaspora that they have a "duty" to "support the freedom fighters" back in the home country by providing weapons, finances, logistical support, and sometimes new recruits. A broad range of groups have found some success particularly among diaspora members in rich Western countries, through pledge drives, contribution cans located next to cash registers in convenience stores and pubs, and direct door-to-door solicitation.

To sum up, when a cohesive ethnic identity is combined with a political ideology of nationalism or separatism, it has resulted in some of the most prominent terrorist movements in history, including groups formed among Basques in Spain, Kurds in Turkey, and Tamils in Sri Lanka. These and others described below reflect the central tenets of nationalist and separatist terrorism that are likely to be seen again in our future.

A global sampling of nationalist and separatist terrorism

Since the mid-1950s, hundreds of nationalist and separatist movements have come and gone. In several cases, multiple groups were formed and competed against each other for recognition by the local population as the legitimate "vanguard" of the movement. Some of them initially embraced various aspects of Marxist revolutionary ideologies, others called for democratic independence. Some began as non-violent movements but evolved to incorporate various forms of political violence—including terrorism. Of those that can be clearly labeled terrorist groups, a small number are particularly notorious in terms of lethality and longevity. While there is a fair amount of diversity among these groups, each one reflects the essential characteristics of nationalist or separatist political violence described earlier in this chapter.[1]

IRA/PIRA

Sometimes, nationalism may be seen in the form of irredentism, generally defined as the desire to merge a particular territory and its population with an already existing state—the classic example being the multi-decades struggle in Northern Ireland, led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its progeny, the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This group first emerged in 1922 as a nationalist militia committed to a unified and independent Ireland. After a lengthy anti-colonial war against the British, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had divided Ireland into two separate states: six provinces in the north became Northern Ireland, and the remaining 26 became the Republic of Ireland. This led to a civil war between pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions. By the end of this war, which the anti-treaty factions lost, the IRA was basically a group of fighters opposed to the treaty and the partition of Ireland. In 1925, the group added an ethnic component by calling for the revival of the Irish language and culture.

For decades in Northern Ireland, the Protestant (pro-U.K.) majority increasingly discriminated against the (anti-U.K.) Catholic minority, making it harder for Catholics to obtain good jobs, education, or political influence. Under Protestant Home Rule in Northern Ireland, Catholics were excluded from entire industries due to traditions of patronage within Protestant-run businesses (shipyards, linen mills, etc.) as well as civil service. They were also excluded from political representation. As a result, during the 1960s, a civil rights movement emerged, with marches and protests in places like Belfast. Some of these turned violent, with Protestant mobs attacking Catholic neighborhoods, and then Catholic mobs retaliating with their own attacks. The Protestant-dominated police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, violently cracked down on Catholics, but allowed Protestant mobs into Catholic neighborhoods.

Over the course of several years, the communal violence spiraled out of control, and British military forces were eventually called in to help improve the security situation. But then on January 30, 1972, in an event that became known as Bloody Sunday, British soldiers opened fire on a massive civil rights street protest, killing 13 unarmed Catholics. At this time, the IRA splintered into two groups, one that wanted to pursue a political route to resolving the conflict, and another that felt it would be necessary to take up a campaign of violence. This latter group called itself the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Both groups found a significant amount of support

throughout the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland and among communities in the Republic of Ireland. For the next 30 years, the PIRA became notorious for car bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, and other related activities. Their operations were funded by various kinds of criminal activity—including bank robberies, counterfeiting, and racketeering—as well as overseas donations, including money and weapons from the Irish diaspora in the U.S.

The PIRA targeted local police, soldiers, judges, prison guards, and other representatives of the government, as well as Protestant civilians and the paramilitary groups they had formed, like the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defense Association (groups which, it should be noted, engaged in various forms of terrorism on their part). In the early years, the PIRA used snipers, assassinations, and small bombs within Northern Ireland, but over time its operations expanded to the Republic of Ireland and to Great Britain. During the 1970s through the 1990s, their attacks ranged from the Prime Minister's residence to civilian areas such as pubs, shops, subway stations, factories, and shopping centers, though in those cases they often gave advanced warning in order to minimize civilian casualties. The group's largest bombing occurred in 1993 at London's financial district, which caused over $1 billion in damage.

The PIRA also became increasingly involved in the political process, through the political party Sinn Fein. This dual-track approach at pursuing its objectives gave us the phrase "the Armalite and the ballot box" in reference to the Armalite rifle which became a popular weapon of choice among the PIRA. In 1998, Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA signed the Good Friday Agreement, in which they vowed to use only peaceful means to pursue its goal of a united Ireland. However, not everyone agreed with the peace process, and this led to the emergence of dissident (or "splinter") groups such as the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA). The RIRA was responsible for the largest terrorist attack in Northern Ireland, when a car bomb detonated in the town of Omagh on August 15, 1998, killing 29 people and injuring more than 200. Over the past several years, the RIRA and CIRA have been responsible for several small bombings, kidnappings, and murder, though they are also known to be increasingly involved in criminal activity, including protection rackets and smuggling. The memberships of both groups are small, but they remain lethal examples of modern-day nationalist terrorism (Horgan and Morrison, 2011).

ETA

Another prominent example of a long-lasting nationalist movement responsible for terrorist attacks is *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA, translated from the Basque language into "Basque Homeland and Freedom") (BBC News, 2017; Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). Ethnic identity has played a much stronger role for this group than it has for the IRA and its splinter groups. ETA's ideology calls for an autonomous nation-state for the Basque people who live primarily in northern Spain and southwestern France. They share a common language (Euskara) and a history that dates back to centuries of territorial autonomy. Although Basque nationalism has deep roots, the foundations of ETA are traced to the Franco regime starting in the late 1930s. During these years, the Spanish state systematically suppressed all Basque cultural expressions, including use of the Basque language, and exiled their political organization, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The government also replaced Basque clergy, assassinated political dissidents, and encouraged Spanish-speaking migrant workers to flood the Basque regions of Spain. These were all part of the Spanish government's effort to unite Spain as one country under the same set of regulations, but this was seen by many Basques as oppression of their historic civic, cultural, and economic rights.

Throughout the 1950s, the PNV attempted to raise international condemnation of the way the Spanish government treated Basques, but to no avail. In 1959, a group of students launched a movement called Ekin (to act), which was initially focused on raising political and cultural awareness by spreading propaganda and flying the Basque traditional flag. They were critical of the more passive political efforts of the PNV and called for more activism in pursuit of Basque autonomy. Many of these students were inspired by national liberation movements in Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba, as well as Che Guevara's writings about a revolutionary vanguard and Frantz Fanon's writings about the need for violent action to liberate an oppressed people. These ideas, in time, led the movement's leaders to shift from promoting Basque culture within the Spanish state to fostering an entirely independent, sovereign Basque nation-state. And they began to use violence as a means to achieve this goal.

Victims of ETA attacks have most often been security forces, government officials, politicians, and other figures of authority. The first known victim of ETA attacks was a police chief, Meliton Manzanas, who was killed in 1968. In December 1973, ETA assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was killed when an underground bomb was detonated beneath his car. Overall, research indicates that ETA has killed over 800 Spanish government officials, judiciaries, security service members, and businessmen over a 50-year time span. Because of its campaign of terrorism, hundreds of ETA members are imprisoned throughout Spain and France.

Following the fall of the Franco regime in 1979, the new democratic government in Spain granted significant autonomy to the Basque region, including allowing for its own parliament and control over taxation in the region. However, this did not put an end to ETA's terrorist attacks. In fact, the group was responsible for killing 91 people in 1981 alone. In 1995, the group used a car bomb to attack Jose Maria Aznar, who had been an opposition politician during the 1970s. He survived the attack, however, and years later became Prime Minister of Spain. ETA specialized in targeted bombings and assassinations, but in recent years they were also responsible for more indiscriminate public attacks, like in December 2004 when they detonated bombs at five gas stations outside Madrid, and in 2008, when they bombed the Madrid airport, killing two and wounding over 50 and causing millions of dollars in damage.

It should also be noted that ETA has not been the only Basque nationalist group of concern here. Some, like the "Gazteriak" (meaning "youth" in Euskara) or the Iparretarrak (a separatist group in France), are focused on the Basque territory within their own respective nation-states; in France, the Basques want their own autonomy, as do the Basques within Spain. Meanwhile, another group—Gora Euskadi Askatuta—wants a new sovereign state to be established that is comprised of both French and Spanish Basque territories.[2] Further, it is also important to acknowledge that while Basque communities typically support nationalism or some form of independence, the majority do not support the use of violence toward achieving these goals. In January 2011, ETA declared a "permanent ceasefire," and while they have not held true to similar declarations in the past, there has been no return to violence as of this writing, fueling optimism and hope that one of Europe's most enduring nationalist conflicts may finally be at an end.

LTTE

In many cases, a nationalist or separatist movement will incorporate terrorism alongside more widespread use of conventional guerilla tactics. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a case in point. Their attacks against military forces in Sri Lanka were punctuated by terrorist attacks against civilians (primarily, but not exclusively, members of the Sinhalese majority population), and during the 1990s the LTTE even became the world's undisputed leader in the use of suicide bombing attacks.

There are significant religious and linguistic divisions between the majority Sinhalese (roughly 74 percent of the population) and the minority Tamils (roughly 12.5 percent); the Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists and speak Sinhala, whereas the Tamils are defined by their name-giving language and are mainly Hindus. During British colonial rule, the minority Tamil population was favored and became the most prosperous, educated, and employed group. However, once Sri Lanka was granted independence, the Buddhist majority Sinhalese took power and began to implement laws that took power away from the Tamils. From the 1950s through the 1970s, periodic outbreaks of communal violence between Sinhalese and Tamil communities exacerbated widespread feelings of insecurity and ethnic hatreds, which in turn fueled a surge in Sinhalese nationalism.

After Solomon Bandaranaike was elected prime minister in 1956, his government enacted a law to make Sinhala the state's sole official language, and also passed legislation that gave preference to Sinhalese over Tamils in access to government jobs, university admission, and other socioeconomic opportunities. In 1972, the country adopted Buddhism as the official state language. Responding to these events, several Tamil separatist groups were formed and took up arms against the state. In 1976, a Tamil leader named Velupillai Prabhakaran established a group called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers.

The declared objective of this group was creating an independent state for the minority Tamil population in Sri Lanka. But one of the first things Prabhakaran did during the 1980s was eliminate virtually all of the other Tamil groups, who he saw as rivals competing against him for power, recruits, and financial support among the Tamil community. In 1984 he also established a naval wing, called the Sea Tigers, and began incorporating the use of suicide bombings, inspired by the use of this tactic in Lebanon by Hezbollah, which forced France and the United States to withdraw their peacekeeping forces from the country. He also built up an extensive fundraising system, drawing support from members of the Tamil diaspora in India, Europe, and Canada. Taxation and extortion among Tamils also became a prominent source of funding for the group.

Throughout the 1990s, the Tamil Tigers pioneered and perfected the use of the suicide belt, using a combination of military-grade explosives packed with ball bearings (Bloom, 2009). They also developed extensive paramilitary capabilities, including long-range artillery, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, and armored vehicles. Heavy indoctrination and radicalization were also a key component of the group's evolution. Members of the Tamil Tigers were known for wearing a cyanide capsule around their neck, preferring death if ever captured by Sinhalese forces. One of their most notorious attacks was the murder of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, who was killed in 1991 by a female suicide bomber. The group also killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. Finally, after a long series of failed peace negotiations, the Sri Lankan military launched an all-out offensive, eventually cornering and killing the leaders of the Tamil Tigers in 2009. Today, it remains to be seen whether the government is willing and able to address the longstanding political and socioeconomic grievances that have animated Tamil separatists for so many decades. Failing to do so, some observers believe it is only a matter of time before we see the return of political violence in some form or another on this island nation.

PKK

Approximately 25–30 million Kurdish people live in a region encompassing southern Turkey, northern Syria and Iraq, and western Iran. They are the world's largest identifiable ethnic group without a state to call their own, even though their ancestors have lived in this geographic area for over a thousand years. The majority of people claiming Kurdish ethnicity reside within Turkey's borders, and it is here that their drive for independent statehood has been the most

prominent and fierce, led primarily by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (in Kurdish, *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan,* or PKK) (Bruno, 2007).

Similar to the LTTE and other Tamil groups described above, Kurdish nationalist and separatist groups have capitalized on widespread grievances about cultural and political rights for Kurdish people. Under its founding leader, Kemal Attaturk, the government of Turkey banned the teaching of Kurdish in schools and Kurdish broadcasting in an effort to secularize and standardize Turkish society. For years, Kurds were not allowed to practice their religion and culture. Kurdish language and cultural expression were banned, and the very concept of their identity was not recognized until as recently as 1991 (Khalil, 2007). Kurdish communities are concentrated mainly in southeastern Turkey, the most rural and economically weakest regions in the south of the country, and they suffer disproportionately compared to the rest of Turkey. The PKK has blamed the poverty, backwardness, and neglect of this region on Turkish imperialism and ethnic discrimination.

The PKK was founded by a group of students led by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, who sought to incite a popular, Marxist-oriented revolution among the Kurdish people and to establish an autonomous Kurdish homeland. They initially attracted many landless peasants, as well as poorly educated and unemployed Kurds, but Turkey's denial of Kurdish ethnic identity and cultural rights also laid the conditions under which more educated and wealthy Kurds also came to believe in the ideology and cause of the PKK. Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the PKK's earlier years was eventually replaced by a stronger focus on ethnic identity, religion, nationalism, and self-determination. Funding sources have included local smuggling (one of the main supply routes for drugs from Asia to Europe passes through this Kurdish region) and fundraising among Kurdish diaspora networks in Europe, where PKK operatives engage in money laundering, drug trafficking, and extortion schemes (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012).

The group launched its first attacks in 1984 in the Anatolia regions of Turkey. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, operating out of bases in Syria and northern Iraq, the group engaged in guerilla attacks against Turkish government facilities and personnel in Anatolia. By the early 1990s, their militants numbered a few thousand and had killed nearly 10,000 people (Reinares, 2005, p. 121). Their most frequent victims have included policemen, governors, members of the gendarmerie, state officials, and politicians. They have also threatened teachers and civilians working on public works projects, and have burned schools, health clinics, and government projects to undermine the state's influence and authority in the region. And the group also targeted civilians who participated in the government's village guard system, as well as any other Kurds who were seen as collaborating with the Turkish government. However, their attacks against civilians have sometimes undermined support for the PKK among Kurdish communities throughout the region, as well as the broader Kurdish diaspora worldwide.

In 1999, the PKK's founding leader, Öcalan, was captured by Turkish authorities, and he has on several occasions in recent years called for his followers to abandon the violent struggle and engage in a political effort for change. But as of late 2015, PKK terrorist attacks have continued in southeastern Turkey, killing mostly soldiers and police officers, and the Turkish government has responded by imposing curfews and deploying additional military forces to the region (*The Guardian*, 2015). Given the deep-seated grievances and motivations behind the violence in this region, it appears unlikely that we will see an end to this conflict anytime soon.

Nationalist and separatist terrorism in India

As mentioned earlier, several violent separatist groups have been based in the Kashmir region of India. The conflict over the Kashmir territory began immediately following the end of British

rule in India and the creation of two independent states of India and Pakistan. Many Muslims (the majority of the population in India-administered Kashmir) view the Indian military as foreign occupiers and want the territory to be a part of Pakistan. Among the most prominent of the terrorist groups here is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), meaning "Army of the Pure," which began in 1993 with the support of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). LeT grew out of the Pakistani Islamist political movement Markaz Dawah waal-Irshad (MDI) founded in 1989. While its ideology is religiously-oriented, the central emphasis of the group has been on liberating Kashmir. In December 2001, the group drew international attention when it attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. Although in recent years the group has adopted different names—including Jammat ud-Dawa (JUD)—and stopped claiming responsibility for attacks, members of LeT were responsible for the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, in which 164 people were killed.

India also has a number of separatist groups in the northeast of the country, far away from the conflict in Kashmir. By some estimates, nearly 10,000 people have died from attacks by terrorists and insurgents in the East Indian state of Assam over the last 20 years. One of the main terrorist groups here is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which was founded in 1979 and seeks to establish an independent country of Assam, ruled by a socialist government. It began as a student-led resistance group opposed to immigration into the region but evolved into a terrorist organization by the late 1980s. Part of their motivating grievances include high unemployment, corruption, and the lack of development in the Assam region despite abundant natural wealth and resources. The group has assassinated political opponents, attacked police and other security forces, blown up railroad tracks, and attacked other infrastructure targets in Assam. It has also extorted millions of rupees from local businesses, especially tea corporations, and is said to have several thousand members.

The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) was formed in 1989 to fight "Indian neo-colonialism" and establish an independent country of Tripura.[3] NLFT's ideology is all about confronting the "oppression" of tribal peoples by the Indian government. Like many ethnic nationalist groups, land alienation and inequitable control of resources are also central undercurrents here. This group has targeted state officials, local elections, and infrastructure projects. They have also extorted money from local communities, smuggled weapons in from Bangladesh, and abducted local residents for ransom—in fact, this region was a major hotspot in terrorist-related kidnappings during the early 2000s.

A similar group is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muviah (NSCN-IM), considered the largest and most formidable of all the ethnic Naga separatist groups in northeastern India, with 4,500 members.[4] The Nagas are a diverse group of 3–4 million who stem from different tribes and speak different languages but came together in common cause during the first half of the 20th century. The Indian government created the state of Nagaland as a full-fledged state of the Indian Union in 1963, but the conflict continued. India signed the Shillong Accord of 1975, granting the region more autonomy. But the NSCN-IM rejected this as a sell-out and vowed to continue the struggle for a fully independent homeland. The group's ideology is both Maoist, socialist, and Christian. Their funding comes through extortion, bank robbery, and involvement in the global drug trade (especially involving neighboring Myanmar, a prime source of opium).

And next door in the state of Manipur is the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), one of Northeast India's oldest terrorist groups and a sworn enemy of NSCN-IM. The UNLF is an ethnic Meitei group that was founded to achieve independence from India and establish a socialist government.[5] At roughly 1.4 million, Meiteis are about 57 percent of Manipur's population, and are opposed to the perceived cultural and economic influence of ethnic Nagas. Overall,

by several estimates, there are at least two dozen nationalist and separatist groups in India, many of whom have incorporated terrorist tactics and strategies in pursuit of their political objectives.

Summary

Other separatist and nationalist groups in recent decades have included the Fronte de Liberazione Naziunale de a Corsica (FLNC) in France, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada, and the Puerto Rican Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) in the United States. In the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established in 1969 with the declared intention "to bring about the liberation of the Moro homeland"[6] and fought against the government for nearly three decades. Similarly, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) fought to achieve independence from Indonesia for the indigenous tribes in West Papua and was responsible for several terrorist attacks primarily against armed guards at mining and logging operations, government, and military institutions. The East Turkistan Liberation Organization, based in China and Kyrgyzstan, is comprised of ethnic Uighurs who are Muslims of Turkish descent[7] and was blamed for the May 2005 assassination of the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Many suspect that this group is an ally of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, an organization based solely in China that is dedicated to establishing an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang Province (Rashke, 2010).

And finally, some of the world's most notorious ethnically-related terrorist attacks in recent years have been carried out by Chechen nationalists. The conflict between the indigenous inhabitants of Chechnya, in the northern Caucasus, and the Russian government can be traced back to the end of World War II, when Soviet authorities forced a massive resettlement of the Chechen population to Central Asia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared itself an independent state, but Russian troops soon invaded the territory in what became the First Chechen War (Sherlock, 2007; Robbins, 2007). This, in turn, led to the establishment of several insurgent and terrorist organizations who represent the desire for Chechen independence, including the Shamil Basayev Gang, the Mosvar Barayev Gang, the Riyad us-Saliheyn Martys' Brigade, the Dagestani Shariah Jamaat, and the so-called Special Purpose Islamic Regiment. Because Chechens are predominately Muslim, many of these groups have embraced some aspect of radical Islamist ideology and are sometimes included in discussions of religious terrorism. However, it is clear that the core objective they all pursue, and the main theme of their appeals for recruitment and financial support, is the establishment of an independent geopolitical entity.

Throughout all these examples, common themes appear with regard to group characteristics and local/national contexts. In each case, we see members of a distinctly identifiable population who share grievances against an established social and political system in which they felt disadvantaged, and an overall sense of injustice. In many cases, widespread discrimination based on ethnicity or religious affiliation has limited access to education, jobs, and land ownership. Often, members of an international diaspora have provided financial and logistical support for a nationalist or separatist terrorist group, even though relatively few may agree with the argument that violent means are necessary or justified in order to achieve their objectives.

Overall, self-determination is an ideological cause that large numbers of people may sympathize with, whether a group is seeking independence from an occupying force (as in Palestine or Kashmir), the geopolitical unification of Ireland, or an autonomous homeland for Basques, Kurds, Tamils, or Chechens. All of these examples highlight the ways in which political discontent, socioeconomic grievances, and identity claims may lead a group of people to embrace

terrorist violence. As noted earlier, terrorism does not occur in a vacuum: analyzing context is vital for understanding the emergence of terrorist activity and ways to confront it successfully.

Conclusion

The most successful counterterrorism strategy is one that is tailored to address the specific contexts, actions, and impacts of a particular terrorist threat. Government responses to nationalist and separatist terrorism have been most successful when significant attention is paid to the deep-seated grievances that motivate political dissent more generally. Byman suggests that successful government policies to address nationalist terrorism must empower the aggrieved members of a community, win over moderates into participating productively in the political system, and encourage self-policing by members of that community (Byman, 1998). Trust must be nurtured throughout all segments of the population that improvements can be made without violence, and that justice can be ensured for all members of a society. For their part, members of a global diaspora have less incentive or interest in supporting a violent separatist or nationalist group when the ideology of that group no longer resonates.

The good news—based on the historical record and scholarly research—is that no terrorist movement can last indefinitely (e.g. Cronin, 2006; Jones and Libiski, 2008). In some cases, a terrorist group's leadership cadre are captured or killed (as in Sri Lanka), while other terrorist groups have given up the armed struggle and embraced a political process (as seen in Northern Ireland and Spain). The truth is, terrorism is not—and has never been—a winning strategy. As Brian Jenkins observes, "terrorism remains a strategic failure in that no terrorist group has ever achieved its stated goals" (Jones and Libiski, 2008, p. 11). They have not brought down any national economies or political regimes. Even those who have been around the longest (the IRA/PIRA, ETA, FARC, etc.) have largely failed to acquire the power to make significant or lasting changes. This should give us some sense of optimism. Nonetheless, given the prominence of nationalist and separatist movements throughout history, it is certainly likely we will see at least some new movements of this kind emerge in the future, and among them a small percentage may (despite lessons learned from the past) embrace the tactics and strategies of terrorism in pursuit of their political objectives.

Notes

1 Portions of the following discussion and descriptions of terrorist groups build from Forest (2015, pp. 159–178).
2 See the profile of Gora Euskadi Askatuta at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3603.
3 The START profile for the National Liberation Front of Tripura is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3644.
4 The START profile for the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muviah (NSCN-IM) is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4585.
5 The START United National Liberation Front (UNLF) is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4584.
6 The Moro people differ from the rest of the population in terms of language, economic occupations, and cultural characteristics, and they are Muslim in this otherwise heavily Christian country. The START profile for the Moro National Liberation Front is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=202.
7 The START profile for the East Turkestan Liberation Organization is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3588.

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8
LEFT-WING TERRORISM

Leena Malkki

Introduction

Since at least the early 1970s, it has been common to categorize terrorism based on political motivation. This way, (non-state) terrorism has been divided, for example, to left-wing, right-wing, single issue, and religious terrorism. This handbook follows the same tradition, as it includes chapters on left-wing, right-wing, religious and national-separatist terrorism.

During the last two decades, left-wing terrorism has commonly been perceived as a relatively minor phenomenon, even if at times predictions have been made about its return. This has not always been the case. When the terrorism studies in its modern form started in the early 1970s, a large bulk of the research concentrated on left-wing terrorism. Left-wing terrorism is, indeed, most strongly associated with the revolutionary movements that operated in several countries from the 1960s until the 1980s. This chapter provides a short introduction to those movements that have been commonly identified most famous left-wing terrorist groups, as well as the features that researchers have claimed are typical for such groups.

What is left-wing terrorism?

Typologies of terrorism based on political motivation have perhaps been attractive due to their apparent simplicity: the most visible part of terrorism campaigns has often been the political objectives. The categories are not, however, as clear-cut as it may seem at first. For example, many national-separatist terrorist groups have also been influenced by left-wing ideologies (the INLA in Northern Ireland and the PFLP in Israel/Palestine are examples of that). The influence of left-wing ideologies in the development of terrorist strategies and legitimation of violence, thus, extends beyond the campaigns discussed in this chapter.

There is some ambiguity in what is usually included in the category of left-wing terrorism. The revolutionary campaigns inspired by left-wing ideologies in the 1960s–1980s are widely seen as the most typical manifestation of this type of terrorism. This time period will also be the main focus of this chapter. Sometimes, also anarchism-inspired campaigns from the late 19th and early 20th century are put under this heading (but will not be discussed here). Another question concerns the second part of the term; namely, what kind of violent campaigns should fall under terrorism? It is not always easy to draw the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

It is good to note that left-wing terrorism does not form a coherent category, as there are big differences between those cases usually put under this heading in almost any imaginable dimension, including the group size, historical context, level of professionalism, political effects, the role of terrorist tactics in the overall campaign and ideology. At one end, there are groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army which operated in the United States in the mid-1970s and never had more than a dozen members, while groups such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru represent the other end of the spectrum. It was also common, especially when it comes to the Latin American cases, that several kinds of tactics were used in various stages of the campaigns.

It is possible, however, to identify certain common features in the campaigns motivated by left-wing agendas. These features are not present in every case to the same degree. However, together, like threads in a rope, they give some meaning to the term.

Ideology and worldview

Ideologies and political objectives that inspire terrorist campaigns tend to reflect the *zeitgeist*. Therefore, the left-wing terrorist campaigns have been most common in times when left-wing ideologies have been *en vogue*. The period from the 1960s until the early 1990s is indeed one period which witnessed a multitude of political and social activities inspired by left-wing ideologies – including campaigns in which terrorist tactics were used.

David C. Rapoport (2004) has named this period the 'New Left Wave' in his influential model of terrorism waves. This assertion finds support in empirical evidence. According to an analysis conducted by Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson (2009), left-wing inspired terrorism indeed peaked around that period, then rapidly declined in the 1990s.

It is good to note that while wider political movements provide an important context to terrorist campaigns, such campaigns are usually perpetrated, or even supported, only by a small minority of those who are part of the larger movements. This has also been the case with left-wing terrorism. The relationship between the terrorist movements and wider political trends has been a delicate question. The non-violent left-wing movements have often fiercely distanced themselves from the violent campaigns, claiming that they have nothing to do with them.

A common feature of left-wing terrorism is its opposition to capitalism and support for a revolution that would lead to a profound alteration of power relations and a society governed according to communist principles. There have been diverging views on who would be the most important revolutionary actors (e.g. workers, peasants or underclass) and how exactly to make that revolution happen. These questions have also created fierce disagreements within the movements. In the larger milieu of left-wing movements, most terrorist campaigns were situated in the anti-Soviet end of the spectrum. This meant that they despised the 'revisionist model' of Communist revolution which they thought only played into the hands of capitalist and imperialist forces. They were more sympathetic to ideals and models deriving from Chinese and Cuban experiences and underlined the necessity of violent revolution.

Another trait typical for the New Left terrorist campaigns of the 1960s–1980s was their international orientation and opposition to imperialism. Many of them saw themselves as part of a worldwide imagined community of revolutionary movements. The wars of national liberation in the Third World were interpreted as part of this anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. Some of them looked at China as a leader of this community, or at least as an important model or source of inspiration. The strength of international orientation varied and the international context seemed particularly important for small revolutionary movements in the Western countries.

Strategy of armed struggle

The popularity of an ideology alone does not, however, explain the resort to terrorism as a strategy or tactic. The common ideological characteristics outlined above do not separate the violent campaigns from the non-violent ones. What made terrorism as strategy appear attractive to the most radical fringes of left-wing movements in the 1960s–1980s has more to do with inspiring examples of alternative ways to bring about revolutionary struggle[1] than purely ideological questions.

While the worldview that informs left-wing terrorist campaigns indeed draws from left-wing ideologies, their analysis of the current methods and strategies for change hardly represent the mainstream leftist traditions. While the question of violence is definitely discussed in the texts of Marx and Lenin, small violent acting as a vanguard of revolution before the masses were organised was not what they had in mind (Cohen-Almagor 1991). Instead of Marx and Engels, or even Lenin, the use of terrorist tactics has been more inspired by writings of such figures as Franz Fanon, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, Mao Zedong, and Régis Debray.

These writings are based on interpretations about a series of guerrilla campaigns during the 1930s–1960s which made the use of violence seem like an increasingly feasible option also for small revolutionary groups operating in urban areas.[2] The series of inspiring examples and important writings can be traced back to the guerrilla campaign led by Mao Zedong from the late 1930s onwards. The success of that campaign was interpreted as a proof that it is possible to beat a much stronger enemy if you are just patient and persistent enough.

Another example testifying for the possibility to achieve victory over a powerful enemy was provided by the Vietnam War. Besides its tactical learnings, the Vietnam War also played a strong symbolic and mobilizing role. For young activists, way beyond the ranks of those who engaged in political violence, the war was a culmination point of all those things that they thought were wrong in the world. It was a war in which predatory capitalism and imperialism of the Western countries, the United States being the worst of them, was showing the full colours of its ugly face.

While the writings of Mao have been compulsory reading for anyone planning guerrilla warfare, an even more important inspiring example to the armed struggle in the form of terrorism was provided by the Cuban revolution in the late 1950s. The alleged learnings from Cuba were popularized in the form of *foco* theory, summarized and made famous by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (1961; Moreno 1970) and Régis Debray (1967/1972). Their recollections and conclusions from the Cuban experience were not always very true to the actual course of events (Childs 1995), but what is more important here is that their writings made the armed struggle look like an increasingly viable option.

Whereas theories of revolution generally stated that certain preconditions need to exist before a revolutionary situation can develop, the *foco* theory claimed that it was not necessary to wait for those conditions to fully build up. Instead, violence can act as a catalyst of revolution, speeding up the course of history. This struggle would be initiated by a small vanguard which operated in the countryside and created close relationships with the peasant population, building up its ranks until it was ready for a full-scale armed confrontation. This vanguard, and not the political party or any other actor, would also lead the revolution.

The *foco* theory was actively marketed by Cuba, and the writings of Guevara and Debray were widely spread in America and Europe. Even if the *foco* theory became discredited quite quickly after the death of Che Guevara in 1967 and backlashes were experienced, e.g. in Bolivia, the Cuban revolution and the persona of Che Guevara remained widely admired among revolutionaries.

The *foco* theory was strongly based on the idea that revolutionaries would work in rural areas, 'the mountains', and the urban environment was considered to be the graveyard of a revolutionary movement. A rural insurgency was not, however, a geographically feasible option for all locations. One such location was the Southern Cone of South America, where the revolutionaries developed an urban version of the revolutionary struggle during the 1960s (Marchesi 2014). The internationally best-known campaign was certainly the one of Tupamaros in Uruguay in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The idea of urban guerrilla most famously put into words is by a Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella in his book *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (Marighella 1969/2002), which was published in 1969. It quickly became popular among the radical revolutionaries around the world and was translated into several languages. In urban guerrilla struggle, a small but committed, clever and disciplined group of people attacks the government, security forces, big businesses and 'foreign imperialists' in a variety of ways, including sabotage, assaults, kidnappings and occupations. These fighters operate clandestinely, taking the best possible care of security. Instead of large numbers, their strength is believed to be based on their courage, moral superiority and ability to catch the enemy forces by surprise, putting them on the defensive.

The idea of urban guerrilla found a receptive audience in urbanized Western countries. The influence of Marighella and the concept of urban guerrilla is strongly present in the written material produced by groups such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany or the Weather Underground in the United States. For such groups, it seemed to provide a strategy to continue their quest for revolution despite their diminishing numbers, as the larger protest movement started to fade away in the early 1970s (Della Porta 1995; Koopmans 1993; Rubenstein 1987).

Tactics that are most often associated with left-wing terrorism are bombings, hijackings, assassinations and kidnappings. It is commonly thought that left-wing terrorist attacks have been mostly discriminate, targeting people, institutions and sites associated with imperialism and capitalism (Hoffman 2006, pp. 227–240). The most iconic attacks perpetrated by left-wing terrorist groups follow this image (for example, the kidnappings of Hanns-Martin Schleyer and Aldo Moro discussed below). There is empirical research that suggests the left-wing terrorist attacks are not necessarily more discriminate than those of the right-wing to the degree that the common stereotypes suggest (Fleming, Stohl & Schmid 1988, p. 159). Even though indiscriminate violence was often indeed perceived as counterproductive by left-wing groups, it has also been used, as evidenced by the history of some Latin American groups. Moreover, there has been a lot of variation in what kind of targets exactly the left-wing terrorist groups have chosen (Drake 1998).

Examples of left-wing terrorism

Terrorism was not the term used by the left-wing revolutionaries of their actions. The actions were often called (urban) guerrilla or armed struggle. The line between terrorism and urban guerrilla is in many ways blurred, not least because groups used or were looking at using different kinds of tactics depending on the situation and their stage of development.

This is most evident in the case of the Latin American campaigns. The continent has witnessed several types of violence during the last decades, including urban terror, but also rural insurgencies and state terror (Holmes 2015). The role of Latin American campaigns as inspiration to left-wing terrorist campaigns in the Western countries is undeniable, but another question is which of the Latin American cases can be put under the banner of terrorism. If one follows the categorization of terrorism, guerrilla war and conventional war put forward by Ariel Merari (1993), the majority of the campaigns would be excluded. This is because according to

his classification, one clear difference between strategies of guerrilla war and terrorism is that guerrilla war indeed attempts to establish control over territories while terrorist campaigns do not generally have such ambitions.

Having said that, the Latin American campaigns do deserve attention in this context. Especially the urban guerrilla campaigns come close to what we understand as terrorism. Furthermore, some of the rural-based campaigns utilized tactics that can be called terrorist as part of their larger campaign and are often mentioned in the terrorism literature.

The campaign of Tupamaros (*Movimiento de Liberación Nacional–Tupamaros*) in Uruguay is the clearest example of the use of terrorist tactics within the Latin American context in the sense that it used violence based on its symbolic power rather than physical effect. The importance of Tupamaros as a model was already mentioned. Its high-profile, innovative and at times whimsical actions captured the imagination of many revolutionaries in Latin America, the United States and Europe.

Uruguay was probably the last country in which one would have expected a revolutionary movement to take a strong foothold. In the debates about revolutionary struggle in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s, Uruguay was often mentioned as an example of a country in which the conditions for revolution did not exist. The country was well-developed, democratic and tranquil compared to other countries on the continent. From the 1950s onwards, however, the conditions that had enabled prosperity and stability started to deteriorate. The economic growth rates turned negative, and the state had to cut down the social security system. The political leadership was unable to provide solutions for the challenges, and the political system, even if democratic, had become closed, making it difficult for any challengers of the two big parties to gain power through the parliamentary system (Waldmann 2011; Marchesi 2014).

By far the most influential and credible challenge to the governing parties was presented by the Tupamaros, which was founded in 1965. The group aimed at bringing out a socialist revolution in the country and did not expect that to happen without the use of force. The strategy adopted by the Tupamaros was urban-based, mostly because the country was geographically inhospitable for rural insurgency.

After keeping a low profile for the first years, the Tupamaros started its campaign in 1969. The tactic that it initially applied can be called armed propaganda – actions that were designed to send a message through coercive action, but at the same time avoiding putting human lives into risk (Brum 2014). Many of the operations were made possible by good intelligence that the group was able to gain through infiltrations and good connections. For example, the Tupamaros stole the accounting ledgers of an investment bank and brought them to the door step of a state prosecutor, leading to the revelations about the bank's secret double accounting system. In another operation, the Tupamaros revealed a secret stack of gold ingots of a wealthy family. It was also able to raid the naval academy of the Uruguayan army, forcing the entire academy to march in underwear around the yard while the Tupamaros loaded weapons to their escape vehicles and raised their flag to the pole, among many other things. All these operations were done for the most part without firing a single shot. With these actions, the group managed to ridicule the ruling elite. The actions quickly made it internationally famous and provided it with an image of glamourous Robin Hood revolutionaries.

During 1970, the Tupamaros started to change its tactics from armed propaganda towards methods more commonly associated with terrorism. This included a series of kidnappings of important foreign officials with the intention to pressure the government to release imprisoned members of the group. It also started a campaign of bombings against civilian infrastructure, such as banks, discotheques, American companies and movie theatres. These actions had decisive effects on the future of the Tupamaros. First, its support among the population started to

decline, especially after it murdered one of its hostages, USAID Public Safety Program director Dan Mitrione (Brum 2014). Second, the task of defeating the Tupamaros was handed over from the police to the army. What contributed to this decision was the prison escape of over 100 members of the Tupamaros in September 1971. It did not take long for the army to destroy the Tupamaros. By the end of 1972, the group was completely demolished. What is noteworthy, however, is that several of its members have returned to politics after serving their prison sentences. Some of them have held high positions, including José Mujica, who was elected the president of Uruguay in 2009.

The Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) in Peru, on the other hand, represents a more traditional rural-based insurgent group. It is undeniably one of the most destructive sub-state groups that have used terrorism tactics. What has added to the destruction has been the heavy-handed measures taken by the Peruvian state against the Shining Path. According to one estimate, during the years 1980–1992, over 23,000 people died as the result of political violence. Over 10,000 of them were 'presumed subversives' (Palmer 1995, p. 271).

The Shining Path is an example of a second wave guerrilla movement in Latin America which, instead of *foco* theory-style quick victories, relied on patient long-term, rural-based guerrilla campaigns (Wickham-Crowley 2014). It started to prepare for a revolutionary struggle in the late 1960s under the charismatic leadership of Abimael Guzmán. This happened against the backdrop of persistent social and economic problems affecting the rural areas despite attempts for reforms. Guzmán and his followers invested a lot of time on studying Marxist-Leninist writings and developed their own interpretation of it, which they strongly believed was the correct one that would lead the way to revolution (Gorriti Ellegoben 1999).

The overall strategy of the Shining Path was to build its presence in the rural areas, slowly weaken the government and finally take over the cities. Even though the Shining Path controlled over territories, their strategy clearly followed the familiar logic of terrorism. By selective killings of political authorities, it has attempted to call the legitimacy and capability of government authorities into question. The group has also been notorious for the brutal way it has targeted rural populations. During the 1980s, its campaign intensified until the group witnessed a serious blow when its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was arrested in 1992. The significance of Guzmán to the group was so crucial that some questioned whether the Shining Path was able to continue its actions. The loss of a leader certainly impacted the group severely. The Shining Path, however, exists still today, but in a much more diminished scale than during its heyday in the 1980s.

Even if the ideologues and strategists of the revolutionary struggle wrote mostly with the Latin American or Asian context in mind, their words also inspired young militants in Western countries. Admirers of Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella could be found in practically every Western European country. However, not all countries experience the same levels of the New Left Wave violence. Moreover, in almost all affected countries, the scope of violent activities is much more limited than in Latin America. Still, the attacks managed to draw wide attention and cause severe concerns.

The most serious terrorist campaigns on European soil took place in West Germany and Italy. This has led to the argument that the shadows of the Nazi past would at least partially explain the violent turn that the protest movement and the New Left took in these countries. This argument gets some credibility from the study by Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2009), which suggests that past dictatorship is among the key variables for the intensity of left-wing revolutionary terrorism in Western countries. Another key variable identified in his study was the large size of the population and a strong communist party. All in all, it seems that the intensity of the New Left Wave violence was most of all connected to the political situation in the country, as were the more specific manifestations that it got (see also Varon 2004).

The roots of the New Left Wave in Europe were in many ways in the wider social and political protests of the 1960s. This was the case also in West Germany. While the student protest movement had many transnational elements, including the opposition of imperialism, capitalism and the Vietnam War, it also had strong national ingredients. The conflict between the younger and older generation was strongly coloured by the political situation in the country and dealing with the Nazi past in particular. During the 1960s, a significant portion of German youths were feeling strongly alienated by the political system, which they thought was essentially a continuation of the Nazi rule, as the same people were still in key positions, and felt that there was no way they could make their voice heard through the parliamentary system. What further contributed to alienation was the heavy-handed policing of protests (Wasmund 1986; Varon 2004, pp. 31–33; Fritzsche 1989).

Terrorism as strategy entered the picture around the time when the mass movement started to wane. As the number of people involved in protests was in decline, it was felt that a new strategy was needed. Experiments with violent attacks had begun already during the late 1960s. For example, arson attacks were conducted in department stores in Frankfurt in 1968. Among those responsible for the arson attacks were Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, who would become leaders of the most notorious German terrorist group, the Red Army Faction (RAF; *Rote Armee Fraktion*, also known as Baader-Meinhof Gang), which was established in 1970.

The RAF followed the tradition which viewed violence as a catalyst of revolutionary situations. By conducting an 'urban guerrilla' campaign in Germany, it hoped to create revolutionary conditions in the country and mobilize people to oppose the Vietnam War. In 1972, the group launched its first major offensive in which it attacked U.S. army bases, police stations and offices of the conservative Springer media concern. Soon after the offensive, almost the entire first generation of the RAF was captured.

Actions in the name of the RAF were soon continued by a new network of people, often referred to as the second generation. The campaign focused strongly on the imprisoned RAF members and attempts to pressure the government to improve their conditions and release them. In the mid-1970s, the RAF and other extreme left groups conducted a series of attacks for that purpose, culminating in the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer in September 1977.

Schleyer was deemed an ideal target because, as the president of the Employers' Association of the Federal Republic and of the Federation of German Industry, and a former member of the Nazi Party, he was an embodiment of those things that the RAF opposed. The kidnapping led to one of the biggest manhunts in German history, but the authorities were not able to find the kidnappers. The episode known as the German Autumn culminated in the airplane hijacking conducted by the PFLP to support RAF's demands. When the hijacked plane was successfully raided by the German special forces, the kidnappers killed Schleyer. Soon afterwards, three imprisoned RAF members were found dead in their prison cells (Aust 1987).

After the German Autumn, the heydays of the RAF were over. Actions in its name continued until the early 1990s. During the 1980s, the attacks targeted mainly the economic and military power of the United States. Also, the release of imprisoned RAF members remained an active focus of the campaign. The group also experimented with joined actions, together with other European extreme left terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades and the French *Action Directe* (Wunschik 1997, pp. 404, 98–299, 387–389; Merkl 1995, pp. 164–173). The RAF became, however, increasingly marginalised and irrelevant. Formally, the RAF announced its disbandment in 1998.

In Italy, another country strongly affected by left-wing terrorism, the violent actions took place in a politically different situation than in Germany. Italy was going through a period of rapid industrialisation, urbanization and economic growth, which resulted in various kinds of

growing pains, including violent protesting, conspiracies for coup d'état and terrorist attacks. Without going into the details of the history of the Italian 'Years of Lead', it suffices to say that left-wing groups were not the only ones plotting violent attacks in these years.

In terms of the scale of left-wing terrorist violence, Italy is in its own league in the European context. According to the study of Donatella della Porta and Maurizio Rossi, there would have been over 4,000 left-wing terrorist attacks in the years 1969–1982, half of which were claimed. This represents 47 per cent of all terrorist attacks in these years. Terrorists can be divided into two periods: years 1969–1976 witnessed relatively modest levels of violence, and in years 1977–1980, there was a rapid escalation, followed by rapid moderation (Weinberg & Eubank 1987).

Like in West Germany, also in Italy there were several leftist groups that used terrorist tactics. The best known of these groups was the Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*). While mobilizing the support of workers was every leftist violent actors' dream that rarely materialized in Europe, this did happen for a time in Italy.

The campaign of the Red Brigades can be traced back to Milan and other big northern Italian industrial cities. The key members of the group, many of them of working-class in origin, started their activities within the factories, organising acts of armed propaganda and spreading communiqués. In 1972, the group conducted its first kidnapping. The hostage was the director of Sit/Siemens. Following the model of Tupamaros, the Red Brigades held him hostage for a short time, questioned him and took photos of him being pointed to by a gun.

A couple of years later, the Red Brigades had come to the conclusion that the situation had worsened and it was necessary to target 'the heart of the state' directly. This led also to the escalation of tactics. In April 1974, the group kidnapped the state prosecutor Mario Sossi and held him hostage for four weeks, eventually freeing him in exchange for the release of imprisoned members of another leftist militant group (which, however, never materialised). A month later, the campaign claimed its first victims when the Red Brigades made a raid on the offices of an extreme right party, *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, in Padova and ended up murdering two people. While the security authorities had long considered the Red Brigades to be little more than a nuisance, after these incidents, the countermeasures intensified considerably, leading to a significant proportion of leading extreme left activists getting arrested.

Extreme left violence did, however, continue and reached its new peak around 1977. In the years after the kidnapping of Sossi, the Red Brigades committed a series of kidnappings, murders and kneecappings, as well as bank robberies to finance their activities. This wave of violence culminated in the kidnapping of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 by the Red Brigades. After almost two months, Moro was murdered. The kidnapping led to another period of intensified countermeasures and eventually to the demise of the Red Brigades in the early 1980s. This demise was accelerated by the *Pentiti* laws, which provided those who turned themselves in voluntarily and shared their information with more lenient sentences (Weinberg & Eubank 1987; Drake 1989).

Left-wing terrorist groups were formed also in the capitalist and imperialist 'belly of the beast', the United States. These campaigns were, however, more modest in scale, as one might have expected (Falciola 2015). The best known of these groups was the Weather Underground. Starting as the radical fringe of the Students for Democratic Society, a major organisation of the protest movement, the group radicalised towards the use of violent means under the slogan 'bring the war home'. It withdrew its most radical plans after three of its members were killed in an accidental explosion when building bombs. From then on, the group resorted only to symbolic bombings (Varon 2004; Berger 2006).

The Symbionese Liberation Army, on the other hand, was willing to engage in more radical actions. With its less than 20 members in total during its existence, this group that operated in

California in 1973–1975 was certainly among the most minuscule of left-wing terrorist groups. The group would probably have fallen quickly into oblivion if it had not kidnapped Patricia Hearst, a young heiress of a media dynasty. The kidnapping turned it into the media spectacle of the decade, especially after it announced that Hearst had joined the group and participated together with other members in a bank robbery. The SLA is also a testimony to the power of transnational influences within the New Left Wave. In requesting food be delivered to the poor and talking about people's prison, the SLA was very clearly impressed by the Robin Hood style of the Tupamaros (Malkki 2010).

Left-wing violence inspired by the Cuban and Chinese examples was not limited to Europe and the Americas. In other continents, most of its manifestations were overwhelmingly rural insurgencies. Sometimes, these movements have used terrorist tactics, the Naxalites in India being one example of it (Gupta 2007). The closest Asian equivalent to the movements described above were, however, the groups that emerged in Japan in the aftermath of the student uprisings in the late 1960s. All these groups were international in their orientation. The best known of these groups was the Japanese Red Army, which developed close ties with the Palestinian groups and is best known for the rampage shooting that it conducted in 1972 in the Lod Airport in Israel (Igarashi 2007; Box & McCormack 2004).

Left-wing terrorism beyond the New Left Wave

By the mid-1990s, practically all major groups of the New Left Wave had ceased their activities. The most long-lasting group of the wave was the 17N (*Epanastatikos Organosi Dekaefta Noemvri*, Revolutionary Organization 17 November) in Greece, which was long famous for its ability to evade the authorities. The security authorities finally achieved a breakthrough and arrested many of its key members in 2002 (Kassimeris 2007; Karyotis 2007).

During the last two decades, left-wing terrorism has been a relatively minor phenomenon in the whole spectrum of terrorism. Several left-wing insurgencies, sometimes utilising tactics of terrorism, have continued to operate in different parts of the world, including, for example, India, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Philippines and Nepal.

In Europe, a few left-wing (or anarchist) groups have operated in Italy, Spain, Greece and Germany. The attacks they have committed follow the left-wing traditions by mostly targeting the government, businesses and security authorities. Most attacks have been small-scale acts of sabotage, seldom resulting in anything more than material damage. However, there have also been a few more serious attacks, for example, in Greece where left-wing violence has continued after the demise of 17N (Xenakis 2012).

Notes

1 Here, I draw from Mark Sedgwick's treatise (2007) on the role of inspiring examples in instigating global waves of terrorism.
2 My treatise on the evolution of the strategy is strongly influenced by Pekelder (2007). See also Strassner (2008).

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9

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

The strategic dimensions

George Michael

Recent events suggest a resurgence of the political far right both in Europe and the United States. Several populist parties have made significant gains in 2014 European Parliament elections, which some observers fear could be a harbinger of future turmoil on the continent (e.g. Krastev, 2014; Poulos, 2015). The crisis of the welfare state, economic stagnation, and the problems associated with assimilating Muslim immigrants have occasioned a right-wing backlash in Europe. In the United States, the Tea Party has challenged the Republican Party establishment, but to date has not taken on an explicitly racialist orientation (Michael, 2013). But ominously, recent studies suggest an increase in right-wing terrorism in America.[1]

The primary feature of extreme right ideologies is nationalism. But typically, the extreme right rejects a civic nationalism in favor of an ethnic or racial nationalism which implies internal homogenization. That is, all residents or citizens of the national community share the same ethnic or racial characteristics (Perliger, 2013). Although right-wing extremism takes different forms in different countries, there has been a convergence of these movements over the past two decades. As Kaplan and Weinberg (1998) observed in their study, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, scattered elements of the extreme right in the West, faced with declining white birth rates, sweeping Third World immigration, diminishing life opportunities for working-class youths, and perceived cultural decadence, have come to feel like strangers in their lands. Communicating through chat rooms and other Internet media, they have found solace in the slogan "white power" and sought to develop a new pan-Aryan identity based on race and civilization that transcends national borders.[2] More and more, white nationalists see themselves as a white tribe under attack by people of color across the globe. The fate of white farmers in South Africa after apartheid is seen as a harbinger of the future if they do not act soon (Dees and Cohen, 2015).

Despite the far right's recent success in Europe, the legacy of World War II still looms large over the continent. The burden of historical fascism weighs down any political movement that extolls ethnic nationalism. Therefore, the electoral viability of the right-wing populist parties is far from certain. Moreover, the demographic transformation on the continent in which the native population continues to decline and the non-European population (mostly Muslim) continues to rise will make it all the more challenging for these parties to secure victories in the future. Likewise, the changing demographics in the United States in which it is projected that over half of the population in the country will be non-white by mid-century renders a racial

exclusionary party unfeasible at the national level (Miller, 2004). For these and other reasons, some elements of the extreme right have decided that a strategy of revolution and terrorism is the only viable alternative to effect their political and social goals.

There has been considerable debate in the extreme right subculture on the appropriateness of terrorism and violence. Even those who espouse terrorism do not always agree on what form it should take. Should clandestine cells be created? Or would lone-wolf terrorism be a more viable approach? Another question worth pondering is, who is the real enemy? That is, whom should right-wing terrorists target? Should non-white immigrants be attacked, or rather the political leaders and agents who encouraged their migration in the first place? Finally, what is the strategic endgame for right-wing terrorists? Do they seek to foment a race war out of which they hope to emerge victorious? Or would they be satisfied with carving out a separate piece of territory where they could establish their desired mono-racial or mono-ethnic state? These are some of the questions to consider when examining right-wing terrorism.

Who is the real enemy of the extreme right?

Historically, Jews have been identified as the primary enemy of the extreme right. This sentiment reached its apogee in Hitler's Third Reich and culminated in the Nazi Holocaust. Elsewhere in the West, extreme right narratives have often depicted Jews as rootless aliens who are involved in international intrigues against the unity of the nation. Jews have been identified as the leading agents behind the Bolshevik Revolution and international communism, yet also castigated as predatory capitalists and bankers.[3] Although Jews in the Diaspora have been a small minority, they nonetheless have often had a very prominent role in the political, economic, and social affairs of the countries in which they have resided. Furthermore, Jews have often taken a leading role in promoting liberal causes, such as reproductive rights, civil rights, the separation of church and state, and open borders immigration policies.[4] After World War II, the extreme right has condemned Jews as the primary agents of multiculturalism and multiracialism. As such, they are characterized as a malignant force that threatens the cohesion of the nation. This theme is often expressed in conspiracy theories in which Jews purportedly control the government, albeit from behind the scenes. In this vein, the notion of a "Zionist Occupation Government," or "ZOG" gained currency in the vernacular of the extreme right, first in America and later in Europe.[5]

Based on this worldview, it is not surprising that Jews have occasionally been the target of right-wing terrorism.[6] Although Jews have long been considered the traditional enemy of the extreme right, more and more Islam is seen as the principal threat, at least in Western Europe. The 9/11 attacks accelerated this process. In recent years, the specter of a Muslim Europe has become a basic ideological feature of the European extreme right (Zúquete, 2008). According to a Pew study, Muslims are expected to compose 8 percent of Europe's population by 2030 (Hackett, 2015). Assuming current trends continue, this figure would continue to grow in the century as median ages for native Europeans continue to increase and birth rates for native European women continue to decrease. Thus, fears of an impending "Eurabia" are not sheer fantasies.[7]

As José Pedro Zúquete (2008) observed, extreme right ideologies are not static, but evolve and are shaped by their surrounding environments. In recent times, there has been a discursive shift in the rhetoric of the extreme right in a decidedly pro-Jewish direction. Israel is lauded as a natural ally of Europe fighting Islamic barbarism in the Middle East. Several far-right populist parties warn of the Islamicization of Europe and seek to enlist the support of the Jewish community, noting that they would not fare well under a regime in which Islamists hold sway. The National Front has long railed against Muslim immigration in France and has distanced itself

from anti-Semitism. Likewise, the English Defence League has drawn support from established Zionist groups through its vocal support of Israel and condemnation of radical Islam (Busher, 2013). Even Nick Griffin, a longstanding British far rightist, decried the "blame the Jew" mentality and instead urged his followers in the British National Party to "get on with the real struggles" (quoted in Zúquete, 2008, p. 340). In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, the founder of the Party of Freedom, proposed changing Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, which guarantees equality under the law, with a new clause stating the cultural dominance of Christian, Jewish, and humanistic traditions (New Internationalist, 2010). Paradoxically, by opposing the decidedly anti-liberal features of Islam, the extreme right has been able to reposition itself as the defenders of true liberal principles, including free speech, safeguarding Jews, women's rights, gay rights, and animal welfare (Zúquete, 2015).

As Islam comes to be regarded as the primary enemy, it is reasonable to assume that its communities will become the targets of extreme right violence. This was illustrated in the case of the Bosphorus serial murders in Germany, which were carried out by the National Socialist Underground from 2000 to 2007 (Kulish, 2011). The group targeted primarily ethnic Turks. All totaled, 10 people were killed. When the police arrested members of the group, they discovered an alleged hit list of 88 names that included two prominent members of the Bundestag and representatives of Turkish and Islamic groups (Pidd and Harding, 2011).

Whereas some right-wing terrorists have targeted Muslims, others have attacked those that they hold responsible for their migration into Europe, as evidenced by the case of Anders Behrig Breivik in Norway. On July 22, 2011, the reclusive 32-year-old man detonated a van bomb at a government building in Oslo, which killed eight people. A subsequent shooting spree at a summer camp on the island of Utøya left 69 more people dead. Hours before he began his attacks, he uploaded his 1,518-page electronic book—*2083: A European Declaration of Independence*—on the Internet. In addition, he emailed his manifesto to roughly 1,000 selected recipients active in the anti-Muslim and right-wing networks (Gardell, 2015). In detail, he explained how he spent nine years methodically planning his attacks, procuring firearms and tons of fertilizer, while evading suspicion from authorities. In addition, he uploaded a video on YouTube entitled "The Knight Templar 2083," which contained numerous references to the Islamic threat to Europe interspersed with iconic images of Crusaders. The notoriety stemming from his attack, he predicted, would serve as a "marketing" ad for his manifesto, thus ensuring that there would be substantial interest in its contents.

Claiming to be a member of the Knights Templar—a medieval order that protected pilgrims in the Holy Land after the First Crusade in the eleventh century—Breivik saw himself as part of an unorganized and leaderless vanguard that would awaken Europe to the perils of Islamicization brought about by the immigration policies engineered by Europe's liberal parties. In that sense, the seemingly senseless shootings at the youth camp were meant to punish the ruling Labor Party for its "treasonous acts against Europe and Europeans" (www.npr.org, 2011).[8] Breivik envisaged a Europe reborn, purged from its internal enemies, mainly cultural Marxists and feminists. Rising from the ashes, his Crusader vanguard would defeat Europe's external enemies—Muslims—and restore the continent's glory as the world's leading civilization (Gardell, 2015).

Just how persuasive his message will be has yet to be seen. In the immediate aftermath of his attacks, representatives of the far right in Western Europe were quick to condemn his terrorism. There emerged no groundswell protest movement that came to his defense. At least in the near term, the general consensus was that Breivik's rampage was a public relations disaster for populist parties that favor immigration restrictions. Moreover, some representatives of the racist and anti-Semitic extreme right lambasted Breivik for his expressed solidarity with Jews and Israel.

For example, David Duke, the former Louisiana state representative and Klan leader, characterized Breivik as a man whose mind had been deranged by Zionism and had targeted innocent white youths. Breivik, he argued, could more aptly be characterized as an Islamophobic neo-conservative. The far right *American Free Press* characterized Breivik as a "radical Christian Zionist" who wanted to kill Norwegian officials for their opposition to the Israeli occupation of Palestine (White, 2011).

Others, however, were more forgiving. Writing on the *Occidental Dissent* website, William Rome did not condone the attacks, but pointed out that it would be hypocritical not to concede that Breivik had struck a terrible blow at the European elite that was responsible for policies that allow for large-scale Third World immigration into Norway (Michael, 2012a). Similarly, Harold Covington of the white separatist Northwest Front conceded that Breivik was probably a "Christian Zionist, neo-conservative freemason," but dismissed the theory that the attacks were part of a Jewish conspiracy to usher in repressive legislation against patriots. Instead, he believed that the attacks were a genuine case of lone-wolf resistance by "a White man who finally had enough, and who through some genetic fluke, still possesse[d] the old alpha gene or chromosome or whatever that is that once enabled White males to act on their convictions instead of tap, tap, tap on computer keyboards" (northwestfront.org, 2011). In Russia, many in the extreme right have championed Breivik for attacking the Labor Party, whose policies were responsible for the rising racial diversity in Norway. However, some Russian far rightists condemned Breivik because his manifesto expressed a positive attitude toward Jews and Zionism (Enstad, 2015).

Generally speaking, the so-called Counter-jihad eschews the anti-Semitism which was integral to the old extreme right. However, anti-Semitism persists in some quarters of the extreme right. For instance, in January 2015, Joshua Bonehill-Paine, an English far right activist, called for a mass protest in Stamford Hill in March of that year to fight the "Jewish menace." The event was cancelled, however, after Bonehill-Paine failed to mobilize support for his protest (Blood, 2015). A former member of the French National Front, Alain Sorel, declared himself hostile to Islamophobia and even sought to forge alliances with certain Muslim organizations in the name of the struggle against Zionist and American influence in France (Gandilhon, 2013). Inasmuch as anti-Zionism looms large in the worldview of radical Islamists, some elements of the extreme right have sought to cooperate with them. After all, the notion of a "Zionist Occupation Government" is not unlike the "Zionist Crusade Alliance" invoked by Osama bin Laden. But to date, the most significant outcome of this collaboration has been in the area of propaganda, including promoting Holocaust revisionism, championing the Palestinian cause, and delegitimizing Israel.[9] Although widespread Muslim immigration is seen as a threat to Europe, Jews are often implicated in this development. Perceived as the primary agents of multiculturalism, liberalism, and open borders immigration policies, Jews are seen as ultimately responsible for the white race's sorry predicament. Some extreme right movements see both Jews and Muslims as enemies.[10] Even Breivik, despite his anti-Muslim sentiment, fantasized of collaborating with al-Qaeda to bring down the hated system in Europe, as he explained in his manifesto.[11]

Is political violence appropriate?

The appropriateness of violence has long been discussed in extreme right subcultures. Some advocates of political violence argue that the electoral route to victory is unrealistic. Therefore, to attain their desired end state, violence at some point in the future will be necessary.

The archetypical blueprint for the white nationalist revolution is *The Turner Diaries*, a novel written by the late William L. Pierce, a former university physics professor and founder of the

National Alliance. Perhaps the most widely read book in the extreme right subculture, it has sold an estimated 350,000 copies since its first publication in 1978 (Segal, 2000). It tells the story of a cellular revolutionary group—the Organization—which conducts a terrorist campaign against the U.S. government that is controlled by a Jewish cabal working from behind the scenes. A struggle of apocalyptic proportions follows as American society implodes under the weight of racial strife. Eventually, the Organization acquires nuclear weapons, and a global atomic war ensues involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel. For his service, the protagonist Earl Turner is inducted into a quasi-monastic inner circle of the Organization known as "the Order." In his final mission, he flies a small crop duster plane equipped with a nuclear bomb on a Kamikaze mission that destroys the Pentagon, thus delivering the fatal blow to the system. After victory in America, the revolution spreads throughout the rest of the world. The book closes with a millennial tone. Out of the ashes of devastation, the countries of the West experience a civilizational renewal and are once again masters of their own destinies (MacDonald, 1978).

Although most white nationalists concede that at the present time, the scenario depicted in *The Turner Diaries* is unrealistic, they still believe that someday violence will have to be used if their race is to survive. Other writers, however, have argued that such nihilistic violence will only damage the credibility of the white nationalist cause. For example, on the *Occidental Dissent* website, Hunter Wallace (2011) wrote a number of essays repudiating the vanguardist, or revolutionary wing, of the white nationalist movement. For his launching point, he took issue with an article by the late William L. Pierce titled "Why Conservatives Can't Win," which originally appeared in 1971. The essence of Pierce's argument was that, whereas the political left was offensive and guided by revolutionary goals, the political right was defensive and conservative. Therefore, it was not surprising that the history of conservatism has been one long march of retreat. As an alternative, Pierce exhorted the political right to offer something inspiring to the youth of America, such as his racial revolutionary program (Pierce, 1971).

For his part, Wallace derided the vanguardist fantasy of the inevitable collapse of the system, comparing it to the Christian fundamentalist prophecy of the Rapture. Both narratives hold that the elect will ultimately triumph through the sheer power of their faith alone. Too often, Wallace noted, vanguardists look askance at their fellow white Americans as brain-dead "lemmings." By rejecting mainstream society, Wallace (2011) noted that the vanguardists are often strangers in their own land. Deriding them as "totalitarian hippies," he averred that they are not engaged in any concrete political project, not unlike their 1960s counterculture counterparts who lived by Timothy Leary's maxim, "turn on, tune in, drop out." Rather than doing the hard work necessary to establish white nationalism as a viable mainstream movement, the vanguardists are prone to escapism as they wait for the inevitable collapse of the system (Wallace, 2010a).

Instead, Wallace urged activists to win the hearts and minds of their fellow white men and women. As he explained, the main reason that they live under laws inimical to their own racial survival was not because their enemies are more powerful than they are, but because they have convinced themselves that their own racial extinction is morally justified. Ultimately, violence would only serve to turn Americans against the white nationalist movement. For that reason, he urged supporters that the first thing they must do is rid themselves of the "vanguardist sociopaths who are constantly self-detonating and destroying [their] momentum" (Wallace, 2011). Wallace urged activists to focus their efforts in their own communities. He catalogued a number of victories that conservative activists had achieved in various American states, including efforts to gain support for initiatives restricting immigration and banning affirmative action. By contrast, the vanguardists had succeeded only in making those people in the "pro-White movement look like kooks and idiots in public" (Wallace, 2010b).

For Wallace, violence made no sense as a tactic for no other reason than "the enemy has all the guns" and can "mobilize far more bodies on the field." Invoking Saul Alinsky's *Rules for Radicals*, he counseled that it was senseless to attack the enemy at his strongest point (Wallace, 2011). As Wallace pointed out, mere rhetoric extolling violence has landed a number of racial activists in prison, including Matt Hale, Bill White, and Hal Turner. However, the fact that Barack Obama was twice elected president even though a majority of the white electorate voted for his rival candidates—John McCain and Mitt Romney—suggested to some observers that this segment of the voting public was becoming less significant (Montanaro, 2012). And it is reasonable to assume that current demographic projections would only accelerate this trend. For this reason, the electoral approach seems less and less promising and violent resistance to attaining power more feasible. As the American extreme right theoretician Michael O'Meara (2008) exclaimed on the *Tyrannicide* blog: "The white race will be reborn not by electing Congressmen, hiring lobbyists, and participating in a system that seeks its destruction, but by returning to its original self—and to the challenge of creating an Aryan warrior aristocracy forged in the fire of Sorelian violence."[12]

What is the best revolutionary strategy?

If a strategy of political violence is implemented, what form should it take? The extreme right has pondered this issue over the past few decades. Some have advocated the creation of clandestine cells that will strike at the system. Emblematic of this approach was the campaign of the Order, an underground group that was active in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Founded in the summer of 1983 at an annual Aryan Nations Congress in Hayden Lake, Idaho, a young charismatic member of the National Alliance—Robert Jay Mathews—ultimately recruited nearly 50 members into his organization.[13]

Abandoning all hope of the efficacy of legal political action, Mathews endeavored to build a clandestine resistance group, which would go on a crime spree and a terrorist campaign that gained nationwide notoriety and included counterfeiting, armored car heists, bank robberies, and four homicides (Aho, 1990). To be expected, the Order's exploits soon caught the attention of authorities, and the FBI identified the group as the most serious domestic terrorist threat in the country.[14] Undaunted, Mathews issued a "Declaration of War" against the U.S. government, which he sent to several newspapers. After an extensive search, the FBI caught up with him at Whidbey Island in Washington State. Refusing to be taken alive, he resisted in a standoff that lasted two days and single-handedly engaged in several shootouts with SWAT teams. Finally, the authorities lost their patience, and on December 8, 1984, dropped white phosphorous illumination flares onto the roof of the house in which Mathews had barricaded himself. This set off a fire that engulfed the structure, and Mathews perished in dramatic fashion. A concerted effort by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies eventually crushed the Order, and many of its members are now serving lengthy prison sentences.

Tactically, the Order did not really achieve much, yet it was significant insofar as it marked a change in the orientation of the extreme right. The U.S. government was now seen as the enemy, and the racialist movement began to take on a more revolutionary posture. No longer did it seek to preserve the status quo. Rather, it sought the overthrow of the U.S. government, which it reasoned was now under the heel of ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government). After the demise of the Order, the extreme right went into a period of retrenchment and soul-searching on the topic of revolutionary strategy. From this interlude emerged a change in tactics. The principal lesson drawn was that when an organization grew to the size of the Order, it would eventually fall prey to infiltration and soon be crushed. A new approach—leaderless resistance—

began to gain currency. Inasmuch as the extreme right is organizationally fragmented, leaderless resistance makes a virtue out of necessity.

First popularized by Louis Beam in an essay in the early 1980s, leaderless resistance proposed that the traditional hierarchical organizational structure was untenable under current conditions insofar as the U.S. government was too powerful and would not permit any potentially serious opposition (Durham, 2007). He reasoned that in a technologically advanced society such as contemporary America, the government, through means such as electronic surveillance, could without much difficulty penetrate the structure and reveal its chain of command. From there, the organization could be effectively neutralized from within by infiltrators and agents provocateurs. His essay was disseminated through computer networks of which Beam was a pioneer in exploiting during the 1980s. Beam argued that it became the responsibility of the individual to acquire the necessary skills and information to carry out what needed to be done. Members would take action when and where they saw fit. Organs of information, such as newspapers, leaflets, and now the Internet, would enable each person to keep informed of events (Beam, 1992).

Although some observers have dismissed the threat of leaderless resistance as overblown (e.g. Garfinkel, 2003; Burton and Stewart, 2008), the examples of Anders Behrig Breivik, and Timothy McVeigh before him, demonstrate the potential havoc that lone wolves can inflict. McVeigh's attack on the Arthur P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killed 168 people and left many others wounded. What is more, the leaderless resistance approach has caught on with other extremist subcultures as well. The last several years have witnessed an alarming number of terrorist attacks carried out by lone individuals, or very small groups, both in the United States and abroad (e.g. Michael, 2012b; Simon, 2013; Spaaij, 2012; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015; Bajekal, 2014). For instance, an attack in November 2009 by Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood, Texas, killed 13 people and left 30 more wounded. Nearly four years later, two brothers who sympathized with the global jihad—Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev—carried out the Boston Marathon bombing, which killed three persons, including an 8-year-old boy. In France, in January 2015, two masked gunmen who identified with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula forced their way into the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* and executed 11 people. For obvious reasons, radical Islamists have gained much notoriety stemming from these and other terrorist attacks. However, other extremist movements have given rise to self-radicalized terrorists as well. This was tragically illustrated on June 17, 2015, when Dylann Roof open fired with a handgun in a church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African-Americans and injuring one more.

Roof confessed to police officials that the purpose of his attack was to start a race war (Payne and Bothelo, 2015). Soon after his attack, it transpired that Roof was the owner of a website called "The Last Rhodesian" (Goad, 2015). Shortly before his attack, Roof posted a 2,500-word manifesto that was replete with white nationalist and extreme right themes (O'Connor, 2015). According to Roof, the Trayvon Martin case was the event that "truly awakened" him to the issue of race. To him, it was obvious that George Zimmerman "was in the right." This event prompted him to type in the words "black on White crime" into Google. The first website he found was operated by the Council of Conservative Citizens.[15] On the site, he found "pages upon pages" detailing black-on-white murders. At first, he was in disbelief and soon realized that something "was very wrong." How, he wondered, could the news media be "blowing up the Trayvon Martin case" while virtually ignoring black-on-white murders? To his dismay, he soon learned that Europe was experiencing racial violence as well. From that point on, Roof set out to learn more about race. Soon, he found out about the "Jewish problem" and was "racially aware."

For Roof, blacks were the most immediate threat to whites in America. He blamed much of their violence against whites on "Jewish agitation." Still, Roof believed that the majority of American and European Jews were racially white. As he saw it, the problem was that Jews appear white, yet see themselves as minorities. If somehow every Jew could be turned blue for 24 hours, he reasoned, there would be a mass awakening, as whites would see them for what they really are. But he counseled that if whites could persuade Jews to abandon their Jewish identity, then they would be just like other whites and share the same racial interests. According to Roof, there were both "bad" and "good" Hispanics, noting that white Hispanics make up the elite of most of their countries, but at the end of the day, "they are still our enemies." East Asians, however, were identified as possible allies. Explicitly rejecting traditional patriotism, Roof noted that he hated the sight of the American flag. As he explained, how could whites in America be proud of anything when they were being "murdered daily in the streets" without fighting back? Based on that reasoning, he wrote derisively of veterans commenting that they believe that the nation owed them something for "protecting our way of life." But, as Roof lamented, he was not sure what way of life they were talking about. Instead, he mused, "How about we protect the White race and stop fighting for the jews (sic) [?]" (O'Connor, 2015).

In conclusion, Roof contended that he had no choice but to strike out at his perceived racial enemies. In his own words, he chose Charleston because it is the most historic city in his state and at one time had the highest ratio of blacks to whites in the country. He lamented that people in the white racialist movement did nothing but talk on the Internet. For that reason, it was necessary for him to take the struggle into the real world. When one of his victims in the church pleaded for him to stop, Roof exclaimed: "No, you've raped our women, and you are taking over our country… I have to do what I have to do" (Payne and Bothelo, 2015). Interestingly, the church sits a mere half-mile from Fort Sumter, where the opening salvo in the American Civil War was fired.

Although some representatives of the white nationalist movement expressed empathy for Roof, they were quick to condemn his actions. Matthew Heimbach, the founder of the Traditionalist Workers Party, drove from Cincinnati to Charleston to pay respect for the victims, but he went on to say that Roof was nevertheless a victim because "he was a white man born to a society that actively hates him and his people, hates his culture and his identity" (itsgoingdown.org, 2015). Writing on the *National Vanguard* website, Kevin Alfred Strom (2015) opined that Roof understood much of the race issue, but his understanding was incomplete, which would ultimately make his violence counterproductive from a white nationalist perspective:

> Dylann Roof's actions were inevitable because our race still produces men of honor, and men of honor do not go gentle into that good night. … A man of honor is moved to action when his people are being exterminated and when that willful murder is covered up and justified by lies. … As long as our race survives, it will produce men of honor. Honor without discipline, organization, and understanding, however, is ineffective.

According to Strom, Roof's actions were misdirected because the blacks he targeted were the "least offensive, least dangerous, and among the most self-segregated Blacks imaginable short of actual separatists." For Strom, the real enemy was the "Jewish power structure," which forced the mixing of the races in America. Only with sober analysis, he counseled, could white nationalists attain their strategic aims.

What is the strategic endgame?

Faced with what they see as grim demographic realities, some extreme right activists have abandoned ideas of taking over their entire countries. Instead, they call for the creation of separate mono-ethnic or mono-racial states where they can practice their version of self-determination. For example, beginning in 2003, Harold Covington published a quintet of novels based on a white separatist insurgency in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States (Covington, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2013). Set in the not-too-distant future, the novels extol the exploits of the Northwest Volunteer Army, which wages a war of national independence. Eschewing grandiose schemes to foment a nationwide revolution, Covington argues for mounting a separatist guerilla campaign in a limited region. On his online *Radio Free Northwest* program, Covington exhorts racially-conscious whites to relocate to the Pacific Northwest to form a critical mass for the formation of his future Northwest Volunteer Army. Still, even Covington does not advocate violence under current conditions; rather, only when a certain period of crisis arrives will terrorism be called for (Johnson, 2011). For his part, in his manifesto, Dylann Roof categorically rejected the creation of a rump state for white separatists as outlined by Harold Covington's Northwest Front. To Roof, this was analogous to whites fleeing to the suburbs to avoid blacks or "just another way to run from the problem without facing it." Instead, Roof urged whites to stand up and fight. In a similar vein to Covington, Matthew Heimbach urged whites to reject their American identity for one based on race, as he explained in a talk to his supporters:

> We need to be getting away from symbols, like the American flag. This is the symbol of our occupation, this is the symbol of our genocide, this is the symbol of the nation, that has already said that they will use drones to drop missiles on political dissidents. Do any of us think, sitting in this room, we're not considered political dissidents? We are at war with this system, and if you think for two seconds that George W. Bush or Ronald Reagan would be friendlier to us than Barack Obama is then you have not been reading your history. (itsgoingdown.org, 2015)

But even carving out a territory consisting of a few American states is still a tall order. Instead, some activists urge like-minded racially-conscious whites to congregate together in select towns and neighborhoods. As the native South African activist Arthur Kemp explained in his book, *Nova Europa: European Survival Strategy in a Darkening World*, over time, white nationalists could begin taking over local governments. As their numbers continued to expand, successively higher tiers of government would come under their control. He cites the examples of the Boer colony of Orania in post-Apartheid South Africa and the Zionist project in Israel as successful case studies to be emulated by white nationalists (Kemp, 2015). But to date, such efforts in the United States appear farcical, as evidenced by Craig Cobb's attempt to establish a "whites-only" town in North Dakota beginning in 2011, which has occasioned protests from area residents and derision in the media (Lenz, 2013).

Other extreme right movements reject separatist projects as retreatist and argue that whites should not settle for a rump state in North America in the style of the Northwest Imperative. For example, the Creativity Movement (formerly the World Church of the Creator) exhorts whites everywhere to unite around a racial religion and take over the globe (Michael, 2009). But inasmuch as the governments of Western nations would reject such a project, such goals could only most likely be realized with the collapse of Western civilization itself.

Conclusion

Ultimately, when contemplating terrorism and political violence, attention should be given to the aspirations and capabilities of the extremist subcultures that give rise to these actions. For these factors will inform strategies, tactics, and targets.

At the present time, the future of right-wing extremism is far from certain. Several important political, economic, and demographic trends could have far-reaching effects. If current demographic trends continue, whites could be reduced to minority status in this century in both Western Europe and North America. This development is viewed in nearly apocalyptic terms in the white nationalist segment of the extreme right. Moreover, a festering economic crisis could create a greater pool of the dispossessed that will support radical movements in the future. An ominous development is the collapse of the center in both European and American politics as their party systems are ever more characterized by an ideological divide. As a consequence, right-wing extremism long relegated to the fringe could become more mainstream.

But as this chapter explained, right-wing extremism and terrorism could take numerous forms. Increasingly, the far right in Europe now sees Islam as the most serious threat, while populist parties actually court Jews for support. Although Muslims in America are far more assimilated than in Western Europe,[16] events such as the 9/11 and sporadic lone-wolf attacks by jihadists have heightened tensions between Muslims and their host communities. In the aftermath of 9/11, a massive homeland security apparatus has been erected in the United States. Furthermore, there is much greater intelligence sharing, not only among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, but also among foreign governments as well to combat terrorism. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the lone-wolf trend will continue not only for the extreme right, but other extremist orientations as well.

Notes

1 For instance, according to a 2014 study conducted by the noted CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen, since 9/11, right-wing extremists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States than Islamists motivated by al-Qaeda's ideology (Bergen and Sterman, 2014). Another study released in June 2015 by the New America—a Washington, D.C.-based think tank—found that right-wing extremists killed nearly twice as many people in America as had jihadists (Shane, 2015).

2 For a more recent analysis of this convergence, see Wright (2009).

3 The example of Jacob Schiff, who provided financial contributions for anti-tsarist revolutionaries in Russia, is often cited to make the case for Jewish malfeasance. Kuhn was also the head of the New York investment firm Kuhn, Loeb & Co., but also supported the Communists in their struggle against the Tsar in Russia, presumably for the pogroms against the country's Jewish population. For more on this line of reasoning from an extreme right perspective, see Britton (1952), and more recently, Duke (2013).

4 Arguably the most thorough analysis of Jewish involvement in liberal causes from a far-right perspective has been conducted by the noted evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald. In his book, *The Culture of Critique*, he argues that there is considerable Jewish hostility to traditional Western culture, which is manifested in various intellectual movements including Freudian psychology, The Frankfurt School, and Boazian anthropology—to undermine the European-derived civilization of America and replace it with a society more congenial to Jews (MacDonald, 1998). According to his analysis, Jewish organizations have promoted policies and ideologies, which have undermined the cultural cohesion of the West, while practicing just the opposite for themselves. Specifically, Jewish organizations are chided for extolling multiculturalism in the West, while insisting upon ethnic exclusivity in Israel. For a review and synopsis of his research, see Michael (2006a).

5 The ZOG acronym was first introduced in the far right's lexicon in 1976 by an obscure neo-Nazi named Eric Thomson. Thomson wrote an article titled "Welcome to ZOG-World" (www.faem.com/eric/2000/et047.htm). By the 1980s, it attained wide currency in the extreme right subculture.

6 For instance, on June 18, 1984, members of an extreme right terrorist group, the Order, shot and killed a Jewish disc jockey in Denver, Colorado (Flynn and Gerhardt, 1990). On August 10, 1999, Buford O. Furrow, a former security guard for the Aryan Nations compound, terrorized a Jewish daycare center in Los Angeles that left several injured. Later that same day, he shot and killed an Asian-American postal carrier (Gibney Jr., 1999). More recently, on April 14, 2014, a long-standing activist—Frazier Glenn Miller—went on a shooting spree at a Jewish Community Center in Kansas, which killed three persons. At his trial, Miller planned on using a "compelling necessity" defense, arguing that he committed the attack in order to stop "the Jewish genocide of the White race." However, Johnson County District Judge Kelly Ryan ruled that Miller could not use that defense (Thomas, 2015). On August 31, 2015, Miller was found guilty. Eight days later, he was sentenced to death (Rizzo, 2015).
7 Eurabia is a neologism created by the Israeli writer Gisele Littman under her pen name, Bat Ye'or (2005). She warns that if the demographic balance in Europe shifts to a Muslim majority, then the continent will move away from its alliances with the United States and Israel. It is also worth noting that Muslims have been implicated in a serious crime wave in Europe that includes an alarming incidence of rape (e.g. see Scruton, 2014; and Leiken, 2005).
8 For more on Breivik and his terrorism, see Brochgrevink (2013) and Bangstad (2014).
9 For more on the collaboration between the extreme right and radical Islam, see Michael (2006b).
10 For example, an extreme right novel—*The Partisan*—depicts a dystopian France in the not-so-distant future in which Jewish elites and Muslims conspire to dispossess the native French (Solére, 2014).
11 Breivik even read al-Qaeda's online English-language magazine, *Inspire* (Brochgrevink, 2013, p. 18, p. 174).
12 Georges Sorel (1847–1922) was a French philosopher who propounded the theory that myth and violence were creative of morality and virtue. Italian fascists praised him as their forefather (Sternhell, Sznajder, and Asheri, 1994).
13 The organization used several names, including "the Silent Brotherhood" and a German version of that same title, the *Brüder Schweigen*. For more on the group, see Flynn and Gerhardt (1990).
14 This is according to the statements of Danny O. Coulson, the founder of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, who was involved in the Order investigation (see Coulson and Shannon, 1999, p. 195). According to one estimate, the investigation is said to have involved one-quarter of the total manpower resources of the FBI (Aho, 1990, p. 61).
15 The Council of Conservative Citizens was founded in 1985, when approximately 30 men, including former members of the defunct Citizens Councils of America, met in Atlanta for the express purpose of creating an organization that would build a unity among the more respectable elements of the far right. Currently the organization is led by Earl Holt III. For more on the Council of Conservative Citizens, see Graham (2015).
16 By and large, Muslims, as a demographic group, seem to fare very well in the United States. Average income for Muslims appears to be higher than the average income in the United States; a 1996 survey found that their medium household income was $40,000 versus $32,000 for the country as a whole (see Pipes, 2002, p. 157).

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10
LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM
Radicalisation, attack planning and execution

Noémie Bouhana, Stefan Malthaner, Bart Schuurman, Lasse Lindekilde, Amy Thornton and Paul Gill

Research on lone-actor terrorism grew exponentially in the past decade. Whilst certainly not a fundamentally new phenomenon (for historical accounts, see Coffey, 2011; Bach Jensen, 2014; Kaplan, 1997; Michael, 2014; van Buuren & de Graaf, 2014), it has been occurring with greater frequency over the past two decades (Appleton, 2014; Coffey, 2011; Eby, 2012; Nesser, 2012). Some studies provide more conservative figures than others (COT, 2007), but by and large the consensus appears to be that 'lone wolf terrorism is on the rise by all accounts, and by every indicator' (Feldman, 2013, p. 270). There is also data to suggest that lone-actor extremist attacks have increased in lethality over the past two decades (Teich, 2013) or may be even more lethal than group-based attacks in certain contexts (Phillips, 2015). Even so, lone-actor extremist events remain a marginal phenomenon compared to group-based terrorism, and the latter is, on balance, still considerably more deadly (Nesser, 2014; Spaaij, 2010).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the biggest areas of contention within the emerging literature concerns definition. As in the broader field of terrorism studies, there is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes lone actor terrorism (Appleton, 2012; Borum, 2013; Borum *et al.*, 2012; COT, 2007; Spaaij, 2010; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). A number of studies have attempted to provide typologies or profiles of lone actors, perhaps seeking to go around the definitional obstacle (Bates, 2012; Borum *et al.*, 2012; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Pantucci, 2011; Philips & Pohl, 2012).

The focus of the remaining lone-actor terrorism research has been quite wide. Some studies focus upon ideological motivations and lone-actor terrorist psychology, including the role of media, such as online media, in motivational development and ideological change (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Borum, 2013; COT, 2007; Gardell, 2014; Gill & Corner, 2015; Michael, 2012; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011; Peddell *et al.*, 2016; Spaaij, 2012; Springer, 2009; Weinmann, 2012). Some dealt with (the difficulties of) preventing, countering or responding to lone actors and the attacks they may execute (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010; Barnes, 2012; Brynielsson *et al.*, 2013; Carter & Carter, 2012; Coffey, 2011; Hewitt, 2014; Meyer, 2013; Striegher, 2013). Although not focused on a particular topic, numerous publications on lone-actor terrorism utilize datasets and (some form of) statistical analysis to identify key characteristics of offenders and attacks, in the search for significant indicators and predictors (COT, 2007; Eby, 2012; Gill *et al.*, 2014; Gill, 2015a; Gruenewald *et al.*, 2013a; Jasparro, 2010; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Spaaij, 2010; Teich, 2013). Others have looked at different types of lone-actor violence in a comparative perspective

(Gill & Corner, 2013; Gruenewald *et al.*, 2013b; Malkki, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; McCauley *et al.*, 2013).

For the purposes of this chapter, we are specifically interested in summarizing the existing knowledge on lone-actor radicalisation, attack planning and the attacks themselves.

Lone-actor radicalisation

Despite a steep increase in research and publications on terrorist behaviour associated with lone actors during the past few years, the share occupied by empirical research remains relatively limited; this is particularly the case with regards to studies of the process of radicalisation. Perhaps predictably, given the very nature of lone actor terrorism, the knowledge-base into processes of radicalisation remains relatively superficial.

The focus of available studies is varied. Some rely on single or small-N case studies to examine biographical trajectories, to develop broad typologies of lone actors or to generate models of lone-actor radicalisation (e.g. Waits & Shors, 1999; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Willman, 2011; McCauley & Mosalenko, 2011, 2014; Pantucci, 2011; Van der Heide, 2011; Weimann, 2012; Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Gartenstein-Ross, 2014; Van Buuren & De Graaf, 2014; Bockler, Hoffmann & Zick, 2015; Reid, Habermeyer & Guldimann, 2015; Van der Meer; 2015). Others, largely reliant on anecdotal evidence or case studies, are concerned with more specific issues, such as the strategic orientation of lone extremists (Centre for Terror Analysis, 2011), the challenges posed by lone actors for counterterrorism and the perception of the threat of lone extremists within law enforcement (Chermak *et al.*, 2010; Gordon *et al.*, 2015; Hewitt, 2014; Michael, 2014; Peddell *et al.*, 2016), or the ideological narratives that underpin and promote lone actor extremism (Kaplan, 1997). While informative as a first approach to the phenomenon, these studies tend to be descriptive rather than explanatory, and the external validity of their conclusions is limited.

A few notable studies are based on larger-N datasets, mostly in the form of databases that rely on open sources (Spaaij, 2010; Nesser, 2012; Gill *et al.*, 2014; Gill, 2015a). While a significant improvement in terms of generalizability, these studies' findings often remain descriptive, without claim to establishing causality, and mostly concerned with behavioural indicators associated with lone-actor terrorists. Furthermore, while a great deal of attention is paid to individual variables (e.g. offender background), and some attention is devoted to situational variables (e.g. characteristics of targets), there is much less focus on environmental factors implicated in the radicalisation process (e.g. types of settings in which the radicalisation occurred) (Gill, 2015b). Despite these limitations, some observations drawn from the empirical literature on lone-actor radicalisation are summarised in the remainder of this section.

As stated, insights from large-N studies, as well as from biographically oriented small-N case studies, are richest on the individual level of analysis. Similar to research on perpetrators of political violence in general, one of the key findings of these studies is the absence of any general socio-demographic profile of lone-actor terrorists with respect to social and educational backgrounds, age, and so on. Nevertheless, in the work by Gill *et al.* (2014), some patterns are observed:

1 their sample includes a comparatively higher proportion of unattached individuals – unmarried and without children – particularly when taking into account that most of these individuals are well into adulthood;
2 relative to their level of education, a large proportion of lone actor terrorists are unemployed (40.2%);

3 a significant proportion have a criminal record (41.2%); and
4 almost a third of the sample have a history of mental illness or personality disorder (31.9%) (Gill *et al.*, 2014: 428), which is in line with other studies that have identified mental illness as a notable characteristic of lone-actor terrorists (see also Nesser, 2012: 66; Spaaij, 2010: 862), compared with group actors (Corner & Gill, 2015; Corner, Gill & Mason, 2016).

Within the general diversity of lone-actor terrorists, Gill *et al.* (2014) also found distinguishable differences between ideological subgroups. For example, compared to extreme right-wing offenders and single-issue offenders, al Qaeda-influenced offenders were significantly younger, less likely to have criminal convictions, more likely to acquire knowledge through virtual sources, and display elements of command-and-control links.

With regard to the social context of lone-actor radicalisation, almost all studies – though with varying degrees of emphasis – conclude that lone actors are often not all that 'alone' during the radicalisation phase. While a few individuals are described as loners and socially isolated, research tends to unearth evidence of meaningful connection to the immediate and broader social contexts, including family and friends, political movements, terrorist organizations, individual mentors, or virtual communities (see Pantucci, 2011; Nesser, 2012; Kaplan *et al.*, 2014; Gill *et al.*, 2014; Berntzen & Sandberg, 2012, 2014; Weimann, 2012). Several typologies, in fact, distinguish types of lone actors according to their degree of connection to radical movements or terrorist organizations (Pantucci, 2011; Nesser, 2012).

With respect to the links between lone-actor terrorists and their immediate social environment, Gill and colleagues found that in 79% of the cases in their sample, other people were aware of the individual's commitment to an extremist ideology, and in 63.9% of the cases, family members or friends were aware of the intent to engage in terrorism-related activities, because the individuals verbally told them so (Gill *et al.*, 2014). Concerning relations to political movements or organizations, they found that in almost half of their cases, lone actors had interacted face-to-face with members of a wider network of political activists, and in 68.1% they had consumed literature or propaganda from a wider movement. Finally, more than half of the lone actors characterized their actions as associated with a wider movement.

These latter findings point to the role of the radicalising environment, even in processes of lone-actor radicalisation. These findings are echoed in other large-N studies. Nesser (2012), for example, stresses that most of the lone actors in his sample had – or wanted to have – ties to extremist groups or extremist environments, and received some degree of assistance, encouragement or instructions at some stage in their trajectory. In-depth case studies likewise tend to stress two aspects of social embeddedness: first, the lone actors' reference to a wider movement and connection to a 'virtual community', either in the form of shared worldviews and frames of interpretation, or in the form of claims to belong and act as part of this movement (see, for example, Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Gartenstein-Ross, 2014); second, the role of the internet and particular online publications, platforms or high-profile figures, such as Anwar al-Awlaki (Weimann, 2012) in informing the lone-actor terrorists' ideology.

Yet, while the literature frequently mentions links between lone actors and the radicalising aspects of the environment in which they evolve, little of any specificity is known about the nature of the places where lone-actor radicalisation happens. Likewise, information about the trajectories that result in exposure to (and the factors that shape their interactions with) these environments and the people in them remains scarce. Whether some types of such places are specific to lone actor radicalisation (as opposed to group radicalisation) remains unanswered. When the radicalising environment is mentioned in studies on lone actors it is, chiefly, in relation to the internet and to the availability of propaganda and other terrorism-supportive nar-

ratives promoted by terrorist organizations or movements which seek to instigate and support violent action by lone actors as part of a broader strategy of 'leaderless resistance'. In fact, this strategy is sometimes, but not always, interpreted as the result of a process of decline and fragmentation of a movement (see Kaplan, 1997; Pantucci, 2011; Michael, 2012; Weimann, 2012).

The emergence of the internet in its current form and its capacity to allow conversation between disconnected, like-minded individuals and to put them in touch with wider 'virtual communities' has been identified as both a factor of 'incubation' and 'acceleration' of the lone-actor terrorist phenomenon (Weimann, 2012: 79; Pantucci, 2011: 34). The case of Anders Behring Breivik, in particular, has brought to the fore the connection between the internet and lone actors (Ravndal, 2013). Al Qaeda and Daesh are also now widely known to use virtual spaces and networks to encourage unaffiliated individuals to commit violent acts, through media such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) *Inspire* magazine (the archetypal example of the genre) and, more recently, through social media networks (Thompson, 2011).

Research carried out by Gill *et al.* (2017) on the role of the internet in terrorism highlights the multitude of ways in which the internet has been used to facilitate terrorism. The study exploited a database of 227 individuals who were convicted of terrorism offences in the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2014, a number of which are lone actors, and compiled and analysed information gained through open-source data on over 100 variables related to radicalisation and attack preparation. Findings of note include that 54% of the actors in the database used the internet to learn about terrorist activity, a figure which rises to 76% from 2012 onwards. The open source data suggest that 44% of actors found or downloaded online extremist media (including videos, photographs and lectures) and a third prepared for their attacks using online resources. Just under a third of actors (29%) communicated online with others, while 15% disseminated terrorist propaganda online. The fact that the database included actors from the 1990s and early 2000s, who were much less likely to use the internet, given its lesser diffusion at the time, means that many of these percentages would be much higher if one considered only recent cases. The study also found that those who were members of a cell were significantly less likely to have learned online than lone actors. This may be a reflection that within a cell there is likely to be a pooling of human, social, technical and financial capital, the absence of which leads individuals to go online to learn how to conduct attacks and for other purposes.

A recurring question when examining lone-actor radicalisation is whether there are factors, processes and mechanisms of radicalisation, at any level of analysis (e.g. individual), which are particular to this type of terrorism, or whether the insights and theoretical models developed in more general research on (group-based) radicalisation have something to tell us (Spaaij, 2010, 2012; Pantucci, 2011; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). As previously stated, several studies would suggest that the picture of the individual 'self-radicalising' in complete isolation is misleading (Spaaij, 2012; Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Gill *et al.*, 2014), if only given the increasingly prominent role that seems to be played by online extremist communities, as well as the fact that many lone actors are known to have had some kind of link to broader movements or political organizations. Conversely, in recent years, the phenomenon of so-called 'homegrown' radicalisation has been portrayed as typically involving elements of 'self-radicalisation' in trajectories of individuals who later joined radical milieus or terrorist groups, as well as small, autonomous cells of so-called 'self-starters' (Kirby 2007) or *quasi-lone* 'wolf packs' (Pantucci, 2011).

In other words, in the domain of radicalisation studies, the boundaries between 'types' of radicalisation, on a spectrum of 'lone' to 'group', appear increasingly hazy as more information comes to light on individual cases. A significant number of cases, many of them labelled 'lone actor', seem to occupy the middle ground on a spectrum marked by cases of completely isolated lone attackers on the one side and individuals who join (or are recruited into) an established

terrorist organization on the other, and a middle ground characterized by evidence of some kind of connection to radical movements or terrorist organizations. This suggests that the study of lone-actor radicalisation has something to learn from research on 'home-grown' and group-based radicalisation, much as the study of 'cell-based' or so-called 'bunch of guys' radicalisation, which tends to focus chiefly on the socio-psychological connections, can learn from research on mechanisms of 'self-radicalisation'.

Lone-actor terrorist attacks and associated planning

Moving on from an overview of known factors and processes associated with lone actor radicalisation, this section reviews the knowledge-base about the *behaviour* of lone actors, as it relates to the preparation and the commission of attacks.

As was the case with regards to radicalisation, compared to the more extensive number of publications on group-based terrorism, research on the characteristics of lone-actor attacks is distinctly limited in size and scope (Spaaij, 2010, 2012; Barnes, 2012; Hamm, 2012; Feldman, 2013; Gruenewald *et al.*, 2013a). The vast majority of publications used in this review date from the last couple of years, reflecting the recent rise of interest in the topic brought about by such incidents as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and Anders Breivik's much-publicized 2011 attack in Norway (Kaplan *et al.*, 2014). Within the relatively small body of literature on lone-actor terrorism, the specific subjects of attack preparation and planning, and of attack commission, have received even less dedicated attention. Unsurprisingly, much of the literature on lone-actor attacks (or attempted attacks) overlaps with the literature on lone-actor attack preparation and planning. This is in no small part due to the narrowness of the literature overall, meaning that the degree of specialisation and fragmentation that characterises more mature fields is absent.

There is not yet a distinct theme within the literature on lone-actor terrorism that focuses specifically on attack preparation, though one would expect that increasing our understanding of what happens 'left of bang' will significantly strengthen preventative efforts (Appleton, 2014: 136). Although not an area of specialization, some useful insights and findings can be drawn from existing research.

Gill *et al.* (2014) find that lone actor attacks are 'rarely sudden and impulsive' (p. 434). Preparatory conduct appears to be a general characteristic, even if the degree to which individuals engage in it can vary considerably (Spaaij, 2010, 2012). A study of the Breivik case, in particular, bears out the idea that lone actors can conduct long and meticulous preparations prior to engaging in violence (Appleton, 2014), although it must be said that Breivik appears to have been an exception rather than the rule in the complexity of the attack he prepared and executed. The literature suggests that a low level of sophistication characterizes the weapons and methods utilized in lone-actor attacks (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010; Jasparro, 2010; Barnes, 2012; Ackerman & Pinson, 2014; Appleton, 2014).

All but one (Eby, 2012)[1] study which focuses on this issue found that firearms were the weapon most frequently used by lone actors, with explosive devices coming in second (COT, 2007; Gruenewald *et al.*, 2013a, 2013b; Jasparro, 2010; Spaaij, 2010, 2012; van der Heide, 2011). The proposed explanation is that little to no training or expertise is required to use firearms such as handguns or assault rifles, and that, at least in the United States, these can be easily and inexpensively acquired (Jasparro, 2010; van der Heide, 2011). Constructing a successful explosive device is considerably more difficult, and lone actors seem less likely to have the requisite knowledge and expertise (Ackerman & Pinson, 2014, Kenney, 2010). With regards to preference for firearms versus explosive devices, and to weapons choice more generally, it appears that there may be differences between lone and group actors (Spaaij, 2012). Jasparro (2010), observing a

further preference for vehicle-collision based attacks, suggests that lone actors, overall, make relatively more use of low-skilled, 'pragmatic' weaponry. Of course, weapon selection is not independent from target choice, as specific target characteristics will render the use of certain weapons more or less inappropriate (Clarke & Newman, 2006).

With regards to target choice, people are the most commonly selected target, with civilians or the general public much more likely to be attacked than government officials or politicians, who are more likely to be protected (COT, 2007; Eby, 2012; Spaaij, 2010, 2012; van der Heide, 2011; Teich, 2013). More specifically, Gill *et al.* (2014) report that lone actors targeted people in 41% of cases, 12% targeted property, while another 33% targeted both people and property. Based on in-depth interviews, Spaaij (2012) concludes that, typically, lone actors attack targets of symbolic, rather than strategic, importance; he adds that knowledge of the target is likely to reveal the source of the individual's grievance.

The lower lethality of lone-actor attacks compared to group-based attacks found by Spaaij (2012; 0.62 deaths per incident versus circa 1.60 deaths per incident respectively) may be another indicator of lone actors' tendencies to execute simple, straightforward operations. Exceptions do exist, of course, and not just in the case of Breivik. Four of the individuals in Eby's (2012) sample used a biological or chemical weapon, and five committed a suicide attack. The likelihood of a growing interest in using nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons of mass destruction, or suicide attacks, has been discussed by several other authors as well (Ackerman & Pinson, 2014; Ellis, 2013; Gordon *et al.*, 2015; Heffron Casserleigh *et al.*, 2012).

Research reveals a variety of motivations that drive lone-actor terrorists' decisions to engage in an attack. In Ackerman and Pinson's (2014) sample, approximately 30% of lone actors were driven by 'single-issue' concerns (e.g. animal rights or anti-abortionist), while 9–18% held some kind of personal grudge. This latter point is an interesting one that is repeated by several other authors, suggesting lone actors may be more strongly driven by personal grievances than members of terrorist groups (Eby, 2012; Nijboer, 2012; Spaaij, 2010; Stern, 2003). A 2007 study found that white supremacy and associated motives was the number one ideology driving lone actors, followed by Islamist convictions and, in third place, nationalist/separatist goals (COT, 2007). Spaaij's 2012 book on the subject similarly states that right-wing extremism is the most prevalent fodder of ideological motives for attack, followed by Islamism, but with anti-abortion violence in third place. In Eby's (2012) work, the rather broad category of 'anti-government' takes up first place, with 47% of lone actors presumably affiliated with this ideological category, followed by Islamism. The more recent study by Gill *et al.* (2014) puts Islamist-inspired lone actors squarely in the lead; 43% of the 119 individuals in their sample were al Qaeda-inspired, 34% held right-wing views, and 18% were allegedly motivated by single-issue concerns.

Rounding off this general overview of research on the preparation and planning phase of lone-actor terrorists are studies that look at the geospatial characteristics of such attacks, though these have been little examined. Eby (2012) found that on average, lone actors travel 122 kilometres (76.15 miles) to the location where they commit their attack, and that 87% of attacks, attempts and arrests take place during a weekday. This finding is particularly interesting and calls for replication with large-N samples, as it seems to run counter to findings in other areas of crime studies, including group-based terrorism, where offenders are found, by and large, to abide by the least effort principle, which states that when faced with multiple equivalent options for action, an individual will select the closest one, minimising effort (Zipf, 1950).

On aggregate, these findings present a picture of an attack preparation phase that is, in many cases, characterized by a low level of sophistication (relative to, for example, group-based terrorist incidents) and driven by a variety of ideological motives. However, what this accumulated research does not provide is an abundance of concrete details about the modus operandi of lone

actors. One reason for this is that such data has, so far, not been captured in detail by quantitative analyses (COT, 2007). Another factor is the variety of attack styles that lone actors have displayed, the above observations aside, although most have used firearms, others have opted for explosives, while others still have adopted more unusual means, such as using cars to run over their victims (Eby, 2012). As Bakker and De Graaf (2010) have argued, lone actor attacks are characterized by a 'wide variety in target selection, use of weapons and modus operandi' (p. 4).

What we do know about the specifics of lone actor attack preparations stems in large part from the quantitative work of Gill *et al.* (2014). Based on their sample of 119 individuals who engaged (or planned to engage) in lone-actor violence in the United States or Europe, the researchers found that:

- 50.4% **changed address** in the five years prior to planning an act of violence with 45% of that number moving within six months of their eventual attack or arrest;
- 40.2% **were unemployed** at the time of their attack or arrest – 26.6% of which had lost their jobs within the previous six months;
- 32.8% **were under an elevated level of stress**, with 74.3% of those people reporting that this had arisen within the previous year;
- 12.6% noticeably increased their **physical and outdoor activities**;
- 16.8% **sought prior legitimization** for the attack;
- 33.6% recently **joined a group engaged in contentious politics**;
- 34.5% tried to **recruit others** prior to their (intended) attack;
- In 57.7% of the cases, **others knew of the lone actors' intentions**;
- 21% received **hands-on training**;
- 46.2% **learned through virtual sources**;
- 50.4% had access to **bomb-making manuals**;
- 29.4% executed **'dry-runs'** to prepare for their attacks;
- And 47.1% **stockpiled weapons**.

These findings suggest potential indicators of intent to act. Especially interesting from the perspective of detecting intent to commit violence is the finding that in almost 60% of cases, someone had some level of awareness of the offender's plans. This is echoed in the work of Cohen *et al.* (2014), as well as that of Hamm (2012), who report that lone actors tend to spread their views (online) before committing an attack. Of course, as Appleton (2014) reminds us, it can be very difficult to distinguish between hollow threats and actual intent to commit violence. Yet some of the capability-related indicators may have the potential to help differentiate between the 'hollow' and the 'actual', as activities such as the stockpiling weapons, dry runs, and increased physical activities are all essentially observable behaviours and signal some level of commitment to action on the part of the actor.

Another finding from the Gill *et al.* (2014) study, which is worth noting, relates to the role of the internet and its importance as a virtual learning environment for the practical aspects of preparing and committing acts of violence. Several other authors reached similar conclusions (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010; Barnes, 2012; Brynielsson *et al.*; 2013; Pantucci, 2011; Stenersen, 2008; Weinmann, 2012). Bakker and De Graaf (2010) contend, however, that such online learning is no substitute for real experience and may therefore prompt lone actors to approach others for advice, potentially marking a point in time at which they are vulnerable to detection and interdiction. The internet, as a medium through which individuals can find and exchange extremist notions, may also play an important role in creating and maintaining lone actor terrorists' intent to commit violence (Brynielsson *et al.*, 2013; Pantucci, 2011). In the words of Pantucci (ibid.: 11),

the internet may have 'fostered the growth of the autodidactic extremist'. Interestingly, Phillips (2011) finds that, after a period of preparatory activity, lone actors are likely to temporarily cease their activities, meaning that during this period observable indicators may no longer be present.

Other findings on lone actor attack preparation stem from case studies. While these have the benefit of being very detailed, they also tend to be largely idiosyncratic, making it hard to generalize from their findings to the wider population. Meyer (2013) draws from the Breivik case to develop detailed, step-by-step narratives of the planning, preparation, and implementation of the attacks carried out in Norway. Gartenstein-Ross's (2014) case study of Carlos Bledsoe charts his discrete pathway to violence. After adopting a radical interpretation of Islam, Bledsoe reportedly developed the intent to commit an attack during his incarceration in Yemen in 2007, following a failed attempt to reach Somalia. He began working on a specific plan after his return to the United States in early 2009. During what could be called his planning phase, Bledsoe searched for possible targets, acquired weapons and ammunition and engaged in some basic operational security practices to ascertain whether the authorities were on to him. He then moved on to the execution phase of his attack and ended up shooting two American servicemen, one of them fatally.

Two of the four case studies in the COT (2007) report likewise present detailed information on the preparatory phase of one individual. David Copeland, who committed a series of nail-bomb attacks in London in April 1999, acquired knowledge of explosives through online bomb-making manuals and proceeded to buy bomb-making equipment and ingredients. As this did not cover all his needs, he also stole chemicals required to make explosives. After what seems to have been a process of trial and error, Copeland succeeded in constructing an explosive device and moved on to the attack execution phase. Interestingly, he does not appear to have conducted reconnaissance of potential targets beforehand, but instead chose a suitable location on the go. He then repeated the attack pattern until his arrest. By contrast, Volkert van der Graaf, the Dutchman who murdered politician Pim Fortuyn in 2001, was more meticulous in his preparation and planning. Using the internet, Van der Graaf researched his target's whereabouts on the day of his planned attack and then mapped the target's location. On the day of the attack itself, Van der Graaf attempted to disguise his appearance, then removed incriminating evidence from the weapon and conducted reconnaissance at the target location before commencing his attack.

What these narratives suggest is that the steps undertaken by the lone actors are not dissimilar to the various phases of the more general 'terrorist planning cycle', highlighted by several authors as a useful analytical guide (Kaati & Svenson, 2011; Rosoff & von Winterfeldt, 2007; Stewart, 2011). The reported lack of reconnaissance activity in the Copeland case, however, illustrates the need to find a balance between general models, such as the planning cycle, and other modelling approaches which would preserve the specificity of such cases. Reconnaissance is thought to be a vulnerable stage in lone actor planning activity (Stewart & Burton, 2009), whereby the risk of detection and disruption is at its highest. This may be particularly the case when the target is a specific individual and when the attacker is inexperienced in surveillance techniques (Burton, 2007). If the length, intensity, and even occurrence of reconnaissance activity varies between lone actors (Spaaij, 2012), then the practical implications for counterterrorism are profound.

Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile to note that, based on a historical analysis of lone-actor terrorism from the late 19th century onwards, Van der Heide (2011) concludes that the characteristics of lone-actor attacks, such as their motives and preferred targets, have evolved over time. She finds that the proportion of attacks targeting specific individuals dropped from 90% to 40% over that time; towards the end of the period, the most common targets had

shifted from public figures to private citizens and property. While this may not be surprising, this observation reinforces the need to develop a general risk analysis framework, which can guide the development, if need be, of period-specific scripts and scenarios in future, so as not to have to 'start from scratch' with every new historical incarnation of the lone-actor terrorist threat.

Conclusion

The preceding synthesis of the research literature on lone-actor terrorism highlights the diversity of factors, indicators, mechanisms, processes, and overall *concepts* that have been associated, analytically or empirically, with the search for an explanation of lone-actor radicalisation and behaviour.

Empirical efforts to unify this knowledge into general frameworks have been largely aimed at producing typologies of lone actors (e.g. Borum, Fein & Vossekuil, 2012; Pantucci, 2011). This taxonomic approach, while a necessary step towards progress in any scientific field (Bailey, 1994), has some important limitations. While well-designed and validated typologies can provide useful definition and organisation in a new area of research, their purpose remains essentially to organise observations: a typology *describes what it is*, but it does little to *explain why it is so*. It may be tempting to think that understanding has been improved by slotting a particular event under a labelled category, but an explanation requires more than a taxonomic exercise: it requires conceptual statements as to the causes and causal processes which account for the outcome under study. The ability to tell apart (even deep) description from explanation, and to move from the one to the other, is crucial when the ultimate goal is to do away with the outcome: to prevent a problem from (re)occurring, we need to remove or disrupt its causes.

Because empirical findings do not speak for themselves (e.g. statistics tell us about the presence and strength of a relation, not what it means), a knowledge-base capable of supporting policy must be made up of more than a catalogue of statistically significant relationships between a set of factors (i.e. descriptive results). It must include theories which advance explanations as to the role these factors play in producing the outcome of interest (e.g. radicalisation) and the conditions under which they may come to interact (Wikström, 2011). This necessitates going beyond empirical generalisations to conjecture inherently unobservable but plausible causal mechanisms (Bunge, 2004). Progress is contingent upon the emergence of theories which can not only make sense of accumulated observations and are compatible with established scientific knowledge in major disciplines, but which can also bridge disciplinary silos to integrate levels of analysis and, crucially, produce general rather than strictly local explanations (Bouhana & Wikström, 2010).

While observations about lone actors and their behaviour have multiplied in recent years, few, if any, meta-models or theories of lone-actor radicalisation and lone-actor extremist behaviour have been put forward, which articulate systematically how the kinds of factors discussed in the prior literature review interact to produce one or the other, and which are able to differentiate between those factors which may act as indicators (needed for the design of detection and mitigation measures) of lone-actor terrorism, and those which may be considered causes (needed for the design of prevention and disruption measures). To arrive at this point, a number of key problems remain to be tackled, namely:

- integrating the levels of explanation (i.e. establishing through which concrete mechanisms the different macro and micro levels interact) in order to tackle the problem of specificity (why some individuals radicalise when most others do not);

- transcending the problem of locality (i.e. getting beyond local explanations to general theories); and
- achieving conceptual clarity, in the absence of which neither of the other problems are solvable.

It is these lines of investigation that much future work on lone-actor terrorism will try to respond to.

Note

1 Eby found that the reverse was true for his sample: explosives came first and firearms second in terms of weapons most frequently used by lone-actor extremists.

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11

TERRORIST PSYCHOLOGY AND RADICALISATION

Zoey Reeve

> I absolutely love you to bits, and you have been the happiest thing in my life … But I have to do this for our future, and it will be for the best, Inshallah, in the long run.
>
> *(Mohammad Sidique Khan's video message to his daughter [Khan 2011])*

The soft voice and tender words of Mohammad Sidique Khan as he kisses and cuddles his baby daughter are difficult to comprehend from a man who would go on to kill and maim scores of commuters bustling to get to work on the London Underground on a summer day in 2005. Khan was the leading member of an extremist Islamist terrorist cell that would go on to detonate homemade explosives in backpacks on the London transport system, killing hundreds of civilians as well as themselves. Barely two months after the bombings, a video featuring highly edited footage of Khan was published on the Al Jazeera news channel. His words in this video message could not have been more different than those to his beloved baby girl: 'Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of *my* people, we'll not stop this fight. We are at war, and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation' (Khan 2013).

Why would a young family man like Khan, well respected in his community and seemingly well integrated, become a terrorist? One argument might be that he and his terrorist friends are crazy or just plain evil; that they're psychopaths getting gratification from taking life. Another might be that terrorists are fighting to right perceived wrongs; struggling against injustice and discrimination. An alternative argument still might be that people become terrorists as part of a complex process involving emotional vulnerability, socialisation, indoctrination, and rewards. This chapter provides a very brief overview of some of the core psychological approaches addressing this question. The psychology of terrorism as a field has transformed over the years from homing in on psychological abnormality to the rejection of such ideas and the development of models of radicalisation. Despite some theoretical progress and a more rigorous scientific approach to studying the psychology of terrorists, as well as an explosion of publications, the field continues to be hampered by a lack of primary source data and access (Sageman 2014).

Who is the terrorist? A terrorist is somebody who commits acts of terrorism. This may seem rather glib, but such a statement is not as straightforward as it sounds. This is because terrorism, very broadly, is the use, or threat of use, of violence to achieve some kind of political or social outcome. It is typically directed at non-combatant civilians and has the effect of spreading fear

across a wider population than the victims of the violence alone. Terrorists often seek to send a message to their audiences – their supporters *and* their victims – as well as the more powerful element they seek to influence with their actions. The reader will notice that this definition of terrorism might also encompass other types of political violence (including warfare), which we would rather see as distinct from terrorism (Horgan 2014). Indeed, an important qualification for definitions of terrorism is that it is committed by non-state actors, usually in small semi-clandestine groups at the periphery of society (Richardson 2006).

Terrorism is as much a pejorative label used to condemn a cause or a group as it is a description of behaviour because of the amount of overlap with other types of groups and violence we would not condemn as terroristic (Crenshaw 2000). Counterterrorism policy in the UK includes 'terrorism offences' that do not even involve actually committing terrorist violence, further muddying the conceptual waters (Terrorism Act 2006). That merely being in possession of the Al-Qaeda magazine *Inspire* can lead to arrest in the UK shows that being a terrorist is not a simple matter of actually 'doing terrorism' (Horgan 2014).

The terrorist as mad and/or bad

Early work on the psychology of terrorists looked at the terrorist as an individual divorced from his/her environment, intent on seeking out some kind of psychological abnormality or difference. The terrorist as a psychopath seems intuitively sensible (Pearce 1977). The killing, the lack of remorse, sometimes the pleasure of taking life, resonate with the psychopath (Cooper 1978). Yet there are significant differences between psychopaths and terrorists. Psychopathic killers are highly individualistic and self-centred, impulsive and they kill to satisfy themselves – their targets are highly personal to them, and they lack empathy. Terrorists, on the other hand, tend to be part of tightly knit groups, are other-centric and empathic in that they kill to avenge or inhibit the suffering of their constituent group, and those they kill tend to be random or at least lack the personalised association that motivates a psychopathic killer (Victoroff 2005). Psychopaths simply don't make good terrorists (Silke 1998). They would, as one former member of the IRA is famously quoted as saying, 'stand out like a sore thumb' (Taylor & Quayle 1994, p. 107).

The terrorist as a narcissist – with a grandiose sense of self, a lack of interest in the well-being of others, and lofty goals to realise fantasies of power and success – seems appropriate (Lasch 1978). Other theories include terrorists externalising personal inadequacies, 'splitting' away the inadequacy and projecting it onto the target of their violence, and fighting it in a literal sense (Post 1984). Others still point to authoritarian personalities, where individuals who are more aggressive to outgroups than most are drawn to terrorism (Heskin 1984). Indeed, there are many other works that allude to psychological abnormality or difference (see Victoroff 2005). But there are some significant problems with this type of research. These works often base *clinical* diagnoses on indirect sources (e.g. autobiographies, media interviews, biographies) (Corrado 1981; Silke 1998). Even where access to (suspected) terrorists was available, cooperation with researchers was not always forthcoming, raising questions about the validity of the data (Crenshaw 1986). Statements made about a terrorists' mental state, then, are political in nature, dismissing as irrelevant the environment and context – the political aspect – of the terrorist fight (Corrado 1981).

Crucially, there is scant evidence to support the view of terrorist abnormality (Silke 1998).

Our tendency to view the behaviour of others as due to some kind of personal disposition, whilst we view our own behaviour as influenced by the situation or context, is a type of bias – an error of fundamental attribution – that underscores much of these early explanations of terrorist psychology (Taylor & Quayle 1994). Indeed, it is a *lack* of psychological abnormality

in terrorists that stands out (Silke 1998). Yet, notions of madness and badness are arguably useful. They may help influence public opinion by depoliticising terrorism, garnering support for draconian counterterrorism policies, and in the case of the 'War on Terror', the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan (Jackson 2005). Another important factor to consider is that although very few people will actually go on to commit acts of terrorism, terrorist groups require a support base from which they can recruit and be assisted through logistics, acquiring resources and funding, and evading capture (Richardson 2006). The mad/bad approach cannot account for those individuals who may be engaged in terrorism to an extent, yet not actively participate in its violence.

Terrorist grievances

So-called 'terrorist grievances' are those political, social, economic, and cultural issues and goals that are all but dismissed by scholars and policymakers looking to psychological abnormality to explain terrorism. Different groups have different types of grievances, which will be influenced by the context and environment that those groups developed in, which will similarly influence the type of goals – and therefore recruits, and methods – that the group has access to (Crenshaw 1981). The IRA, with their history of violent resistance to British rule in Ireland, for instance, whilst not being overtly supported by most in Ireland, was to some degree at least passively supported, and it was socially acceptable (at its peak) to be a member. Members were typically working class, and methods of violence tended to be bombings, ambushes of soldiers, and targeted assassinations, in keeping with the idea of resistance to British occupation (Crenshaw 1986). In contrast, the German Red Army Faction (RAF) emerged from student protest movements, with membership drawn primarily from the middle and upper classes. With vague goals about creating some kind of socialist order, their terrorism was primarily kidnappings and hijackings. RAF was not socially acceptable in Germany, and they did not enjoy a great deal of support from the public (Crenshaw 1986). Political, social, economic, and cultural grievances are therefore important in not only explaining why people become engaged in terrorism, but also shed light on the type of support and members that might be attracted to joining (Crenshaw 1986).

From a psychological perspective, the experience of some kind of deprivation, injustice, or inequality – arguably those grievances purported by most terrorist groups – can lead individuals to violent action on the basis of frustration (e.g. Gurr 1970). For proponents of the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis, the perception of disparities between the lot of one group relative to others provokes violence. O'Leary, for instance, credits economic deprivation, low educational attainment, and lack of political representation as core factors associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland (2007). Clearly this approach most readily lends itself to the notion that poverty is an important cause of terrorism. However, the evidence supporting this is inconsistent, particularly when we consider that many left-wing terrorists from groups like RAF were not impoverished, and that indeed, many members of extremist Islamist groups, particularly in the West, are similarly not poverty-stricken (Krueger & Maleckova 2009; Krueger 2008).

Political oppression, injustice, and alienation in the form of state-lead assaults on identity, freedoms, securities, etc., are common terrorist grievances, particularly in separatist groups like PIRA and the ETA (Victoroff 2005; Crenshaw 1986). Similarly, discrimination features heavily in explanations of involvement in extremist Islamist groups in the UK and Europe, where the Muslim group tends to have high levels of unemployment, imprisonment, segregation, experiences of Islamophobia, and targeting by counterterrorism policies, as well as lower levels of educational attainment and social economic status (Mirza *et al.* 2007). The frustration and resentment caused by these injustices – even if those injustices are merely perceived rather than

personally experienced – lead to engagement in terrorism as a way to address those grievances (Piazza 2011).

Whilst this approach steps away from psychological abnormality and considers the political context in which a terrorist group might develop, it cannot explain why, of the vast numbers of people potentially affected by 'terrorist grievances', so few go on to participate in terrorism. Rather than gravitate back to poorly researched and supported theories of psychological abnormality to explain this, some scholars have suggested that personal experiences of trauma motivate vengeance and violence. For instance, Speckhard and Akhmedova (2006) found that of 34 martyred Chechen terrorists, almost all had experienced or witnessed abuse at the hands of the government (Speckhard & Akhmedova 2006). Other personal motivations for participating in terrorism include possible increases in social status and financial rewards (in some communities) (Post *et al.* 2003); the promise of supernatural rewards, such as a place in Paradise (Thayer 2008); and importantly, the feelings of belonging and comradery that come with being in a tightly knit group of similar others (McCauley & Segal 2009). The terrorist as a freedom fighter struggling against oppression and subjugation may be an image that terrorists attempt to portray, but they aren't completely selfless either; personal vengeance and rewards are an important attraction to engaging in terrorism (Horgan 2008). Belonging to a self-styled group of warriors fighting against injustice, meting out revenge, offers members strong impetus to engage in terrorism.

Terrorist groups

Belonging and identification are crucial features of engagement in terrorism and often come about after a period of alienation from wider society. In an important study utilising open source material (media reports and court transcripts) to investigate a number of extremist Islamists, Sageman found that young Muslims from the Middle East who studied abroad in Europe became homesick and alienated from their host countries, leading them to seek out new friends and similar others at local mosques – even if they had not previously been religious (Sageman 2004). These small, somewhat isolated groups became tightly knit, the individuals within them conforming. Perceptions (and possibly experiences) of injustice would lead these small groups towards a sense of moral outrage, and exposure to a particular type of interpretation of events (perhaps through extremist religious ideology) helped them make sense of the world and their own personal experiences of injustice. Through social networks of friends and family, such individuals could be mobilised into action (Sageman 2008; Bakker 2006).

Groups are vital in influencing individual attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours, particularly in people who have identified strongly with that group (Sageman 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko 2011). Contrary to what Sageman found, however, Crenshaw suggests that 'Terrorists are not necessarily people who seek 'belonging' or personal integration through ideological commitment, but once embarked on the path of terrorism, they desperately need the group and the cause' (Crenshaw 1981, p. 393). Whether or not terrorists 'seek belonging' prior to engagement in terrorism, the power of the in-group in providing the individual with belonging, something to work towards and on behalf of – often to protect – and to love, is clearly a critical feature (Sageman 2004).

Radicalisation: terrorism as a process

Engagement and involvement in terrorism is not a static state, but a gradual process, which tends to involve transitioning through different stages (Taylor & Horgan 2006). Since 9/11, the concept of 'radicalisation' has been increasingly used to explain engagement and participa-

tion in terrorism (Neumann 2013). Some definitions of this often used but under-conceptualised term suggest that radicalisation is 'the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology' (Horgan 2009, p. 125). Extremism refers to beliefs and views that are outside of the norm, not moderate, and possibly uncompromising (Precht 2007, p. 17). Already, the reader will note that 'radicalisation' as a concept is inherently relational and value-laden, given that being 'radicalised' is intrinsically linked to whatever is the norm or central set of ideas at any given time, in any given society relative to what is considered to be radical in relation to that norm or central set of values (Neumann 2013). Radicalisation from this perspective is also bound to ideology, which is problematic because 'Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists – even those who lay claim to a cause – are not deeply ideological and may not "radicalize" in any traditional sense' (Borum 2011, p. 8). Those whose involvement in terrorism emerges from a history of violence are unlikely to radicalise in this 'traditional' sense given that the environment in which the terrorism arises is situated in an already violent context (Post *et al.* 2002).

Agreement as to whether radicalisation is behavioural or merely cognitive is another contentious issue which impacts on how policy is approached (e.g. Neumann 2013). Whilst cognitive radicalisation refers to the acceptance and promotion of radical ideas that are far removed from those central to society (Neumann 2013), behavioural radicalisation refers to support and participation in terrorism (CONTEST 2009). Yet, being radicalised does not necessarily equate to committing terrorist *violence*, although involvement may occur in other ways that ultimately enables others to commit it (Horgan 2008). At the outset, the concept of radicalisation is contested, which influences not only how models of radicalisation are constructed, but also how policy decisions are approached (Neumann 2013).

Models of radicalisation often invoke metaphors such as pyramids (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008) and staircases (Moghaddam 2005) to represent the gradual process of engagement and involvement in terrorism. Moghaddam, for instance, explains that 'as individuals climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of other, or oneself, or both' (Moghaddam 2005, p. 161). Individuals (and groups) experiencing/perceiving injustice and relative deprivation lie at the base of the staircase. Those seeking to address these grievances may move up the staircase to the next floor. Where no improvement is achieved, anger and frustration are directed towards 'an enemy', and the more naturally aggressive continue to climb the staircase. At this point, there is a gradual engagement with 'terrorist morality', where terrorism as an act starts to make sense, and is justified. Categorising the world into 'us' versus 'them' paints the terrorist group as legitimate, and the enemy as illegitimate and a justifiable target. The final level of the staircase enables individuals to overcome 'inhibitory mechanisms' that prevent people from harming others (Moghaddam 2005, p. 166).

Whilst Moghaddam's metaphor reflects the procedural nature of involvement in terrorism, it suggests linearity. However, radicalisation is *not* a linear process, and whilst there are various factors associated with it, not all of these factors will necessarily be experienced by all individuals who become radicalised, nor will they be experienced in the same way (Horgan 2008). Some of these core features include: push factors, like terrorist grievances or personal events which drive individuals *away* from the core of society; socialisation, where individuals engage with similar others in tightly knit, emotionally bonded groups of dissatisfied and frustrated individuals; indoctrination, where the group disengages with the morality of society and internalises perceptions that violence is necessary and just. And finally, pull factors, or rewards, which act to draw individuals away from the centre to the periphery.

Push factors

Most models of radicalisation begin with consideration to perceptions and/or experiences of injustice. For Horgan, risk factors such as emotional vulnerability in the face of alienation, and perceptions and/or experiences of injustice and relative deprivation, make an individual vulnerable to radicalisation (2008). Personal crises may prompt individuals to reconsider their worldview, making them more open to alternatives (Wiktorowicz 2005). Personal experiences of victimhood can be very important for participation in terrorism *if* that victimhood is framed in terms of the wider group grievance (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011). Emotional vulnerabilities and personal crises may prompt individuals to seek out guidance and leadership. In British extremist Islamists, mosque leaders and community elders are an important source of assurance (Sageman 2008). However, as a number of studies have shown, community and religious leaders are often too old, too conservative, and unable to understand the particular challenges experienced by young British Muslims in the UK, thereby further alienating them from both the wider society and their community (Horgan 2008). Push factors are often linked to a lack of social ties and alienation, as well as discrimination (Horgan 2008). Experiences of discrimination on the basis of counterterrorism policies may be a particularly problematic push, and efforts to target young Asian and black men for stop and searches, for instance, provides powerful grievances that are felt at both the personal and group level (Bhatt 2010).

Socialisation

One way to deal with push factors – particularly those that entail feelings of isolation and alienation – is to seek out like-minded others. The development of tightly bonded groups with similar grievances and motivations towards some kind of action is an important step in the radicalisation process (Sageman 2008).[1] Identification with an in-group occurs on the basis of a shared representation of the in-group identity in terms of norms, values, attitudes, expectations, and behaviours (e.g. Reid & Hogg 2005). Engagement in groups advocating terrorism can occur where an individual is dissatisfied with their current activity (Horgan 2008). Identification with the victims of the injustices is a crucial part of the process of radicalisation, as is the identification of who or what is to blame for the injustices (Richardson 2006). The use of violence is justified as a legitimate method to defend and avenge the wider group from subjugation and humiliation, when confidence in the effectiveness of legal protests and activities is lost. For violent Islamic extremism, it is through identification with the Muslim Umma – the worldwide Muslim community and an identification that is advocated by extremist Islamist ideology – that the perception of conflict, or war against Islam and Muslims, is developed (Sageman 2008). Via identification with the Muslim Umma, individuals like Mohammad Sidique Khan see those suffering in Afghanistan and Iraq as 'brothers and sisters', rather than strangers they will never meet (Atran 2006).

The relationships within a group are a crucial element of terrorism and are often experienced through a sense of fictive kinship. Members of the small and isolated group are regarded in familial terms and are emotionally connected to one another to the extent that they are willing to kill and die for their cause together (Atran 2003). Within this small and tightly bonded group, increasingly radical views develop as a result of risky-shift effect, where conformity with the most extreme ideas in the group gradually increases the overall radicalism of the group and its members (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011). Thus, gradual engagement with the attitudes, logic, and behaviour of the group develops over time (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011). Whilst some groups develop as part of existing terrorist groups perhaps through social ties that precede engagement in terrorism, others can develop organically through friendship (e.g. Sageman 2004;

Wiktorowicz 2005). The July 7th bombers, for instance, self-radicalised and were not recruited. Socialisation as part of a small, increasingly radical group facilitates the construction and internalisation of a new identity, complete with value changes and increasing isolation from society (Wiktorowicz 2005).

Indoctrination

Increasing radicalism in the group, possibly due to risky-shift and exposure to extremist propaganda and rhetoric, paints violence as a justified obligation to avenge the innocent wider in-group from humiliation and oppression by the evil out-group (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011). Ideology provides followers with clear rules about how to live their lives, and in the case of violent extremism, promotes depersonalisation and dehumanisation of out-group victims, which further enhances the justification for violence (Borum 2011). The in-group and its norms are idealised, but the out-group is demonised (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008). The moral logic of terrorist violence is accepted and internalised, and the group becomes more and more isolated from wider society and often its own community (Richardson 2006). At this point, members become disengaged from mainstream morality and even the local community (Moghaddam 2005). The decision to engage in illegal acts including violence furthers this isolation and places incredible stress on the group, as it must now protect itself from police and security services (Silke 2008). Vengeance, retribution, and displaced aggression may motivate extremist Islamists to define themselves as holy warriors obligated to defend Islam and Muslims from oppressors in the event of triggering events (Silke 2008). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to have acted as such triggers for Mohammad Sidique Khan's involvement in the July 7th London bombings (Khan 2013). The acceptance of terrorist morality and the dehumanisation of 'the enemy' frees the individual from any potentially inhibitory mechanisms that might prevent the taking of life (Moghaddam 2005).

Pull factors

Participating in terrorism, despite the enormous potential costs (financial, time, ostracism, prison, injury, death, etc.), can be rewarding for individuals. As much as push factors 'push' an individual away from the centre of society, pull factors draw the individual towards the periphery (Horgan 2008). Being considered as honourable, heroic, courageous, and a martyr, are rewards that may influence the decision to participate in terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism (Atran 2003, 2006). In some cases, terrorists are rewarded higher status, respect, and authority in their peer group, the wider movement, and possibly the wider community, although this may be imagined (Horgan 2014). Status-seeking is often associated with risk-taking, which tends to be most common in young males, who incidentally tend to be the most likely recruits to terrorist groups (Silke 2008). Families of those killed or imprisoned may be financially reimbursed for their loss in some cases (Sageman 2004). Imprisoned members of Hamas and Hezbollah, for instance, are seen as heroes, and dead terrorists are glorified as martyrs (Post *et al.* 2003). Terrorists might be lauded 'as pop stars' (Horgan 2008, p. 85), the pull of renown presenting a potentially powerful motivation for involvement (Richardson 2006). Even membership in the groups themselves can be pull factors for individuals who were otherwise isolated and alienated (Sageman 2004).

McCauley and Moskalenko suggest that identification with a group and the human tendency towards cooperation, and punishment of out-groups, explain willingness to perform costly acts like terrorism (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011). There is a strong argument to be made for understanding terrorism as altruistic: individuals incur sometimes devastating costs to exact some form of punishment on groups they perceive as threatening to the in-group (O'Gorman & Silke 2015;

Reeve 2015). The radicalisation process involves experiencing a myriad of different push and pull factors, which both propel an individual away from society and draw them towards the periphery. Individuals might be enraged by the perceived suffering of their wider in-group – and that rage is likely to be facilitated and enhanced during socialisation and indoctrination – but it is not without some personal gratification that they sacrifice, and *kill*, for the victimised group.

Conclusion: terrorism is the tip of the iceberg

People like Mohammad Sidique Khan don't commit acts of terrorism because they're crazy. Indeed, terrorists are *less* likely to exhibit psychological abnormality than the general population (Crenshaw 2000; although see Bakker 2006). But nor are they motivated entirely by injustice and suffering. Rather, through a complex, multifaceted, often lengthy process, they are both pushed away from society and drawn into extremist fringes, where the worldview makes sense and provides a worthy cause and rewards for otherwise unremarkable, entirely ordinary people. Yet, despite the progress we seem to have made in understanding the psychology of terrorists, early research was hampered by a number of challenges that contemporary researchers still face today. Primarily, there is a dearth of good quality, primary source data (Silke 1998). Very few individuals become terrorists (although note the difficulty in defining terrorism and terrorists), and such individuals tend to be quite protective of their security, making access difficult (Horgan 2009). Conceptually, definitions of terrorism, terrorists, and radicalisation continue to be problematic because they are based on value judgements, and in the case of radicalisation, are inherently relational. This lack of conceptual clarity, combined with the lack of data, has led some to conclude that 'we still don't know what leads people to turn to political violence' (Sageman 2014, p. 556). In some ways, we don't really know why most people *don't* become terrorists either, with explanations typically focusing on different experiences, openness to new ideas, and avoidance of incurring personal costs (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko 2011).

Another problematic issue is that involvement in terrorism takes many forms. There are a number of other ways that an individual or group can commit terrorism *offences*, which are not violent but aid and abet an attack, thereby enabling its success (Terrorism Act 2006). These other activities can entail subversive involvement like fundraising, generating publicity, distributing propaganda, and legal activities such as peaceful protests and visiting extremist websites: 'The person we think of as "the terrorist" is therefore fulfilling only one of multiple functions in the movement, albeit the most dramatic in terms of direct consequences' (Horgan 2008, p. 86). Given that an individual can be arrested and charged with terrorism-offences without actually committing terrorism-violence serves to highlight the conceptual confusion about what terrorism is and who actually does it. Attempts to understand the psychology of terrorists will inevitably be limited by these conceptual constraints.

Note

1 Lone-wolf radicalisation follows a somewhat different path (see McCauley & Moskalenko 2014; and also Chapter 10 in this volume).

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12

CHILDREN AS AGENTS OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

Deborah Browne

A teenager described as 'Britain's youngest convicted terrorist' was arrested in April 2015 when he was only 14 years of age (Connors, *BBC News*, 2015). The boy was arrested for threatening to behead his teachers, but it soon emerged that he was directing a plot to massacre veterans at an Anzac Day parade in Melbourne, Australia. Although 14 is alarmingly young to be involved in such activities, this story is only one of many involving teenagers who have been arrested for terrorism-related activities. In February 2016, *The Guardian* ran a story about two girls, aged 15 and 17, who were arrested in Paris for criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise (*The Guardian* online, March 2016). They were suspected of plotting an attack against a concert hall. In February 2016, a teenager was stopped at Sydney Airport trying to fly to Syria, allegedly to join the Islamic State. The *Sydney Morning Herald* described how he was arrested for allegedly planning a terrorist attack in Sydney and that he was being investigated for allegedly preaching extremism on the playground (Olding, 2016).

There is also some evidence that incidents involving teenagers are growing. In January 2016, the Israeli news website Ynetnews ran a story that claimed that a third of the terrorists over the previous months had been under 20 years of age (Levy, 2016). While Home Office Statistics for end of year at December 2015 show an overall decrease in the number of terrorism-related arrests in the previous year, the number of children under 18 years of age arrested for terrorist-related offences rose from 10 in 2014 to 16 in 2015. This was described as 'the highest number of arrests from this age group in a calendar year since the data collection began' (Home Office, 2016, p. 8).

Children are not only involved in terrorist incidents but are also used as soldiers in organised armed conflict. It has been suggested that young people under 18 are serving as combatants in almost 75% of the world's conflicts, and 80% of these have fighters under the age of 15 (Singer, 2005). The first U.S. serviceman to die in Afghanistan was shot by a 14-year-old boy (Singer, 2005).

This chapter examines the phenomenon of the child as an agent of terrorism and political violence, including child soldiers. Improving our understanding in this area is a key step in helping to support young people away from extremism and radical views.

The child as combatant

Child soldiers, also referred to as children associated with armed forces and armed groups (CAAFAG), have been defined by UNICEF under the Paris Principles as both boys and girls 'who are part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and those recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage' (UNICEF, 2007). The Paris Commitments and Principles are part of a number of treaties, conventions and legal actions that have been taken to try to shield children from the excesses of armed conflict, which include the Roman Statute of the International Criminal Court, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in 1999 (Lindegren, 2011, p. 40), the Graça Machel Report in 1996, the Cape Town Principles that emerged from this and the International Criminal Court trial in 2008 of Thomas Lubaango Dyilo for his attempts to use child soldiers. Despite increasingly fervent attempts to deal with the situation, and the inevitable problems producing reliable data and key indicators for this population (Pedersen & Sommerfelt, 2007), it is estimated that there are around 300,000 children under 18 involved in military forces or armed groups worldwide (Betancourt *et al.*, 2011; Weierstall *et al.*, 2012).

We have all seen images of serious, wide-eyed children staring intently into the camera, which pans back to show an AK-47 being clutched by fidgety little fingers. As Rosen (2005, p. 1) puts it, 'our emotional logic tells us, something is clearly and profoundly wrong when children are soldiers'. There are a number of assumptions that underlie this conviction that the concept of a child who engages political violence is immoral and unethical. Some of these relate to our beliefs about the legitimacy, justness or 'righteousness' of the conflict. When the media give accounts of children actively engaged in vicious conflicts in Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Colombia, or Uganda, then the cultural and geographical distance, together with the sense of these being at least 'less just' wars, make it easier to dole out unconditional disapproval of armies that use children in this way.

Children have been used, however, as soldiers by most countries and most armies at some points in their histories. It wasn't until 2006 that Britain banned the use of 17-year-olds in combat. It is estimated that a million of the 2.7 million soldiers in the American Civil War were 18 or under, with approximately 100,000 under 15, and hundreds under 13 (Rosen, 2005).

Rosen (2005) also points out that children and young people were used by almost all partisan and resistance groups during World War II. Children as young as 11 hiding in the forests of Eastern Europe joined adult resistance fighters in planting bombs, throwing grenades and shooting weapons. These boys and girls, many of whom were orphans, had escaped the ghettos and joined the groups in order to survive. How they are viewed amply demonstrates the power of the 'righteous war'; far from being viewed as monstrous, the recruiters of these children were regarded as offering them the only way of surviving genocide, and the 'child soldiers' as heroes playing a necessary role in defence. Child martyrs have been immortalised in Western literature – including, for example, Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* (Guillermet, 2012). Only think that the same concerns – poverty, separation from family, avoiding genocide or partisan violence, etc. – have been described as factors determining whether children will join armed groups in today's armies (e.g. Lindegren, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2008).

How we view children as combatants is coloured by our perspective of the righteousness of the war. We are wary of this new wave of youth martyrs increasingly reported by the media since the global war on terrorism. But they are not a new phenomenon. Radical groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas have recruited children as young as 13 as suicide bombers (Singer, 2005). In Sri Lanka, terrorist groups have been using child suicide bombers for some

time; specialised jackets are manufactured to conceal explosives which include specially tailored smaller sizes for child suicide bombers (Singer, 2005, p. 108).

Pathology and personality

For many years, psychologists have debated whether individuals who are drawn to violence and terrorism have symptoms of pathology or personality disorder, but the evidence for this has neither been strong nor conclusive (Horgan, 2003). Nonetheless, some studies have suggested that those who engage in terrorism and political violence, including children, tend to have more violent personalities (e.g. Punamaki, 1987).

Weierstall *et al.* (2012) found appetitive aggression in two groups of young Ugandan men, one of which had been abducted by LRA and the other which had experienced the war but had not been child soldiers. The research found that PTSD related symptoms were reduced or even absent in those who reported violent deeds as more positive. This might suggest that having a proclivity to enjoy violence acts as a buffer to PTSD; however, it is more complicated than this. The researchers also found that the group of abducted child soldiers had greater appetitive aggression scores than the control group, and that the more violent events they had been involved with, the greater their attraction to violence. They suggested that as trauma exposure increased, the young people needed to develop a greater appetite for violence in order to protect themselves against trauma symptoms. This is consistent with the findings in other studies. Somasundaram (1998), for example, described how difficult it was to treat two boys who, after normal early childhoods, joined militant groups. After witnessing and being involved in violent and gruesome acts, both boys showed symptoms of severe PTSD and a propensity towards violence.

These findings are by no means limited to the literature on terrorism and political violence: years of study into child abuse demonstrates that those exposed to violence as children show an elevated risk of becoming violent themselves (Widom & Wilson, 2015), and it has been suggested that early socialisation experiences, such as exposure to abuse or bullying, can significantly affect later social interactions and mental health (e.g. Boyda & McFeeters, 2015; Lereya, Copeland, Costello & Wolke, 2015). It is very probable that the same psychosocial developmental factors apply in all cases.

Machel (2001) theorised that children who engage in such horrific behaviour can become desensitised to suffering as a result of their exposure. He explained 'often they are exposed deliberately to horrific scenes to harden them and make it easier to sever links with the rest of society' (2001, pp. 11–12). The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone forced newly abducted children to commit atrocities against their families and communities (Ashby, 2002). Cambodia's Khmer Rouge also recognised that a brief period of physical abuse and mental terror produced particularly fierce warriors (Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, 1994). Bandura (1990) described the process of 'moral disengagement', whereby child recruits are gradually indoctrinated into violence through helping them to disengage with the act, diffuse responsibility and dehumanise the victim. This brutal form of radicalisation has been horrifically successful, with reports of child recruits in disparate countries committing unthinkable acts of violence against their own families and communities. Ashby (2002) gave the example of testimony given by a 12-year-old boy in Sierra Leone who had been recruited at only 4: '… while I was shooting I had no idea how many people I was killing. I chopped off hands …'

The resilience to violence, therefore, may be seen as a coping mechanism to deal with the horrific situations in which these children find themselves. Indeed, it has been suggested for some time that the resilience that many children demonstrate to long-term political violence is a form of coping (e.g. Cairns & Wilson, 1989). In any social situation that a child or young person

is exposed to, what constitutes 'adaptive coping' depends on the context and the resilience they build to the circumstances in which they find themselves (Frydenberg, 1997; Bai & Repetti, 2015). Behaviour that in normal circumstances might be construed as pathological might be seen as adaptive when viewed in the context of their experiences as a child soldier, or indeed as a victim of the political conflict. Indeed, it has been suggested that it might be counter-productive to send such children for treatment until their social situation had changed (e.g. Richman, 1993) because it could make them less resilient to the terrorising events in their environment.

Coercion and abduction

When militant groups are under pressure to increase combatants and are not having sufficient success through more benign methods, they resort to coercive methods. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist organisation operating in the Philippines, suffered a decline in recruitment after their charismatic leader was killed in 1998, so they later resorted to coercion to recruit new soldiers (Banlaoi, 2011), threatening the young men and their families. Targeting children because of poor recruitment is a fairly common reason, and was, for example, noted with the Real IRA in the late 1990s (Singer, 2005).

Bjørkhaug (2010) distinguished between child soldiers in Colombia who were forced to join armed groups, those who joined voluntarily, and a group described 'in the twilight zone between voluntary and coerced recruitment they are closer to coerced recruitment' (2010, p. 8). 'Hugo', for example, was a 12-year-old boy who attended a party organised by FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in a rural village and was told the next morning he had volunteered for his new status as child soldier. He felt he was not in a position to withdraw (Bjørkhaug, 2010, p. 8).

Abduction is a serious problem in many areas of chronic conflict. In Sierra Leone, it is estimated that 50% of those forced to join the civil war were 15 years or under (Betancourt *et al.*, 2011). It is estimated that 90% of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda consists of abducted children (Moscardino *et al.*, 2012), including those in support roles (including sexual). Research here found children were abducted between age 5 and 16 years and spent between one and 108 months in abduction (Klasen *et al.*, 2010), although further research has shown evidence of children being abducted even younger, with some born in captivity (Vindevogel *et al.*, 2011).

Abduction in itself is a stressful event, and research indicates it is more predictive of traumatic symptoms than most other war experiences (Morgos *et al.*, 2007). Abducted children tend to have a disturbing range of war experiences, both as victim and as child soldier perpetrator. Klasen *et al.* (2010) found that of the 330 former soldiers they looked at, over 90% had been beaten by armed forces, 87.9% had witnessed murder, 25.8% were raped, and 52.6% killed another person. In Sierra Leone, former child soldiers involved with the RUF were also victim to stabbings, being shot and being without food and/or water for at least two days, as well as killing others (Betancourt *et al.,* 2011).

The concept that a 'dose' of traumatic war experiences leads to more problems recovering and adapting to the post-war environment is also an issue. Moscardino *et al.* (2012) found that former child soldiers who had been abducted by the LRA and a comparison group who had not been abducted, but who lived through intense warfare, all showed higher rates of PTSD, psychological distress and behavioural problems. Rates were significantly higher, however, in the child soldiers than in the children who were never abducted. Weierstall *et al.* (2012) found similar higher rates in former LRA-abducted child soldiers, and also found that the former child soldiers were exposed to more life-threatening events.

Children who are abducted or coerced into being child soldiers are often forced to carry out atrocities against other individuals. Klasen *et al.* (2010) described how abducted children soldiers in Uganda had frequently been forced to kill or torture other individuals, including their own families. The children reported recurrent thoughts of their own acts being unjustified and unforgivable, suggesting that they may also have been suffering from 'survivor guilt'.

On top of guilt about their experiences, Betancourt *et al.* (2010) found that many children in Sierra Leone returned to communities and families that were slow to accept them because of fear and the stigma associated with being a child soldier. One female child soldier in their study commented, 'in actual fact you didn't choose to become a rebel. You were forced to go and live with them and now everybody blames you' (Betancourt *et al.,* 2010, p. 24).

Environmentally influenced choices

Sometimes engagement in political violence is due to environmental factors that induce an inadvertent choice on the child or young person. So for example, as with the children escaping the death camps of Eastern Europe in World War II, some young people have chosen to involve themselves in terrorist, militant or separatist groups in order to survive. Bjørkhaug (2010, p. 2) described these children as 'passive victims of actions conducted by adults'.

Lischer (2010) postulated two causal paths to the recruitment of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, both of which are sociological in focus and see cause in the environment in which the child finds themselves rather than overt coercion, intentional choice, political motivation or psychological factors. The first is when a displaced population is militarised (there is a lack of government protection), and the second is when a population lacks security (e.g. when there are attacks on displacement camps, etc.). The reasons people gave for joining appeared to be due to 'youth desperation' because of lack of food and necessities, pressure from adults, the desire to alleviate family suffering and the perception that there are no alternative options. Vargas-Barón (2010, p. 208) also suggested that some children have already been subject to severe deprivation before they are recruited and children might run away to join armed groups to feel safer and more supported. Indeed, poverty is frequently cited as a contributing influence driving radicalisation and/or voluntary recruitment (e.g. Lorenzo-Dus & Marsh, 2012). Singer (2005, p.110) suggests poverty may be a contributory factor in explaining why young children volunteer as suicide bombers, citing a Palestinian psychiatrist: 'an important factor in suicide bombers is their sense of frustration with their surroundings, connected with their desire to go to heaven' – teenagers who have only known deprivation are likely to find visions of paradise particularly beguiling. There are some notable parallels between these explanations and sociological positivism, which postulates that criminal behaviour is determined by external and societal forces (e.g. Durkheim, 1938; Merton, 1938). Sometimes, being a child soldier feels like the better option, because of current circumstances that, as well as poverty, might include being a street child, a victim of domestic violence or a refugee (Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, 1994). In some cases, it could be because extremist activities are just more exciting, something Fraser (1974) suggested attracted children involved in peripheral extremist activities in Belfast.

In many studies, schools are described as places targeted for recruitment of child soldiers. Bjørkhaug (2010) explained that in Colombia, young school children were trained as recruiters, had their school fees paid and were given weapons in order to impress other children. Goodwin-Gill & Cohn (1994) described how the Mujahedin armed small children for future battles with the Russians, focusing on indoctrinating displaced, orphaned and refugee children. The Trojan Horse scandal in Birmingham schools in the UK, where conservative Islamic teachers were

accused of an 'undue amount of religious influence on the education of pupils' (e.g. Adams, *The Guardian*, 2015), is another disheartening example of plans to indoctrinate Muslim children.

Even child soldiers who are not necessarily completely passive in their radicalisation will still have been significantly impacted on by their environment. While adult learning theories, such as transformative learning theory, might more appropriately help explain radicalisation in adults (e.g. Wilner & Dobouloz, 2011), it may be that social learning more aptly explains the involvement of children and young people. Social learning theory has provided much evidence over many decades now that children and young people imitate adults and model their behaviour on actions for which they see others being rewarded (e.g. Bandura, 1977; Miller & Dollard, 1941). It is well recognised that children will imitate aggressive and violent behaviour that they witness not just directly but on television (e.g. Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963); findings which have been applied to interventions with delinquency and young offenders. The same processes are likely to apply to terrorist activities, where many child soldiers see older young people and adults rewarded for demonstrating aggression towards others and so are more likely to engage in these behaviours themselves (e.g. see Bandura, 1990). Family and societal influences tend to be particularly strong in shaping attitudes and identify formation in young people (e.g. Erikson, 1965; Steca *et al.,* 2011), which remains the case when looking at the family and societal context in which young people identify with terrorist groups. For example, it was raised by Taylor (1988) in relation to decisions of young people (including Gerry Adams) to join the IRA in Northern Ireland.

Environmental influences include the political climate, which provides the opportunities to engage in both peripheral and more organised activities. In Israel after the Second World War, influenced by the powerfully evocative images of the *Hitlerjungend*, nationalistic and militant Boy Scout groups were actively encouraged. These were aimed at mobilising youth and encouraging extremism; this was the political background that provided socialisation for future extremist Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat (Rosen, 2005).

Of course, even in such politically charged environments, some children remain resilient and do not participate in political activism and violence. Resilience is mediated by many factors, but ultimately, no matter what personality, peer, indoctrination or pathological variables interact to incite a desire to participate, the right environmental conditions must exist.

Adolescence, youth idealism and political commitment

In 2002, before blowing herself up in Jerusalem, Ayat al-Akhras recorded a video acknowledging her association with the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and her commitment to pushing towards victory against the Israelis Rosen (2005, p. 91). There was no overt evidence of coercion, just a coherent statement of her own convictions. Charles Bishop, the 15-year-old American who flew a light aircraft into an office building in Florida in support of Osama bin Laden, also appeared to be acting on his own convictions and without evidence of the involvement of anyone else (CNN, 2002). More recently in the UK, the decision of three teenage girls, aged 15 and 16, to run away to Syria to become involved with ISIS appeared to demonstrate a strong sense of conviction (e.g. BBC, 2015).

It must be acknowledged, of course, that some of the political motivations that drive adults to engage in a cause are just as influential with young people. Rational Choice Theory (RTC) suggests that the choice of a group or individual to engage in violence is a rational and logical response to the environment and to the consequences of previous choices. An act of terrorism is a choice made in order to accomplish a political objective (Crenshaw, 1998). If this is the case, then the young person chooses to engage in a radical movement or act of terrorism as an

expression of their individual choice and beliefs. Singer (2005) describes a number of examples of teenagers who become fervently involved in resistance movements in Iraq. A 12-year-old soldier said, 'We will kill the unbelievers because faith is the most powerful weapon' (2005, p. 107). Adolescence and young adulthood have long been recognised as a time when individuals are still developing self-efficacy and are exploring their individual identities and the strength of their beliefs (Erikson, 1965; Lo, Cheng, Wong, Rochelle & Kwok, 2011; Steca *et al.*, 2011). Adolescents are also more likely to engage in rebellious and risk-taking behaviours at this stage than adults (Lo *et al.*, 2011; Galvan *et al.*, 2007; Steinberg, 2005).

The increased tendency of adolescents to withdraw and/or rebel from parents or their communities has been associated with delinquent and anti-social behaviour (e.g. Lo *et al.*, 2011) and may also account for decisions to engage with terrorist groups. It has been pointed out that young potential recruits to Islamic terrorist groups find the 'takfiri' message to withdraw from impure mainstream society appealing (Atran, 2008). Atran explains that a Saudi intelligence officer described the first sign of radicalisation of a young man as when 'he stops praying where his family and tribe pray. He leaves the mosque and turns against his family, tribe and our Salafi way'.

Many theorists who have examined radicalisation refer to extreme grievance or seeking revenge following a particular incident as motivational factors (e.g. Silke, 2003). Wilner and Dubouloz (2011) describe this as transformative radicalisation; given the nature of the developmental stage of adolescence, it is possible that such an event would have a more profound impact on later behaviour than at another stage of development. Silke (2003, pp. 41–42) gives the example of a teenager in Northern Ireland who, along with his brother and father, were taken at gunpoint from their home late one night and treated harshly by soldiers at a nearby barracks on an unfounded suspicion; despite having little sympathy for the IRA before the incident, he joined two years after the experience. Silke (2003, p. 41) explains that 'the personal histories of terrorists frequently contain encounters with members of the security forces or rival groups where the individual, friends or family members were threatened, harassed, assaulted or even killed, and such catalyst events leave the potential terrorists (usually teenagers or in their early twenties at the time) with a powerful desire for vengeance'.

Social Identity Theory explains the propensity of young people to be attracted to peer groups (e.g. Tanti, Stukas, Halloran & Foddy, 2011), including extremist groups, to help them define themselves and improve self-esteem in terms of their group membership. Young people might identify with radical groups because they feel accepted; perhaps it is not surprising then that many terrorist groups have 'youth wings' (Singer, 2005). Atran (2008) cited several examples of young terrorists who were members of football teams together, many of whom died in suicide attacks that they planned together.

In the 1930s, there were many examples of organised expression of youth militancy (Rosen, 2005). In France in WWII, many children and young people, particularly youth groups, became involved in resistance fighting. Fishman (2002, p. 75) commented, 'the search for meaning, idealism and the taste of adventure common in adolescence made quite a number of teenagers receptive to Resistance propaganda'. Most infamously, however, in Nazi Germany, there was the *Hitlerjungend* (Hitler Youth). Despite its notorious origins in an authoritative, fascist state, propaganda emphasising images of *Hitlerjungend* vitality and potency was extraordinarily powerful. Groups like this in Germany and Italy, for example, helped hasten the growth of youth paramilitary in Israel at the same time (Rosen, 2005), where the formation of nationalistic and militant Boy Scout groups were actively encouraged. Modern equivalents to these movements include Saddam Hussein's *Ashbal Saddam* (Saddam's Lion Cubs), a paramilitary force of 10–15-year-old boys who received arms training and were seen as a feeder organisation to adult military organisations (Singer, 2005).

The propensity of adolescents to engage in risk-taking behaviour and to be influenced by their peers may make them particularly vulnerable to the group cohesiveness and bravado of extremist groups. Immature behaviour and powerful peer influences mean that it can often be difficult to distinguish between normal adolescent rebellious behaviour and anything more extreme. Fishman (2002) explained how, even before resistance fighting became a huge problem during the war, the Vichy Authorities in France found it difficult to distinguish between youth counterculture and illegal resistance activities.

The characteristics that have long been associated with varying levels of maturity in adolescence are mirrored in brain development during the same period. Maturation of the mesocortical system in earlier adolescence appears to be associated with heightened sensitivity to rewards and has been linked with increased risk-taking behaviours (e.g. Galvan *et al.*, 2007). In addition, this has shown to be mediated by the presence of peers (Chein *et al.*, 2010; Steinberg, 2005): the presence of peers effectively increases risk-taking behaviour.

As maturation of brain structures associated with increased cognitive control does not occur until later adolescence and early adulthood (Asato *et al.*, 2010), there is a disjuncture between the young person's affective experience and their ability to consciously regulate their behaviour. Steinberg (2005, p. 70) described this as being analogous to 'starting an engine without yet hav[ing] a skilled driver behind the wheel'. The implications of this are seen in non-war societies, including the US, Australia and Western Europe. Crime rates escalate exponentially between the ages of 10 and 18 or 19, when offending peaks, and the age-crime relationship has been found to hold independently of other variables and in multiple countries (e.g. Allen, 2016). After the riots in the UK in August 2011, over half of all those brought before the courts were 20 years or under, and 27% were under 18 (Ministry of Justice, 2012).

Dealing with children who engage in political violence

Child soldiers and, in particular, young terrorists, are increasingly of concern to peace-keeping and international forces. U.S. forces in particular have reported encountering many child soldiers in Afghanistan, and a number of children between 13 and 18 years of age have been detained at Guantanamo Bay (Singer, 2005; Wilson, 2012). Whether young people detained for their involvement in armed conflict are viewed as victims of their environments or as rational, free-thinking agents of their own fate will have implications for how they are managed and treated.

Determining whether a child or adolescent makes a rational choice to engage in armed conflict of their own volition is far more complicated than with adults. Young people are still developing the cognitive and intellectual capacity to fully understand the implications of their decisions and the long-term consequences of their behaviour. As has just been described, research clearly demonstrates the brain continues to develop through adolescence, and indeed at least into the mid-twenties (e.g. Cohen *et al.*, 2016). Key areas associated with regulating sensation-seeking behaviour can be the latest to develop. Neurological and psychological maturity develops at different rates for different people, so that chronological age is not always a good indicator of a young person's ability to understand the consequences of their actions.

The competency of minors to make legal or medical decisions has been the subject of debate in courts for years, as has whether their best interests should take precedence (e.g. David, 1986; Opie, 2004); the matter is so complex that how 'competent' or 'mature' minors are dealt with is still inconsistent (Vukadinovich, 2004) despite decades of debate.

Maturity also increasingly plays a role in how young people who offend are dealt with by the courts. In 2011, for example, it was added to sentencing guidance for judges and magistrates for deciding on sentencing options for young people in the UK (e.g. Sentencing Council, 2011). Maturity is seen as a factor that may mediate offending behaviour in adolescents and young adults, so that less-mature individuals are more likely to engage in offending behaviour (Barnes & Beaver, 2010). Indeed, it is increasingly seen as important that teenagers and young adults in custody should be managed differently to take account of the vulnerability that their relative immaturity creates (Harris & Browne, 2016).

Treatment of children and young people who are involved in armed conflict, however, has been, to date, less sympathetic. While children under 18 can be acquitted under international law on the basis of a distinction about whether their behaviour is intentional or unintentional during a conflict (Guillermet, 2012), there is a lot of concern about how closely some jurisdictions are willing to following international and human rights law. In Israel, for example, UNICEF have been negotiating with the authorities to improve protection for children and their rights while in detention (UNICEF, 2015). Despite ongoing dialogue, the U.N. Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, which reviews reports on children in armed conflict in order to end violations against children, gathered affidavits in 2013 and 2014 reporting ill-treatment of children detained by Israeli authorities in the West Bank. Of the 208 cases, 69 were from children under 16 years of age, 189 reported being painfully hand-tied upon arrest and 171 children reported being subjected to physical violence during arrest, interrogation and/or detention (UNICEF, 2015, p. 3).

Another example of where there have been grave concerns about the treatment of children involved in armed conflict is with children held at Guantanamo Bay. Wilson highlighted that the law around the detainees at Guantanamo is 'opaque', particularly with the children who were detained, about whom there is still limited information. Much international law regarding the rights of these children comes from the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a treaty that has been ratified by every country in the world except the US and Somalia.

There is not a lot of clarity about how many children were held in Guantanamo; Wilson (2012) theorised it was anywhere between six and over 60. In 2011, WikiLeaks suggested that, contrary to official reports at the time, there were at least 22 children held there (Worthington, 2011). Whatever the number, there is concern about how these children were treated while they were detained.

Wilson (2012) described disturbing accounts of how Omar Khadr, who was taken into custody in Afghanistan at 15, and other juveniles held at Guantanamo, were treated. Khadr was interrogated aggressively despite suffering from near-fatal gunshot wounds. Reporting in May 2015, the U.S. news organisation Democracy Now described how Khadr was the first person since World War II to be prosecuted in a war crimes tribunal for crimes committed as a juvenile. It is now claimed that his confession to throwing a grenade was illegally obtained through torture and cruelty during his eight years at Guantanamo (Democracy Now, 2015). There are other similar stories. One juvenile detainee died under mysterious circumstances and another, Mohamed Jawad, was arrested by the U.S. military after Afghan officials told him that he and his family would be killed if he did not confess to throwing a hand grenade into a vehicle carrying U.S. military personnel (Wilson, p. 44–45).

Getting all jurisdictions to adhere appropriately to international principles and conventions of child protection and treatment is only part of the problem. The concept of the 'child soldier' is in itself somewhat ambiguous. Rosen (2005) describes how most conventions define a child in terms of the 'Straight 18' position, with a child being defined simply as any person under

18 years of age. While transparent and unambiguous, the reality is not as simple. As early parts of this chapter have shown, adolescents and young adults may not have the cognitive capacity to truly make rational decisions and understand the long-term consequences of their actions. Entry into adulthood is both conceptualised and experienced differently in different cultures; Makruf and Pratiwi (2011) suggest that in Indonesia, for example, youth is defined as between the age of 16 and 30. Arnett (2000, p. 471) pointed out that many 18–25-year-old Americans do not see themselves as adults.

McMahan (2010) points out that it is already inherently difficult to determine the level of moral responsibility of the child, which makes it difficult to determine whether there can be an ethical justification for fighting them. However, he also makes the interesting point that:

> many of the combatants in properly constituted armies are between the ages of eighteen and twenty, and in most cases there is very little difference with respect to the capacity for moral agency between a seventeen-year-old and a nineteen-year-old, certainly not enough to make it a reasonable presumption that the one lacks the capacity for moral agency while the other is a morally responsible agent.
>
> *(2010, p. 34)*

If, as research is suggesting, young people are not fully mature until their mid-twenties, then the question extends from how much we can hold those 18 and under to account, but also brings in to question the presumption of maturity of young soldiers in all legitimate armies.

Notwithstanding continuing debate on the status of child combatants, there is now considerable recognition that these children can suffer significant psychological problems and trauma. Ashby (2002) described a beach in Sierra Leone that is so idyllic it was used to film the original Bounty chocolate 'taste of paradise' advertisement campaign. In an ironic twist, it is now the setting of a rehabilitation centre for former child soldiers. Ashby explains, 'in addition to war wounds, most have been branded like cattle by their commanders. Their emotional scars can only be imagined' (p. s11). Countless studies have now demonstrated singularly high levels of pathology among former child soldiers (e.g. Somasundaram, 1998; Klasen, Reissman, Voss & Okello, 2015; Moscardino, Scrimim, Cadei & Altoè, 2012). Being a perpetrator of trauma as a child soldier has been found to be associated with guilt and PTSD, with a greater number of experiences as perpetrator linked to externalising problems (Klasen *et al.*, 2015). Klasen *et al.* (2010, p. 1107) described child soldiers as 'one of the most severely traumatized populations of children and adolescents'.

It has already been said that treating children who are, whether forced or not, acting as child soldiers might be detrimental. Many of their behaviours, while characteristic of PTSD, appear to help them cope with their situation. Treatment is most effective when the child is no longer in a situation where he or she needs to engage in violence. Once the situation has changed, however, treatment is important to help ensure a cyclical pattern of violence does not develop.

The impact of being a child soldier lasts beyond the conflict and beyond dealing with PTSD. Research has found that the stigma associated with being a former child soldier and a lack of community acceptance is a significant predictor of increased hostility post event (Betancourt *et al.*, 2010), leaving the child, now often a young adult, marginalised and distressed. Haer and Böhmelt (2016) found evidence to suggest that child soldiering in a previous dispute might increase the willingness to engage in armed conflict again. It is clear that the trauma that these children have suffered and its longer-term implications warrants more attention.

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13

SOCIAL MEDIA, THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT AND TERRORISM

Katherine E. Brown and Elizabeth Pearson

Introduction

In 2015 the speed, scale and reach of social media gave terrorist organizations the capacity to reach some 2 billion individuals. By 2014 there were over 10,000 individual websites (up from 2,000 in 2003) making material available to some 3 billion Internet users in 2015 (Weimann, 2016). Weimann's early (2004) analysis of the thousands of terrorist websites found that every ideology was represented, including Hamas, the Shining Path, the Supreme Truth, and Al-Qaeda. As a result, terrorist recruitment, funding, propaganda, bomb-making know-how and the ability to choose and hit targets, have all been impacted, particularly by Web 2.0 (Mantel 2009). Brachman (2008, 116) shows how Jihadist theologian al-Suri in *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance* 'frequently discusses the Internet and new media technologies, recognizing them as critical vehicles for inciting global resistance'. Terrorists' shift towards the cyberworld simply mirrors society's expanding digital footprint and seamless movement between the 'virtual' and 'real'. Consequently, understanding content alone is insufficient; it is necessary to trace the social human connections, collaborations and networks through which such malleable content flows.

'Online radicalization' is a trending theme in terrorism studies, to the extent that an April 2016 Google Scholar search on this term, as well as 'internet radicalization', harvested more than 20,000 and 15,000 results respectively. Much work is focused on Islamist groups, particularly Daesh (also known as Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL), as this chapter will make apparent; however, no ideology is unrepresented on the Net, and this chapter is concerned with the spectrum of extremism, including far-right, socialist and jihadist movements. Our focus is on 'terrorism' as it is generally understood and therefore excludes non-violent groups and state-sponsored actors. Despite proliferation of research outputs, there are many unanswered questions in research into terrorism and the Internet. This chapter addresses some in four main parts. The first maps mechanisms of the 'radical' or 'extremist' online world. We discuss the uses to terrorists – communicative, social, symbolic and operational – of social media and the Internet. The second discusses the interaction of the online and offline realms, focussing on debates about cyberspace as an initiator, facilitator or 'force multiplier' of extremism in the 'real world'. The final substantive part assesses online counter-radicalisation efforts to date, categorised in two ways: 'negative' activities which seek to 'inhibit' terrorist movements online, and 'positive' counter-narratives which offer alternative content that challenges radical messages. The fourth section explores the

gaps in knowledge, and areas for future research, drawing together the main themes discussed. We then offer a brief conclusion.

Mechanisms of online terrorism: four roles of the Web

Use of social media by today's groups and their supporters or affiliates is firstly communicative, fulfilling the same role as traditional media used by violent radicals of yesteryear (Conway 2004; Nacos 2015). Social media serves as a public platform used to 'influence' broad audiences of potential recruits, motivate members and sympathisers, and to inform the public and news organisations of terrorists' actions and ideas. Its speed, scope and scale far exceed those of traditional modes of communication, and the advantages do not end there. The Net is also largely unregulated, easy to use and low in cost, providing relative anonymity and 'reach'. Additionally, the dynamic nature of social media means users amplify content to reach a wider audience. Boko Haram for some time distributed propaganda videos via YouTube, from where it spread (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012). Daesh developed their own Twitter app, 'Dawn', which automatically downloaded 'tweets' to a given account's timeline. This subverts attempts to close accounts and vastly increases reach through synchronisation with peak viewing times of different time zones. Dawn links to a variety of material, from skilfully produced online 'documentaries' of life in the new Caliphate to news of events such as the opening of a children's hospital. Messaging is multi-functional: promotional and reassuring, as well as vividly brutal (Winter 2015). Net messaging is also carefully constructed to create brand coherence and demonstrate allegiances across groups. After the acceptance of a *baya* (pledge) to Daesh, Boko Haram began to employ Daesh branding in its media output, mimicking particular actions such as special effects, camera angles or graphics in Daesh videos (Wyszomierski 2015; Zenn 2015).

Online messaging can also influence hard-to-reach audiences: youth or supporters and recruits far away. While Sageman (2008, 114) has argued the Internet is primarily a resource for those with 'already made up minds', and authors Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2009) note that the Net is 'largely ineffective when it comes to drawing in new recruits', there remains increasing evidence of its ability to attract recruits with no previous interest in extremism. Pantucci (2011) has argued, 'the increasing prevalence of the Internet and the easy availability of extremist material online have fostered the growth of the autodidactic extremist.' Conway and McInerney's research (2008) analysing YouTube posts and comments of a small group of individuals discussing material concerning the Iraq conflict shows this. The authors demonstrated how individuals browsing generic websites could be targeted and integrated into a specific network, highlighting one case of a young male 'Irish rugby fan' posting a comment about his wish to convert to Islam after watching a Martyrdom video. Within weeks several heavy users of martyrdom YouTube channels with radical links had targeted him for recruitment. Daesh recruiters have also specifically targeted young women in Europe via social media (Conway 2016). Such efforts represent an evolution of a trend noted by Speckhard and Yayla (2016) in Al-Qaeda recruiters to target individuals precisely because they had no prior connections to the jihadist network and were 'clean skins'.

A second role of social media is 'social'. This is achieved in part by 'narrow-casting', channelling internal private communications between members or sympathisers of extremist groups. The online environment can provide safe spaces for debate, organisation and networking, and risks of detection are perceived to be lower than offline. 'Broadcasting' on social media can assist in 'narrowcasting'. On 26 September 2015, just four days after Telegram launched its new 'Channels' tool, Daesh set up its own, '*Nashir*' ('Distributor'). Extremists favour Telegram because of its 'secret chat' function, which encrypts messages and avoids security service detec-

tions. Much extreme activity also takes place on the 'dark' or 'deep' Net. Here, sites are hidden, encrypted using Tor Hidden Services or password-protected and do not appear in any online search (Bartlett 2015).

New online personae through the use of 'skins' or avatars, together with direct access to the creation of group identity, mean the online space can afford individuals more power than they find offline. Communicating anonymously, the Internet is a location in which the limitations of offline identities disappear. Bermingham *et al.* (2009) note the more aggressive expressions within female content in a study of YouTube extremism. For Daesh, women's open online advocacy of violence is a core feature of their support (Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett 2015; Pearson 2015b; Saltman and Smith 2015). This is linked to greater online freedoms afforded women to violent self-expression compared with offline. Al-Qaeda used the online magazine *Inspire* to advertise women's ability to support them through propaganda or fundraising from the safety of '*purdah*.' In contrast, female offline violence is prohibited in all but the most exceptional circumstances by the majority of Jihadi theologians (Von Knop 2007). Online space therefore serves an important function in allowing the expression of sentiment not possible offline, although this may lead to 'dissonance' between online and offline personalities (Brachman, Levine and Baudrillard 2011, 25).

This private use of social media also intensifies the ability to radicalise. The Net works like a virtual echo chamber as confirmation biases are tapped, further polarizing group identities (United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2008; von Behr *et al.* 2013; Madden, 2008). Confirmation bias is heightened further as material is often tailored to specific audiences. The Hamas site *al-Fateh* ('The Conqueror') uses cartoon-like characters to appeal to children, while extreme-right groups have also appealed to young males with online versions of popular computer games that involve shooting homosexuals, black people and other minorities (Selepak 2010). Titles include 'Watch Out Behind You Hunter – shoot the fags before they rape you', 'Border Patrol – don't let those spics cross our border' and 'Kaboom – the suicide bombing game'. However, private online communities need not be hidden. Siibak (2014) describes how the Estonian extreme-right nationalist group '*Eesti Leegion*' (Estonian Legion) evolved in its Internet use in the late 2000s with members convening in communities on the SNS Rate site. These were either private sites, requiring authorised validation to gain admission, or 'publicly private' in that coded language was employed in public sites that could be understood only by intended communities.

Once online, every post, comment and emoji contributes to the symbolic foundations of the 'terrorist world'. Social media does more than simply reproduce or reflect the 'offline world'. Each user can contribute to the shared reality, and so we see both the formation of identity online and in the 'real world', in which it becomes meaningful. These symbols may echo and reproduce symbols employed offline. Jihadi online communities repost particular images, such as the extended right finger, the symbol for unity in God (*Tawheed*). Conway (2012) elaborates in her discussion on the 'radical milieu', which can be contrasted with simple 'sympathizers'. Waldmann notes the milieu possesses 'a form of social structure responsible for the observed in-group cohesion. It is not merely a sum of individuals holding similar political/cultural attitudes' (Waldmann 2010, 25). Web 2.0 enables creativity, interaction, and collaboration, permitting the collective contribution to a particular terrorist worldview. Bjelopera argues that:

> [Online] interactivity blurs the lines between readership and authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers and newsletters. This blurring … encourages people … to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just … [online] spectators. (2013, 101–2)

Users become co-creators of the terrorist habitus. However, it is not an equal environment; despite popular conceptions of such communities as anarchical, they are often hierarchical in social structures and outputs. Klausen (2015) finds some Daesh Twitter accounts have more influence – a limited number of 'feeder accounts' are important in creating the overall shape and direction of the online terrorism world.

The fourth way in which terrorist groups use social media is operational – the connections to offline action are discussed in the second section of this chapter. Operational terrorist activities are carried out online – cyberterrorism – and include potential terrorist attacks on critical digital infrastructure: major e-commerce sites and governmental networks (Gellman 2002). Brill (2010) discusses a range of terrorist cybertactics, from 'hit-and-run' attacks to attempts to gain and maintain long-term access to the digital infrastructure of perceived enemies, or cyberinvasions to disrupt or disable technology-based targets such as factories or military communication systems (see also Rid 2013). There is also scope for online psychological warfare, as carried out by the Syrian Electronic Army in support of Assad. Engaging in spamming, website defacement, malware, phishing and denial of service attacks, they have targeted political opposition groups, Western news organizations and human rights groups. It has also hacked defence contractor and government websites who oppose Assad (Al-Rawi 2014). As terrorism is about generating fear, so is cyberterrorism (Thomas 2003).

Relationship between 'online' and 'offline' activities

Perhaps the most fundamental research question is, 'what is the relationship between the online environment and the likelihood of offline violent attack'? All studies assume some influence. This section looks at three areas in which the Internet and online social media are thought to influence action in the non-digital world: in initiating real-world terrorism; in reinforcing and sustaining terrorism; and acting as a 'force multiplier'.

Much research has focused on the Internet's utility to initiate interest in terrorist groups and recruit to them, i.e. to 'radicalise', and has generated much fear, given the reach of the Internet and the potential for unpredictable attacks (Mcfarlane 2010). However, studies mostly find the Net-radicalisation relationship is correlative rather than causative. One of the few to use empirical data, an analysis of 15 'radicalised' individuals found the Internet only complemented real-world radicalisation and did not necessarily accelerate the process (von Behr *et al.* 2013). Before Daesh, researchers found access to the Internet alone does not radicalise; rather, human connections and often 'real life' interactions are required for the 'first spark' of recruitment to a terrorist cause (Hussain and Saltman 2014, 75). It can be difficult to establish which has priority – online or offline – as groups and individuals need real-world issues and practices from which the online realm springs. Fidler (2015) argues that 'the Islamic State is more a "boots on the ground" than a "bytes on the net" problem'. Reinforcing this cautionary note, Archetti (2015, 51) pleads: 'What must be kept in mind is that narratives are not merely the product of words, but of social practices'. Social media gives access to those narratives; however, it creates communities and builds meaning around these social practices.

Few cases have challenged the theory that the Internet alone is 'insufficient' for radicalisation. However, forewarning perhaps of the current vogue of Daesh recruitment of young women on the Internet is the 2010 case of the lone-actor British student, Roshonara Choudhry. She stabbed her MP, Stephen Timms, in revenge for his support of the Iraq war after watching hours of *jihadi* videos, mainly lectures by charismatic American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki (Hussain and Saltman 2014). Choudhry told police she was acting for Al-Qaeda, but investigators found no evidence of any offline links or online contacts with cell leaders or sympathisers.

She described attacking Timms after watching an Azzam video, which she interpreted as suggesting women might carry out defensive *jihadi* violence after all (Pearson 2015a). While there are lingering suggestions that the full details of the case are not known (Pantucci 2011), it shows that reliance on content-based analysis of terrorist action limits understanding of 'terrorist use of the Internet' (Ramsay 2010). It is important to consider the 'end-users' and how they engage with the messages they find on social media.

Lone terrorist actors are an interesting group; there is evidence of the importance of the Internet in influencing their actions, as few 'lone' actors are actually isolated online, although they may be offline (Gill, Horgan and Deckert 2014). Gonzalez *et al.* (2015) note that interactions with fellow extremists, or watching extremist media online, radicalizes about 20% of domestic lone-actor terrorists in the United States. Picart (2015) discusses the case of Colleen LaRose in the United States as a self-radicalizing individual who was allegedly recruited by the idea of glory and heroism of 'martyrs' in propaganda and online chatrooms. Simon (2013, 203–4) finds that lone actor conversations with those already holding extremist views are 'among the most influential aspects of the Internet for inspiring terrorist attacks by those who might otherwise never consider going to such extremes'. The Garland, Texas, attackers, for example, created a Twitter hashtag, #Texasattack, hours in advance, which they used to ask for advice and get support from Twitter users during the shooting. McDonald (2016) terms this not just 'premeditated' but 'premediated' violence. Such 'pre-sharing' online has been witnessed in 17 cases of lone-actor incidents, particularly noticeable among school shooters (Birdwell, Smith and Barton 2016).

Cases initially reported as examples of unaffiliated or auto-didactic 'online radicalisation', such as Nidal Malik Hasan, who in 2009 shot and killed 13 people at the Fort Hood military base, may turn out to be 'connected' to known groups. Hasan had not watched the online videos of Al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki but was later found to have been in email contact with him (Brachman, Levine and Baudrillard 2011; Conway 2012). Terrorist groups are also increasingly aware of the value of non-affiliated but self-motivated individuals. In 2013, Al-Qaeda launched a new pamphlet online called the 'lone *mujahid* pocketbook'. Earlier, Abu Musab al-Suri claimed in *A Call to a Global Islamic Resistance* (posted in 2005) that supporters needed 'principles, not organisations'. Moreover, Hamm and Spaaj (2015) found a 21% decline in affiliated extremist attacks in the United States compared with lone actors, suggesting this is correlated with rising Internet influence.

Key to challenging the ability of the Internet to cause terrorism is the vast amount of extremist material online, contrasted with the relatively low numbers of radicals. Von Behr *et al.* (2013) point out that incidences of terrorism have not notably increased in the presence of the Internet. They suggest a key power of the Internet is that it 'affords more prospects for radicalisation', but that self-radicalisation is almost non-existent. Clearly the availability of a message – for instance, a *jihadi* video online – does not necessarily equate 'reach' – the message actually being accessed and consumed. Clearly, reach does not necessitate uptake. Online content may have many effects, including alienation from group goals. Responses cannot be predicted.

The second feature of Internet impact on offline activity is facilitating terrorist violence and broader actions. Holman (2016) suggests this facilitation is complex and constitutes an opportunistic link without which 'recruitment' could not occur. He stresses that online recruitment is not a 'one-way' action, echoing Sageman's (2004) 'bunch of guys' theory which highlights the importance of groups seeking the 'link' to organisations. Affiliates, for example, organize plots via peer-to-peer networks without centralized control. Younes Tsouli, the so-called 'Terrorist 007', whose online activities, including the distribution of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) video propaganda led to his 2005 arrest and subsequent conviction in the United Kingdom, is one such

'affiliate'. Although connected to a number of *jihadis* internationally, communication was never face-to-face and always online (Kohlmann 2006).

Another aspect of facilitation is fundraising. Extremist groups rely heavily on donations (Conway 2004). These are either directly solicited via organizational websites or indirectly through front organizations and/or charities; Al-Qaeda was found to use the same bank accounts as some humanitarian relief agencies (Thomas 2003). The Internet can facilitate wide transnational funding networks, for example enabling women in the United States and Canada to raise funds for the Somali Jihadist group al Shabaab (Hahn 2014). The 'dark' or 'deep Web' has a particular role here. Weimann (2016) cites a webpage in the deep Web with instructions for funding, 'the Islamic Struggle without Leaving a Trace', and inviting donations for *jihad* through bitcoin transactions.

Social media and the Internet also facilitate terrorist attack, enabling groups to live-monitor the impact of an attack and gain situational information. This can maximize fatalities, operational success and publicity. Al Shabaab's Nairobi attacks in 2013 were live-tweeted, enabling terrorists to deliver information to the public and media through what was effectively an alternative news channel, to issue further warnings and demands and to justify the attacks in response to Somali suffering and an attempt to garner publicity (Anzalone 2013). Analysis of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 in which Lashkar-e-Taiba activists carried out shootings and bombings across the city over four days indicated that the terrorists were in constant contact with Pakistan-based controllers who were able to keep track of constant up-to-date information from public Twitter posts and communicate it directly to the attackers (Fair *et al.* 2009; Leggio 2008; O'Rourke 2010). Khetan (2009, cited in Oh, Agrawal and Rao 2010, 37–38) demonstrates how this gave them information on the identity of a hostage and impacted on the assessment of the organisational benefits of killing him:

Terrorist: He is saying his full name is K.R. Ramamoorthy.
Handler: K.R. Ramamoorthy. Who is he? … A designer … A professor … Yes, yes, I got it … [The caller was searching on the Internet for the name, and a results showed up a picture of Ramamoorthy] … Okay, is he wearing glasses? [The caller wanted to match the image on his computer with the man before the terrorists.]
Terrorist: He is not wearing glasses. Hey, … where are your glasses?
Handler: … Is he bald from the front?
Terrorist: Yes, he is bald from the front … he is fat and he says he has got blood pressure problems.

As well as increasing the efficacy of ongoing attacks, the Internet facilitates the execution and planning of future attacks as well. Online surveillance permits the targeting of particular locations such as airports and garnering information on their vulnerabilities. Gill *et al.* (2015) found 9% of convicted U.K. terrorists in their study had chosen a target through online research. They also emphasized the particular ability of the Internet to school terrorists. There are tens of thousands of Internet posts relating to bomb-making and IEDs and have been for years (Chen 2011; Chen *et al.* 2008). However, the nature of instruction on how to construct them has changed significantly. Gill *et al.* (2015) compare Copeland's 1999 bomb attacks in support of extreme right-wing ideology on parts of London, and counter-*jihadi* Anders Breivik's 2011 Oslo bomb attack. Despite reading much online material, Copeland could not follow how to progress from one stage of bombmaking to the next. He changed his aims and created a different type of bomb. By the time of Breivik's attack, YouTube offered a video to get him over similar hurdles. The authors emphasize how the interactivity of the modern Internet has changed the technical

capabilities for those seeking particular skills. However, Holbrook (2015) in a detailed study of recent terrorist cases brought before the U.K. courts reveals unaffiliated individuals struggled to turn insights gleaned from the Internet into 'actionable' activity.

Another significant impact of social media on terrorism is the ability to amplify the impact of the violence as a 'force multiplier'. Terrorism thrives on 'the oxygen of publicity', and terrorist communication and propaganda become simultaneously continuous and instantaneous through the digital realm. Online communication allows the events to be relived and experienced virtually over and over, repeating the action. Physical acts of terrorism are 'propaganda of the deed' – namely, events driven by the opportunity to distribute. This was noted back in the 1970s, as Jenkins argued: 'Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is a theatre' (1974, 4). A 1996 example comes from the storming of the Japanese embassy in Lima by the largely unknown Peruvian group MRTA (Silke 2010). Two websites run by sympathizers were able to shape how the group, and the event, were represented in the media, placing significant pressure on government policy as a result.

Demonstrating awareness of this point, Daesh reportedly choreograph videos and stage productions of their actions, rehearsing executions and ensuring the aesthetics are 'right'. Social media increases the infamy of particular groups and individuals – e.g. with videos of executions that make individuals 'famous', personalising the events, and encouraging 'brand' loyalty to particular 'heroes'. So-called 'Jihadi John' attained celebrity status among Daesh supporters after carrying out a number of executions. The advantage of social media in brand-creation is that it appears personalized, thereby increasing the feeling of intimacy with viewers. This has allowed groups to 'upscale' their messages, from the local to the transnational. The extreme-right has been particularly effective in using the Internet in this way (Caiani and Kröll 2015).

The efficacy of interactive, visual, and multimedia material, rather than simple 'text', to radicalise and influence more broadly, is widely noted. This works too for extremist messages; they require 'content', not just speeches – bin Laden grew frustrated at the lack of success of his early sermon-orientated tapes in the 1990s (Burke 2016). Music is shown to be an important component of content. For the far-right, this is often linked to rock music (Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk 2006). Meanwhile, *jihadi* groups create battle hymns (*nasheeds*) that are repeated over and over in videos, on banners and in gifs that accompany websites and other material (Gråtrud 2016). Research has shown inclusion of music and exposure to lyrics lead individuals to 'engage in deeper processing and consideration' of *jihadi* messages (Lemieux and Nill 2011, 144). However, producing such material is no guarantee it will be distributed, especially by mainstream news networks or social media sites. For example, Mohammed Merah, who carried out attacks inspired by Al-Qaeda in Toulouse, France, finished editing a 24-minute video clip, posted to Al-Jazeera, of a compilation of images from the GoPro camera that he had attached to his body armour before each killing. Al-Jazeera chose to not show it.

Anti-radicalisation initiatives online

The fight against online terrorism has two key weapons. First are 'preventive' approaches, promoting positive alternative narratives and counter-narratives. The second are 'repressive' modes, involving the removal or restriction of sites. This includes 'takedown' approaches, or the filtering of particular key-words, 'hiding' those words in searches (Briggs and Feve 2014). The counterterrorism fight lies in unlikely alliances of netizens and hacker groups, and government agencies. Indeed, some of the most effective campaigns have come from net-users from communities affected by

terrorism, as they often possess the credibility online with 'target' audiences that governments struggle to attain. The relationship is not an easy alliance, with policymakers repeatedly calling on social media platforms to be more aggressive and proactive. A 2016 U.K. Home Affairs Select Committee report suggested the Internet is a 'Wild West' that requires more social media company initiatives to counter extremism (Home Affairs Select Committee 2016).

The presumed efficacy of the counter-narrative approach is based on the assumption that 'the public is passive and that different members of an audience tend to change attitudes and behaviour in a similar way upon reception – or injection/inoculation, continuing with the hypodermic needle metaphor – of the same media message' (Archetti 2015). Online counter-narratives can also be understood as psychological and mechanical 'noise' which 'interferes' with the messages they are designed to counter (Weimann and Von Knop 2008). To make such a 'noise' strategy credible, Ashour (2010) argues that certain criteria must be fulfilled: each distinct element of a radicalisation narrative needs to be countered; the messengers themselves need to be credible; and a dissemination strategy that maximises existing global institutions is required.

'Jamming' is one 'interfering' and positive method used, and is an example of the ways in which netizens can impact on extremist propaganda as a form of collective rather than directed action. Humour can subvert messages of power and brutality. For example, users of 4Chan, an online 'bulletin board' primarily used to share images on particular themes, employed images of ducks to challenge Daesh propaganda (Gunter 2015). The campaign made global headlines as it ridiculed online images of fighters posing together in macho postures, replacing each face with the head of a toy yellow duck, frequently captioned 'Allah Quackbar' (see Figure 13.1 for examples).

Many counter-narratives emerge spontaneously from particular Internet communities in which extremism appears. 'Counter-Speech' was a project led by the British think tank DEMOS to collect data on content produced by Facebook users to challenge posts by 'populist far-right' hate groups (Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones 2015). They found a combination of approaches were used to counter extremism online by individual netizens. A non-confrontational constructive comment and questioning strategy in response to such hate speech was common and most popular, along with the use of photos and videos. These had greater reach within Facebook and were often shared. The hashtag #BBOG (Bring Back Our Girls) in response to the Chibok abductions by Boko Haram in 2014 is further example of spontaneous mass adoption of a campaign aimed against terrorism.

Governments may never have the perceived authenticity of grassroots activism, but they have nonetheless sought to reduce and eradicate online extremism (United States Government 2011, 6). Governments act to influence the broader context of' Net radicalisation, with informational campaigns aimed at 'capacity building' to make 'vulnerable' populations aware of dangers online and improve their digital literacy. Saltman and Russell (2014, 3) suggest positive approaches might include 'engagement with extremist ideologies and narratives, development and dissemination of counter-narratives, and addressing the grievances perceived by those vulnerable to or experiencing radicalisation', as well as 'digital literacy and critical consumption education'. Governments worldwide have therefore created their own counter-narrative websites and social media campaigns to directly negate messages spread by terrorist groups and promote their own 'national values'. After the Al-Qaeda-supported attacks of January 2015 on the Charlie Hebdo offices and a Jewish supermarket, the French government created a video challenging Al-Qaeda and Daesh propaganda, suggesting foreign fighters would find a 'hell'. This campaign had the Twitter hashtag #Stopdjihadisme (Pietrasanta 2015). The worldwide and multilingual 'Say No to Terror' campaign is another example. Aly *et al.* (2014) describe it as 'a comprehensive communication campaign comprising a website, media, and social media presence'. The campaign uses a variety of multimedia content, including short videos and posters, for communicating a



Figure 13.1 4Chan 'Allah Quackbar' photographs.

counter-narrative to selected elements of the terroristic narrative. However, Neumann (2013) argues that for such 'counter-speech' to be effective it needs to be distanced from governments and clearly shaped by civil society organisations. This is perhaps why Saudi backing of the 'Say No to Terror' campaign is covert (Aly *et al.* 2014). It is also why the United States government has stressed the need for successful strategies against Al-Qaeda-inspired groups to come from American Muslim communities (Helmus, York and Chalk 2013).

Repressive moves to destroy and remove content are favoured by some scholars due to the direct impact they have on terrorist networks and on the ability therefore to disseminate information. In their Daesh Twitter census, Berger and Morgan (2015) recommend suspension of accounts to disrupt networks and effectively prevent their expansion. While acknowledging the 'whack-a-mole' effect in which suspended accounts (and websites) simply pop up again in a fresh guise elsewhere, Berger and Morgan assert, 'the consequences of neglecting to weed a garden are obvious, even though weeds will always return' (2015, 15). In particular, Berger (cited in Cellan-Jones 2015) suggests the removal of Daesh Twitter accounts is effective, as it 'wastes their time' in being re-established. Berger and Perez (2016) also suggest that users suffer devastating reductions in future follower counts after suspension, that networks are disrupted and that content is destroyed, given that suspension removes tweets in which photos, videos and other files are embedded. While Daesh Twitter supporters have countermeasures such as back-up accounts, suspension is still highly disruptive. Indeed, between 2015 and August 2016, Twitter used a campaign of suspension to successfully reduce ISIS supporter numbers by as many as 360,000 ('Combating Violent Extremism' 2016). This has served a deep blow to Twitter ISIS online networks, recruitment and funding.

'Hactivist' communities have also been hugely influential in striking coordinated attacks on Daesh media. The hactivist group 'Anonymous' that emerged from 4Chan has collectively reported thousands of Daesh-supporting Twitter accounts *en masse* on a number of occasions, resulting in their suspension. On one day in April 2015, for example, Twitter suspended 10,000 accounts associated with Daesh extremism (Hall 2015). Other methods of takedown include denial of service (DDoS) attacks to overload servers, SQL injection attacks (accessing and 'injecting' malicious database code) to hijack websites and corrupt them from within and 'doxxing' extremist sites, as when Ghost Security and the separate Ghost Security Group helped prevent an attack in Tunisia (Brooking 2015).

'Takedown' has been a key component of law enforcement and prosecutions on terrorism too. In 2010, the United Kingdom opened a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit that in cooperation with companies addresses Internet activities that violate legal prohibitions against glorifying or inciting acts of terrorism ('The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit' 2010). In April 2015, the European Union also set up an Internet Referral Unit to address terrorist content on the Internet, and a month later the French National Assembly adopted legislation that expanded the government's surveillance authorities' magnitude and ability to counter terrorist threats (EUROPOL 2015). In the case of suspected terrorist Sohiel Omar Kabir, the Department of Justice (DOJ) used his Facebook activity to identify his involvement in terrorist activity (The Investigative Project on Terrorism 2012).

Fake sites are also used by government agencies; these cause suspicion and paranoia among terrorist sympathsisers by increasing doubt about the authenticity and reliability of online material. The Dutch intelligence service AIVD (*Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst*) carried out such an operation, administering a false *jihadi* website that enabled officers not only to access the details of users and monitor communications sent via the site, but also to infect with spyware the computers of radicals who downloaded material (Olmer cited in Torres Soriano 2012). Officials also organized the dissemination of a fake issue of the 'Voice of Jihad', the flagship online publication of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Readers of the publication encountered two completely different Issue No.14s simultaneously online, a situation that triggered major confusion (Torres Soriano 2012), and there is 'Operation Cupcake', a 2010 British security services operation to disrupt the Al-Qaeda *Inspire* magazine, whereby files were infected with viruses and recipes for cupcakes replaced the normal code and content of the website (Gardham 2011).

Such approaches are not without problems, however. There is potential for 'takedowns' to have perversely beneficial impacts for those targeted. In particular, Pearson (2015a) found Twitter Daesh supporters building community around suspension itself, constructing it as a form of 'online martyrdom'. Suspension was used to bolster narratives of institutional Islamophobia, and '*wilayat* Twitter' came to be regarded as an extension of the battleground of Syria and Iraq. Suspension did not 'waste time', as it was perceived as a Twitter 'life event', male supporters in particular using return from suspension as a badge of honour. They incorporated screenshots of suspension into online profiles, or used the number of times they have been suspended as 'handles', for example, @omgnotagain313.

Second, there are issues around civil liberties and transparency. Cowls and Brown (2015) outline the key difficulties of repressive interventions in human rights terms and the international law. They list challenges to a number of freedoms: freedom of expression, the right to privacy, freedom of association and assembly and freedoms of thought, conscience and religion. There is no agreed definition of 'terrorism' worldwide (Schmid 2012), therefore there are questions over how to identify the extremist material that should be removed. There is also the question

of where and how material appears, whether in public, semi-private, or private, and the complex issue of the law and the location (geographically) in which content may originate, versus that in which it is deemed problematic. Given the potential costs to civil liberties, Neumann (2013) argues that the most effective way of tackling radicalisation online is not via denial-based strategies, because they risk countering the values that Western liberal democracies are trying to protect. Instead, he proposes using social media to gather evidence, intelligence and data on terrorist groups and individuals to bring them to justice.

One question raised is the degree to which private companies and service providers should bear the responsibility for extremist content, versus law enforcement and government. Social media providers such as Twitter have rules and limitations for users on the content that can be tweeted. However, they also have obligations toward their users. This can lead to inconsistency. The @HSM_Press official Al Shabaab account which live-tweeted the Nairobi Westgate Mall attack was removed as Twitter staff became aware. However, a similar account @HSMPress_ tweeted similar propagandistic material and remained active, as it claimed it was not affiliated to Al Shabaab (Sullivan 2014). Putting the onus on companies to delete and censor content may also impact negatively on freedom of expression. Filter lists and rules are not transparent; users cannot see how searches are blocked. Cowls and Brown (2015) cite an anonymous industry expert who cautions against reliance on industry without wider debate of the bigger policy questions: 'the danger is that the policy debate becomes coloured by the notion you can short-circuit hard legal questions by applying political pressure to industry. There needs to be more work to address these hard challenges' (2015, 82).

Third, there are issues around the sheer quantity of output and where to place the emphasis. Again, to use Daesh as an example, most of the supportive online content is in Arabic. However, Twitter takedowns tend to focus on output in the West, in European languages. This is not where the greatest content is produced, nor the key languages in which propaganda appears. There is therefore a skew to the expression of Daesh terrorism in particular locations rather than a coherent attempt to counter the core of the group. One of the difficulties of localised campaigns against transnational groups is fragmentation. For example, there are hundreds if not thousands of current worldwide and NGO programmes producing online narratives to counter this. This enables them to be location-specific but also represents a fragmentation of the response versus the coherence of Daesh strategising.

Gaps in knowledge/limitations in research

Conway (2016) notes that previous innovations in technology – tape recorders, television – have revolutionized terrorism, so we should expect the Net to do so too. What is needed is the empirical research to determine this. One of the key challenges of work on online extremism, or any online environment, is the mercurial nature of the Internet. Content appears, then is taken down; movements and trends evolve at great speed. By the time research is done, peer-reviewed and published, and policymakers ready themselves for the bureaucratic processes of response, it is already out of date. However, the sheer volume of data and the richness of its content – messaging, documents, videos, images, symbols – means there are many possibilities for new research (Prucha and Fisher 2013).

For current research there is a considered need to avoid simplistic technological determinism – the belief that a technology, due to its mere existence, must produce certain effects. It is important to focus efforts on understanding not merely the content that is available online, but the ways in which this content is used in the process of radicalisation. That is to say, most

research focuses on the 'supply' side of this debate, and the experience of radicalisation or use of terrorist material online is less well understood.

Much research has pointed to the need for civil engagement in countering extremism and the capacity-building of netizens (Briggs and Feve 2014; Hussain and Saltman 2014). Pilot research projects seek to determine the ways in which such interactions might work. There has been work at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, for example, to analyse youth responses to counter-narrative 'adverts', which appear in response to relevant online searches (Tuck 2015). 'Highly personal' messages were found to be the most effective (Frenett and Dow 2015). Such projects could be extrapolated and built on.

As this chapter makes apparent, there is also a skew in terms of research towards the current specific interests of government and whatever group or movement is perceived as representing the biggest security threat. The chapter has derived many more examples from the *new* phenomenon of Daesh than from other groups, because they are the current Western focus. At the same time, Europe is witnessing a rise in the populist far-right, there are separatist groups mobilising in Turkey and the Caucuses and narco-insurgents in South America (Morrison and Sanchez 2014), all of whom use social media and the digital world. There is clearly a need to widen research to other movements.

Conway (2016) has five other suggestions for future research: that it should deepen the individual experience; upscale to gather large-N samples of data; show greater consideration of gender; and learn from other disciplines and areas of Internet study. These last categories are important in situating the phenomenon of radicalisation against the broader social backdrop. At the same time, there is a tendency, as with offline terrorism studies, to decontextualize 'radicalisation' and to view it as a special case. This is despite evidence that online political extremists may well share key behaviours and characteristics with other forms of extremism, such as users of pro-anorexia sites (Graham 2015). Particular areas of interest may lie in comparisons with other youth movements, and better knowledge of the particular uses of different age demographics of particular sites. McDonald (2016) points to the mediatisation of not just terrorism but violence too. Teenagers who pause midway through a violent assault to post pictures posing with their victim is an example. An examination of youth and representations of violence on social media may shed light on extremism and broader violence too (United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 2012). This is particularly important, as social media is a space dominated by a youth of 'digital natives' (14–24-year-olds), and can seem alien to counterterrorism officials seeking to 'protect' 'at-risk' youngsters from radicalisation.

Concluding points/summary

As Gill *et al.* (2015) point out, 'online' extremism is as multifaceted as 'offline'. It is a contoured space, with multiple functions and possibilities for terrorism, all of which must be painstakingly identified and disaggregated in order to see the specificity of activity and meaning, and counter each in turn. This chapter explores three of the key areas of research: the role of terrorist content in social media; the relationship social media and the online realm have with 'real world' terrorist events; and counterterrorism efforts online. As the final section of the chapter shows, there is considerable ambiguity in our understanding of terrorism 'online', due partly to a paucity of empirical data, and conceptual weaknesses. Nevertheless, as the connections between the 'digital' realm and other areas of life deepen and intensify, the ongoing intellectual and policy utility of this research is without doubt.

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14
TERRORIST GROUP STRUCTURES
Balancing security and efficiency

Joshua Kilberg

A crucial and often misunderstood aspect of the study of terrorism is the organizational structure of groups. What affects the organizational structure of terrorist groups? How does the structure of a group affect its behavior? This chapter will seek to address these questions and, in the process, will argue for the importance of understanding organizational structure as a critical tool in counterterrorism analysis.

Terrorist groups strive to balance efficiency with their need for security. On one hand, it must maintain its security in the face of counterterrorism efforts; on the other hand, it must strive for greater efficiency. While a simple idea, in practice, these two goals are at odds with one another. The extent to which a group copes with its security environment is what determines if a group will persist or not. A terrorist organization with the right structure for its environment is a group that has adapted and reached the right balance between security and efficiency.

When examining terrorist group organizational structures, both the internal and the external forces acting on the group have an effect on a group's behavior (and on its success). *Internal forces* are those arising from a group's motivations and the choices it makes while planning and executing attacks. *External forces* are the forces acting on the group that are beyond its control; they describe the environment in which the group operates. To understand organizational structure is to understand how a group deals with these internal and external forces.

This chapter is organized as follows: first a brief review of the previous research related to terrorist group organizational structures. Second, four organizational structures are introduced. Third, some general trends of how organizational structure is affected by the group's environment and how structure, in turn, affects the group's behavior. Finally, some concluding remarks.

Constraints on terrorist groups: balancing security and efficiency

Terrorist groups are constrained by the resources they have at their disposal, by the ideology of their supporters and by the counterterrorism efforts they face (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006, p. 1). For example, the more effective the counterterrorism effort, the more discerning a terrorist group will have to be when recruiting new members. In a more permissive environment, recruitment can be open and member vetting may be of lesser importance. By contrast, in a non-permissive environment – that is, where the group faces a well-resourced and effec-

tive security apparatus – recruitment may need to occur in secrecy and new members may be restricted to those with familial ties to ensure trustworthiness (Simmel 1906).

Like any illegal organization, however, terrorist groups must maintain some level of secrecy to survive. Without the right level of secrecy, a terrorist group becomes vulnerable to government forces. This need for secrecy, while necessary for survival, also constrains the group in terms of how it can communicate with its members and how it conducts its operations. In a permissive counterterrorism environment, for example, communications can be more overt, frequent and, therefore, more efficient. By contrast, a non-permissive counterterrorism environment will push the group to strictly limit their communications, which increases security but decreases efficiency.

Like other illegal groups, the organizational structure of terrorist groups is driven primarily by the need to maximize concealment and security; this is done at the expense of maximizing efficiency (Baker and Faulkner 1993). So, while secrecy and security is a paramount consideration for terrorist groups, the group must also effectively and efficiently accomplish tasks if they are to be successful. In this way, the types of tasks being performed are important. Social psychology and organizational theorists agree that it is the information-processing requirements – the type of data, its complexity and the intelligence of an individual required to accomplish the task – that dictate, to some extent, what form the group will take (Baker and Faulkner 1993, p. 844). For example, simple, routine tasks are accomplished more efficiently in a centralized structure, while difficult tasks are accomplished more efficiently in a decentralized structure. Therefore, if a terrorist group is not facing serious threat, it should organize itself in a more hierarchical way in order to routinize tasks (e.g., create a communications unit and a training center).

This finding is supported by the social psychology of small groups and organizational theory research, which argues that, for small groups, high information-processing, such as simple and routine tasks, are performed more efficiently in centralized structures.

The pressures within a terrorist group vary based on the level of clandestinity they must use in order to evade capture or death. For example, secrecy and concealment is not a high priority for groups like Hamas, who are able to operate overtly in the West Bank. For groups operating in states where the degree of state surveillance is high – such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Red Army Faction in West Germany in the 1970s – their members live clandestine, isolated lives. The more clandestine a group is forced to become, the less connection there can be with their supporters and the general public. Groups pushed to adopt the highest levels of operational security must, in effect, sacrifice organizational structures that could improve efficiency.

Taking these views into account, two propositions emerge. First, terrorist groups face unique challenges, distinct from normal organizations. Second, the clandestine nature of some terrorist groups – when compared to the overt nature of others – is likely due to the permissive (or constraining) conditions within the group's home country.

Organizational typologies of terrorist groups

Understanding the machinations of organizations such as corporations has been a popular topic of study over the past several decades. Early studies in this area focus on the transaction cost argument that transactions move from markets (one-off interactions) to hierarchies as the knowledge specific to the transaction builds up (Child 1972). In other words, once it makes sense for transactions to become routinized, a hierarchy will emerge.

Networks occupy the middle ground between markets and hierarchies. Networks occur when organizations maintain dense interconnections – sometimes even with competitors – that cannot easily be explained by saying that these organizations are engaged in market transactions.

Table 14.1 Terrorist group structures

Structure	*Leadership? (e.g., clear leader or leadership structure)*	*Functional Differentiation? (e.g., a political wing or a propaganda unit)*	*Centralized command and control?*
Bureaucracy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hub-spoke	Yes	Yes	No
All-channel	Yes	No	No
Market	No	No	No

This middle way – networks – lack the large span of control and specialization made possible in a hierarchy but enjoy greater flexibility. Networks themselves can take various forms (detailed below), each of which possesses different characteristics.

As most of the research extant on organizational structure focuses on licit groups (i.e., groups operating within the law), it identifies efficiency as a paramount concern for groups in which profit, not ideas, is the main motivation. Keck and Sikkink (1998) offer a view that fundamentally differs from many of the aforementioned views. Their transnational advocacy networks, unlike firms, are motivated by values, not profit. Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2001), RAND Corporation scholars, have done the most work on conceptualizing the structure of illegal groups. These scholars note that since illicit groups face drastically different challenges from their licit counterparts, illicit groups must be examined differently.

No group is an exact match for any of the idealized types of structure below. In reality, many groups combine features of different types and change their structures over time. As explained in Table 14.1, the below structures are listed in order of most to least centralized.

Bureaucracy

A bureaucratic structure is the most hierarchical of all the structures. These groups have: "clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, and formal decision making procedures" (Powell 1987, p. 69). The relationship between the agenda-setting leadership and its subordinate units is clearly defined and unidirectional (Heger *et al.* 2012). Child (1972) finds that bureaucratic organizations tend to be more rule-bound and require greater documentation of their efforts. An example of this type of group is Hezbollah; its command structure is dense, elaborate and centrally controlled (Ranstorp 1994). Like other large organizations, Hezbollah has separate departments, each with its own specialization.

Bureaucracies, then, provide clear and obvious lines of authority – everyone knows their place within the group and their responsibilities. There is a chain of command ensuring that all of a group's actions fulfill the strategic objectives of the campaign (Neumann 2011). Bureaucracies also ensure top-down coordination, leaving the group's leadership to respond to changing circumstances, enemy actions and other factors that may require a change of strategy. There is also the possibility of lower ranks of the group feeding information back up to the leadership, providing timely information of changes on the ground. This, in turn, improves the leadership's ability to respond and make strategic adjustments. Bureaucratic groups are highly likely to be nationalist groups with narrow goals such as territorial change.

The main disadvantage to an otherwise highly efficient system is that this structure provides little operational security. For a bureaucracy to work, it must be highly interconnected, with

frequent communications between units and with the chain of command. This makes the group vulnerable to arrests and infiltration, because every member will be familiar – and therefore able to betray – the group's internal structures, processes and personalities. It also exposes the group to enemy disruption. Since a bureaucracy is reliant on top leadership for command and control, leadership strikes are expected to have a more pronounced effect than with other types of structures (although the research on this is mixed). In a famous scene from the film *The Battle of Algiers*, Colonel Mathieu, commander of the French paratroop regiment sent to disrupt the uprising by the Font de la Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria, sketches out on a blackboard the organizational structure of the group. Colonel Mathieu outlines a bureaucratic structure in which each member has knowledge of just three members: the person that recruited them and the two people that they themselves recruited. Through a campaign of torture, the French military eventually identifies the group's leadership. Had the FLN adopted a more decentralized structure, in which no one central leader holds centralized command and control, a structure in which decisions are downward delegated to the cells themselves, the French could have used any type of torture they wanted, but they still would have had great difficulty in dismantling the group.

Hub-spoke networks

Networks are a newer type of organizational structure that are less hierarchical (i.e., flatter), more decentralized and more flexible than bureaucratic structures. Networks generally lack the large span of control and specialization enjoyed by hierarchical groups but enjoy more flexibility. These networked groups can be further differentiated by their characteristics; each possesses different strengths and weaknesses (Krebs 2002). Overall, networked groups remain smaller and flatter than bureaucracies, yet possess some form of leadership, differentiating a network from a market.

The hub-spoke structure is like a franchise or a cartel where a set of actors are "tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, p. 7). These types of groups have a leader and employ functional differentiation but do not have central command and control. Rather, the nodes of this group have more individual autonomy to plan and carry-out attacks. Kenney (2003, 2007) employs a similar typology in his study comparing narcotics networks and terrorist groups. The hub-spoke structure can be found in groups of a variety of motivation but are most often religious or nationalist-separatist (Kilberg 2011). An example of a hub-spoke network is pre-2001 Al-Qaeda.

All-channel networks

This type of network requires "rapid, dense, multidirectional communications to function well and endure" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, p. 287). It is for this reason that all-channel networks require the most multidirectional communication. The rise of the network form – and in particular, the all-channel network – is tied with the information revolution (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Diverse and dispersed actors can now regularly and easily coordinate and take action across great distances where, previously, this was not possible. All-channel networks do have a leader, but there is little hierarchy and no central control or functional differentiation in these groups. Decentralized groups are more likely to be religious, left-wing or right-wing and are more likely to have broad goals such as social revolution.

An example of an all-channel network is Al-Qaeda post-9/11. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda atomized in an attempt to evade destruction by U.S.-led forces. In so

doing, Al-Qaeda's leadership shifted away from a command-and-control role, in which the leadership had more of a say in day-to-day operations, to a group in which lieutenants and cell leaders were empowered to make more of the decisions. Owing to the vastly more difficult security environment in which Al-Qaeda's leaders found themselves after 9/11, the group's leadership became much less hands-on and more inspirational in nature.

Market groups

This term is used for groups with very little organization. Market groups have no discernible leadership, are not centrally controlled and have no functional differentiation (Powell 1990; Williamson 1973). These "groups" are almost more of a movement than they are a typical organization, and membership is essentially open to all. This structure is also referred to as the leaderless resistance model described by Beam (1992). In this type of group, a leader does not dictate individual behavior, and members lack any real oversight or direction from above. Because of its highly decentralized nature, a market group is prone to losing sight of the agenda. Furthermore, since these groups lack centralized command, their constituent cells may diverge from the group's stated goals and may prove to be counterproductive for the cause. While relatively rare, these types of terrorist groups do exist and are characterized by a diverse and decentralized group of individuals sharing little more than common cause and committing acts of violence under the aegis of a particular group. An example of a market structure terrorist group is the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). Under the ELF banner, distributed, often completely unconnected cells of environmental activists claim acts of eco-terrorism (Joosse 2007).

What forces affect organizational structure?

Terrorist groups are free to choose their targets and their methods of attack. They make these choices based on ideological reasons, but they are also constrained by the structure of the counterterrorism environment. Terrorist groups, then, are shaped by the character and capacity of the society and government in which they operate. In order to succeed – or at least persist – these terrorist groups must cope with a variety of challenges.

External forces

External forces are those exterior pressures and phenomena acting on a group. In order to maintain relevancy, and to successfully navigate their environment, terrorist groups must adapt to the external forces acting upon them.

Counterterrorism effectiveness: Put simply, the better a state is at fighting terrorist groups, the more likely the group is to be small and decentralized. Owing to a lack of good data, counterterrorism effectiveness, however, is difficult to compare between countries. Previous research suggests that countries with a high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are more likely to be effective when fighting against terrorism (Kilberg 2012). The reason is simple: states with a high GDP per capita have more resources available to dedicate to counterterrorism.

Everything being equal, in a state with greater counterterrorism effectiveness, groups will be pushed to adopt decentralized structures. More decentralized groups, however, are more difficult to disrupt. In the face of strong counterterrorism efforts, it is mostly networked or market groups that are able to survive (Kilberg 2011). These decentralized groups tend to be most successful in a strong counterterrorism environment because they present fewer targets; communication is sparse, and leadership interdiction is less likely to have an effect than with a

centralized group. By contrast, in countries where the counterterrorism efforts are ineffective, hierarchical groups prosper.

Political freedom: Political rights and civil liberties in a state place external constraints on a terrorist group; exactly what type of relationship the existence and level of civil liberties have on a terrorist group is debatable. Some argue that a lack of political and civil freedoms in a state are directly linked with the incidence of terrorism (Walsh and Piazza 2010). On the one hand, when the political and civil rights of a population are diminished, access to decision makers and the ability to citizens to have their voices heard are reduced. In states lacking freedom, citizens will be more likely to resort to terrorism because they lack access to non-violent political expression.

On the other hand, a more dictatorial state is free to use harsh methods of repression when confronting terrorism. In these situations, a terrorist group might prefer a more decentralized structure with anonymous cells, which can be more resistant to coercive counterterrorism efforts (Kilberg 2012).

Durability of a polity: States with stable systems of government are more adept at dealing with threats and maintaining power. Any polity – totalitarian, democratic and everything in-between – that has endured for decades has proven that it can effectively confront challenges to the state, such as terrorism. In less durable polities (i.e., in states where there has recently been a change in the system of government), terrorist groups will tend toward adopting a larger, more hierarchical structure. This is because there is a very real chance of that group seizing power from the current government. Any group that hopes to replace the government in such a situation will strive to adopt a governance structure mirroring the state. It is also because unstable states are less effective in their counterterrorism strategies.

Older, more established, polities tend to push groups to adopt market or all channel structures (i.e., decentralized), not bureaucracies. The stability of long-lasting polities confers some advantage to the state. This advantage is observed by the constraints it places on terrorist groups. Only those groups with decentralized structures can operate in older, more established polities.

Internal forces

While it is certainly true that a group's structure is chosen in part due to external factors acting on the group, forces within the organization also shape its structure. For example, certain targets (such as choosing hard targets) and certain attack types (such as armed assaults) require coordination and a relatively high number of terrorists in order to be successful. Consequently, groups choosing these attack features will only do so if their internal structure permits it; the choices a group makes speaks to the internal forces at work.

Hard target selection: A group's target selection shapes the structure it adopts. Groups that successfully attack hard targets, such as police and military targets, need to possess a more complex set of organizational characteristics. The reason for this is simple: attacking a hard target means the group will almost certainly encounter armed resistance. If a terrorist group is to persist, it must have enough capability to withstand a response. By contrast, attacking a soft target, such as a shopping mall, does not pose the same risk to a group since the target is often unarmed civilians. Groups which do not attack hard targets do so for one of two reasons. First, their mission does not require attacking hard targets, or attacking hard targets would be counterproductive. For example, some groups may avoid human casualties altogether, opting instead to attack unoccupied targets to minimize the risk. Second, a group may not possess the aptitude (or the required numbers) to attack a hard target. Previous research indicates that if a group has a centralized structure, then it has the capacity to pull off hard target attacks (Kilberg 2011).

Group goals: The variation of the goals of terrorist groups vary widely. This variation may affect the chosen structure of the group. Some seek broad goals, such as complete social revolution, seeking a new empire or regime change; others have far more narrow goals, such as preserving the status quo, forcing a policy change or securing territorial change (Jones and Libicki 2008). It is argued here that the more esoteric and far-fetched the goal, the more loosely organized the group, since there is no operational imperative that selects a more centralized structure. In other words, groups with broad goals simply wish to express their grievances in a violent way. Conversely, groups that have narrow goals, such as maintaining the status quo or seeking territorial change, are much more likely to believe that they will achieve their goals and therefore will adopt a more hierarchical structure in anticipation of achieving their goal. In a study about the end of terrorism, Jones and Libicki (2008) conclude that less than 10 percent of all groups ever achieve victory. However, everything being equal, narrower goals are more achievable than broad, poorly defined goals.

Groups can be categorized into five non-exclusive categories: left-wing, right-wing, religious, nationalist/separatist, and single issue. Left-wing groups in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s had a particular character and some common tactics (Rapoport cited in Cronin and Ludes 2004). Nationalist struggles, owing to their large well of potential support, tend to represent the longest lasting groups. These groups include the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. Religiously motivated groups often have similar organizational structures to nationalist groups since they both have a deep well of potential support (Post 2005).

The impact of leadership: The overall importance of a leader is mixed. For market and networked groups, the leader has little to do with the day-to-day operations of the group (in the case of a market group, there is no real leader). For these structures, the leaders occupy a role of figurehead or deity from which ideology and inspiration are drawn but planning and executing attacks are not. For bureaucratic structures, the leader plays a key role in the operations of the group (Rowlands and Kilberg 2011).

The so-called kingpin strategy has been used for decades as a strategy to break up illegal organizations such as drug cartels, the mafia and terrorist groups (Kenney 2003). The logic behind this strategy is that targeting the leadership of an organization should disrupt operational and strategic functioning of the group. With the destabilization of these core elements of the group, its capacity to conduct operations should diminish, and its cohesiveness should decline. With enough disruption, it may even be possible to induce distrust, infighting and atomization of the group, which in turn may even lead to the collapse of the organization.

Conclusion

In providing a review of terrorist group structures, this chapter explains the internal and external forces affecting terrorist organizational structure. As secret organizations, terrorist groups are not only driven by efficiency, they must also protect themselves from infiltration and threats (Volders 2016).

In terms of external forces, the counterterrorism environment shapes the structure of groups. The more open the society, the more decentralized the organization. A similar relationship exists in terms of the wealth of a state (used as a rough proxy for counterterrorism effectiveness), as well as polity durability. Ideally, there would be a measure of counterterrorism effectiveness and/or capacity that would allow intra-state comparison. At present, such a measure does not exist. This is an area for future research. In terms of internal forces, several factors shape the structure a group adopts in complex ways: target selection, group motivation and leadership.

The policy implications of a model that describes the type of group most likely to be found in a given environment are many. In states with low counterterrorism capacity, terrorist groups are most likely to be hierarchical in structure. These groups are able to enjoy the efficiencies of a bureaucracy without suffering the security disadvantages that come with this structure. States with a high counterterrorist capacity are much more likely to face decentralized groups. These groups, aware of the huge imbalance, have adopted an organizational structure best suited to this environment. The story of a successful (or at least a long-lasting) terrorist group most often includes a chapter on how it was able to balance security and efficiency. Without this balance, groups tend not to last long.

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15

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TERRORISM

Sarah Marsden

Far less attention has been directed at questions of terrorism's outcomes than to issues of mobilisation and causation. As such, there is much still to learn about how terrorism produces particular effects, and indeed, on how terrorism ends.

One of the central questions in work on terrorism's effectiveness is that of the most appropriate metric. If terrorism is conceptualised as a strategy to achieve substantive political change, as we will see, it is largely ineffective. If, however, terrorism is primarily interpreted as a communication strategy, then one could argue it is very often a success. Informed by the dominance of the strategic model in accounts of political violence (Abrahms, 2008), to date, studies have largely taken political change as the key metric; as such, this measure dominates the discussion that follows.

Assuming terrorism adheres to a strategic logic, it remains necessary to specify the mechanisms by which terrorism's effects are wrought, an area that is somewhat under-theorised. Perhaps the most coherent theory of change has been presented by Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walters (2006), who argue terrorism is a form of costly signalling. Given their relative weakness, militant groups use violence to change their audience's perception about their capacity to impose costs and commitment to their goals. As part of this, militants are presumed to use five strategies: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding (Kydd & Walter, 2006). After a review of work interpreting the political outcomes of militant groups, these various strategies organise the discussion that follows. While we are beginning to develop a better understanding of how and why terrorism produces particular outcomes, major gaps in our knowledge remain. Not least the question of why, if terrorism is such a politically unproductive tactic, it remains a stubborn feature of political contention. I address these issues in the conclusion.

Political utility

There is a growing consensus that terrorism is an unproductive method of forcing political change. Large-scale analyses have repeatedly demonstrated that terrorism does not reap political rewards. Looking across hundreds of groups, studies by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki (2008), Audrey Kurth-Cronin (2009), and Leonard Weinberg (2012) have all found that a mere 7 to 13 per cent of groups achieve some, or all, of their stated objectives. The vast majority end their campaigns by joining the political process, an outcome represented in 43 per cent of cases, or

through disruption by the police, a fate befalling around 40 per cent of groups (Jones & Libicki, 2008; Weinberg, 2012). Nevertheless, some have argued for terrorism's success (Lake, 2002; Pape, 2005). In the words of Kydd and Walter, 'terrorism often works. Extremist organisations … engage in terrorism because it frequently delivers the desired response' (2006, p. 49). However, as Peter Krause (2013) has put it, the debate over terrorism's success is perhaps best characterised as a 'debate that wasn't'. When the various studies' methodological approaches are made comparable, by applying the same standard of measurement and taking account of different case selection procedures, there is far less disagreement than might first appear to be the case, with the almost unavoidable conclusion that terrorism is, by and large, a failing political strategy (Krause, 2013).

Of those that do succeed, what then, do we know about their characteristics? One of the most consistent findings is that the larger the group, the greater the chances of achieving positive gains, and the longer they are liable to last (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Ambition is also important in determining outcomes. Groups with larger-scale goals, most paradigmatically seen in the jihadist movement's desire for a global caliphate, are less likely to achieve gains (Krause, 2013). Groups adhering to nationalist/separatist and left- or right-wing ideologies, on the other hand, are more likely to either join the political process, or achieve victory (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013). Targeting practices also inform how likely a group is to progress its goals. Comparing guerrilla campaigns targeting the military with campaigns of terrorism attacking civilians, governments appear far less likely to grant concessions when militant groups target non-combatants (Abrahms, 2012). Even taking account of a group's fighting capacity and that of its opponents, alongside the scale of their political objectives, Abrahms finds civilian targeting offers the strongest explanation for failure, a finding supported in a more recent study by Virginia Page Fortna (2015).

In trying to explain the continued use of such an apparently unproductive tactic, Fortna (2015) suggests that organisational longevity may be a viable explanation. Given her finding that terrorism prolongs civil wars, she proposes its use may contribute to organisational survival, albeit at the cost of political gains. In a more detailed account of the role of organisational goals and their relationship to political outcomes, Peter Krause (2014) has posited 'power distribution theory' as a potential explanation, arguing that it is the distribution of power within a movement field that determines success. Where a single group has the monopoly of power within a movement, political gains are more likely because the hegemon is able to maximise the movement's strategic coherence and the credibility of the threat it poses. Moreover, having a single powerful actor provides incentives to pursue strategic goals whilst limiting the occurrence of counterproductive intra-movement violence.

As this brief review shows, we are developing a clear picture of terrorism's political failure, and of some of the factors that contribute to positive outcomes for militants. It now remains to examine those process goals implicated in terrorism's effects in order to develop better explanations, not only of the circumstances under which terrorism succeeds and fails, but also why it continues to be used despite its political failure. As we shall see, there is much to learn on both fronts.

Provocation

Terrorism's success is largely dependent on the response of the target, which makes understanding their opponent's preferences important for militant groups (Harris, 2006). By provoking a state into behaving in ways that harm citizens, non-state actors are able to consolidate their claims for legitimacy, create the conditions for the populace to pressure the government to change policy, or, in the most extreme cases, precipitate open rebellion or even war (Merari, 1993). Provocation is a technique well recognised by militant strategists. Marighella famously

made the case for guerrilla action to prompt the government into increasing levels of repression (Marighella, 2002). More recently, provoking America into attacking the Islamic world was a central part of 'The Awakening', the first phase in Al-Qaeda's notional timeline for the conflict that would push America to fight an 'awakened' Ummah in a more proximate battlefield (Hussein, 2005, cited in Musharbash, 2005).

Two mechanisms are potentially relevant to interpreting a repressive response to militant violence (de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007). First, that by reacting excessively, the 'true nature' of the state is revealed. And second, the experience of repression creates conditions of disenfranchisement or socioeconomic deprivation inspiring an uprising (de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007). Provocative violence offers a particular challenge to liberal democracies (Wilkinson, 2011; Li, 2005). In the debate over how best to navigate the tensions between supporting civil liberties and maintaining security, it is important to note that undermining human rights is a potentially counterproductive policy, often leading to more terrorist attacks and carrying the capacity to spark rebellion (Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; Hafez, 2003). Where physical integrity rights (those rights related to murder, disappearance, torture, or imprisonment) are not respected, states experience more terrorism (Walsh & Piazza, 2010). Indeed, state behaviour is found to be a more powerful explanation than democratic structure in determining the incidence of terrorism (Walsh & Piazza, 2010). In explaining these findings, Walsh and Piazza argue that not only is it harder to collect intelligence from a disenchanted public, repressive states are less likely to receive domestic or international counterterrorism support.

While provoking counterproductive responses to terrorism can work in a militant group's favour, there is a puzzle. The relative strength of the state means that provoking a repressive response may harm the group, undermining any strategic gains. Exploring this apparent paradox using data from Western Europe, David Carter (2016) found evidence that militant groups adhere to a strategic logic. Carter argues that armed non-state groups' target selection anticipates state responses: where militants expect discriminate state repression that may lead to substantive damage to the group, provocative guerrilla tactics prevail. Where they anticipate more indiscriminate responses liable to harm civilians, terrorist attacks are more common. Carter's work demands replication on data beyond Western Europe, and the decision-making processes within militant groups demand careful analysis. Nevertheless, the study raises important questions about the relationship between tactical choices and anticipated state responses, and underlines the need to continue to look comparatively at different types of political violence. More generally, work on terrorism's provocative dimension underlines the importance of looking carefully at the assumptions underpinning the mechanisms by which we assume terrorism to produce particular outcomes. Carter's (2016) work also demonstrates the importance of considering strategic interactions over time, and underlines the relevance of the type and capacity of opponent which armed non-state groups face in determining the effects they are able to produce.

Outbidding

Writing over 30 years ago, Martha Crenshaw (1981) drew attention to the relevance of intergroup conflict in understanding the causes of terrorism. Commonly known as 'outbidding', a number of studies have examined the way militant groups use violence to compete with other groups over resources. Perhaps first most comprehensively examined by Mia Bloom (2005), outbidding has been used to explain the increase and uptake in suicide operations. Not only are they an effective tactic, they serve to increase levels of support for those groups with greater capacity and willingness to create martyrs. Arguably, a similar situation is unfolding in the con-

flict between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, where the former is being eclipsed by the brutality of the latter (Burdette, 2014).

We've already seen how taking account of organisational factors, including outbidding in fragmented movements, can inform more nuanced explanations about terrorism's outcomes (Krause, 2014). Looking more closely at the make-up of movements, Joseph Young and Laura Dugan (2014) found robust support for the hypothesis that the greater the number of groups, the lower their longevity, while the most powerful of groups are less likely to fail in conditions of increasing competition. Similarly, groups with fewer competitors are more likely to achieve victory or join the political process (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013). Adding further insight to the relevance of organisational factors, Brian Phillips (2015) found that having a rival with opposing political aims led to increased longevity, although he only looked at rivalry between two groups, as opposed to the wider constellation of actors considered by Krause (2014) and Young and Dugan (2014).

Recent work has demonstrated the importance of looking beyond dyadic encounters. For example, a careful account of the Israeli case has found that whilst violence motivates support for militant actors, such outbidding is most powerful within distinct elements of the movement field (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, & Paserman, 2014). Specifically, where there are changes in levels of support, they occur within secular groupings or Islamist groupings, rather than between them. Hence, Fatah's violence reduces support for less prominent secular factions, and smaller Islamist groups suffer from Hamas' gains. It seems being the hegemon in a somewhat fragmented movement with opponents fighting for distinct goals has benefits in producing both positive organisational and political outcomes. Moreover, that contextualising the use of terrorism in light of the make-up of the wider movement field reaps important analytical rewards, helping to inform explanations not only of why particular forms of violence emerge in certain settings but why some groups secure gains and others lose ground.

Spoiling

Peace negotiations face many impediments, not least of which is political violence. Kydd and Walter (2002) were two of the first to look carefully at the impact of violence on peace agreements and found it was indeed effective at disrupting peace processes. In their modest sample, parties in civil war were able to reach a peace agreement in six out of 10 cases where there was no violence, but in only one in four cases where there were terrorist attacks. In exploring these findings, Kydd and Walter argued that success in derailing peace negotiations is more likely where mistrust between actors is high, and when the moderate oppositional group in negotiations with the government is considered strong enough to prevent violence from more extreme actors, but fails to do so. Violence essentially erodes trust in situations of uncertainty. For example, during the Oslo Peace Process, violent non-state actors on both sides impeded progress (Thomson, 2013). Yitzhak Rabin's assassination at the hands of Yigal Amir, a far-right Jewish activist, had a significant impact on the progress of talks, while Hamas' suicide attacks had a similarly chilling effect. Importantly, the repercussions of these events continue to resonate in Israel and Palestine today, perhaps most obviously in the shape of the 'separation barrier' which, its architects argue, was erected to prevent such attacks.

Developing our understanding of the role moderate and extreme movement factions have in determining the consequences of peace negotiations, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2005) set out an explanation of the pattern of violence that surrounds peace deals. Because more moderate wings are often the ones to make peace agreements, extreme actors, less likely to be satisfied with the outcome of negotiations, establish control of the militant wing, thereby prolonging

violence. Moreover, because governments are motivated to secure the counterterrorism support of former militants turned negotiating partners, they are more likely to agree to concessions. As a result, de Mesquita argues, where this series of interactions develops, two patterns of violence are likely to emerge. Concessions with moderate factions can lead to an initial increase in violence, however this is likely to be relatively short-lived. Once former militants are persuaded of the government's trustworthiness, their collaboration supports the state's counterterrorism response to those militants that rejected the peace process. In more recent work on the organisational determinants and effects of spoiling behaviour, Brian Phillips (2015) argued that intra-field rivalry informs organisational outcomes. In unified movements, spoiling interferes with peace processes, prolonging conflict and extending organisational longevity.

Finally, and in perhaps the most comprehensive account of the spoiling effect of terrorism, Michael Findley and Joseph Young (2015) looked at terrorism's impact across several decades of data on civil war. Even relatively marginal actors, beyond the primary state–opponent dyad, were found to have the capacity to disrupt peace processes. Moreover, terrorism both extended the duration of wars and increased the chances that conflict would restart. Such accounts demonstrate the importance of looking at the impact of violence over time and considering the effects of terrorism on ongoing processes of political contention. Doing so again draws attention to the impact of terrorism on prolonging and exacerbating conflict.

Intimidation

A core component of terrorism is instilling fear. Intimidation or coercion can operate via different mechanisms, either through prompting the population to exert pressure on the government to concede to militant demands, by enforcing compliance from the local population, or by signalling to the government, and its supporters, the costs of not agreeing to their demands (Kydd & Walter, 2006). One of the most often-cited examples of terrorism's coercive power is the Madrid train bombings in March 2004. Three days after the attack, Spain went to the polls and elected the Socialist Party, which had campaigned for a withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Prior to the attack, the incumbent Popular Party was ahead in the polls, and the bombing has been considered crucial to their electoral failure (Rose, Murphy, & Abrahms, 2007). However, a number of studies demonstrate that the relationship between the attack and a change in government was not straightforward (Bali, 2007; Michavila, 2005). Voters' intentions were informed not only by the Socialist Party's policies in relation to the 'war on terror' but by the record and response of the incumbents to the attack. More specifically, by continuing to blame ETA for the attack, even after their denial of responsibility, the government lost support and were ultimately punished by the electorate. Moreover, the incumbent party were losing support even before the attack. In the wake of the bombing, and against this backdrop, many more people – up to 1.7 million – were motivated to vote than might otherwise have been expected (Michavila, 2005). Rather than the sole stark fact of experiencing a catastrophic terrorist attack, a collection of factors informed the ultimate outcome of the election.

Looking at the Israeli case, a series of studies have demonstrated the impact of terrorism on electoral outcomes and support for concessions. Although it's a complex picture, terrorism around elections tends to increase support for the right-wing bloc (Berrebi & Klor, 2008). However, this effect is most acute where the violence actually takes place; interestingly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) found an increase in support for left bloc parties where violence occurred outside the voter's local area. A similar picture emerges when assessing the threat of violence, with increased support for the right-wing in Israel in areas within range of rockets from Gaza (Getmansky & Zeitoff, 2014). Drawing further attention to the importance of the local nature

of the effects of violence, Gould and Klor (2010) show that local attacks increase support for territorial concessions in favour of the Palestinians. These were subject to an upper – and rarely met – threshold of violence, beyond which support dropped, leading them to conclude that 'terror attacks appear to be strategically effective in coercing Israelis to support territorial concessions' (p. 1463).

Evidence from the Palestinian perspective suggests that violence enacted by Israel has a similar effect of moving people to support more hard-line political actors (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, & Paserman, 2012). However, this effect was short-lived. Within three months, more moderate attitudes prevailed. Interestingly, David Jaeger and his colleagues found evidence of longer-term determinants of attitudes to the conflict. Those that grew up at the time of the Oslo peace talks were more moderate in their political views compared with those who were teenagers during the First Intifada, an interesting finding that draws attention to both the long-term impacts of political violence and the need to understand the wider social and historical context of contention.

Attrition

Described as perhaps the most important strategy of terrorism, attrition works by persuading an opponent that an aggressor has sufficient resolve and capacity to exert substantial costs if their demands are not met (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Here, militant actors use terrorism to target the will, rather than the capacity of their opponent, something long recognised as important in securing more substantive war aims (Clausewitz, 1997). Although we've already seen that terrorism is generally unable to achieve significant policy goals, looking at lower order concessions, it is possible to see some benefits of terrorism as a strategy of attrition. Recent research looking at terrorism's capacity to progress lower order political goals has considered the impact of civilian targeting on the likelihood rebel groups are invited to participate in negotiations (Thomas, 2014). Thomas' conclusions suggest terrorism can be an effective tool in coercing governments to talk. The more oppositional groups target civilians in civil wars, the greater the chance they will be invited to negotiate, and the more concessions they are liable to extract in the following months. It will be important to learn the extent to which these findings are applicable to the wider universe of groups which use violence, including those outside civil wars. Audrey Kurth-Cronin's (2009) analysis of 457 groups found that fewer than 18 per cent engaged in negotiations. Equally, most of the negotiations that did take place in Kurth-Cronin's study did not achieve a final resolution, with only around a third of talks actually producing a peace agreement. It seems that while it is possible that violence can precipitate shorter term objectives, such as securing a seat at the negotiating table, this does not necessarily support achievement of long-term political goals.

In addition to larger-scale studies, there are important case studies demonstrating how the will to fight was eroded by terrorism. In a careful and rigorous study of Jewish violence during the time of the British mandate in Palestine, Bruce Hoffman (2015) demonstrates the power of violence in prompting the British withdrawal. It is a case that demonstrates the three factors Kydd and Walter (2006) argue are important in determining whether terrorism will be successful. First, the state's interest in the issue was declining. The economic impact of the Second World War at home, pressure from America, and a growing feeling their presence in Palestine was counterproductive meant there was less and less political will to sustain the mandate. Second, there were constraints on the extent to which they were able to retaliate against the Jewish violence. Although some terrible acts of violence and torture were perpetrated by the British, they were unable to sustain a consistent enough

regime of repression to wipe out the resistance. Finally, there was increasing sensitivity to the costs of violence, in particular the King David Hotel bombing and the murder of two British police sergeants, the picture of whose bloodied bodies hanging in an olive grove caused revulsion in the UK. Together, these factors combined to persuade the British to withdraw, and they are an important example of the circumstances under which terrorism can be effective.

Conclusion

It seems that while terrorism may be able to secure lower-order political outcomes, it is generally a losing long-term strategy, which begs the question, why, given its low success rate, does terrorism continue to be used? Three explanations seem possible. First, militants simply don't know that terrorism is unlikely to secure political gains. Given the position of uncertainty most political contention takes place in, alongside the limits on human decision-making, militant leaders are unable to accurately assess the likelihood of achieving political gains. Indeed, one suggestion is that leaders overestimate their chances of success by drawing inappropriate analogies from guerrilla campaigns which are typically far more effective (Abrahms & Lula, 2012). Cognitive biases such as group polarisation, emotional reactions, or the physical limitations of engaging in risky, violent contention are all liable to influence the ability to reach adequate conclusions about the chances of success (Berrebi, 2009; Davis & Cragin, 2009).

On the other hand, if terrorism is seen as the last resort of a weak and desperate actor, it may be the only option available to them, or at least it may be seen as more economical than selective violence (Kalyvas, 2004). However, Abrahms (2008) contends that terrorism is rarely used as a last resort, often being used where alternative political strategies exist. Moreover, as Kalyvas (2004) has argued, terrorism may be more likely early on in a conflict where resources are limited, with armed non-state actors switching to more discriminate, and effective, forms of violence as a civil war progresses. Even taking account of the dynamic nature of militant group behaviour, the capacity of terrorism to achieve lower order goals may mean it remains an attractive strategy for weaker actors even in the face of longer-term political failure. If complete success is unlikely, violence remains able to secure some strategic benefits, whether that is in provoking opponents, pressing for negotiations, upsetting peace deals, or competing with rivals. Beyond this, we need to know much more about the large numbers of militant groups that join the political process. Whether or not these count as successes demands careful examination, as it seems likely that a good many of them progress political goals as part of mainstream politics.

Finally, we may be asking the wrong questions: political outcomes may not be the most appropriate measure of interpreting what violence seeks to achieve. While the strategic model is the dominant approach used to understand the demands of those who use terrorism, many have recognised the importance of terrorism's expressive nature (Merari, 1993). For example, showing support for a particular political outcome rather than necessarily trying to achieve it (Lomasky, 1991), acting out of vengeance or anger (Merari, 1993; Schelling, 1991), and encompassing the symbolic, performative, and communicative nature of the violence (Coker, 2008). Ultimately, expressive and instrumental functions of terrorism are both likely to be important (Crenshaw, 1995; McCauley, 2002). Reflecting the complex, non-unitary nature of militant groups, there is also increasing recognition of the importance of organisational factors and the complex ways in which political and group outcomes interact (Krause, 2014). If, as Martha Crenshaw (1988) has argued, group survival is a central part of violent contention, it is possible, at least in some cases,

that this supersedes pursuing strategic goals, and that militants ultimately prioritise affective ties over political success (Abrahms, 2008).

While progress is being made in interpreting terrorism's outcomes, if we are to further our understanding of the effectiveness of terrorism, it seems necessary to make a number of adjustments in the way we account for outcomes. The first shift is to look beyond bald measures of success and failure. Terrorism is used for different reasons, to different ends, at different times in political campaigns. It is not, as Charles Tilly (2005) reminded us, a causally coherent phenomenon. It is a form of violence which encompasses a range of more or less specified goals, which can change over time, and differ across levels of analysis. Analysis of political violence is likely to reap the rewards of looking across political, organisational, social, and cultural effects. It will be important, therefore, to move beyond simplistic arguments about whether or not terrorism 'works' to ask more nuanced questions about how and why terrorism produces particular outcomes.

Second, the most convincing studies of terrorism's outcomes demonstrate the importance of context, be that in terms of socio-cultural history, the wider political opportunity structure, or interaction with others in the movement field. However, we need to learn more about how organisational and political factors interact, and the mechanisms by which intra- and inter-movement rivalry and cooperation inform outcomes. In understanding the effect the wider context has on contention, it is important to carefully examine the role of the state in creating the context from which violence emerges (Goodwin, 2011). Be that because of state policies and the way they shape public opinion or in the way states can sometimes encourage violence to further their own political ends (Keen, 2012). For example, with respect to spoilers, Greenhill and Major argue that 'the type of spoiler does not determine the kinds of outcomes that are possible; instead, the kinds of outcomes that are possible determine the type of spoiler that may emerge at any given time' (2007, p. 8). Similarly, with respect to outbidding, it is the shape of the oppositional movement that determines the scope for intra- and inter-faction competition.

Finally, it is important to take account of the dynamic nature of political violence. With a few exceptions – most notably Jakana Thomas' (2014) use of monthly data – studies generally assess outcomes at discrete moments in time. Recent work has begun to look at the dynamic nature of violence (e.g. Findley & Young, 2015), but it remains necessary to understand better the impact of violence and strategic interactions over time. For example, Fortna (2015) and Phillips (2015) both found that terrorism has the effect of prolonging conflict, which speaks to terrorism's impact on sustaining wider patterns of violence and the importance of understanding how terrorism is situated in cycles of contention.

More detailed comparative work will help develop our understanding of all of these factors. While valuable, large-scale comparative studies are less well-equipped to examine the detail of causal processes and face a range of methodological challenges, including the distance between theorised and proxy constructs and a sometimes weak analytical foundation (Kalyvas, 2008), a number of scholars have brought significant insight to our knowledge of particular movements through smaller-scale comparative work. For example, Peter Krause's (2014) research on the Palestinian and Algerian national movements, and Lorenzo Bosi and Donatella della Porta's (forthcoming) study comparing the Provisional IRA and Italian left-wing groups, develop valuable explanations about the mechanisms implicated in producing particular outcomes. Looking across different types of groups, using a broader range of outcome measure, understanding how differing forms of political violence interact, and looking beyond the strategic model to develop a more sophisticated account for interpreting terrorism's effects will all be important parts of the research agenda moving forward.

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16

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

Mikel Buesa and Thomas Baumert

Introduction

Studies regarding the economic repercussion of terrorism have gained—especially after the attacks of 9/11 (Neumayer, 2004:262)—wide attention from scholars and policymakers, both from the input (terrorist financing) and the output (economic consequences of terrorism) side. And while in the aftermath of 9/11 the economic repercussions of those attacks still tended to be broadly overestimated, after more than one-and-a-half decades of monographic studies it has become possible to obtain a sharper and more precise image about how terrorist actions affect the economy. Thus, in the present chapter we give an overview of the current state of the art regarding the economic impact of terrorism differentiating two scenarios: (a) single or isolated terrorist events of a certain magnitude and (b) countries or regions which suffer terrorist attacks over an extended period of time. In addition, the question about terrorist incomes and its sources will be briefly reviewed, as practice has proven that cutting off a terrorist group's financial income represents a crucial aspect of any effective counterterrorist policy.

The starting point for this study is the definition of terrorism as a sort of economic war aimed to economically and psychologically erode its opponent (Buesa, 2005; Baumert 2008, 2010). This definition fits in the context of terrorism as a "predatory war model" as presented by Buesa (2010). In other words, from an economist's point of view, terrorism might be understood as a form of political action, exerted by a certain organization, consisting of the systematic use of violence against people and property, as a means of achieving the public's support for their cause, not by ideological persuasion, but through fear. The terrorist's final goal is to undermine the will of citizens and of the State to the point of forcing them to accept their demands.

Thus, for example, in the case of 9/11—without doubt the most iconic "single terrorist event" of the present century—it seems clear that Al-Qaeda soon realized the economic dimension of the attacks against the World Trade Center as an action aimed precisely at the financial core of the U.S. economy, being well-aware not only of the psychological impact that it would cause to the world but especially the economic repercussions that it would imply for the U.S.

economy. In this sense, it might be worth quoting in length an original speech of Osama bin Laden recorded three years after 9/11:

> We [Al-Qaeda] are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy… We, alongside the mujahideen… using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition… bled Russia for 10 years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat… Every dollar of Al-Qaeda defeated a million dollars, by the permission of Allah, besides the loss of a huge number of jobs… As for the economic deficit, it has reached record astronomical numbers estimated to total more than a trillion dollars. … And it all shows that the real loser… is the American people and their economy.[1]

Measuring the economic impact of terrorism: a review

As has been already stated above, when studying the economic impact of terrorism, it is necessary to distinguish between two main cases: (a) single or isolated terrorist events of a certain magnitude (such as 9/11, or the Madrid,[2] London, Mumbai and—although to a much less extent—the Boston bombings) and (b) countries or regions which suffer terrorist attacks, even if on a lesser scale, continuously during an extended period of time (such as the cases of Ireland, Spain, Israel, Colombia and Turkey). Usually the former will be related to transnational terrorism with an Islamic background, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS,[3] while the latter will be linked to nationalist/separatist groups (IRA, ETA, PKK) or to politically-orientated (mostly left-wing) terrorism, such as the Colombian FARC.[4] Despite the fact that single attacks of a great magnitude might have an important direct economic impact, only rarely will they have a significant effect on aggregate demand; it is only through a persistent terrorist campaign that lasting economic damage might be obtained.[5]

Direct impact

So far, 9/11 has been the most profusely studied case of terrorist attack regarding its direct economic impact (among others, by IMF, 2001; Navarro and Spencer, 2001; Hobjin, 2002; GAO, 2002 and Lenain *et al.*, 2002). Although there are small differences between the costs accounted for by the different studies, there is a certain consensus that at least the following ones have to be included: the value of the human losses, the value of the goods destroyed, the expenditure for rescue and recovery, the costs of attending the injured (both psychological and physical), the temporary attention of those who have become homeless due to the attack and the impact on business, including temporarily closures and the drop in sales (Valiño *et al.*, 2010:16).[6] Considering these costs, the above-mentioned authors have estimated an overall direct impact of 9/11 of at least $47 billion (0.46 percent of the national GDP), broken down as follows: $14 billion for the private sector, $1.5 billion for public, state and local firms, $0.7 billion for the federal Government and around $11 billion for rescue and clean-up operations (shared between public and private enterprises). The other $20 billion would correspond to compensation to the victims, although Dixon and Stern (2004) have estimated this cost as up to $38 billion.[7] Following a similar approach, the impact of the Islamic Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004, resulted in a loss of almost €212 million (0.03 of GDP, see for the details Buesa *et al.*, 2007) and of £44 million[8] (0.02 percent of GDP) in the London bombings on July 7, 2005.[9] Actually, the City soon recovered and there was nearly no disruption of business, partly due to the fact of having already learnt to deal with terrorist attacks two decades before (cf. LCCI, 2005).

Box 16.1 Problems to be dealt with when measuring the direct costs of a terrorist attack

The first direct cost from it that has to be evaluated is that regarding human losses, either death or injury. Of course, the best way to do so would consist of estimating the loss of human capital due to terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, in most cases it is not possible to apply the human factor estimation as there is no—or not enough—information about the exact number of injured and of their professional qualification. Hence, an alternative approach has occasionally proved to be successful, consisting of using the compensations paid by the State to victims for the harm suffered as a proxy for the human capital lost.

Another sort of direct cost of terrorism is that of the physical damage caused by their attacks. A complete accounting of this destruction is quite difficult, although it might be safely estimated by means of the payment from insurance and compensation companies. Nevertheless, even in a case like 9/11, these figures may vary significantly, depending on whether the attacks on the Twin Towers were considered as one single attack or two separate ones (in the latter case, the maximum amount to be paid doubles).

Finally, the costs related to the care of the victims are usually easy to obtain from public and private institutions, although there has to be a certain lapse of time passed before the long-term costs of the victim's attention might be accurately estimated.

In general, the direct economic impact of terrorist groups that maintain a more or less continuous activity in a given territory is even more difficult to estimate accurately than those of singular attacks, due to the lack of reliable data as one goes back in the time series. Nevertheless, several studies allow us to give a conservative—that is, a minimum—value of the direct economic impact caused by terrorism in Ireland, Spain and Colombia. Applying the proxy-method described in Box 16.1, Jackson *et al.* (2007) have calculated a total direct cost of £1,192 million (in 1982 purchasing power parity) for Northern Ireland (with an additional £32 million for the Republic of Ireland). Regarding ETA, Buesa (2011) has calculated, for the period spanning from 1987 to 2010, a direct cost of €1,804.8 million (of which €447.6 million corresponds to material costs). For the Colombian case, Trujillo and Badel (1998) have estimated for 1991–1996 a total direct cost of 4,502.4 million pesos, while Pinto *et al.* (2005) obtained for 1999–2003 a total direct repercussion of at least 3,302 million pesos. It seems reasonable to compare these figures, although there is little empirical literature on this topic. As we have seen, the direct costs that the terrorism by ETA has meant for the Basque Country, in annual terms, is the equivalent to around 1.2 percent of its GDP between 1993 and 2002 and of ca. 0.9 percent between 2003 and 2010. Actually, this figure very much coincides with the one calculated for the case of Colombia for the period 1995–2003, where according to Pinto *et al.* (2005:21–22), the impact caused by the FARC on the economic growth of that country rose to 1.2 percent of the national GDP per year.

The indirect costs of terrorism

Repercussions on national and foreign direct investment

Terrorism, as has previously been stated, can significantly affect the functioning of an economy as soon as it becomes a persistent, enduring factor. It is then that the accumulation of violent acts generates a climate of insecurity which negatively affects consumers and businessmen, reducing

their expectations and altering their economic behaviour, inducing them, for example, to delay the acquisition of durable assets or alter their specific consuming habits. This question has been studied extensively in the case of the Basque Country regarding ETA. Thus, for example, Enders and Sandler (1991), analysed the repercussions that ETA's terrorist campaigns against assets and infrastructures of the tourist sector have had on tourist behaviour. Reviewing the flow of foreign visitors to Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, the authors conclude that these campaigns resulted in a reduction of 2.6 percent in the number of tourists who visited Spain, and who, instead, opted for more secure destinations for their holidays.[10]

Violence is always perceived negatively by investors regarding business opportunities and thus, even if it does not exclusively affect their decisions, it does certainly influence it negatively. In fact, an inquiry conducted in 2003 among big and medium-sized businesses of the Basque Country showed that the main determinants pointed out by investors were the economic indicators, the impact of the terrorist attacks, the *kale boroka*[11] and the political uncertainty regarding the future of the Basque Country. And for three out of 10 of these businesses, the factors "terrorism" and "political uncertainty" had in fact conditioned their decision of delocalization of their business facilities outside the Basque Countries (Buesa *et al.*, 2004:113–118).

This inverted relation between terrorism and investment has also been studied regarding the entrance to Spain of foreign direct investment. Hence, there is evidence that during the period 1975 and 1991, and due to the presence of terrorism, the net foreign investment in Spain diminished 13.5 percent per year, causing an accumulated loss that went from €1,800 million at the beginning of the 1980s to €3,000 million at the end of that decade (Enders and Sandler, 1996). More recent research, which studied the specific case of the Basque Country between 1987 and 1997, confirmed the negative effect that ETA terrorism had had on FDI (Barrios and Strobl, 2003). This would explain the abnormally low levels of investment in that region of Spain (Fernández-Otheo, 2004:146). On average, according to Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), an increase in one standard deviation of a country's terrorist risk is associated with a 5 percent fall (in terms of GDP) of foreign investment.

Potential loss of GDP and human relocation

One significant repercussion of persistent terrorist activity is that, through a reduction of investment, of consumer's confidence and of consumption it gives rise to contraction, which reduces economic growth. Evaluating the size of this reduction requires a contra-factual analysis that allows real GDP to be compared with the potential one that an economy might have reached in the absence of terrorism. The pioneer study of this sort was presented by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) for the Basque Country (later replicated by Myro *et al.*, 2004). Both agree in considering that, from the mid-1970s on, the growth-path of the Basque economy drifted away from its potential one of around 10 percent (8 percent in the estimation of Myro *et al.*, 2004), thus opening an increasing gap between the values actually reached and the ones it might have registered if terrorism had not significantly affected its running. According to the estimations presented by Buesa (2011), the Basque Country between 1975 and 2010 grew at a pace of 1.9 percent per year while, in the absence of terrorism, it might have done so at 2.5 percent per year. This means that the region potentially lost a mean annual growth of 0.6 percent, a figure similar to the one obtained by Bilgel and Karahasan (2017) of 6.6 percent in Anatolia from 1988 to 2001. Yet, it is lower than the one estimated by Cotte Poveda (2006:219) for Colombia, who considered it to be of 2.5 percent per year and the up to 10 percent GDP reduction obtained by Dorsett (2013) for the case of Northern Ireland.[12] Similarly, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), studying the case of the second Intifada, affirm that during the three years that it lasted, Israel's

GDP per annum presented a 10–15 percent gap regarding its potential one in the absence of terrorism. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008 and 2009), working with a huge dataset of countries, have concluded that, generally speaking, the impact of terrorism on economic growth is more severe in underdeveloped countries than in developed ones (a conclusion also shared, more recently, by Meierrieks and Gries, 2012).

But the effects of a persistent terrorist activity in a region are not only reflected in its economic growth but also in human relocation. Thus, according to the New Ireland Forum (1983), between 1971 and 1981, Northern Ireland suffered a net departure of 8,000 people per year. Similarly, from the end of the 1960s onwards, a continuous flow of persons related to the business sector, as well as other professionals and qualified workers, left the Basque Country—constricted by the impact of violence and, more specifically by the threat and extortion of businesspeople—for other regions of Spain in an attempt to flee the insecurity and threat that terrorism imposed upon their lives. This "diaspora" is difficult to quantify precisely, although (according to data of the Population Census of the Basque Country) it can be estimated at around 125,000 people, roughly one-third of those who emigrated from the region from 1975 to the early 21st century.[13] Again, cities which have "only" suffered single attacks, albeit of significant magnitude, seem to be more resilient, with no significant outward flows of people (Blomberg and Sheppard, 2007; cf. also Coaffee, 2009).

Impact on financial markets

Financial markets are the first—after a period of initial shock, where there is a predominance of exaggerated reactions as a result of uncertainty (Chen and Siems, 2004:39)—to absorb and transform the news of a terrorist attack into economic information, efficiently incorporating it into share prices, so that these reflect almost immediately the expectations as to future performances of these shares (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005:4). Thus, it is no wonder that, together with the easy availability of reliable data, the stock market's reaction to terrorist attacks has become the most frequent type of study regarding the economic impact of terrorism.[14]

Again, for the immediate impact to become medium-term, there will have to be a series of attacks or, at least, the financial agents will have to believe that this is probably going to happen. In other words, the impact of single terrorist events on stock markets is unnoticeable in the long term. Markets get used to terrorist actions and rapidly recover from their effects.[15] Uncertainty is thus transferred to the derivatives market, which by means of the risk premium assesses long-term instability. In this sense, share prices and the evolution of stock market indexes are a good source of information about the economic impact of terrorism both overall and sectoral,[16] since they reflect both companies' profit expectations and the likelihood seen by investors as to these being achieved. According to Frey *et al.* (2004:13), terrorist attacks influence both.

One question often discussed in this context is the possibility that terrorists might use their "insider information" about the attacks they are going to perpetrate not just to finance them, but to obtain large profits from them which might be used in maintaining the infrastructure of the organization in question (Baumert, 2009, 2010), playing the markets on derivatives. Interestingly, on April 23, shortly after the Boston Marathon bombings, the Associated Press's (AP) Twitter account was hacked and a false "tweet" was published which read: "Breaking: Two explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured." This one fake tweet, which could be viewed by the two million people who follow the news agency's Twitter account, caused the Dow Jones Industrial Average to drop by 145 points within minutes of the news. To put that into perspective, the Dow Jones lost around 265 points on the day of the real bombings. This example shows that financial markets will in future be much more vulnerable (either directly or, as in this case, indirectly, through social media, etc.) to cyberterrorist attacks than to physical ones.

The costs of protection

In order to fully evaluate the indirect costs of terrorism, a last point that has to be accounted for: that related to the implementation of additional security measures. Obviously, after any attack, the first reaction is to increase both public and private expenditure to prevent any new threats. Again, this activity will be twofold, consisting of specific measures (such as installing armored doors with additional security systems on airplanes' cockpit doors after 9/11, or forbidding any liquids in hand-luggage after a failed attempt to detonate liquid explosives during a flight, costs that have been estimated to have reached $5 billion per year and airline passengers one additional hour per trip, an enormous opportunity cost) and general ones (such as implementing additional CCTV, creating new antiterrorist squads, hiring private personal security and body guards, costs of imprisonment of terrorists, among others). In a broad sense, the latter would also include international military actions, such as the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, if considered preemptive actions to prevent future attacks. This being the case, the indirect costs of terrorism obviously skyrocket to enormous figures, such as the $3 trillion estimated by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), which explains the total cost of $3.3 trillion originated by 9/11 calculated by the *New York Times*.[17] The bulk of this does not correspond to the terrorist attack, but to the nation's military response to it. In the case of the IRA, the estimated costs due to additional security measures were estimated by Jackson *et al.* (2007) at around £9,826 million.[18] Similarly, Buesa (2011:162) calculated that the cost due to additional protection reached €697.4 million per year between 1993 and 2002 and €681.6 million per year for the period 2003–2008. The counterterrorist actions carried out by the Colombian military total 600 million pesos per year between 1991 and 1996, according to Trujillo and Badel (1998), while for the period 1999–2003, Pinto *et al.* (2005) calculated an annual cost of ca. 2,641.6 million pesos. However, calculating the costs due to additional security measures is a tricky matter, as from a strictly economic point of view it requires balancing the opportunity costs of moving input from other sectors to the security one with the growth induced in this sector by the additional input, a task that requires weighing the multiplier effects of the former against those of the latter.

How much money do the terrorist groups handle?

Measuring the money handled by terrorist groups is a complicated matter, as the police forces seldom manage to capture their bookkeeping, as occurred with the Basque terrorist group ETA in 1986.[19] Usually their accountancy is only revealed after the terrorist group has broken up or a part of it has been exposed and their computers seized. Summarizing the existing studies, mostly based on information made public by judicial institutions, it is possible to conclude that the most relevant inflow of funds for nationalist terrorists have traditionally been those derived from extortion (including the so-called "revolutionary taxes") and kidnapping. These criminal activities are sporadically accompanied by the theft of arms and explosives (Valiño *et al.* 2010:14). International terrorism has also used other illegal methods, such as forged credit cards and money online fraud (both through "skimming" and cyber-attacks on financial institutions). Crime and terrorism also join together on occasions with drug trafficking: the cocaine trade finances terrorism in Colombia and Peru, while in Afghanistan the main drug traded is opium. An additional source of income for many terrorist groups is transfers made either by political parties related to the terrorists or by charities, such as the nonprofit Muslim organization Holy Land Foundation for Aid and Development, found guilty by a judge in the U.S. of illegal financing of the extremist Palestinian group Hamas. Similarly, it has been proved that an important part of ETA's income came from its (legal) political branch and from related "cultural" and charity associations. However, it has to be pointed out that, in most cases, the money handled by terrorist groups is relatively small. For example, the economic

inflows obtained by ETA only represent a minimal fraction of the overall Basque economy (Buesa and Baumert, 2013, 2014). Between 1993 and 2002 it only meant 0.07 percent of the Gross Domestic Product of that region, and during the period of 2003 to 2010 it slightly exceeded 0.01 percent of GDP.[20] This value very much coincides with the ones obtained in previous studies referring to other terrorist groups: In the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, Byman *et al.* (2001:49–50) estimated an annual expenditure of $50 million at the early 2000s, a sum that corresponds to 0.31 percent of Sri Lanka's GDP. Regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the estimations made for the 1980s gave an amount of $400 million (Kiser, 2005:39). For the Irish Republic Army (IRA), sums between $9.8 and $22.5 million per year have been handled (Horgan and Taylor, 1999:9–10). In 1993, the Northern Ireland Office estimated the IRA's annual budget to reach $8 million, around 0.03 percent of Ireland's GDP (Kiser, 2005:52). And in 2002 the Police Services of Northern Ireland considered that the IRA had collected funds that amounted to between $7.7 and $12.3 million; roughly speaking, between 0.01 and 0.02 percent of the region's GDP (Evans, 2002:28). Concerning the Colombian experience, it has been estimated that the country's two main terrorist groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), had, between 1991 and 1996, incomes of 609.8 billion pesos per year (in 1995 ppp). This would approximately correspond to 0.88 percent of the Colombian GDP (Trujillo and Badel, 1998:31).

However, terrorist groups have shown themselves to be very resilient in adapting their financial networks and their means of income, so that it might be assumed that the availability of new sources of financing, such as cyber-attacks, might tend to increase the money managed by terrorist groups with the required know-how.

Conclusions

When studying the economics of terrorism, it is necessary to distinguish between low-frequency, high-intensity attacks and those groups who follow a high-frequency, low-intensity strategy. Only the former will have a significant, lasting and measurable negative effect on aggregate demand. The economic repercussions of terrorism can be divided into direct costs (human losses, physical damage and costs of attending the victims) and indirect costs (including effects on national investment and foreign direct investment, lost growth of GDP and human relocation, financial markets and, to a certain extent, the costs of additional security). From a sectoral point of view, the most vulnerable targets are the tourism and transportation industries, as they represent targets which at the same time offer a major economic repercussion and broad (international) media coverage. Having said this, the majority of studies show that most terrorist actions have a limited economic effect, which only rarely reaches one point of the affected countries' GDP, except when (erroneously) including the costs of foreign military actions such as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. At the same time, it is possible to conclude that terrorist groups handle a limited volume of money, and that cutting off these sources of income, however small they are, has proved to be a crucial measure of any effective counterterrorist policy. But it should also be borne in mind that cyberterrorism is growing as a new and more effective way of causing economic damage, e.g. producing significant speculative reactions in stock markets through false news published through hacked media accounts.

Finally, it has to be remembered that the costs of terrorism are reversible and that, when the struggle against the terrorist groups is successful and results in its disappearance, a true peace dividend emerges so that the affected economies—even after campaigns that may have lasted decades—do recuperate, and the wealth that their citizens had lost is recovered (cf. Gupta *et al.*, 2002; Santamaría *et al.*, 2013).

Notes

1 http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/01/binladen.tape/ [accessed September 14, 2015].
2 For a detailed analysis on how to evaluate all costs—including the political ones—related to a terrorist attack applied to the case of the 3/11 Madrid bombings, see the different works contained in Buesa and Baumert (eds) (2010).
3 The case of ISIS has to be really accounted in both categories, depending on whether they are acting outside of or within the borders of the territory they control.
4 However, these categories are not exclusive, as ETA does not only claim an independent, but also a Marxist–Leninist oriented Basque Country. Similarly, the terrorist attacks suffered by Israel might not only have a nationalist but also a religious motivation.
5 Actually, some authors argue that even the 2008 crisis is ultimately the result of 9/11, as the Federal Reserve Board of Governors' decision (supported by the European and Japanese central banks) to guarantee unlimited market liquidity in the aftermath of those attacks established, through an excess of cheap money, the basis for the subprime crisis. However, even if a certain connection between events might seem plausible, it is obvious that Al-Qaeda had not foreseen that reaction, so that it should not be considered to have any effects as a result of the attacks against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
6 Depending on the particular type of attack, additional costs might have to be added.
7 According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, the costs of 9/11 can be itemized as follows: the destruction of major buildings in the World Trade Center with a replacement cost of from $3 billion to $4.5 billion; damage to a portion of the Pentagon: up to $1 billion; cleanup costs: $1.3 billion; property and infrastructure damage: $10 billion to $13 billion; federal emergency funds (heightened airport security, sky marshals, government takeover of airport security, retrofitting aircraft with anti-terrorist devices, cost of operations in Afghanistan): $40 billion; direct job losses amounted to $17 billion in lost wages; the amount of damaged or unrecoverable property hit $21.8 billion; losses to the city of New York (lost jobs, lost taxes, damage to infrastructure, cleaning): $95 billion; losses to the insurance industry: $40 billion; loss of air traffic revenue: $10 billion. www.iags.org/costof911.html [accessed September 14, 2015].
8 Not including the £4.6 million cost of the inquests.
9 Unfortunately, there is no reliable information available for other major terrorist attacks such as the Mumbai bombings on November 26, 2008, although it might be assumed that the impact was of at least $150 million ($40 million for the restoration of the facilities and $110 of insurance).
10 The effects of these attacks lasted up to three years, although they presented the highest intensity after 11 months.
11 "Low-level terrorism" carried out by "street fighters" of ETA-related groups.
12 The author also concludes that in the absence of subsidies transferred to the region by the UK, the gap might actually be double.
13 Although never officially recognized by Israeli authorities, who are very reluctant to publish any information regarding emigration, there is some evidence that points towards the fact that during the second Intifada, there were for the first time more Israeli emigrants than immigrants (Valiño *et al.* 2010:20).
14 For an extensive review of these studies, see Baumert (2009, 2010) and Baumert *et al.* (2013).
15 Actually, the recovery time has continuously diminished from 44 trading sessions after 9/11, to 20 after 3/11 and just two after 7/7.
16 For the sectoral impact of terrorist attacks, see Valiño *et al.* (2010:22–23) and Heijs and Baumert (2010).
17 www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0 [accessed on September 14, 2015]. This would imply total costs for the U.S. of about $7 million for every dollar Al-Qaeda spent planning and executing the attacks—a figure that fits the ones estimated by bin Laden (see the quotation in the Introduction to this chapter).
18 The same authors give the costs of imprisonment of IRA members back in 1983 (the only year for which this information was available) as £56 million.
19 The so-called Sokoa papers, named after the French town where they were seized; even then, it is often difficult to make a very accurate estimation, as the boundaries between the operating nucleus of the terrorist group and that of its supporting (political) branch tend to be continuous and their financial flows often overlap.
20 It might be worth comparing the economic impact of ETA with its own economic size, that is, with the money handled by the terrorist group (as detailed in Buesa and Baumert, 2013). For the first period studied (1993–2002), the direct costs caused by ETA have exceeded 25 times the resources handled by

this terrorist group and its satellite organization. In the case of the indirect costs, this ratio even rises to 313 times the money handled by ETA. For the second period (2003–2010), these figures respectively amount to 87 times higher for the direct costs and 140 times higher for the indirect ones.

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17

FUNDRAISING, ORGANISED CRIME AND FINANCING TERRORISM

James Windle

Individual terrorist acts can be relatively cheap: ranging from a few hundred dollars for the Boston Bombing to US$50,000 for the Bali bombing and US$350,000–500,000 for 9/11 (FATF, 2008). Running a terrorist organisation can, however, be expensive, especially if a group engages in a prolonged campaign or assumes state functions in areas under their authority.

This chapter will explore how terrorism is financed, and it begins by investigating the five most widely used methods of raising funds. A theme running through this section is that many sources of funding provide additional, non-monetary rewards. The chapter then reviews how terrorist financing has adapted to counter-measures and globalisation. As organised crime[1] can be important for financial, symbolic and operational goals, the chapter then interrogates the relationship between terrorism and organised crime by exploring Makarenko's crime–terror continuum. This section concludes by challenging the belief that ideology prevents the formation of alliances between criminals and terrorists, or the development of hybrid crime/terror groups.

The five main funding streams

There are five main sources of finance open to terrorists:

1 Legitimate investments
2 State sponsorship
3 Donations/extortion
4 Charities
5 Crime.

As much terrorist financing requires legitimate businesses, and some activities blur the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate, the five sources of income should not be viewed as distinct types, but rather as sitting upon a spectrum from fully legitimate to fully illegitimate (see Windle, 2013). For example, smuggling can be undertaken by boat captains or truck drivers employed in legitimate industries; while a range of legitimate companies can provide fronts for extortion, money laundering or acquisition of resources such as chemicals, explosives or arms.

The type of funding source used can depend on: opportunities, group size, members' skills (Asal *et al.*, 2014), law enforcement priorities, competition, start-up costs (Picarelli and Shelley, 2007) and ideological and political considerations. While many groups choose activities which do not require special skills or large start-up costs, larger and more sophisticated groups may possess the human and financial resources to develop larger and more sophisticated activities (Croissant and Barlow, 2007). Opportunities can be presented by geography, existing markets and members' skills and positions in social networks. The PKK's involvement in heroin distribution, for example, resulted from Turkey's geographical position on a traditional smuggling route linking South Asian opium fields to Europe, coupled with logistical support provided by large numbers of members and sympathisers living across Europe (Roth and Sever, 2007).

Legitimate investments

The 'most resilient and well-organized' terrorist groups diversify into legitimate business (Passas, 2007:25). Hezbollah, for example, claim that the majority of their income comes from their own investment portfolio (Levitt, 2007). Legitimate sources can be low-risk, non-suspicious and difficult to trace (Napoleoni, 2007). They can serve two additional purposes. First, they can hide and move money from other sources (i.e. donations or criminal activity) (Comras, 2007). Second, they can provide operational assistance. For example: manufacturing plants can obtain explosive precursor chemicals; import companies can facilitate arms smuggling; and media companies can spread propaganda (and attract donations) (Philippone, 2012; Roth and Severe, 2007). Furthermore, the provision of fee-paying public goods (Kambere *et al.*, 2012) and employment (Ryder, 2009) can strengthen a group's political capital.

The choice of legitimate investment will depend upon the start-up capital and skills available to the group. Primarily working-class Irish paramilitaries, for example, ran traditional working-class enterprises such as pubs, building firms and taxi hire companies (see Ryder, 2009; Silke, 2000; also Comras, 2007).

State support

States can support terrorists by providing training and logistical support, equipment and weapons, or cash (Levitt, 2007). While state support has declined since the end of the Cold War, a small number of groups continue to enjoy the benefits. The most commonly cited contemporary relationship is between Iran and Hezbollah (Levitt, 2007; Philippone, 2012), with an estimated annual donation of US$100 (Freeman, 2012). Other relatively recent alleged cases include Pakistan's support of Lashkar-e-Taiban (LeT) (Kambere *et al.*, 2012) and Syria's logistical and financial support to the PKK which ended when Turkey threatened military action in 1998 (Ruehsen, 2012). While sponsorship can be very profitable, states can be fickle, and conflicts of interest can arise (Giraldo and Trinkus, 2007; Freeman, 2012).

Donations/extortion

Donations from individuals and groups have been an element of funding in 'virtually every conflict' (Passas, 2007:25). For example, US$6 million was raised by the sale of bonds in America and Ireland to fund the IRA during the War of Independence (1919–21) (Gantt, 2010). Donations can come from legitimate and illegitimate actors (Rollins *et al.*, 2010) and can be lucrative: a 20 per cent tax levied by Hezbollah on Lebanese businesses in the Tri-Border area of South America (Picarelli and Shelley, 2007) annually generated an estimated US$10 million (Levitt,

2007). While local and expatriate communities have been a traditional source of donations, the Internet is becoming an increasingly important means of attracting a wider range of donors (Comras, 2007; UN Security Council, 2014a).

The boundary between donation and extortion can be blurred (see Windle, 2013). Some in a community may voluntarily donate, while others are coerced. Former PKK European fundraisers, for example, explained how they would ask families in ex-patriot communities to annually buy a magazine subscription and donate one months' salary. Businesses would be asked to pay 'insurance fees'. While many sympathetic businesses chose to pay extra, some businesses and families were coerced (Ruehsen, 2012; also Swaine, 2013). The Provisional IRA (PIRA) used the common organised crime method of extorting pubs and clubs by coercing them to employ their private security firms to work the door (Horgan and Taylor, 1999; see Windle, 2013). Coercion has ranged from Hezbollah spreading rumours that uncooperative business people were Israeli spies (Lombardi and Sanchez, 2007) to Irish paramilitaries following-up implied threats with destruction of property, physical violence (Silke, 1998) and kidnapping (Horgan and Taylor, 1999).

Extortion can backfire. FARC were pushed from some areas of Colombia after landowners resisted extortion attempts by providing funds and operational support to opposition paramilitaries (Giraldo and Trinkus, 2007; also Horgan and Taylor, 1999). While extortion by Al-Qaeda in Iraq motivated some influential tribes to cooperate with coalition forces (Bahney *et al.*, 2010). If, however, a percentage of the funds are reinvested back into the community, then extortion/donations can strengthen political capital (Giraldo and Trinkus, 2007).

Donations and extortion can also play symbolic roles. Voluntary donations signpost legitimacy within a community (Freeman, 2012), whereas extortion is essentially a group asserting its right to tax. Furthermore, providing donors or the extorted public goods, such as healthcare or protection, indicates the group's capacity to perform state functions. Extortion can also be used as a weapon of terror. ISIL, for example, demanded Christians in Iraq and Syria convert to Islam, face the death penalty or pay a tax (U.N. Security Council, 2014a).

Charities

The use of charities has a long history. In the early-twentieth century, funds from U.S. charities destined for humanitarian work in Ireland were diverted by the IRA while sham charities were created as fronts to smuggle arms from America to Ireland (Gantt, 2010). While some have argued that charities have become less active since 9/11 (Picarelli and Shelley, 2007), FATF (2014) consider them to remain a significant source.

Charities can be 'victims of infiltration and abuse' if funds are diverted without the charities' knowledge (Comras, 2007:123; FATF, 2014; Passas, 2007; Levitt, 2007). For example, in 2011, US$23,000 was fraudulently diverted from Muslim Aid by members of a terrorist cell working as street collectors (FATF, 2014). Some charities are, however, created and administered by terrorist groups (FATF, 2014) or supporters of particular groups or causes. Their support may be public. For example, charities linked, respectively, to LeT and PIRA, passed around collection boxes at social gatherings (see Horgan and Taylor, 1999; Kambere *et al.*, 2012). Such charities can range in size and sophistication (Comras, 2007) and can be linked to one group or a variety of groups supportive of the charities' religious or ideological agenda (Levitt, 2007).

Charities can also be used to hide the origins of donations to protect businesses and individuals, and move money (Levitt, 2007; Lombardi and Sanchez, 2007). For example, the Safa Group was a network of around 100 charities and for-profit firms – many of which existed only on paper – which hid and transferred donations to Al-Qaeda, Hamas and other terrorist

groups (Comras, 2007). Even charities which knowingly raise and distribute money to terrorist groups can, however, provide important social goods. For example, charities in Pakistan linked to Al-Qaeda ran medical clinics, schools and orphanages (Comras, 2007; Napoleoni, 2004; also Levitt, 2007). Such activities can be useful for strengthening political capital, recruitment and propaganda. Charities can also provide operational support (FATF, 2014), such as smuggling.

Crime

While individual acts of terrorism can be financed through less organised petty street crime (Comras, 2007; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007), larger organisations may require more sophisticated organised crime. While some groups concentrate on one area (see Bahney *et al.*, 2010), many engage in a portfolio of criminal activity (see Croissant and Barlow, 2007; O'Callaghan, 1998; Silke, 2000). The PKK, for example, have profited from drug and arms trafficking; robbery; extortion; human trafficking and smuggling; travel document forgery; currency counterfeiting; and money laundering (Roth and Severe, 2007; also Curtis and Karacan, 2002).

Involvement in organised crime can be risky: it can attract the attention of a variety of local, national and foreign police forces whilst opening gaps for infiltration from security services. Involvement in certain activities can also negatively impact political capital and legitimacy if the activity is perceived by constituents as harmful or immoral (i.e. drug smuggling, prostitution) (Dishman, 2001; Freeman, 2012; Passas, 2007). PIRA, for example, banned its members from involvement in drugs and used vigilante campaigns against drug dealers to strengthen political capital (Silke, 1999). Conversely, the Taliban's attempt to suppress opium production eroded its support-base in rural areas reliant on the illicit crop. Learning from past mistakes, the Taliban have since gained much political capital by protecting farmers from state eradication teams (Felbab-Brown, 2009; also Windle, forthcoming).

Organised criminal activity can be symbolic and operational. Document fraud and smuggling, for example, can be used to move people or goods across borders (Picarelli and Shelley, 2007). The smuggling of taxable goods can weaken national economies (Napoleoni, 2004) whilst highlighting the state's inability to secure its borders. Kidnapping tourists and aid workers can also be indicative of the government's ability to protect its citizens (Phillips, 2009) whilst making headlines, disrupting tourism and/or preventing the distribution of aid which could provide the state political capital. The following section discusses some factors which facilitate changes to fundraising.

Adaption

The end of the Cold War is identified by many as a turning point in terrorist financing. Many terrorist groups had been financed in order to allow the main powers to avoid direct conflict. As the Cold War wound down, however, the financial and diplomatic costs of sponsorship became too difficult to justify (Freeman, 2012). It is commonly suggested that the loss of funding caused by the end of the Cold War forced terrorists to diversify into alternative revenue streams, especially organised crime. This trend is argued to have intensified after 9/11 as the international community increased its pressure on state sponsors, charities and individual donations (see Makarenko, 2004; Picarelli and Shelley, 2007; Roth and Sever, 2007). Dishman (2001) has argued that one adaption which affected terrorist funding was structural reorganisation into looser networks of interconnected cells (also Comras, 2007; Napoleoni, 2007). Al-Qaeda's central leadership had, for example, traditionally avoided collaborating with criminals to avoid alienating their conservative support base. After 9/11, however, more autonomous cells were

forced to generate their own income and, less constrained by the centre, became more deeply involved in crimes that their more cautious and politically aware leaders would have avoided (see Rollins *et al.*, 2010; Roth and Sever, 2007; also Higgins *et al.*, 2004).

Giraldo and Trinkus (2007; also Piombo, 2007) have, however, noted that crime had financed terrorism and insurgency during and before the Cold War. Stalin robbed banks as a young radical while the Chinese Communist Party profited from the opium trade during the Long March (1934–35) (Windle, 2011; forthcoming); as did a number of Southeast Asian insurgents from the 1950s (McCoy, 2003; Windle, forthcoming). Whereas, the Shining Path had never received state sponsorship, and PIRA and the Tamil Tigers – aware that states were fickle sponsors – diversified their income stream before the end of the Cold War (Giraldo and Trinkus, 2007; Piombo, 2007). Additionally, not all states succumbed to international pressure and continued sponsoring terrorist groups (Lombardi and Sanchez, 2007; Piombo, 2007). Furthermore, the structural changes noted by Dishman (2001) are not unique to terrorism but mirror changes in organised crime and legitimate business (see Adamoli *et al.*, 1998; Castells, 2000; Hobbs, 2013; Kenney, 2007). This may suggest globalisation as the more significant driver of structural change.

The end of the Cold War did, however, result in a proliferation of cheap black-market arms (Silke, 1998) and increased the number of weak and failed states open to exploitation. It also reduced the final barriers to globalisation: increasing the speed and ease of moving goods, money and people across borders whilst presenting new opportunities, such as internet fraud (Comras, 2007; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007; Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007; Makarenko, 2004; Roth and Sever, 2007), and opening new markets for licit and illicit goods. In short, the end of the Cold War and events of 9/11 did impact terrorist financing; however, involvement in alternative revenue streams may have been driven more, or as much, by opportunities presented by globalisation. The following section expands on some of these ideas by further exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism.

The crime–terror continuum

Dishman (2001) suggested that organised crime and terrorism are best viewed on a spectrum: an idea developed further by Makarenko (2004) into the crime–terror continuum. The continuum visualises organised crime and terrorism as bookends. In between are seven positions divided into four groups: alliances; operational motivations; convergence; and black holes. While some argue that different motivations make alliances and convergence unlikely (Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007; Schmid, 1996), the continuums' key strength is that it avoids black-white dichotomies identifying groups as purely politically or financially motivated, whilst allowing for movement along the scale.

Alliances

Terrorists may collaborate with large or small organised crime groups (OCGs), criminal enterprises or independent entrepreneurs. The strength and durability of alliances vary. While they can be longer-term alliances, one-off collaborations are most common (Dishman, 2001; Felbab-Brown and Forest, 2012; Gupta *et al.*, 2009; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007), often occurring when terrorists lack the organisational capabilities to engage in crime and when necessity demands (see Ellis and Jesperson, 2015; Makarenko, 2004). Such partnerships are often business arrangements involving the hiring of criminal specialists or procurement of goods or services from criminals.

Many alliances are predatory (Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007) or patron-client relationships, rather than alliances formed to achieve shared goals. For example, drug traffickers and

dealers in Afghanistan (Felbab-Brown, 2009), West Africa (Ellis and Jesperson, 2015) and Ireland (PSNI and Garda Síochána, 2014) have paid terrorists or insurgents for protection. As the traffickers/dealers are extorted, the relationships are predatory; however, as a service (i.e. protection) is provided, they can be mutually beneficial. Patron-client relationships have included:

- Irish Republicans designed bombs for FARC and trained their operatives. The Republicans were paid in cocaine, which they exchanged with Eastern European arms dealers (Curtis and Karacan, 2002);
- the Medellín cartel hired ELN to plant car bombs (Makarenko, 2004);
- Al-Qaeda employed professional smugglers to move operatives out of Afghanistan after 9/11 (Clarke and Lee, 2008);
- criminal enterprises sold kidnapped foreigners to insurgents groups in Iraq (Phillips, 2009);
- Al-Shabaab have acted as brokers between buyers and poachers in the illicit ivory trade (Ellis and Jesperson, 2015).

While Makarenko (2004) suggests that long-term alliances are more common in developing countries where instability is in the interest of both terrorists and criminals, alliances have formed in developed states, including Ireland and Spain (Curtis and Karacan, 2002). Furthermore, Felbab-Brown and Forest (2012; also Ellis and Jesperson, 2015) observed a variety of relationships in Nigeria: Boko Haram were reluctant to align with criminals to avoid damaging their pious reputation. Southern militant groups, however, entered into longer-term alliances with local OCGs.

Alliances may be facilitated by opportunity as much as necessity, if not more so. Opportunities may be created by entrenchment in social networks (Mullins, 2009). That is, if criminals and terrorists routinely interact in their daily lives, they may feel confident in developing alliances (Gallagher, 2014). This said, specialists – such as lawyers or accountants employed to launder money – may have to be subcontracted from outside the immediate social network.

Not all terrorists and criminals are compatible. They may conflict for market share (Felbab-Brown and Forest, 2012; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007) or if one group perceives the other as a threat. OCGs in America, China, France, Italy and Japan have, for example, all cooperated with the state against legitimate and illegitimate political groups identified as a threat to the capitalist system (see McCoy, 2003), a system within which criminals are enthusiastic participants.

Security and ideological differences are often seen as barriers to long-term cooperation. In terms of security, criminals may avoid cooperation to avoid attracting unwanted attention, while terrorists may avoid opening their network to actors perceived as mercenary. Trust does not, however, have to be complete for alliances to form. PIRA allied with an OCG to smuggle arms from America and, to avoid betrayal, they 'insisted the gang provide hostages… while the operation took place' (O'Callaghan, 1998:179).

Operational motivations

Due to the risks associated with cooperation, many groups prefer to develop 'in-house' capabilities (Dishman, 2001; Gupta *et al.*, 2009; Makareneko, 2004). Examples include Cosa Nostra and the Medellín and La Familia cartels using terror tactics to intimidate and discourage criminal investigations (see Paoli, 2003; Rollins *et al.*, 2010) and Hezbollah operatives developing tobacco-smuggling operations (Levitt, 2007).

Whether a group develops in-house capabilities depends upon structural constraints, skills, opportunities and aspirations (Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007). Starting certain criminal

endeavours requires resources and skill sets unavailable to some terrorist groups. Developing new smuggling routes, for example, may require: the acquisition of safe houses; travel documents; corrupt border guards; and, most importantly, knowledge of the social and geographical environment. This can be costly and time-consuming. The IRA, for example, adapted to declining donations in the 1970s by organising members to engage in fraud, extortion and livestock and fuel smuggling. As they already had experience of smuggling to the mainland United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, alliances were unnecessary (Gallagher, 2014). One-off collaborations, however, continued when necessary, including the employment of American and European arms smugglers (O'Callaghan, 1998). Alternatively, many loyalist paramilitaries entered into longer-term alliances with OCGs and criminal enterprises as their structures limited the development of in-house capabilities (Gallagher, 2014; see Higgins *et al.*, 2004).

Convergence

Terrorists and criminals may also converge into single-hybrid entities (Makarenko, 2004; Rosenthal, 2008). This is where:

> the groups no longer retain the defining points that had hitherto made them a political or criminal group. It is possible they still may maintain a public façade, supported by rhetoric and statements, but underneath, they have transformed into a different type of group with a different end game.
>
> *(Dishman, 2001:48)*

That is, the group exhibits the characteristics of both organised crime and terrorism. Convergence is contentious. Clarke and Lee (2008) argue that the crime–terror continuum is becoming outdated as the majority of terrorist groups become hybrids. Alternatively, Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007; also Wang, 2010) argue that ideology prevents convergence.

There are, however, examples of convergence in developed and developing states. For example, while all of Ireland's paramilitary groups engaged in organised crime during the height of the conflict, several have become more interested in profit than politics; some republican and loyalist groups have even put aside their differences to cooperate in cross-border smuggling (Cusack, 2014).

Criminals can become motivated by politics. There is a long history of criminals entering legitimate politics as a means of affecting political change (and securing the rewards of politics). Such criminals are, in many ways, following legitimate businesspeople. That is, Pablo Escobar, Arun Gawli, and most of the Afghan parliament trod a path worn by legitimate businesspeople such as Mitt Romney, Thaksin Shinawatra and Silvio Berlusconi. More concrete examples include the drug-dealing crew who organised and funded the Madrid bombings (Giraldo and Trinkus, 2007; Rollins *et al.*, 2010) and D-Company, a large South Asian OCG who entered into a long-term alliance with LeT after the destruction of the Babri Mosque and anti-Muslim riots of 1992. They have provided financial and operational assistance for a number of terrorist attacks, including the 1993 and 2008 Mumbai attacks, and helped evacuate Al-Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan in 2001 (Clarke and Lee, 2008).

Convergence can be facilitated if the ideological identity bonding the group weakens (Gupta *et al.*, 2009). This can occur when strong leaders are removed (Dishman, 2005), as happened to the UDA (Horgan, 2009), Abu Sayyaf and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Rosenthal, 2008). This said, many IMU members 'fought to the death in defence of the Taliban regime in 2001 and 2002' (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007:18). That is, while the IMU's leadership became

more criminal, many of its members clung to their political motivation. Clonan (2009) similarly notes how the 'political "die-hards"' within the Real IRA are exploited by a core leadership more interested in financial rewards than politics. Alternatively, while the Taliban's leadership remains mostly politically motivated, many of its soldiers join as a means of escaping poverty (Rosenthal, 2008).[2] That is, the motivation of individuals or cliques may differ from the group. This can result in individuals or cliques splitting to form primarily criminal groups (Gupta *et al.*, 2009) or engaging in individual acts of criminality.

The Black Hole

Black holes are weak or failed states where crime and terrorism converge, possibly resulting in hybrid groups entering into power and a continuation of conflict to 'secure economic and political power' (Makarenko, 2004:138). The end result is a safe haven which can be used for harder to conceal illicit actions or large terrorist training camps (see Felbab-Brown, 2009).

Afghanistan is often used as an example. During the ongoing conflicts, the survival of individual groups became more important than political goals, resulting in warlord rule in order to profit from illicit trades, most notably the opiate trade, but also smuggling of taxable goods from Pakistan (Makarenko, 2004). For example, many warlords appointed to political/bureaucratic positions after 2001 had exerted authority over aspects of the opiate trade. While formal ties with overt criminal activity were rejected in order to enter legitimate state institutions, several former warlords exploited their position by protecting 'former' contacts. Furthermore, coercive state institutions are corrupt, lacking in adequate resources and personnel, and generally ineffective (Windle, 2011, forthcoming).

The 'terrorist good, criminal bad' critique

The most prominent critique of the crime–terror continuum is that ideological differences prevent long-term cooperation and convergence (Dishman, 2001; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007; Napoleoni, 2004; Passas, 2007; Wang, 2010). This critique tends to centre upon binary characterisations of criminals and terrorists as motivated purely by money or politics. Neither terrorists nor criminals are, however, homogeneous groups. Motivation for terrorist involvement can include: revenge against perceived injustice; respect of peers and community; control and authority; fraternity; money; sex; and excitement (see Bjørgo, 2002; Horgan, 2004; Joosse *et al.*, 2015; Silke, 2003). For example, decisions about which side to align with when terrorist groups split are often driven less by ideology and more by human factors, including trust in immediate leadership (Morrison, 2015). Similarly, African (Piombo, 2007) and South Asian terrorists often exhibit greater loyalty to their clan or tribe than to ideology.

Some terrorists are motivated by financial rewards. Not only have financers skimmed money from their group (Ryder, 2009; Shapiro, 2007; Silke, 1998), but some groups provide greater remuneration to more senior members. Hezbollah fundraisers in America, for example, 'drive luxury cars and live in upper-middle-class neighbourhoods', while the Palestine Liberation Organization paid organisers eight times as much as the families of those killed in action (Shapiro, 2007:58). That is, while the group may continue to be politically motivated, some of its members may be motivated by personal enrichment to some extent.

Criminals are also often motivated by emotional, social, political and/or visceral rewards (see Decker and Chapman, 2008; Desroches, 2005; Hobbs, 2013). As such, criminals may want to help terrorists because they are friends or because they believe in the cause, feel involvement will boost their esteem in certain circles (Gallagher, 2014) or find involvement in terrorism exciting.

For example, an associate of Whitey Bulger, who raised money and smuggled arms for PIRA, claimed the gangster 'loved being associated with the IRA… he liked the legitimacy a political cause gave him' (cited in Swaine, 2013). The terrorist, on the other hand, may be attracted to the financial rewards, may want to help a friend or enjoy the parties the criminal throws.

Both terrorist and criminal values, and thus motivations, change over time (Horgan, 2009). Motivational changes may reflect trajectories into terrorism. That is, 'the process of becoming a more committed member [of a terrorist group] is shaped most remarkably through engagement in terrorist activities' (Horgan, 2004:137; also Bjørgo, 2002). As such, greater involvement in crime may gradually shift an actor's perception of their self and values (Mullins, 2009) whilst also presenting more enticing opportunities for personal enrichment.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how terrorist groups draw from a range of sources and that many financing activities also play operational and symbolic roles. The choice of financial source will depend on the groups' end-goals; existing skill-set; financial capital; market conditions; and opportunities presented by entrenchment in social networks, geography and existing demand for products or services. Similar factors also drive the formation of alliances with criminals and/or development of in-house capabilities.

A number of terrorism researchers have argued that collaboration and convergence between terrorists and organised criminals is unlikely due to inherently different motivations. Such binary understandings of actor motivations obscure the reality of crime–terror relationships: terrorists and criminals are not homogeneous groups. Terrorists are not always altruistically motivated, and criminals are seldom unfeeling, economically-rational capitalist robots. Terrorists and criminals can be motivated by a range of economic, emotional, social and visceral rewards; and people's values and goals change over time. Some terrorists and criminals conflict over markets or perceived threats. Others, however, find collaboration mutually rewarding.

Notes

1 How we define organised crime impacts the perceived relationship between the two phenomena. This chapter uses a fairly inclusive definition: 'a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities' (Albanese, 2004:8). This definition sets a wide parameter which allows discussion of a variety of groups from small drug-trafficking crews to large mafia-type organisations. Many of the actors discussed in this chapter may, however, be better defined as criminal enterprises rather than organised crime groups, who can be defined by their monopolisation of markets (Varese, 2010).

2 The U.N. Security Council (2014b) have, however, recently reported that internal conflicts may reflect disputes over economic resources, indicating a level of convergence in some Taliban cliques.

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18

FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND TERRORISM

David Malet

The 'foreign fighter' is a recently delineated category of actor, although militants who have travelled from another country to participate in political violence have been a regular feature of armed conflict throughout modern history. The emergence in the twenty-first century of a growing body of research into the recruitment and behaviour of foreign fighters is due to the contemporary prominence of the transnational jihad movement. The jihadists have been unavoidable in their import since 2001 because of major terror attacks orchestrated by current and veteran foreign fighters affiliated with Al-Qaeda and subsequently because of the social media-fuelled emergence of the caliphate proclaimed by ISIS as a destination for jihadists and their supporters. But foreign fighters have engaged in terror attacks, or war crimes, in conflict zones for centuries, arguably with far more significant results than the jihadists have achieved thus far, and, to a lesser extent, subsequent attacks against their home countries or other nations.

It was the strategy of terror attacks by foreign fighters in post-war Iraq during the 2000s, particularly their propensity for employing suicide bombings and for targeting local civilian populations, which drove the study of transnational militant recruitment and the differences between local rebels and those who travel from other countries to join their fight (Paz 2005; Hafez 2007). But it also became apparent that other foreign fighters were surviving for decades to both physically and ideationally disseminate their operations transnationally, creating a permanent semi-professional class of militants who would propagate best practices across conflict zones. But their propaganda also encouraged self-starters to conduct domestic attacks, blurring the organizational distinction between locally active terror cells and transnational movements.

By the mid-2010s, the fear that highly skilled veterans of conflicts such as those in Somalia and Syria would return to their home countries and launch particularly deadly domestic terrorist attacks had shifted the focus of many terrorism scholars away from foreign fighter behaviour in the field to analysing radicalization and retention. Subsequently, the link between foreign fighters and terrorism was accentuated by the divergent policy responses of governments hoping to mitigate any threat posed by returning citizens by preventing their departure or return and domestic attacks conducted by ISIS supporters who had been obstructed from traveling to Iraq and Syria.

This chapter assesses the relationship between foreign fighters and terrorism, and it supports the existing claims that foreign fighters are a type of insurgent, and therefore distinct from

domestic or international terrorists. However, as with locally organized insurgents or military forces, some foreign fighters engage in terrorist attacks against non-combatants. Furthermore, because they conceive of their political grievances in transnational terms, after leaving their war zones they pose a distinct – although historically small – threat of perpetrating terror attacks in their home countries or other states to which they travel.

There is a difference between foreign fighting and foreign support for militant groups, although this line is becoming increasingly attenuated because of various forms of transnational advocacy and attacks on behalf of ISIS. As governments and international organizations develop new anti-terrorism provisions designed to curtail foreign fighter mobilization and to prevent their return, it is important to preserve analytic frameworks for understanding the relationship between foreign fighters and terrorism.

Foreign fighter recruitment and terrorism in war

As with terrorism, there is no standard definition of a foreign fighter, although there has been general consensus in the literature that they are private citizens who join non-state armed groups in some country other than the one in which they reside. They are distinct from other types of rebels whose fights 'spill over' into neighbouring states. They do not work for states, either as mercenaries or contractors or in their regular militaries or foreign legions. The definitions offered in most of the foundational studies present them as fighters in rebel groups in civil wars, rather than militants who travel to another country that is at peace to launch terror attacks (Malet 2015, pp. 458–459; Moore 2015). Krueger (2007) and Mendelson (2011) specifically state that foreign fighters are insurgents and not terrorists, while Hegghammer (2013), in examining Western foreign fighters, includes any attacks, including terror plots, against targets outside of the West in his definition of foreign fighting.

Historical significance

Historical records document the presence of foreign fighters in nearly 100 civil wars since the late eighteenth century, or more than one in five insurgencies. Irregular armed groups engaged in what is in most cases recruitment activities that violate national and international laws are understandably poor at preserving their records. Thus, even for the biggest and best-documented case of foreign fighters to date, the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, which estimates indicate drew over 50,000 foreign volunteers in under three years, there are no precise figures available nor full records of any particular group of fighters to examine. But conservative estimates would put the aggregate number of foreign fighters at over 100,000 worldwide during the past 250 years (Malet 2013).[1]

But it has been documented that foreign fighters have provided skilled leadership and manpower to rebel groups in significant armed uprisings throughout international history. Spurred by their ideologies or a sense of kinship, foreign volunteers contributed to rebel victories in the wars that established the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Italy, Greece, Venezuela, Colombia, Zimbabwe, and Kosovo, among others. In other instances, they were responsible for sufficiently weakening the fascist regime in Spain to force it to remain neutral during World War II, and the loss of one-third of Mexican territory to the United States. Foreign fighters aided the Biafran ethnic insurgents in 1960s Nigeria, exacerbating that conflict and leading to the establishment of a different type of transnational volunteer corps, *Medicins sans Frontiers* (Doctors without Borders), to mitigate the humanitarian costs after the regime attempted to block any further involvement by foreign non-state actors (Malet 2013).

From Marxists in Nicaragua, Malaysia, and Laos, to co-ethnic diaspora supporters in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Cyprus, to Islamists in Somalia, Kashmir, and Chechnya, foreign fighters have provided links to external sources of expertise and funding that have contributed to the efficacy of insurgent groups (Malet 2015; Bonelli 2015; Moore and Tumelty 2008). While they have fought for a wide range of different causes, the biggest cohorts both in particular conflicts and over time have been Marxists and Islamists.[2]

In many instances, they have been described by their local brothers-in-arms as impractical zealots, and extreme ideological orientation is consistent with the armchair warrior mentality noted within exile and hard-line diaspora communities (Hockenos 2003; Tarrow 2005). It is also explicable because foreign fighters do not have to worry about reprisal attacks against their homes and families that constrain local rebels (Mason 2004, p. 168).

One potential explanation for the aggressiveness of foreign fighters, including costly tactics such as suicide attacks, is that they are actually the most desperate amongst the militants. That is, despite the lesser exposure to risk and greater opportunity to flee than locally rooted combatants have, foreign fighters are more likely to believe that they are in a fight for the very existence of their people, and that all means of victory are justified. Across very different circumstances and ideologies, recruiters of foreign fighters have been strikingly consistent over the centuries in the messages and processes they use to radicalize and mobilize volunteers. In every observable instance, the recruitment message has been predicated upon a threat to the communal identity group that recruits share with local fighters. Whether Muslim or Marxist, recruiters overcome collective action barriers by stressing the enormity of threat and requirement for individual action because governments are not assuming the responsibility for the defence of the community. While skilled specialists like pilots may be offered special material incentives, and some groups promise exalted positions in newly made societies, the emphasis is always on the need to prevent lasting destruction and even genocide, even when the rebel group has the upper hand in the conflict (Roy 2004; Malet 2013; Barret 2014, p. 21; Briggs and Silverman 2014, p. 14; Bonelli 2015, p. 7).

Profiling foreign fighters

As with other participants in militant movements and political violence, it is possible to develop a portrait of the typical foreign fighter that does not require profiling based on stereotypes of particular groups. For example, Barrett (2014, pp. 16–17) notes that

> Judging by the profile of individuals who are known to have gone to Syria or who have self-identified as foreign fighters, the typical age range is 18–29… Almost all are males… Most foreign fighters arrive without any military training or previous experience of fighting, though there is a hard core of older fighters who have fought on other fronts… [Most Western] volunteers have no cultural or ethnic links to Syria… [and although active in community groups in urban centres] have no previous record of involvement with extremism.[3]

Compare this profile with this description of American volunteers fighting in Spain with the International Brigades: 'A man between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven who lived in an industrial, urban centre where labour unions and radical political parties were most active… [and they] were more likely to be foreign-born or first-generation American.' Although active in labour organisations and other groups that felt menaced by the rise of fascism, most had not been members of the Communist Party that organized the Brigades, and some would-be

volunteers were turned down repeatedly when they could not get a sponsor to vouch for them (Rosenstone 1969, pp. 84, 98).

At the same time, militant groups have an incentive to recruit loosely affiliated supporters rather than core members to become foreign fighters who will be unavailable to lend their skills to domestic operations or could be sacrificed. There is evidence that having promising fighters go off to Iraq depleted the talent pools of Saudi militants during the last decade (Byman 2015, p. 7), which was the same reason why the Comintern did not permit its young leadership in Britain to go to Spain in the 1930s (Malet 2013, pp. 99–107).

It is partly the lack of connection between foreign fighter recruits and existing terror networks in their home countries that results in their perpetration of terror attacks in their destination countries. Untrained recruits have historically been used as cannon fodder by indifferent or distrustful local militia commanders, and in the modern context this has meant sacrificing them in martyrdom attacks filmed for propaganda value. Foreign fighters, with no affective ties to local populations and perhaps more dogmatic views of the conflict, have been used instrumentally to kill civilians on the other side, but they have also been responsible for perpetrating brutality against the civilians whom they are purportedly there to defend. The type of widely reported sexual assaults committed by ISIS recruits were also a complaint against volunteers in the Texas Revolution of the 1830s (Malet 2013, pp. 83, 120, 203–204; Byman and Shapiro 2014, p. 14).

By means of comparison, foreign fighters who carried their conflicts into refugee camps in Lebanon were reportedly 'more dangerous than local actors like Hezbollah or Hamas [who] draw their legitimacy from the support of their local constituencies. But the rootless returnees are not responsible to any local constituency and thus have no "red lines" they won't cross' (Exum 2008). They have been responsible for spreading the tools of terror, including tactics like beheadings and technologies like effective improvised explosive devices (IED), and targeting international organizations and aid workers (Byman 2015, pp. 5, 11).

Foreign fighters have also been observed to switch their allegiances to other groups *in situ*, indicating that perceptions of efficacy matter as much as ideology to recruits (Spencer 2014). Perhaps because of their aggressiveness, insurgencies employing foreign fighters have been historically nearly doubly as successful as those that have not, winning nearly half of their wars versus the average insurgent victory rate of under 30 percent (Malet 2013).

At the same time, Al-Qaeda affiliates have also tried to disseminate lessons learned in past experiences of wartime governance. Harsh reprisals against civilians have turned not only local opinion against them but brought international condemnation from other jihadist leaders. So, like Hezbollah and Hamas, foreign fighter-led jihadists have attempted to 'try to win loyalty of population by providing services' in, for example, Mali (Callimachi 2013) and, more abidingly, in the ISIS-declared caliphate.

Because foreign fighters are usually illicit actors, transporting volunteers internationally requires illegal operations. In some cases, organizations are able to establish dummy corporations to make travel arrangements appear legitimate, but more typically they partner with networks of experienced smugglers to bring recruits to destination countries. The requirement of transporting foreign fighters therefore fosters relationships between political militant groups and organized crime networks (Richardson 1982, p. 36; Levitt 2010, pp. 40–56). Holman (2015, p. 13) notes that foreign fighter networks, which facilitate participation in foreign insurgencies through logistical support and ideological motivation, are distinct from domestic attack networks whose goal is the execution of attacks within members' countries of residence.

State responses

Ever since the emergence of modern foreign fighters in the late eighteenth century, even regimes that won their independence with the assistance of transnational volunteers have banned the activity as undermining sovereignty (Malet 2015). Since 9/11, Western governments have treated foreign fighters as 'unlawful enemy combatants,' subject first to extra-legal imprisonment and interrogation methods, and then to targeted aerial killings (Scheipers 2013, p. 45; Malet 2013, pp. 33, 217).

In September 2014, building on past United Nations resolutions that banned mercenaries and transnational insurgents, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2178 to eliminate 'foreign terrorist fighters.' This new term not previously used by researchers conflated foreign fighting, perhaps for causes that some member states supported, with normatively unacceptable terrorism. Its definition encompasses 'individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict' (U.N. Security Council 2014, p. 1).

Resolution 2178, which was adopted by over 120 countries over the course of the following year, requires U.N. members to take steps to prevent the 'recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts.' However, as Smith (2014) notes, 'Resolution 2178 does not specifically outline the definition of criminal conduct or terrorism.'

Veteran foreign fighters and domestic terrorism

The first decade of research on foreign fighters, which encompassed the Iraqi insurgency and the declaration of the Islamic State, was concerned primarily with profiling foreign volunteers fighting with jihadist groups. However, some authors also examined the legacies of the two waves of volunteers who travelled to Afghanistan (in the 1980s as Arab Afghans and in the 1990s as Al-Qaeda trainees) and the 'bleed out' of third-wave militants from 2000s Iraq to other insurgencies and to terror networks (Fishman 2008).

There are three primary concerns that counterterrorism officials share about returned foreign fighters. The first is their weapons and explosives training and combat experience that could make domestic attacks more effective. The second is their transnational organizational linkages that could make them more effective facilitators of radicalization and recruitment. The third, conversely, is psychological damage that they may have suffered in the field that makes them more vulnerable to further radicalization and desperation attacks and potentially introduces increased social costs to their communities (Qureshi 2014, p. 7).

The threat of domestic attacks

The biggest concern about foreign fighters since the Syrian conflict began has been that they will return home and transition from being insurgents to proficient terrorists. By 2014 there had been a dozen reported instances in Europe alone by returnees from Syria, most involving weapons possession and imminent plots (Zammit 2014). Others, such as the *Charlie Hebdo* attack, involved returnees who had gone elsewhere. But that case, and that of 7/7 bomber Mohammed Khan, also involved individuals who trained with militant groups abroad but were not foreign fighters themselves.

While some returned Western foreign fighters have claimed that they would never do anything to threaten their home countries, and possibly their own families, others had already been involved in domestic extremist groups or posted videos to social media from the field in which they issued threats against their governments (Byman and Shapiro 2014, pp. 6, 9, 16–18, 22).

Hegghammer (2013) found that of the Western jihadists who had returned between 1980s Afghanistan and 2000s Iraq, 107 of 945, or 11 percent, had been charged with participation in domestic terrorism subsequent to their return, and that veterans had been involved in about half of all plots. While few attacks overall had been carried out successfully, the majority of successful plots had benefitted from the participation of veteran foreign fighters. Hegghammer noted that his findings were a maximum likelihood estimate and that the actual percentage would be lower because many foreign fighters had travelled and returned unnoticed.

Subsequent studies using Hegghammer's data have argued that the figures may be lower still because many 'plots' were never developed meaningfully, arrests were frequently for nothing more than possession of printed material supporting militant groups, and many 'foreign fighters' were actually foreign-trained terrorists who had gone abroad to learn skills but did not participate in combat with any insurgent group (De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2014; Qureshi 2014, pp. 7, 12; Byman 2015). De Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014, p. 47) found that returned jihadis were involved in only about 10 percent of lethal terror attacks in the West. Holman (2015, pp. 13–15) found that European jihadist deployment networks 'did not show intent to engage in domestic attacks,' with exceptions found among isolated 'individuals on the fringe' of the networks who had since joined other groups or networks focused on domestic attacks.

Byman (2015, p. 15) argues that 'In general, returnees prefer insurgency to terrorism' because insurgents enjoy greater legitimacy in the Arab world. However, to compete for attention, skilled returnees who do engage in domestic plots in Arab states are likely to attempt major attacks to discredit their governments, rather than the lone attacker pattern that has manifested in the West.

Still, the threat of domestic terrorism by returnees, however small a percentage, is still greater than zero. Pantucci observes that foreign fighters have been redirected by militant groups back to their home countries to carry out attacks, and returnees have also engaged in lone actor attacks (Chatham House 2014, p. 11). In the ISIS era, the first high-profile case of blowback against the West was the 2014 shooting in Brussels at the Jewish Museum of Belgium. Contemporaneously, similar predictions were made about extreme Russian nationalists who returned from the civil war in Ukraine in anticipation of uprisings against the Putin regime (Byrne 2015).

Significant numbers, perhaps one quarter, of foreign fighters have already returned from Iraq (Keatinge 2015, p. 10). One key concern for counterterrorism officials is the lag time between return and any potential domestic plots. A case in point was Said Kouachi, who carried out the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* magazine in Paris more than three years after training in weapons use in Yemen. Kerchove (2015) argues that it is necessary to keep returnees out of prisons where they can be easily further radicalized in confinement with incorrigible elements of their movements.

Radicalization and recruitment

In the twenty-first century, the patterns appear to have remained consistent. Out of tens of thousands of jihadi foreign fighters in the last 35 years, there have been a handful of returnees whom we can identify as significant radicalizers of domestic terrorists and next-generation foreign fighters. Abu Hamza al Masri of the notorious Finsbury Mosque in London, and Hambali, architect of the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah, might be the most notable.

Watts' (2008) study of the Sinjar Records of foreign fighters in Iraq demonstrated that individual returned foreign fighters were effective in recruiting multiple individuals from particular

communities in Arab countries like Libya because returnees had the credibility and glamour to serve as exemplars and the logistical connections to help others to get to the battlefield.

By contrast, Maher argues that the greater concern should be the effective reintegration of the 90 percent of returnees who do not participate in domestic plots (Chatham House 2014, p. 11). Clearly, a number return unconvinced of the righteousness of the cause for which they risked their lives. Many foreign fighters return disillusioned by their treatment at the hands of local insurgents and because of internecine fighting within the community that they had ostensibly come to defend from outsiders (Malet 2013, p. 201; Barrett 2014, p. 27; Byman and Shapiro 2014, p. 19). Although PTSD was not documented in foreign fighters in past cases, severe symptoms have been observed in returnees from Syria to Europe and Southeast Asia (Briggs and Silverman 2014, pp. 37–39). Such veterans are potentially a credible resource to use in counter-radicalization efforts, but if they do not receive adequate assistance they are particularly vulnerable and possibly more likely to engage in dangerous activities at home.

State responses to returned foreign fighters

The magnitude of contemporary foreign fighting has produced demands for a policy to manage the potential threat. The volume of returned jihadists from Syria and Iraq has proven overwhelming to law enforcement agencies in Europe attempting to monitor them (Briggs and Silverman 2014, p. 39; Keatinge 2015, p. 9), and this has produced wildly varying policy prescriptions, from the 'Aarhus Model,' named for Denmark's second city but also practiced elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East, which combines amnesty with offers of counselling and job training, to legislation barring foreign fighters from returning and stripping them of their citizenship that has been enacted by the United Kingdom and Australia.

Notably, the United Nations and other international agencies and governments have previously spent billions of dollars on the demobilization and reintegration of the 'foreign fighter diaspora' involved in a patchwork of conflicts around the African Great Lakes region, similarly claiming overwhelming success in demobilizing tens of thousands of fighters through the offer of amnesty and jobs. But history indicates that, for all of the spending, amnesty alone might be sufficient. The jihadi movement has been unique in its longevity since the Arab Afghan movement of the 1980s. Those fighters were not given the opportunity to go home and became stateless perpetual insurgents. Historically, however, few foreign fighters became involved in domestic plots or joined other insurgencies, and many even returned to their former positions that their employers had kept for them (Malet 2015, p. 465).

Foreign fighters, counterterrorism, and the age of social media

The so-called Arab Afghans of the 1980s were the first cohort of foreign fighters in modern history not to demobilize at the end of their war, but to continue for decades to hop to other conflicts and to train others. It is too facile to explain the difference as the result of greater fanaticism or being more dangerous. Other transnational jihadists in Central Asia, in Yemen, and in Sudan in prior decades dissipated. But the bulk of the Arab Afghans were not permitted to return to their home countries and became perpetual insurgents, wandering from one war zone to the next. This development should serve as a caution to proposals to render foreign fighters stateless. When Osama bin Laden's passport was stripped, he simply relocated his radicalization efforts, and to the rest of the world he was still Saudi.

Most of the fears and justifications offered for stripping citizenship and barring their return have been that foreign fighters have acquired battlefield training and global terror network con-

nections that make them especially dangerous. They are also expected to be particularly effective at facilitating the radicalization of new recruits who may embarrass their countries as war criminals or return home as worse threats. Much of the surrounding debate has been about how to best counter a security challenge described as unprecedented.

The novel element to today's foreign fighters is social media and how these have de-territorialized radicalization and recruitment. The difference with social media is that grooming foreign fighters no longer needs to occur in secretive meetings arranged in familiar locations by trusted contacts. It is foreign fighters who are currently over there and their online support who are the real-time sources of propaganda, and that is why returnees are likely even less instrumental to radicalization today.

It is also important to recognize the impact of social media in this area. Nearly two centuries ago, foreign fighters shared their views with the public in letters to newspapers, and early in the twentieth century were producing films to disseminate their propaganda (Malet 2013, p. 89). In the Twitter era, interested parties follow fighters while they are still in Iraq and Syria, and it matters less whether they physically return or not. Arguably, those who are still in the field will have far more interesting propaganda than someone who has returned to the everyday world (Exum 2008, pp. 4–5).

But the knife cuts the other way as well. Among surviving foreign fighters are a large percentage who were disillusioned by their paramilitary experience. A very small percentage become domestic threats, but among those who do are the most effective and credible counter-radicalization spokespersons possible. On balance then, returned foreign fighters are probably less of a threat to further radicalization than they are a resource for preventing it.

Notes

1 Observations date to the European private citizens who volunteered with the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783), although transnational military volunteers date back to at least the Crusades in the West (Malet 2013, p. 34).
2 Both factions are present in the Syria-Iraq conflict of the 2010s, with foreign fighters amongst the Marxist supporters of the Kurdish Workers Party. If spokesmen of the Spanish fascist regime are to be believed, Moroccan volunteers joined the Nationalist rebel armies to wage jihad against the atheist communist-aligned regime (Malet 2013, p. 119).
3 Although some had been on watch lists and left without being stopped or avoided interdiction (Byman 2015, pp. 6–7).

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19
SUICIDE TERRORISM

Assaf Moghadam[1]

In the decade and a half after the attacks of September 11, 2001, suicide terrorism has become a household tactic used by a growing number of terrorist and insurgent groups. The present chapter aims to provide an overview of conceptual and definitional aspects of suicide terrorism; offer a brief historical background of this modus operandi; and review the main explanations for suicide terrorism.

Definitional and conceptual aspects of suicide terrorism

To casual observers, suicide terrorism may be an easily recognizable tactic, but academics have been unable to agree on a single definition of the term "suicide terrorism." In fact, the very use of the term is contested. Scholars frequently use the terms "suicide operations," "suicide missions," or "suicide attacks" to describe this tactic, while others opt for the use of the terms "martyrdom operations" or "human bombs."

The term "suicide terrorism" suffers from several problems. For starters, it contains the word "terrorism" in its name, and as long as "terrorism" is a contested concept (e.g., Schmid, 2011; Hoffman, 2006), no definitional agreement can be expected on "suicide terrorism" (Moghadam, 2006a). Secondly, suicide missions have historically been used not only during campaigns of terrorism but also during conventional military campaigns involving standing armies, such as the use of kamikaze suicide attacks by the Japanese during World War II. Most definitions of terrorism, however, strictly distinguish acts of terrorism from conventional warfare. Third, even when suicide attacks are employed by non-state actors, they frequently target military or government targets. Attacks on military and government targets, however, are frequently referred to as guerrilla or insurgent tactics, as opposed to terrorism.

'Suicide terrorism' and most of its synonyms also contain the word suicide. Unlike ordinary suicide, which is "done by oneself and to oneself" (Maris, Berman and Silverman, 2000, p. 31), suicide terrorism requires not only a willingness to die but also a willingness to kill others (Merari, 1998). It is generally assumed that the acts of dying and killing occur simultaneously, but broader definitions of suicide missions have been proposed that allow for greater time lags between the act of killing and the perpetrator's death. For instance, broader definitions of suicide terrorism would consider the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai as suicide attacks. The attacks were carried out by several operatives of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), who carried out a series of shooting and

bombing attacks over the course of four days. While the perpetrators clearly expected to die during the mission, their death did not coincide with their victims' murder. In fact, one of the LeT operatives survived the mission, though he was later sentenced to death and executed.

Despite the coexistence of both narrow and broad conceptualizations of suicide attacks, scholars generally agree that in a suicide attack, the act of killing and the act of dying occur as part of the same mission. Therefore, a terrorist responsible for detonating an explosive device in a market, killing innocent bystanders, will not be considered a suicide terrorist even if he later commits suicide in prison.

Suicide missions are most commonly defined narrowly, as attacks whose success is contingent upon the death of the perpetrator (e.g., Schweitzer, 2001; Ganor, 2001). According to this definition, suicide operations such as the 9/11 attacks, the London bombings of July 7, 2005, and more than 4,000 other attacks in a growing number of countries between 1980 and 2014 qualify as suicide attacks.[2]

A brief history of suicide attacks

The modern phenomenon of suicide terrorism is often dated to the early 1980s, when a series of suicide attacks in Lebanon struck the Iraqi and American embassies as well as U.S., French, and later Israeli military targets. Antecedents of suicide attacks, however, can be found as early as biblical times. The biblical Samson who, according to the Book of Judges, killed himself along with scores of Philistines in an act of revenge, is oftentimes cited as one of the earliest historical examples of a suicide attack. Samson's attack fits the classic, narrow definition of a suicide attack because his death—presumably caused by pushing apart two key pillars in the Philistine Temple of Dagon—was a precondition for the success of his vengeful act.

In more modern times, antecedents of contemporary suicide attacks were employed over the course of several centuries in three Muslim communities in the Malabar coast of southwestern India, Aceh in northern Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines. According to Stephen Dale (1988, p. 51), the attack mode consisted of Muslim warriors "rush[ing] at the enemy, trying to kill as many of them as possible, until they themselves were killed." Because their death was not necessary for the success of the attack, the attacks may best be considered in the context of the broader conceptualization of suicide missions.

Additional antecedents of the contemporary suicide attack phenomenon appeared in Russia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Several attacks by the Anarchist group *Narodnaya Volya* ("The People's Will")—including, most prominently, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881—involved the death of its perpetrator as an integral part of its mission. The assassination followed eight previous, unsuccessful attempts at the Tsar's life. The ninth attempt succeeded because one of the four Russian revolutionaries who equipped themselves with bombs on that day decided to detonate the bomb in such close proximity to the Tsar that it would ensure not only his target's death but also his own.

Prior to the contemporary proliferation of suicide attacks, suicide attacks were featured in several conventional, inter-state wars. Perhaps the most prominent use of this modus operandi in an inter-state war was by the Japanese *kamikaze* suicide pilots, who staged over 3,000 suicide sorties between October 1944 and August 1945. Precursors to modern day suicide attacks have also emerged in the post-World War II period in Vietnam. According to Leonard Weinberg (2006, p. 117), during the Tet Offensive in 1968, special Viet Cong sapper units were sent on suicide missions against high prestige or high visibility targets. At least a number of these attacks seem to have been "classic" suicide attacks, i.e., operations in which the death of the perpetrators were a precondition for the success of the attack.

The use of suicide attacks by Japan and, to a lesser extent, by other countries during World War II helps dispel some popular misconceptions about this modus operandi. The above cases demonstrate that this tactic has not been used exclusively by terrorist organizations, but also by states. Second, and perhaps more importantly, along with the example of the Russian anarchists and Viet Cong, the kamikaze missions provided early evidence that suicide missions are not exclusively motivated by religion (Hill, 2005).

The roots of the contemporary phenomenon of suicide terrorism that emerged in the early 1980s lie in the Islamic Revolution of Iran. More than any other regime that preceded it, revolutionary Iran provided the religious and ideological justification for the use of violence in the name of Islam. Waging jihad fulfilled a core role within this framework, and the revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, along with others, extolled self-sacrifice and martyrdom as the highest duty to God that a Muslim could perform. The idea of martyrdom as the most meritorious service to God reached its pinnacle during the early years of the Iran–Iraq war. Between 1981 and 1984, the Islamic Republic of Iran called upon masses of youth to volunteer to participate in the so-called "human wave attacks." These attacks consisted of up to 20,000 children as young as 12 or 13 who were sent into the line of fire and across minefields, with no backup. Exploding the mines with their own bodies, these children were used to clear the way for the soldiers that followed them. To encourage their participation, the children were provided with a plastic key that they were asked to place around their necks. That key, they were told, would open the gate to paradise after they had become martyrs.

The cynical call for martyrdom made its next appearance in Lebanon. One of the first acts of suicide terrorism of the modern era occurred in the Lebanese capital of Beirut in December 1981. Twenty-seven people died and more than 100 were wounded when a member of the Iranian-backed Shiite group Al Dawa (The Call) drove a bomb-laden car into the Iraqi embassy in Beirut.

Not before long, suicide attacks would also be aimed at Western targets in Lebanon. In April 1983, a suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden van into the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people and wounding another 120. On October 23 of that year, suicide bombers killed nearly 300 American and French servicemen with two coordinated car and truck bombings targeted at the compounds housing these forces. These suicide attacks were the beginning of a new trend, namely the systematic use of suicide attacks as part of terrorist and/or insurgent campaigns. Until 1999, dozens of additional suicide attacks were conducted in Lebanon, most of which were carried out by Hezbollah, which targeted mostly Israeli forces and its Lebanese allies.

Lebanon was the staging ground for many innovations in the history of suicide attacks. One of these innovations was the deliberate generation of a cult of martyrdom, which was influenced by revolutionary Iran. Generating this cult had the added effect of raising the number of potential recruits for Hezbollah, as well as creating a mechanism to morally disengage the group from the act and its victims. One of the ways in which this culture was propagated was through euphemistic labeling. Thus, the group used the phrase *al-amalyiat al-istishhadiyya* (martyrdom operation) to describe this tactic instead of the word *intihar* (suicide), which became common practice among other Islamic groups employing this tactic. Hezbollah also invented the recording of farewell videos featuring the "martyrs," which were frequently broadcast alongside the footage of the attack itself. The group also established martyrs' funds, while its spiritual and strategic supporters praised the martyrs' deeds in mosques and other public institutions (Reuter, 2004).

Hezbollah influenced other groups in Lebanon to adopt suicide bombings as well. On March 10, 1985, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party dispatched 18-year-old Sumayah Sa'ad, who drove a car loaded with dynamite into an Israeli military position in Southern Lebanon, killing 12 Israeli soldiers and wounding 14 others. No other female suicide bombers are known to have

been used prior to that date. Two weeks later, 17-year-old San'ah Muheidli drove a TNT-laden car into an IDF convoy, killing two soldiers and wounding two more. The two women were posthumously awarded the title of "Brides of Blood" (*Arous ad-Damm*) (Taheri, 1987).

Suicide attacks were relatively successful in Lebanon in that they raised the costs of military presence for foreign states. They helped lead to the withdrawal of French and American troops from Lebanon and likely contributed to Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon to a smaller, self-proclaimed "security zone," which it held until it fully withdrew from Lebanon in 2000.

The success of the tactic in Lebanon soon prompted groups beyond Lebanon to adopt suicide missions, among them the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), whose leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, was greatly impressed by Hezbollah's successful use of suicide attacks as a tool to fight an asymmetric battle (Hoffman and McCormick, 2004). Beginning in July 1987, the LTTE's charismatic leader decided to adopt suicide tactics in order to offset the militarily superior Sri Lankan state, which is dominated by ethnic Sinhalese. Between 1987 and 2001, the LTTE planned and executed an estimated 200 suicide attacks[3]—a number that, until 2003, accounted for more suicide operations than those by all other organizations employing this tactic combined. In 2003, the LTTE was bypassed by Palestinian organizations as the lead perpetrators of this tactic.[4]

The first Palestinian organization to adopt this tactic was Hamas, which carried out its first such mission at the Mehola Junction on April 16, 1993. Between 1993 and 1998, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) carried out nearly 30 suicide attacks. The tactic became even more widely used in the next wave of attacks that occurred during the Second Intifada. Henceforth, suicide attacks were also used by more secular organizations such as the Fatah's Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Suicide missions have also been used by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict between 1996 and 1999, and have been a signature tactic of Chechen militants in their conflict with Russia. However, it was not until the late 1990s that the tactic witnessed a massive proliferation to nearly every corner of the globe. The reason for this proliferation was Al-Qaeda's rise as a transnational terrorist actor and the growing appeal of its guiding ideology, the Salafi Jihad (Moghadam, 2008).

Al-Qaeda, the "Islamic State," and the globalization of suicide attacks

On August 7, 1998, a set of explosions, only minutes apart, rocked the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks foreshadowed future spectacular suicide attacks by Al-Qaeda that would target the United States and its allies over the next decade. They included the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000; the attacks of September 11, 2001; an attack on a synagogue in Djerbia, Tunisia, in April 2002; and a series of suicide and other terrorist operations in Kenya in November 2002. The group was also involved in a number of other suicide bombings, including in Casablanca and Istanbul in May and November 2003, and in London in July 2005. Numerous other attempts were foiled, including an attempt by shoe bomber Richard Reid to detonate an explosive device over the Atlantic, a desire to hit U.S. landmarks in New York and New Jersey, and a plot to blow up as many as a dozen airliners bound from London to the United States over American cities in the summer or fall of 2006.

In Al-Qaeda's arsenal of tactics, suicide attacks played a pivotal role. Like other groups, Al-Qaeda adopted this tactic because of its high lethality and its ability to instill fear in the target audience and sow confusion among its enemy. More so than other groups, however, Al-Qaeda was highly successful at instilling the spirit of self-sacrifice and the cult of martyrdom into the collective psyche of virtually all of its fighters.

Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, was the first theoretician who succeeded in turning martyrdom and self-sacrifice into a "formative ethos" of global jihadists, some of whom would later join Al-Qaeda. The significance of self-sacrifice for Al-Qaeda is exemplified in a document found in an Al-Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan titled, "Goals and Objectives of Jihad," which ranked the goal of "attaining martyrdom in the cause of God" second only to "establishing the rule of God on earth." Another document listed two "illegitimate excuses for leaving Jihad" as "love of the world" and "hatred of death" (Chivers and Rhode, 2002).

Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members inculcated this importance of martyrdom into the minds of the network's rank and file. In 2004, for instance, bin Laden urged his followers to "become diligent in carrying out martyrdom operations; these operations, praise be to God, have become a great source of terror for the enemy… These are the most important operations" (quoted in Blanchard, 2005, p. 10). Similarly, bin Laden's deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, regularly elevated martyrdom as the most honorable act for Muslims (see for example "Al Qaeda Film …," 2006).

Al-Qaeda was proactive about preaching the virtues of martyrdom—and martyrdom operations—not only to the members of its core group, but to all of its affiliates and associates. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when Al-Qaeda lost its safe haven and the center of gravity of the global jihad movement began shifting to Al-Qaeda's formal and informal partners, suicide attacks began appearing in a growing number of theaters.

On March 22, 2003, less than a week after the U.S.-led invasion of the Iraq campaign, four civilians, including Paul Moran, a 39-year-old Australian cameraman on assignment for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, were killed in a suicide car bombing on the outskirts of the village of Khurmal in northern Iraq. Over the next decade, the number of suicide attacks in Iraq would easily surpass that of all known suicide attacks in all other countries combined. As late as 2014, Iraq remained a hotspot of suicide attacks, accounting for 45 percent of all suicide attacks in that year (Schweitzer, Levin and Yogev, 2015).

In Iraq, as in a growing number of other countries in which suicide attacks would emerge in the post-9/11 period—notably Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—suicide attacks have become a signature tactic of Sunni groups adhering to a strict Salafi-Jihadist interpretation of Islam. Salafi-Jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates, as well as the so-called "Islamic State" and its various predecessor organizations and affiliates, have long become the prime perpetrators of this tactic. Suicide attacks by secular, nationalist, or Shiite groups are not entirely unheard of, but in terms of quantity pale in comparison to suicide attacks organized by Salafi-Jihadist groups (Moghadam, 2009). A report on trends in suicide terrorism during 2013, for example, noted that over 85 percent of all suicide attacks during that year were carried out by Salafi-Jihadist organizations (Rosner, Yogev and Schweitzer, 2014). A follow-up report presenting trends for 2014 stated that in that year, too, most suicide attacks were perpetrated by groups with a Salafi-Jihadist bent (Schweitzer, Levin and Yogev, 2015).

Explanations for suicide terrorism

In recent years, and especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a steep increase in the number of studies dedicated to explaining the causes of suicide attacks. Some of these have focused on the level of the individual bomber, examining such personal motivations as humiliation, despair, personal crisis, commitment, or psychopathology (e.g., Lachkar, 2002; Lester, Yang and Lindsay, 2004; Sarraj, 2004; and Berko, 2012). Others have stressed the need to focus on group factors such as tactics, strategy, or inter-organizational competition as the key variable for explaining the onset, or spread of, suicide bombings (e.g., Sprinzak, 2000; Bloom,

2005; Pape, 2005; and Pedahzur, 2005). A third category of studies have emphasized the importance of cultural and/or ideological explanations for the causes and/or proliferation of this tactic (e.g., Moghadam, 2003; Moghadam, 2006b; Hafez, 2006; and Hafez, 2007). While some studies cross the various levels of analysis and offer multi-causal models, most studies highlight some factors over others (e.g., Moghadam, 2008).

At the individual level, most experts agree that suicide bombers, like all terrorists, are sane and relatively "normal" in the sense that they do not exhibit signs of suffering from a salient psychopathology (McCauley and Segal, 1987). Scholars have instead offered other motives to explain the prevalence of suicide attacks. Commonly ascribed motivations for suicide bombers include revenge (Stern, 2003; Khosrokhavar, 2005; Kimhi and Even, 2004); posthumous benefits such as elevated social status after death, social rewards for the family, or attainment of heavenly pleasures in the afterlife (Ganor, 2001; Hopgood, 2005); and/or a deep sense of commitment to a larger cause and the resulting empowerment sensed by performing a perceived duty to one's country or community (Kimhi and Even, 2004; Pedahzur, 2005). Several scholars have argued that self-sacrifice also serves as a mechanism to overcome and reverse a perceived sense of humiliation, shame, and injustice, and consequently a way to attain honor and significance in one's life (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2009; Hassan, 2001; Moghadam, 2003; and Stern, 2003).

Other researchers have argued that suicide bombers are driven to act by motives similar to those that also affect ordinary suicides. In separate studies, Lankford (2013) and Merari (2010), for instance, have argued that suicide bombers tend to be afflicted by anxiety, depression, marital problems, and other issues frequently associated with suicidal tendencies. (For a critique of this approach see, for example, Brym and Araj, 2012.)

In sum, studies examining individual motivations of suicide terrorism have established a variety of possible motives that may lead individuals to become suicide bombers. No studies, however, have convincingly established why the motivations cited in these studies produce suicide bombers in some cases but not others.

Partly in response to these limitations, a second category of studies has focused on group and organizational aspects for explaining the emergence or spread of suicide terrorism. Studies falling within this approach are particularly important because suicide attacks are rarely carried out by individuals acting on their own, but by individuals who are members of larger groups employing terrorism. Many of the studies falling into this category have built upon Martha Crenshaw's (1988) pioneering theoretical work on terrorist organizations. Other studies that have highlighted the network aspects of suicide terrorism have built on the work of scholars such as Donatella Della Porta (1988) and Marc Sageman (2004) (for example, see Pedahzur and Perliger, 2006; and Acosta and Childs, 2013).

Researchers examining suicide terrorism from an organizational perspective tend to emphasize the strategic and tactical benefits of this mode of operations. Mia Bloom (2005), for example, has argued that suicide bombings are used by organizations in an attempt to outbid other groups. She argues that such outbidding for the purpose of expanding the group's "market share" among the local population is particularly fruitful when suicide terrorism resonates highly with a local population. Empirically, Bloom's theory helps illuminate the adoption of this tactic in some cases, but its validity as a general theory of suicide terrorism has been challenged (e.g., see Pape, 2005).

Several authors have argued that their relatively high degree of lethality has rendered suicide attacks a "rational" or "logical" choice for organizations and states under certain circumstances (e.g., Atran, 2003). Robert Pape (2005, p. 61), for example, asserts that "the main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works." The main reason for suicide terrorism, Pape argues, is foreign occupation, and democracies are particularly at risk

of suffering suicide attacks. Here, too, subsequent scholarship has challenged the contention by arguing that the degree of success of suicide terrorism is overstated (Moghadam, 2006c; Abrahms, 2006); and that the links between occupation and suicide terrorism are either weak (Moghadam, 2006c), or correlational rather than causal (Ashworth *et al.*, 2008).

Some researchers focusing on the group level of analysis have argued that the reasons why groups adopt suicide terrorism have to do with organizational properties. Michael Horowitz (2010a), for example, has argued that suicide terrorism can be seen as a type of military innovation. As such, its adoption requires special training that older organizations might be hesitant to adopt because they are set in their ways. Younger groups, he argues, are thus more likely to adopt suicide bombings than older ones.

Scholars of suicide terrorism have found more common ground in describing the tactical benefits of suicide bombings. Organizations employing suicide attacks are clearly aware of the tactical benefits afforded by this modus operandi (e.g., Ayers, 2008). First, even more than ordinary terrorist attacks, suicide operations are likely to draw attention to a group's cause, aided in large part by the extraordinarily high attention such operations enjoy in the media. In this regard, suicide attacks can be thought of as a form of "strategic signaling," whereby terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group's character and goals to the target audience. As pointed out by Hoffman and McCormick (2004), for instance, the LTTE used suicide attacks to signal an image of elitism, professionalism, invincibility, and fanatical single-mindedness to the Sri Lankan government.

Second, suicide missions, even more than ordinary terrorist attacks, serve the organization's attempt to create extreme fear in the larger population—a key feature, in fact, of all terrorist attacks. This occurs in part due to the group's demonstration of the inefficacy of the targeted government, and in part due to the demoralization of the public and of law enforcement agencies. A suicide attack creates not only a disproportionately intense amount of fear among the targeted population, but its effect may be particularly traumatizing and long-lasting (e.g., Richburg, 2004; Harel, 2003; and BBC News, 2004), thus serving, as Holmes (2005, p. 162) put it, as an "intensifier of enemy despair."

Third, suicide attacks may serve as an internal booster for the group's morale. The use of this tactic helps suggest the complete dedication of the suicide attackers to their cause. It can lead to a sense of moral superiority of the groups' members over their adversaries, which may result in a group's perception that it will eventually prevail over its enemies (Dolnik, 2003).

Finally, terrorist organizations adopt suicide operations because of a number of unique operational benefits. They are a cost-efficient tool, with suicide vests costing as little as $50–$150 (Hassan, 2001). They are also high-precision weapons of sorts, and have therefore often been called the "ultimate smart bomb" (Hoffman, 2003). The explosive devices, which are usually strapped on to the perpetrator's body, can be detonated at the time and place of the attacker's choosing, thus maximizing the lethality of the improvised explosive device (IED). Other tactical benefits of suicide attacks are that their use obviates the need for the complicated task of planning an escape route. Furthermore, the suicide bomber's ensured death nullifies the risk of his or her capture. The risk that the bomber will be intercepted, interrogated, and compelled to disclose incriminating information about the organization is minuscule (e.g., Sprinzak, 2000; Ganor, 2001; and Cronin, 2003).

In sum, organizational approaches to suicide bombing have highlighted the strategic and tactical benefits of suicide attacks. The reasons why groups adopt suicide attacks have little to do with the motivations that lead individuals to become suicide bombers. Similar to the individual level studies, however, organizational approaches have limitations. They fail to explain why, if the tactical benefits of suicide terrorism are so numerous, not all organizations use suicide attacks.

Neither do most studies provide a satisfying answer to the question of when a terrorist group decides to adopt a suicide attack.

A fruitful debate related to the organizational level of analysis is the question over the structure of the groups responsible for suicide terrorism (Pedahzur and Martin, 2016). Here, scholars have made "reasonably robust" findings that "networks play a role at both the local and global levels in facilitating the diffusion of suicide bombing over time," as Horowitz (2015, p. 80) writes in a review article. This approach is exemplified in a seminal article by Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger (2006), who demonstrated the limits of traditional assumptions that view decisions to conduct suicide attacks as the product of decisions made by hierarchical organizations. Adopting network analysis applied to Palestinian suicide bombing networks, they showed that local activists, and internal rivalries at the local level, fare better at explaining these decisions. Pedahzur and Perliger's research has influenced additional noteworthy studies. Acosta and Childs (2013), for example, have used network analysis to argue that the reproduction of suicide attacks is driven by a global network of terrorist entities with common ideological agendas. These networks, they argue, use brokers to promote suicide attack. These findings echo those of Horowitz (2010b), who has argued that large numbers of connections to other groups raise the likelihood of a group adopting suicide bombing.

Sociocultural approaches, the third major category of studies of suicide attacks, have attempted to provide an answer to the limits of the individual and organizational approaches by arguing that individuals and organizations will embark on suicide terrorism if they enjoy social support for this tactic. Indeed, this explanation appears to account for the widespread use of suicide attacks in places like Lebanon or Israel, where a cult of martyrdom has been apparent—manifesting itself in venerations of suicide bombers, the prominent use of euphemistic labels for suicide attacks and their perpetrators, and the penetration of the suicide bomber into popular culture, such as movies, comics, or plays.

Some researchers claim that sustained levels of suicide terrorism are entirely dependent upon strong support among the attacker's domestic population (Bloom, 2005). It is apparent, however, that an increasing number of suicide attacks in recent years have been performed in countries where there does not seem to be strong popular support for these activities—such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Iraq (Moghadam, 2006c). A culture of martyrdom may well surround the world of the suicide bombers in these cases, but increasingly that culture seems to be found on cyberspace as opposed to the street.

In sum, existing research into the origins and proliferation of suicide terrorism has made some headway in explaining the ongoing use and appeal of this tactic, but debates persist. To date, scholars have been able to highlight several factors that correlate with the adoption of suicide terrorism—such as religious ideology—but have not been able to prove causation. Social network approaches to suicide terrorism have also proven productive. As more data on suicide terrorism becomes available, scholars will hopefully attain more data to test some of the existing hypotheses put forward to date, and generate new explanations.

Notes

1 The author thanks Amber Atteridge for research support.

2 According to data provided by Yoram Schweitzer.

3 There are no precise data on the number of attacks perpetrated by the LTTE. For a discussion, see Hoffman and McCormick (2004) and also Hopgood (2005).

4 Based on information gathered from the suicide terrorism database by the National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa. The author thanks Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger for providing me with access to the database.

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20
TERRORIST HOSTAGE-TAKING

Margaret Wilson

Introduction

This chapter examines the nature of terrorist hostage-taking; its typical forms and key characteristics. The current uncertainties in defining hostage-taking incidents are discussed, along with research that has practical implications for policy and practice.

The chapter opens by setting out the three main forms of hostage-taking and the typical stages of an incident as it unfolds. Important distinctions are made between cases that involve human hostages and other entities, and the necessity of distinguishing between terrorist and non-terrorist cases. The role of intended bargaining in 'true' hostage events is highlighted. The second section examines the role that location, mobility, targeting and the number of hostages play in distinguishing between different types of hostage-taking incidents. The third section considers some areas of ambiguity in understanding hostage-taking, including the difficulty in identifying motivations and the definition of a hostage. Finally, the chapter concludes with some of the practical issues raised by current research in relation to media coverage, the granting of concessions and decisions on intervention.

Basic issues

Three types of hostage-taking

There are three types of hostage-taking: kidnap, hijack, and barricade-siege. A kidnapping involves the removal of a person or persons to an unknown location. This is the most frequent form of terrorist hostage-taking and, worldwide, the number of cases continues to increase every year. A hijacking involves a form of transport, which is taken over by hostage takers, keeping the passengers and/or crew captive. The type of hijacking that receives the most media attention is the hijacking of aircraft, referred to as aerial hijack. However, many other forms of transport have been hijacked, including private vehicles, maritime vessels, buses and trains. The final type of hostage-taking is 'barricade-siege', a form of hostage-taking where the location of the hostages and the hostage takers is known. In these cases, the hostage takers take over a certain location, such as an embassy or a public building, and they barricade themselves inside with the hostages. In terrorist incidents, barricade-siege is the rarest form of hostage-taking, and the number of cases has decreased over the years.

The importance of bargaining

A typical hostage-taking incident involves a planned mission to capture one or more persons who are held with threat against their lives in order to negotiate for some form of concession from another party. That target may be a government or other authority, and the concessions may be assets such as money or prisoner release, or change, such as the withdrawal of troops or political recognition.

Many scholars will only define an incident as hostage-taking when there is an intention to engage in a trade for the hostages (Faure, 2003; Wilson, 2003a). There are some cases where we know for certain that the captives were never intended to be negotiated over at all. For instance, the passengers on board the planes used in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were victims of a terrorist attack, but they were not 'hostages'. The distinction between cases where negotiation is intended and those where it is not is important, because whether we count such incidents as hostage-taking or not can have serious implications for research that aims to guide negotiators, understanding the dynamics of hostage-taking or predicting the outcomes of different forms of attack. The outcomes of past incidents can also influence people's perceptions of the risk of various forms of terrorist action, and so potentially their own behaviour if they are caught up in a hostage-taking incident (Wilson 2003b). Those who are required to manage an ongoing hostage crisis are also called on to judge the likely outcomes as the incident unfolds, and they too are not immune from the influence of past cases.

All these factors suggest that we should maintain a distinction between hostages who are taken to bargain for concessions and those that are taken for other purposes. However, in practice, there are a number of reasons why it can be hard to judge whether a trade is intended in a live hostage-taking incident, or if it ever was when studying past cases, and I will come back to this issue later in the chapter.

The stages of hostage-taking

Wilson (2003a) sets out the stages of a hostage-taking event from planning to resolution and the areas of psychology which are relevant to each. As the stages imply, hostage-taking incidents unfold over a temporal dimension, regardless of how short each stage is. The seizing of the hostages may involve transporting them to another place or simply restraining them, whether by physical force or by threat, in the place where they were found. The holding phase is the length of their capture and can vary from minutes to years.

However, not all of the stages will happen in any one incident; a stage may appear to be missing. For example, if hostages are taken in reaction to the failure of a different form of terrorist action, it may appear that the planning stage is absent. Similarly, a hostage incident may never reach the negotiation phase if hostages escape or the scene is stormed by rescuing forces.

The entity held

While the word 'hijack' refers to a hostage-taking incident involving transportation, it is also often used to refer to the taking of transport alone, without involving any hostages at all. The people on board at the time might be released with or without injury, or they might have been killed and the transport taken. These hijackings usually happen because the thieves want to use the transport for a different criminal or terrorist purpose; for example, a car may be used to conduct a robbery or deliver a bomb. This form of hijacking was used in the 2016 terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Berlin, where a truck was hijacked and the driver killed before using

the vehicle to drive into a crowd of civilian shoppers. A plane or a yacht may be used for drug or arms smuggling or to access a terrorist target, for example, as in the hijacked fishing boat used in the 2008 armed assaults in Mumbai. 'Hijack' in these cases is used to distinguish a theft where the vehicle was in someone's possession when it was taken, as compared to the theft of an unattended vehicle which is just 'stolen'.

However, transport can not only be hijacked without its occupants but it can also be held for ransom independently of the hostages. A terrorist example of this involved three planes hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1970, where the hostages were removed and the planes blown up, causing millions of dollars of economic damage to the airlines involved (Mickolus, 1980). More recently there have been numerous non-terrorist cases of commercial vessels being taken by Somali pirates, with huge sums of money demanded for the return of the ships and their cargo. These cases sometimes have and sometimes have not involved the ships' crew as hostages themselves.

Thus, while 'hijack' can occur without hostages and ransoms can be demanded for property and other entities, in terms of understanding the dynamics of hostage-taking incidents, the current chapter will only consider cases involving living human hostages.

Non-terrorist hostage-taking

As noted in the previous section, all three forms of hostage-taking are used by criminals as well as terrorists. People can be kidnapped for the purposes of criminal extortion, where their family or employers are approached for a ransom. A person may be kidnapped in order to gain access to premises, or to put pressure on another, such as a family member, to force them to commit or aid a crime.

The most frequent form of non-terrorist barricade-siege is domestic sieges. They usually involve a lone individual taking a member or members of their own (or ex) family hostage and barricading them into a home. Other relatively frequent non-terrorist forms of barricade-siege are criminal incidents and prison hostage-taking. Criminal incidents generally occur when some other crime, such as a bank robbery, goes wrong and hostages are kept in order for the hostage takers to bargain their way out of the situation. Prison hostage-taking occurs where someone already held in a jail takes hostage another prisoner, a visitor or a member of the prison staff, in the hope of gaining some concession such as legal advice or a prison transfer.

I have already mentioned that transport may be hijacked for criminal purposes without the hostages involved, but hostages may also be taken along with the transport to afford some protection to criminals fleeing from a crime scene. A large proportion of those who hijack planes are not, strictly speaking, 'terrorists' at all, where their motivations are purely financial, or more often, concern transportation as an end in itself, for example, asylum seekers fleeing conflict in their own country.

Is it terrorism?

Judging whether an act is terrorism or not is far from straightforward. Hostage-taking is no different in this respect. The one thing that contemporary scholars are agreed on is that an act of terrorism is not determined by the person who carries it out but rather by the action taken (Schmid, 1993). Thus, one does not need to be a member of an 'official' terrorist organisation in order to have carried out an act of terrorism. This distinction is important because it overcomes a number of problems. First, not all countries agree which organisations are terrorists (Beck & Miner, 2013). Second, lots of acts of terrorism are carried out by people who are not affiliated

with any known group. Finally, numerous authors have pointed out that labelling people as 'terrorists' implies a value judgement and depends on your position in the conflict (see for example, Horgan, 2005). By using features of the act itself, it is possible to keep the definition objective, and this means that any player in a conflict, including Western governments, may be deemed to have carried out an act of terrorism.

In order to consider the characteristics of terrorist hostage-taking, we need to look at three common components of the definitions of terrorism. First, an act of terrorism has to *involve violence or the threat of violence*. While this aspect of the definition can be troubling to those who study politically motivated attacks on infrastructure, for those examining hostage-taking it is the easiest of the components to identify. Once we have established that the hostages are there against their will, then either violence or the threat of violence is the thing most likely to be keeping them there, and this is true in all three forms of hostage-taking. This in itself, however, will not be enough to label the act terrorism, because 'ordinary' criminals use violence as well.

It is the second and third components of the definition of terrorism that make determining whether a hostage-taking incident is terrorism so difficult. The second feature of terrorism is that the act is designed to cause *fear in a wider population* than those exposed to the immediate violence, and the third feature is that the fear generated is intended to create pressure for *some kind of change*, whether that change is political, societal or religious.

When it comes to hostage-taking, whether fear is caused in a wider population may be related to the targeting of the incident. If random people or members of groups such as tourists are taken hostage, then it is reasonable to assume that the act would affect a larger population. People may fear that they or those they know could be taken hostage in the future. However, it is less clear whether hostage-taking generates fear when a specific politician or other prominent person is taken hostage. This kind of hostage-taking is akin to the assassination of political figures, which Schmid (2000) has claimed can never be considered terrorism, because of the nature of the definition. However, just because people are not afraid for their own lives, it does not mean that they are not afraid in a more general sense, for example, of what a particular terrorist organisation is capable of. Some 'purists' might say that very specifically targeted kidnappings, like assassinations, cannot be terrorism, but many kidnappings certainly do create fear, and so all three forms of hostage-taking can fulfil this aspect of the definition of terrorism.

The third factor is probably the hardest to gauge, that is, whether the act is designed to put pressure on a government or other authority to result in some form of change. There are a whole range of reasons why we may not know exactly what the hostage takers want, both at the time, and even after the event has concluded, and therefore judging an act as terrorism can be very difficult. I am going to return to this issue later in the chapter. First, I am going to examine the key variables that distinguish between different hostage-taking incidents and how they impact on the dynamics of the event for all of the parties involved.

Key variables

The location and mobility of the holding phase

The location of the hostage-taking event is a crucial factor in distinguishing between hostage-taking types. In kidnapping, the location of the hostages is usually unknown, and this makes it more challenging for the authorities. If it is not known where the hostages are being held, then the kidnappers have an advantage in that their location cannot be stormed by rescuers and they can abandon the plan and escape if they so choose. The unknown location changes the balance of power between the authorities and the hostage takers and has an influence on negotiations.

Kidnappers can not only hold hostages at unknown locations, but they can change that location as well. Once the location of the hostages is known to the authorities then there is the potential for the kidnapping to turn into a barricade-siege.

From the authorities' point of view, with barricade-siege, they have an advantage because they know where the hostages are located and can surround the scene. The hostage takers are at a disadvantage because they cannot just change their minds, release (or kill) the hostages and escape, as they might with a kidnap. Unless they were prepared for a suicide mission, they are required to negotiate a way out for themselves. Of course, the hostage takers can still surrender, and that is what the authorities will be hoping for as an outcome.

In a plane hijacking, it is most usual that the hostage takers board the aircraft as passengers and then make themselves known once the aircraft has taken off. The passengers and crew are unable to escape while the aircraft is in the air, although they might try to intervene and overpower the hostage takers (Wilson 2003b). The events of 9/11 have changed our perceptions of plane hijackings, and therefore, potentially, people's reactions to them. The fear that a hijacked plane may be crashed as a weapon has led to discussions about whether shooting planes down should be an option in ending aerial hijack.

In the early stages, aerial hijack is similar to kidnap, because the authorities cannot surround the plane and the hostage takers have a degree of flexibility about where they will divert the flight to. However, with limited fuel, the plane will need to land, and once it has, the same restrictions start to apply as they do with a barricade-siege in a building. There are cases where the hostage takers have been able to refuel the plane and take off again, and in the past, political hijackers have sought to land the plane in a country which is sympathetic to their cause. This gives them an advantage in being able to seek asylum once the hostage incident concludes.

Other forms of transport are more restricted in their movements and will become sieges more quickly than aerial hijacks. Buses lack security and are easy to board, but are limited in how far they can go. A bus can also be effectively tracked and stopped by road blocks.

Trains suffer from all of the problems of buses, except that they are even more constrained in terms of where they can go. This does not mean that trains have not been hijacked. There was a major hijack incident on board a train in the Netherlands in 1975 where South Moluccan terrorists kept passengers hostage for several days (Mickolus, 1980), but the incident lacked mobility and so was quickly turned into a siege.

Maritime vessels can be boarded in port or at sea, but those taken at sea have both similarities and differences to aircraft hijackings; passengers have limited potential for escape, but unlike aircraft, authorities can board a vessel while it is still in transit.

The number of hostages

The number of people taken hostage in an incident has implications for the way that the hostage takers manage the situation. The ratio of hostages to hostage takers is an important consideration for how the hostages will be controlled. In addition, many hostage-taking operations use hostage release as part of the negotiation process, and so having a larger initial number of hostages can be useful for bargaining. For example, the nationalities of the hostages may be established, and those with whom the hostage takers have no grievance (or no potential gain) may be released. Likewise, the hostage takers might let the women and children go and keep only the adult males. These forms of release can be used to gain concessions and to demonstrate that the hostage takers are negotiable. The number of hostages involved in an incident is important to the authorities as well; the number of hostages to be freed, and to avoid injuring, is an important factor in planning any rescue attempt.

It is frequently the case that hijackings and barricade-siege involve large groups of hostages, while kidnappings tend to involve single or small groups of hostages (Wilson & Smith, 1999). Nonetheless, forms of transport with only a few passengers or crew have been taken in the past, for example, in the form of a private plane. Equally, a building may be used in a barricade-siege with only a few hostages present. Although only one hostage is often involved in a kidnapping, there are also many occasions where more than one person is taken, such as a group of tourists, or a small team of journalists. A large number of people can also be kidnapped as part of one operation. For example, in April 2014 almost 300 Nigerian teenage girls were kidnapped from their school by terrorists from Boko Haram. The hostage takers initially claimed that their aim was to sell the girls, but there were reports that they were also asking for the release of prisoners in exchange for the hostages. It is quite rare for a large number of people to be abducted, because they are difficult to transport and hide. When there are a large number of hostages, it is harder for the kidnappers to make sure that no one escapes or attempts to overpower the hostage takers themselves.

Thus, while some hostage numbers are more typical of certain forms of hostage-taking, and have implications for the internal dynamics of the operation, the number of hostages does not define the type of incident per se.

Targeting

There are several different types of targeting strategy used in hostage-taking operations. Sometimes the hostage or hostages have been targeted as named individuals, for example where the hostage takers set out to capture a specific person such as a prominent government official. In these cases, the hostage has been specifically targeted because of who they are. The next set of victims is those who have been targeted because of their membership of a particular group. That is, they have not been selected by name, but because of what they represent, for example, because of their membership of an occupation or a nationality. Finally, hostages might be selected based on opportunity; people have just been taken because they happened to be in a certain place at a certain time.

Each form of targeting may be used in all forms of hostage-taking, although some combinations are more unusual than others. For instance, while seizing an aircraft usually involves random hostages, they may be targeted by their likely nationality, or on occasion because a named individual is known to be on board. Similarly, kidnappings are often targeted at specified individuals, but membership of a national group may be enough to make someone a target in many geographic locations.

In barricade-siege, the hostages will be selected from whoever is there at the time. If the location that is targeted is a public building such as a hotel, then the hostages may be 'random' in as much as the hostage takers do not know who will be there by name. Nevertheless, the building chosen will determine the likely occupants; for example, a five-star hotel in an otherwise deprived region may contain official guests or wealthy foreigners. If the hostage takers have taken over an embassy, they may well hope that they have captured foreign embassy staff as well as local people who are there in support roles. Here again, hostage takers may keep only the people that they perceive to be 'useful' hostages, and release those that do not serve the purpose of their mission.

Uncertainties

Understanding motivation

As discussed earlier in the chapter, to decide if a hostage-taking incident is terrorism or not needs an understanding of whether the perpetrators' intention is to create widespread fear,

and to use that fear as leverage for political or social change. There are some indications that terrorist hostage-taking incidents are different from non-political forms, for example, being less deterred by target hardening (Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005) and being harder to negotiate to resolution (Faure, 2003). Knowing what motivates the hostage takers is a crucial factor in managing any negotiation process and working to resolve the situation.

However, understanding what hostage takers want can be difficult for a number of reasons. Although the target chosen might sometimes give a clue about the perpetrators' motivation, it is important not to make assumptions about whether an incident is terrorism or not, or which particular cause might have driven it, before there is any concrete information for decision-makers to go on.

In recent years there has been a tendency in the media to assume that many acts of violence are driven by a specific terrorist agenda, often well before there is any evidence to support that assumption. Both law enforcement officers and politicians are often careful to remind the public not to jump to conclusions before investigations are complete. In ongoing events, the motivation of the hostage takers is always unknown until they make some contact, but even after the incident is over, there are many cases where the motives remain unknown. As previously discussed, these historical cases form the basis of many academic research endeavours, which in turn inform future policy, and so understanding motivations has long-term as well as immediate importance.

Hostage takers, unlike many terrorist bombers, are usually either present at the scene of a siege, or in contact with the authorities through negotiation, and there may be actions taken or statements made which make the purpose of the hostage-taking clear. One of those actions is the issuing of demands which have to be met in order to secure the release of the hostages. Clearly, the demands become central to the negotiation process and the possibility that the hostage takers will settle for lesser concessions needs to be explored.

There will be some demands associated with political or other change that will signify that, in combination with the violence and fear, the act is most likely to be an act of terrorism. Likewise, personal demands that affect only the hostage takers themselves should clarify that the hostage-taking is not an act of terrorism.

There is one very frequent demand that presents a problem in deciding whether an incident is terrorism or not. Money is often a personal demand, and therefore associated with non-terrorist incidents. However, it is also one of the most frequent reasons that terrorist organisations take hostages, raising funds that are used to resource further terrorist attacks. This can therefore be hostage-taking which may not, *in itself,* be aiming for change as a result of that one operation, but is contributing to an ongoing campaign which is directed toward change.

While demands might give us some insight into the hostage takers' motivations, in many hostage-taking incidents, demands are never made; on occasion because the hostage takers never got around to it before they surrendered, escaped or were killed or overpowered. However, there are cases where demands are just not issued; perhaps because the aim of the mission was not about concessions per se but some other aim, for example, publicity. Importantly, even when demands *are* made, the receiving of concessions may be a 'bonus', while the real point of the mission lies elsewhere (Mickolus, 1987). This can make the distinction between hostage-taking for concessions and hostage-taking for other purposes even more difficult to determine.

One of the more general motivations of terrorist action is to attract publicity, and hostage-taking does this very well (Faure, 2003). The so called 'symbiotic' relationship between terrorism and the media has been covered in an extensive literature. Clearly, in order to create fear, and to turn that fear into pressure for change, the message of threat needs to be promoted as widely as

possible (Braithwaite, 2013). However, the 'message' from publicity is sometimes designed not for the general public alone, but for the terrorists' own 'constituency'; that is, their own supporters. The action may be designed to show that they are committed to fighting for change, or to bolster the morale of those they claim to represent (Cronin, 2007; Kydd & Walter, 2006). Terrorist acts are also used for recruitment. If terrorists can provoke a government into responding in a heavy-handed way, then this can increase support and recruitment to the terrorists' cause. This phenomenon is also known as 'jujitsu politics' (McCauley, 2006).

However, in those cases where no demands are made, we do not know if the perpetrators ever intended to make any and therefore whether the hostages were 'true hostages' after all. If hostage takers have escaped from the scene, we may not know who they represented or what they wanted. Some attacks are claimed by more than one terrorist organisation, and many are never claimed at all, particularly those where there is a public backlash (Bradford & Wilson, 2013).

Finally, when we are considering past cases and trying to decide what motivated them, we need to be aware that a great deal of what happens to try to resolve a hostage crisis goes on behind the scenes, and just because there are no public accounts of the hostage takers' demands does not mean that none were made.

Defining a hostage

At the start of this chapter, hostages were defined as captives taken in order to bargain for some form of concession. It was also noted that there are clear cases, both terrorist and non-terrorist, where there is never any intention to negotiate over a person's release. However, as the previous section demonstrated, many terrorist incidents involving captives never reach a stage where demands are issued, or more confusingly, despite lengthy interactions with the authorities, specific demands are just never issued. In an unfolding incident, the captors' motivations or intentions would not be known until communication had been established between the hostage takers and the authorities. In these circumstances, we do not yet know whether the hostages were to be bargained for or not. Similarly, when a person is found dead after an abduction, it is unclear if there was *intention* to bargain which failed, or whether this was just a murder or an assassination. Under these circumstances we still need to decide whether to define that person as having been a 'hostage', and as previously stated, this can have implications for scientific research.

In the inclusion criteria for the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the potential absence of bargaining has been compensated for by defining a hostage incident as one that is 'for the purpose of achieving a political objective through concessions *or through disruption of normal operations*' (GTD Codebook, 2015, p. 23; emphasis added). In this way, people captive inside an embassy or a hotel are disrupting normal operations, even in the absence of demands. While this does get round the problem of defining a hostage incident when there are no demands, the intention of the hostage takers in relation to the hostages is more important, albeit harder to operationalise. The intention to bargain signifies an intention to keep the hostages alive, at least in the short term, since dead hostages attract much smaller ransom payments (Dolnik, 2003). The absence of demands may therefore signify a potentially more threatening situation for the captives and may require a different response from the authorities.

However, communication of intent is not the only issue in determining the status of captives. Another area of uncertainty occurs in cases of 'collusion', where the hostages are in collaboration with the hostage takers, for example, a whole plane full of people who have been 'hijacked' and who all subsequently claim asylum. Determining the true role of the hostages is extremely important in assessing the risk to the hostages and in deciding how to bring the incident to an

end. However, while an incident in is progress we must always assume that the danger to the hostage is real until they are safely out of the hostage-taking situation.

Aside from cases of deception, thus far I have only considered the intention to bargain as part of my definition of when a captive becomes a 'hostage'. The word hostage is certainly used very freely by the media, and it now seems commonplace in the reporting of ongoing terrorist incidents to refer to anyone on the premises as a hostage, well before we know the aims of the violence, and regardless of whether the terrorists are interacting with them. The media have been accused of using the term to deliberately attract more attention to an unfolding crisis (see Braithwaite, 2013; Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006).

In November 2015 and January 2016, two armed assaults on luxury hotels were carried out by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliates in Mali and Burkina Faso. The hotels were most likely targeted for the Western and official occupants. The attacks were protesting military interventions in terrorist-held territories in West Africa and were characterised by terrorists storming into the building shooting and killing people indiscriminately. In Mali, it was reported that some occupants were rounded up into a hall, and some were released on proof that they could recite the Shahada. However, in both cases many of the 'hostages' were fortunate to never encounter the attackers, hiding in their rooms until security forces cleared the building and escorted them to safety. These people were certainly trapped in a terrorist attack, and may have become hostages if they were discovered, but they cannot be 'hostages' while they are unknown to the perpetrators.

There has been a lot of debate in terrorism studies about what it means to ascribe the word terrorism to a violent act and, quite rightly, this has led to the strict definitions we now employ. If we do not have strict definitions of violent acts, it is difficult to study them systematically. The word *hostage*, like *terrorist*, is an emotive one, and so it could be argued that we should have as strict a definition for its use as we do for specific acts of political violence and their perpetrators.

Changing forms

The first sections of this chapter set out the three forms of hostage-taking and their typical qualities. However, terrorist attacks are often dynamic events that have a tendency to stray between classifications.

While the three forms are most often seen alone, there are also occasions when incidents change over time. Because hostage-taking is a temporal process, the location, number of hostages, and the intentions of the hostage takers can change during the hostage-taking event. As previously noted, both kidnaps and hijacks can evolve into sieges. Likewise, on occasion hostage takers have successfully removed themselves, along with hostages, from a known location, turning a siege into a kidnapping. These changes mean that the form of hostage-taking is not always stable throughout its lifespan and that the way that the authorities deal with the unfolding event may need to be different at different stages.

In recent years there appears to have been some blurring of the boundaries between different forms of terrorism. Armed assaults ('shooting sprees') as well as hostage-taking incidents are incorporating suicide bombings, and armed assaults are mixed with hostage-taking to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain what role the victims are going to play. It is in dealing with such acts of terrorism that the issues covered in this chapter start to matter. Is the incident a hostage-taking or an armed assault? Are the people present true hostages or just victims who will be killed? Fast decisions must be made by those responding to a terrorist attack. The following section therefore considers some of the practical issues faced in trying to resolve hostage-taking incidents and the areas where future research can have a valuable input.

Practical considerations

Publicity

One of the first issues that needs to be addressed is whether it is desirable to limit media coverage of hostage-taking incidents. As many terrorism analysts have pointed out, if the primary purpose of terrorist action is to publicize a cause, then media coverage may be perpetuating terrorism as a means of getting heard. While it may seem reasonable to conclude that withdrawal of media coverage would decrease terrorism, there are some who say that acts of terrorism would simply become more extreme in order to gain attention (Alexander, 1978; Martin, 1986). Yet other commentators hold that freedom of the press and the public's right to information are too valuable to sacrifice (e.g. Farnen, 1990).

However, aside from the longer-term publicity that comes from media coverage, there are immediate short-term considerations for the authorities. Hostage-taking incidents, along with other 'interactive' forms of attack such as armed assaults, will attract media attention while the incident is still in progress, and this can have very serious implications for those who are trying to find a peaceful resolution. In cases of siege, the authorities may not want live coverage of the incident to be broadcast, because the terrorists themselves may be watching and gain advantage in terms of knowing where the SWAT teams are placed, etc. There are clear examples in the past where media broadcasts have led directly to the death of a hostage or the failure of ongoing negotiations (Dolnik, 2003; Faure, 2003). To mitigate against these problems, the mainstream media can be kept away from the immediate scene, asked to report responsibly, or report with a short time lag to allow police operations (e.g. Almagor, 2005). It has even been suggested that, in the US, the media might be used to *decrease* fear of terrorism through accurate reporting of the (un)likelihood of being caught in a terrorist attack (Huddy *et al.*, 2005).

On a practical level, since the 1970s when this debate began, communications have changed a great deal, and new technology has made it near impossible for any public act of violence to go unreported via social media. There are many who believe that information from those caught up in a terrorist incident can be of immediate value to both other victims and the authorities (such as the information posted by those caught up in the armed assaults in Paris in November 2015). However, the possibility that such information is used by the terrorists themselves remains a concern, the only solution to which is to shut down the network, a move that was criticized following the 7/7 attacks in London.

Aside from giving terrorists a platform to generate fear, there are other issues to consider in relation to media coverage of terrorist attacks. Some researchers have argued for media blackouts on all forms of terrorism because of fears of 'contagion' or copycat crimes (Hayes, 1982; Oots, 1986). When it comes to studying contagion in terrorist attacks, the most frequently used example is aerial hijacking, where research shows a clear relationship between news of a 'successful' hijacking and further attempts (see for example, Dugan *et al.*, 2005). Although the data have not yet been analysed, it seems likely that increased use of vehicles as weapons of violence in recent years will be similarly found to have been influenced by contagion effects.

A final issue relating specifically to hostage-taking is the controversy regarding media blackouts on naming kidnap victims. It is sometimes considered to be detrimental to negotiations to afford publicity to a kidnap, as it can interfere with efforts to negotiate the hostage's release or give the impression that the hostage is more 'valuable' than the terrorists thought (Dolnik, 2003). On the other hand, this lack of public acknowledgement of the victim's plight can seem to relatives and the public as though a victim is being ignored or forgotten.

Concessions

It is often cited that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. government will negotiate with terrorists. However, this 'no-negotiation policy' is a misnomer. While both the US and UK have laws preventing the payment of ransoms to terrorist hostage takers, they must enter into a dialogue with them, that is, to engage in negotiations. Many negotiations end with the release of hostages without any concessions being made. The negotiators' overall aim is to get the hostages out while giving as few concessions as possible and to get the hostage takers to surrender. The important distinctions here are between negotiations, concessions and ransoms. Not negotiating is not the same thing as not paying for the release of hostages.

Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) showed that, in cases occurring from 1978–2005, for all those terrorist hostage takers who had 'logistical success', that is, were able to obtain some hostages, a fairly high percentage went on to have 'negotiated success', that is, to receive one or more of their demands. In kidnapping incidents, 60.2 per cent of terrorists with hostages received some concession, while in other hostage events, 36.5 per cent went on to obtain one or more of the things that they asked for. This is likely to be an underestimation, as governments try to avoid making public any concessions that they granted in order to prevent copycat crimes (Faure, 2003). Despite these limitations, it would be important for future research to consider not just whether any concession were granted but the nature of those concessions, in order to understand how these resolutions were achieved.

As discussed earlier in the chapter, terrorist hostage takers do frequently demand money, and some countries do pay ransoms for the return of their citizens (Faure, 2003). This policy is heavily criticized by those who claim that they do not pay ransoms, as such payments are thought to increase the frequency of subsequent attacks. Brandt and Sandler (2010) calculate that in kidnapping, for every hostage incident where concessions are granted, 2.62 more abductions will happen. Although the payment of ransoms to terrorists is illegal in the US and UK, there are suspicions that payments *are* made, via intermediaries, or that governments exchange something other than money (Faure, 2003). In 2014 some controversy was generated when President Obama entered into a prisoner exchange with the Taliban, releasing five Afghan prisoners in return for captured U.S. soldier Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.

Empirical studies of previous hostage incidents appear to have clear-cut policy implications on ransom payments; however, there are serious ethical issues to consider. In recent years, Islamic State (IS) kidnappings have brought discussions of non-payment of ransoms into the public domain, and this has been reflected in changing governmental responses. In 2014, the U.K. government signalled its intention to close a loophole that could allow insurance companies to reimburse ransom payments to terrorists. The following year saw the U.S. government move in the opposite direction, relaxing its position on the payment of ransoms for hostages and indicating that they would not prosecute those who paid for the return of family members.

Finally, in order to understand the relationship between the granting of concessions and future hostage-taking, we need to revisit the definition of a hostage. The no-payment policy may appear to have reduced the number of Americans taken hostage, but it may have increased the number killed. Terrorism researchers are well aware of substitution effects, and it is possible that 'non-profitable' hostages could be killed before they have been held long enough to qualify as a 'hostage'.

Intervention

One of the most difficult aspects of managing a hostage-taking incident is the decision as to whether to call for an intervention and send rescuing forces into a hostage siege, and if so, at what stage this should happen.

In studies of hostage-taking incidents that took place in the late twentieth century, it has been reported that more hostages are killed as a result of rescuing forces storming a siege than are killed by terrorists (e.g. Poland & McCrystle, 1999; Wilson, 2000). It is important to note that these studies were analysing 'true' hostage-taking incidents, that is, those where bargaining was present or appeared to be intended, and that the figures do not therefore include cases where large numbers of people are targeted, rounded up, captured and subsequently killed. While recent conflicts have seen many such killings, these cases are more appropriately labelled massacres than hostage-taking incidents. It is possible that contemporary 'true' hostage incidents do present a greater danger to the hostages than those of earlier conflicts; however, this needs to be confirmed with empirical data.

At present, those who manage hostage-taking incidents have to judge whether the danger to the hostages outweighs the danger of an armed intervention. Since we know that many hostages are killed in such interventions (by the terrorists, or in the crossfire), the decision to storm a hostage incident requires a determination that there is no other alternative. However, despite the importance of such judgements, there have been very few attempts to understand hostage-taking dynamics, or to predict the outcomes of various scenarios. Friedland and Merari (1992) analysed 69 incidents of hostage-taking and examined the factors which had a greater association with violent versus non-violent endings (regardless of which party initiated them). They found that the factors most associated with violent endings were major international incidents where the strategy chosen was non-mobile, the presence of explosives or grenades, deliberate hostage execution and the availability of a trained rescue team. In 2000 Wilson was able to show a statistically significant relationship between various aspects of behaviour in aerial hijackings (including the demands made) and outcomes such as harm to the hostages or eventual surrender. However, these studies were the first attempts at predicting outcomes and relied on very small sample sizes. Here again, analysis of a more recent sample of cases would be extremely valuable.

Those in positions of command and control in hostage-taking incidents need to assess indications of 'escalation'; that is, whether the internal dynamics of the hostage-taking incident pose sufficient risk to the hostages to justify an intervention, with its risk of injury and death to one or more of the hostages. Future research could help detect changes related to escalation which would be valuable to those tasked with managing such situations.

Conclusions

This chapter has set out the three basic forms of terrorist hostage-taking and the key characteristics that play a role in determining both the internal dynamics of a hostage event as well as the decisions that will affect its resolution. As the issues covered in this chapter have shown, there are a number of variables that must be considered in deciding how to respond to such a crisis. Hostage-taking incidents are complex dynamic events with high stakes and rapidly-changing characteristics.

The chapter has highlighted the importance of definitions, not just in distinguishing between terrorist and non-terrorist hostage-taking, but in terms of defining what we mean by 'hostages' as well. While the definition of terrorism has been clearly set out over the last 30 years, there has been little previous attention to defining a hostage, and this chapter has stressed the importance of bargaining (or the intention to bargain) over the captive's release in defining a hostage-taking incident. It has been argued that a strict definition of what constitutes a hostage-taking incident is required in order to set the parameters of research that is used to predict outcomes and guide the actions of those tasked with resolving hostage-taking crises.

This review has shown the need to distinguish between terrorist and non-terrorist hostage-taking and the potential implications of such distinctions in the management and resolution of hostage-taking events. It would be useful to understand which of the principles learnt from hostage-taking in general are relevant to terrorist hostage-taking and which are not. For example, knowing if the perpetrators are terrorists or not and whether the captives are hostages to be bargained over or not have crucial implications for bringing about a successful conclusion. Therefore, research which allowed some insight into whether and when demands were likely to be issued would be very useful in understanding the dynamics of hostage-taking incidents.

Over the last 20 years there appear to have been some significant changes in the way hostages are used, most recently in the emergence of mixed and multiple forms of terrorist action. While true hostage incidents are not as frequent as armed assaults and bomb attacks, there have been recent attacks where victims get caught up in lengthy incidents in which their role is unclear. We need a better understanding of these forms of hostage-taking in order to understand how to react to them. Further research on hostage-taking incidents is required in order to develop a contemporary understanding of terrorist hostage-taking.

In conclusion, there are still a large number of areas where research can provide extremely valuable information that can have direct relevance to policy, as well as to the prevention and resolution of hostage events.

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21

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) TERRORISM

Gary A. Ackerman

Introduction

When it comes to the means by which they ply their nefarious craft, most terrorists most of the time have been content to use fairly traditional weapons. Indeed, of historical terrorist attacks where the type of weapon was known, over 99 percent have involved the utilization of firearms, bombs, incendiaries or melee weapons.[1] Occasionally, however, terrorists can be a little more ambitious in selecting their instruments of harm, at times even venturing to employ decidedly unconventional means – the most infamous of which include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The specter of such weapons being used against unprotected victims – especially in the form of so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – has become a source of substantial concern for both governments and publics around the world, often conjuring up terrifying images of pestilence and mushroom clouds.

Emblematic of such concern is the following from the 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (White House 2006, p. 12): "Our greatest and gravest concern… is WMD in the hands of terrorists. Preventing their acquisition and the dire consequences of their use is a key priority of this strategy." Nor are such pronouncements confined to the United States, with similar sentiments echoed in other Western countries such as the United Kingdom, where Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, then-Director General of Britain's MI5, declared that, "Today we see the use of home-made improvised explosive devices; tomorrow's threat may include the use of chemicals, bacteriological agents, radioactive materials and even nuclear technology" (Manningham-Buller 2006).

At the same time, others have criticized this apparent preoccupation with CBRN weapons, casting WMD as an overblown threat that, either unwittingly or by design, has been exaggerated by politicians, journalists and a putative homeland security industry (Mueller 2006; Lustick 2006). An oft-cited example of the way that such hype can negatively affect policy is then-U.S. Vice-President Cheney's infamous "one percent doctrine," which essentially stated that if there is even a 1 percent possibility that a terrorist group could be assisted in procuring a nuclear weapon, it should be treated as a certainty with respect to government response (Suskind 2006). Based on such reports, an argument can at least be made that policymakers have not always approached the issue of CBRN terrorism in the most measured fashion, at least not from the viewpoint of objective risk assessment practice.

This chapter will attempt to untangle these opposing views about CBRN terrorism, by exploring why terrorists might be attracted to CBRN weapons over guns and bombs and what types of capabilities are required to successfully utilize them. In so doing, it will also briefly consider the nature and magnitude of the CBRN terrorism threat both at present and in the future.

CBRN weapons: an aid to the asymmetric adversary

While a thorough exposition is beyond the scope of this chapter,[2] it suffices to introduce CBRN weapons as follows:

- *Chemical weapons* (CW) cause harm through the toxic effects of chemical reactions with living cells (e.g., an aerosol release of a nerve agent like sarin).
- *Biological weapons* (BW) act via the infection of a target population with pathogenic microorganisms (mainly viruses and bacteria) or biologically-produced toxins (e.g., contaminating food with the plant toxin ricin or precipitating an intentional smallpox outbreak). Some BW use contagious agents, others do not.
- *Radiological weapons* inflict harm through the effects of ionizing radiation on the human body (e.g., a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or "dirty bomb").
- *Nuclear weapons* involve a detonation based on a fission or fusion nuclear reaction to yield immense thermal, kinetic and radioactive contamination effects (e.g., the hydrogen bomb).

There are two central aspects to appreciate about CBRN weapons. First, merely possessing a harm agent (such as a toxic chemical or radioisotope) is not enough – the harm agent must be paired with a delivery system (such as an explosive or an agricultural spraying device) in order to constitute a viable CBRN weapon. Indeed, aside from the nuclear type, the efficacy of these weapons is almost entirely dependent on how efficiently they are delivered to their intended target. Thus, when then Secretary of Defense William Cohen melodramatically brandished a bag of sugar on national television in 1997 and stated that the equivalent amount of anthrax-causing spores could wipe out half the population of a city like Washington, D.C. (ABC News 1997),[3] he was being somewhat disingenuous. While that quantity of spores could in theory cause large-scale infections, Cohen failed to make a distinction between a harm agent and a deliverable weapon and ignored the daunting task of effectively delivering lethal doses of spore particles of the right size in the right concentration to a large target population. The second point to note is that, while there are versions of CBRN weapons developed and produced by government programs specifically for military purposes, this is by no means the only source of such weapons. There are plenty of materials that are naturally occurring (certain toxins in plants that grow wild) or are in widespread commercial use (hazardous industrial chemicals or radioisotopes used in medicine) that, with some improvisation, can be employed as CBRN weapons.

The ability for relatively small amounts of harm agents properly delivered to have large-scale effects makes CBRN weapons expedient tools for asymmetric adversaries like terrorists. Yet, another important issue to consider is that it is not merely their potential for causing bodily injury that lies at the root of public concern about CBRN weapons. There are several unique qualities of CBRN weapons that arguably make them qualitatively different and inherently more frightening than guns and bombs, irrespective of the scale of harm that they can cause. These include the invisibility and intangibility of radiation, microorganisms and many chemical agents (in the form of gas or vapor), which can create uncertainty about the extent of exposure and the precise location from which to flee and in turn heighten anxiety for victims. CBRN agents are also mostly invasive, where harmful effects occur deep within the body, which plays

into primal human fears of contamination. In addition, given the somewhat complex chemistry, physics and biology involved in their operation, the average member of the public (or policy-maker) is far less familiar with the construction, deployment and effects of CBRN weapons relative to the relatively straightforward (and ubiquitously portrayed in popular culture) characteristics of basic firearms and explosives. Conversely, the subversion of the very technologies that ordinarily promote life and societal well-being (such as the biology used in vaccine production or the chemical engineering that is a cornerstone of modern industry) can accentuate angst as the mundanely beneficial is twisted towards baleful ends. All of these factors combine with the asymmetric potential of CBRN weapons for large-scale harm to make them psychologically terrifying. And since the raison d'être of genuine terrorism is the psychological coercion and intimidation through fear of the target audience, CBRN weapons thus in theory represent consummate terrorist instruments.

The final preliminary issue to address is the distinction between CBRN weapons and "WMD." The latter term has at times been used interchangeably with CBRN, which, at least in the context of terrorism, can be particularly misleading. Besides being grossly overused (Lake Superior State University 2003), it is somewhat nebulous, as it is unclear what qualifies as "mass destruction." Is it 100 fatalities? One hundred structures? One thousand casualties? Furthermore, while nuclear weapons unequivocally result in catastrophic consequences, chemical and biological weapons can have a range of effects depending on the harm agent selected, the quantity used and the method of delivery, while radiological weapons are arguably incapable of even causing large numbers of fatalities and thus would be better characterized "weapons of mass disruption" than destruction. This is not merely an academic problem – terrorists can take advantage of the conflation of CBRN and WMD in the popular consciousness to heighten the psychological impact of even small-scale chemical, biological or radiological incidents by casting them as WMD attacks.

Nonetheless, the term "WMD" has cemented itself in both official and public discourse, and the best way to mitigate its deleterious effects is to define its use precisely in a way that carefully delimits its application to only the most calamitous of attacks. Thus, in this chapter, WMD will refer only to *chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and yet-to-appear weapons which, if used, would inflict catastrophic casualties, widespread psychosocial disruption or devastating economic consequences substantially greater than those brought about by the largest non-state actor conventional attacks carried out thus far* (Ackerman and Tamsett 2009, p. xxii).

Motivation

The standard formula for understanding a threat like CBRN terrorism is to examine the intent that an adversary might have for employing these weapons, relative to the capability it possesses for doing so. Recognizing that these overarching factors are not completely independent, one can begin by exploring the various motives that might underlie a terrorist's decision to pursue CBRN weapons. Several comprehensive articulations for why terrorists might seek CBRN weapons have been undertaken elsewhere (for example, Gurr and Cole 2002; Bale and Ackerman 2009; Gressang 2001); thus it suffices to consider these motives under three broad categories.

First, there are the *operational and instrumental motives*. The most common of these in popular discourse is the potential for CBRN weapons, when used as WMDs, to cause massive numbers of casualties. For terrorists seeking revenge or pursuing other punitive goals against an entire population, CBRN weapons would be one means of achieving large-scale injury and death. Indeed, for those seeking to inflict truly catastrophic levels of casualties, numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands, nuclear or high-end biological weapons are among the few viable options. Yet, terrorists rarely pursue mass murder on such cataclysmic scales; they are usually

far more interested in using violence and the spectacle thereof to intimidate their enemies. We have already established that CBRN weapons, by their very nature, exert a disproportionate psychological impact. Irrespective of the scale of their physical effects, they are thus eminently suitable as weapons of terrorism *per se*, which is likely to be a key driver in terrorist decisions to utilize them. In this respect, governments, the media and other public voices can paradoxically play a role in stimulating terrorist decisions to pursue CBRN weapons. Indeed, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has stated that the genesis of Al-Qaeda's biological weapons exploits was the immense coverage in the West (as illustrated by Secretary Cohen's antics described above) such weapons received in the mid-1990s (Al-Zawahiri 1999): "Despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of them [biological weapons] when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials."

A unique instrumental motive for choosing CBRN weapons in particular is their ability to contaminate vital locales and make them unusable, thus inflicting long-term economic and social disruption. This aspect has not been lost on terrorists, as seen in the following advice from a jihadist who is well aware that radiological weapons are not suitable for causing massive casualties (Al-Faqir 2005):

> The important thing is to disperse radioactive material in a large commercial area so the government is forced to shut down this area, which will cause this country massive economic disruption due to the following reasons:
>
> - The high costs of decontamination of radioactive areas.
> - The high economic losses in this large commercial area due to closure.
> - Subsequent unemployment and loss of jobs.
> - Stoppage of general life in that area.
> - Large compounded problems are to follow due to these losses.

A further advantage is the ability of at least biological and radiological agents to be used covertly, with a significant lag time between exposure to the agent and when health effects become evident, thus allowing the perpetrators ample opportunity to escape and perhaps even flee the country. Last, there are more strategic motives for acquiring (or at least being perceived as acquiring) CBRN weapons that do not even require that they be used. First, credible possession of a sizeable CBRN weapon might serve as a deterrent against attack by counterterrorism forces. Second, widespread knowledge that a terrorist group possesses (or perhaps even that it is pursuing) CBRN weapons might provoke its government enemies to spend exorbitant amounts of money on efforts to protect its citizens from CBRN attack, thus furthering a strategy of economic attrition, or as terrorist strategists have put it, "death by a thousand cuts" (Cole 2010).

The second category are *psychological or ideological stimuli*, which can take a variety of forms, but tend to favor CBRN weapons for reasons that are not objectively instrumental. Among the more frequently observed of these are the resonance of CBRN weapons with certain ideological prophecies of cataclysm and the end of days (Stern 1999). Several religions contain references to plagues, poisons or punishment by fire, for example the Old Testament stories of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and the Egyptian plagues or the New Testament allusions to apocalyptic upheavals in the Book of Revelations. To the extent that terrorists adhere to such beliefs, CBRN weapons might take on a legitimate or even "sacred" role. Moreover, the relatively bloodless (albeit no less awful) effects of CBR agents and the instant incineration of the immediate victims of a nuclear blast might be viewed as a "humane" or "purifying" way to erase the old world and make way for the new, along the lines of Robert Jay Lifton's "destroying the world to save it" (Lifton 2000).

Then there are those terrorist leaders or commanders who are drawn to CBRN weapons for more solipsistic reasons. The first of these is a fetishistic relationship to either advanced technology in general (i.e., when leaders are so-called 'techies') or CBRN weapons in particular, which seems to have been the case with the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, who wrote odes to the nerve agent sarin. Not always entirely distinct from this is the pursuit of CBRN for purposes of social status and self-glorification by individuals who fancy themselves as masterminds and are intent on displaying their technical prowess to both followers and enemies.

The final category of terrorist motivations for pursuing CBRN weapons are *organizational motives*. One important set of motives entails a group version of the pursuit of prestige described already, although based on organizational concerns. When a terrorist group finds itself in a rivalry with one or more other groups for the support of a constituency, there can arise a pressure to intensify its attacks in order to differentiate itself from its rivals (Bloom 2005); similarly, an incumbent leader of a terrorist group might face a challenger within his own group, with both parties having an incentive to escalate tactically in order to elicit the support of the group membership. It should be noted that tactical escalation can take many forms, however one of the ways of gaining or maintaining status might be to show oneself to be an innovator who is sufficiently bold and competent to acquire CBRN weapons. Tied to the idea of status and prestige, the traditional association of CBRN weapons with advanced state programs might make them attractive to terrorists who seek to establish themselves (at least for their constituencies) as a "world power" on a par with their state enemies.

Last, some terrorist groups might pursue CBRN weapons simply because they possess a surfeit of resources (Ackerman 2014, p. 78), akin to how a multinational corporation might diversify its portfolio as an investment against future uncertainties. While it is somewhat uncommon for terrorist groups to enjoy such freedom of operation, there have been cases where a well-established group with safe havens and a stable membership has established specific research and development organs for the purpose of innovation in weapons and tradecraft. Examples include the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah and the FARC in Colombia.

Capability

The other key component of threat assessment is to consider whether an adversary possesses the requisite capabilities to obtain and successfully deploy a CBRN weapon. The requirements for achieving this vary widely by the type of weapon (see Ferguson, Potter and Sands 2005; Zimmerman and Loeb 2004; Koblentz 2009; Tucker 2007; and Croddy 2002 for more specific treatments), but some general observations can be made.

There are various routes by which terrorists might acquire CBRN weapons capability. The first of these involves the terrorists being *given ready-made weapons by an outside party*, such as a state sponsor, rogue elements within a state's military complex or even an allied terrorist group that already possesses them. While this route is the least technically sophisticated, it requires the collaboration of existing possessors of these weapons, and there are a variety of reasons – ranging from fears of a loss of control over the weapons to potentially devastating retribution from the prospective target government – that in most cases will act to dissuade the original owners from transferring their arsenals. The second route involves *theft of a weapon* from existing stores. This relies on the terrorists' tradecraft and existing conventional capabilities, with the quality required and the attendant risks increasing in proportion to the scarcity, security and hazard potential of the desired weapon. The third route involves *buying a weapon* from a seller, presumably some type of black market arms dealer. There is considerable doubt over whether such markets for CBRN weapons actually exist, but, even if they do, such a transaction would entail significant risks for

the organization, either of being duped by swindlers peddling fake weapons (as Al-Qaeda apparently was with respect to their attempts to purchase highly enriched uranium (Hodge 2010)) or of being caught up in a "sting" operation devised by security forces.

The final mechanism of CBRN weapons acquisition is the *production of a weapon* by the terrorist organization itself. At least for chemical and biological weapons, this has historically been the most common acquisition route (Ackerman and Binder 2012). Remembering that a CBRN agent consists of both the harm agent and an effective delivery system, internal production requires not only acquiring the raw materials (such as seed cultures for pathogens or fissile material for nuclear weapons), but also the component parts of a delivery package. To obtain these materials, terrorists could follow one of the three routes described above, except that security and cost are likely to be lower than in the case of the corresponding prefabricated weapon type. Although most global non-proliferation efforts were designed to prevent states from obtaining WMD, some efforts have been made to reorient these towards keeping CBRN weapons and weapons-suitable materials out of the hands of non-state actors like terrorists (such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540). There is also a patchwork of national laws and regional initiatives focused specifically on the issue, although neither domestic nor international efforts are sufficiently robust so as to completely preclude terrorists from obtaining dangerous CBRN materials.

Assuming that the requisite raw materials have been acquired, terrorists engaging in production of a weapon still need to obtain any relevant equipment and a place where they can produce and weaponize the CBRN agent with minimal threat of discovery by security forces. Safe havens where terrorists either control territory or operate under conditions where a host state is unable or unwilling to act against them can thus be expected to facilitate such production. While the extremely remote possibility of terrorists producing their own fissile material means that for nuclear weapons obtaining the required materials is the most daunting obstacle to production, for chemical, biological and radiological weapons, the most important capability requirement is likely to be mustering sufficient expertise to produce both the agent and an effective delivery system. As was clearly demonstrated in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, even having members with contemporary scientific and technical skills is rarely sufficient for success. What is mostly needed is personnel with not only explicit knowledge (i.e., that which can be codified in textbooks or manuals) in the relevant C, B, R or N discipline, but also more contextual, applied or "tacit" knowledge, the "tricks of the trade" that are often acquired through apprenticeship on an existing weapons program or over an extended period of trial and error (Jackson 2001). Such expertise can take many years to build up internally, even if terrorist groups recruit members with scientific training, or can be acquired from outside the group, such as hiring technicians from former state-level CBRN programs who have a mercenary bent. Both options entail significant risks and will likely be a major stumbling block in producing sophisticated chemical, biological or radiological weapons (crude CBR weapons with relatively small-scale physical effects present much less of a problem, however).

Even if a viable weapon is produced or acquired, the terrorists would still need to move the weapon to the target area – in many cases requiring extensive travel, including across multiple international borders – without interdiction by authorities. This raises issues of command and control, smuggling logistics, the need for safe houses and so forth, which further complicates successful deployment of a CBRN weapon.

Organizational attributes that can facilitate the above acquisition, production and deployment processes include copious finances, internal champions, a dedicated institutional R&D capability (such as the PIRA's Engineering Department or Hamas's Al-Qassam Brigade Engineering Unit), robust operational security, perseverance in the face of setbacks, a culture of learning,



Figure 21.1 Required capabilities for CBRN attack by desired consequence.

and a diffuse and trusted network of allies and supporters (Ackerman 2016, Bale and Ackerman 2009). None of these factors, however, are either necessary or sufficient to guarantee success.

A different class of attack that is usually included under the rubric of CBRN terrorism is a conventional attack on a facility where hazardous materials are stored with the intent to release toxic agents into the environment, contaminate surrounding areas and potentially cause large-scale casualties. It is worth noting that in this regard, an attack on a nuclear power, fuel storage or production plant would normally result in *radiological* agent dispersal. Although nuclear facilities are among the most heavily secured, a long history of incursions into such facilities raises continuing concerns about their vulnerability to terrorism (Halverson and Ackerman 2016). Facilities housing large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals are even less protected, despite efforts in this regard in the United States and elsewhere (Coburn 2014), while attacks on facilities containing dangerous pathogens are also feasible, albeit less likely.

An overall observation regarding the capabilities required for CBRN weapons is that much depends on the desired scale of the weapon's effects. As the adversary's desired physical effects of a CBRN attack increase, in most cases so too do the amount of agent and sophistication of the weapon needed to bring this about. This in turn tends to make the difficulty, expense and risk involved in acquiring the weapon rise, which increases the capability requirements accordingly. Figure 21.1 provides a notional comparison of the relative capability levels required for a given level of desired consequences, across the four weapon types. It is immediately obvious that a nuclear weapons capability is the most difficult to achieve, chemical and radiological weapons are comparatively easier (with a smaller range of effects and difficulty), while biological weapons in their crudest form require relatively meager capabilities, with requirements growing significantly as the scale of the desired attack rises.

Assessing the CBRN threat

Having explored the motivational stimuli and capability requirements underlying CBRN terrorism, it is instructive to consult the historical record to appreciate the extent to which these factors have manifested empirically. The following results have been drawn from the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and non-state actors (POICN) Database (START 2016). Although sparse when set against terrorism as a whole, there have been over 440 ideologically-motivated



Figure 21.2 CBRN terrorism events over time.



Figure 21.3 Event type: actual weapon used compared to failed attempts/major interest plots.

CBRN incidents since 1990, averaging around 17 incidents per year, with a peak in the late 1990s (Figure 21.2). While many of these incidents consisted of unfulfilled plots, failed bids to acquire agents or weapons and botched attempts to attack, in over half of all cases an actual CBRN weapon was used by terrorists, closely tracking total events over time (Figure 21.2). Chemical weapons accounted for most of the events and the highest proportion of uses, followed by biological weapons (Figure 21.3). Casualty rates fluctuated substantially over time (Figure 21.4); even though overall casualty totals pale in comparison to conventional terrorism, the average number of casualties per incident (almost 26), is far higher for CBRN. Regarding the perpetrators themselves, the historical record shows that non-state actors from most ideological milieus have contemplated or pursued CBRN weapons, with the most frequent being religious extremists, ethno-nationalists and (often solipsistic) lone actors (Figure 21.5). The intended or actual delivery mechanisms reflect a wide diversity of methods, with explosives, direct contact and aerosol spray being the most common among those known (Figure 21.6).

This overview, while useful, conceals several prominent cases. These include: the March 1995 use of sarin nerve agent on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo;



Figure 21.4 Casualties from CBRN terrorism.



Figure 21.5 Perpetrator type.

several threats by Chechen rebels using radiological materials; the dissemination of the bacteria that causes anthrax through the U.S. postal service in 2001; Al-Qaeda's pursuit of nuclear weapons; and the recent use of mustard agent by the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. It is worth noting that despite the use of sophisticated "warfare" agents (especially by Aum Shinrikyo) and several cases that have resulted in multiple casualties (for example, the chlorine attacks by



Figure 21.6 Delivery mechanisms.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2007), there have thus far never been any CBRN terrorist attacks that could unequivocally be characterized as WMD attacks. This is not for want of trying, however, as several terrorist groups have pursued nuclear and large-scale chemical or biological weapon capabilities.

Past events can inform, but do not determine, the future threat. Looking forward to those non-state actors most likely to possess both the motivation and capability to perpetrate a substantial CBRN attack, the list is dominated by Sunni jihadists, including but not limited to IS, as well as Al-Qaida and its various affiliates. An emergent apocalyptic millenarian cult with characteristics akin to those exhibited by Aum Shinrikyo is a perennial threat for CBRN terrorism. However, the difficulty of acquiring and successfully employing a nuclear or sophisticated biological attack means that disgruntled insiders (such as scientists with access to dangerous agents) are among the highest threats for acquiring these weapons. Additional significant threats for using chemical, lower-scale biological and radiological weapons include U.S.-based far-right extremists and mentally ill lone actors, with a lower, but non-negligible, probability of radical environmentalists dabbling in bioterrorism and even transnational criminal organizations potentially utilizing chemical agents as weapons (Ackerman *et al.* 2014; Ackerman, Blair and Bale 2010).

Yet, one cannot rely solely on the historical record to assess the threat (Ackerman 2009; Caves and Carus 2014). Socio-cultural, geopolitical and technological changes can enhance or diminish the CBRN terrorism threat in ways that depart from previous trends. For instance, in the socio-cultural sphere, the advent of open-source distributed education platforms can enable people in the most remote regions of the globe to gain scientific expertise, perhaps including some of the tacit knowledge required to build CBRN weapons. Also, social media provides new avenues for extremists to disseminate their ideology, which can facilitate the recruitment of new members (some of whom might already have technical expertise) and help legitimate the use of CBRN weapons. At the same time, a globalization of norms against the use of CBRN weapons might also occur. In the area of geopolitics, increased instability in some regions, such as South Asia, might provide greater opportunities for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials and to operate beyond the reach of authorities; conversely, a lessening of geopolitical tensions between countries could lead to more rapid disarmament and enhanced cooperation in keeping dangerous CBRN agents out of the hands of terrorists.

Of major concern to many are emerging technologies, particularly in the domains of chemical and biological engineering, that could allow for easier, safer, cheaper and less conspicuous production of CBRN weapons. Examples include synthetic biology (Marris, Jefferson and

Lentzos 2014), chemical micro-reactors (Smithson 2009) and additive manufacturing. There is, however, substantial debate as to when such technologies will be sufficiently mature for terrorists to exploit and the extent to which they can actually facilitate CBRN weapons production. In any event, one must not forget that technological advances can also bolster the defense against CBRN weapons, such as the use of hyperspectral imaging for long-range detection of chemical or biological weapons and employing genetic engineering to produce better treatments or prophylaxis for nerve agents. Which of the offense or defense will develop more rapidly is unclear, although history has usually witnessed a lag between offensive innovation and defensive adaptation. The question then becomes: how much damage will terrorists employing new CBRN technologies in an asymmetric manner be able to do before governments and citizens develop the necessary defenses?

As to our initial question of the magnitude of the threat posed by terrorists and CBRN weapons, it appears that both sides of the argument have some merit. On the one hand, there has certainly been some unwarranted hype in this regard – most terrorists are likely to continue using traditional methods and it will remain difficult for most terrorist actors – at least in the short- to medium-term – to carry out what can be genuinely classified as WMD attacks, as defined above. On the other hand, there will almost certainly be some terrorists who will be drawn to CBRN for one or more of the reasons discussed. This set includes global jihadists, and the extent to which this type of extremism proliferates in coming years will to a large degree determine how prodigiously CBRN weapons are pursued by terrorists. The capability already exists for many terrorists – including lone actors – to carry out crude, small-scale CBR attacks, but these do not provide many of the tactical or strategic advantages of a WMD attack and might thus be less attractive to many perpetrators. However, over time technology is likely to make it increasingly easier for smaller and less skilled actors to acquire a large-scale CBRN capability, and even today, some of the more adroit terrorist organizations have proven themselves "to be capable of truly remarkable feats of engineering" (Ackerman 2016), often relying only on commercially available materials. While the future persists as an undiscovered shore, it is thus prudent to remain alert to the possibility of CBRN terrorism, while continuing to pay attention to the more mundane, but just as deadly and occasionally innovative, use of conventional weapons by terrorists.

Notes

1 After subtracting the 12,532 terrorist incidents with unknown weapons from the total number of terrorist attacks, only 834 of the remaining 129,434 incidents (0.64 percent) did not involve use of one of the abovementioned weapons (START 2015).
2 For a general introduction to CBRN weapons, see Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar (2005), pp. 1–82.
3 To add to the hype, Cohen stated that "one breath and you are likely to face death within five days" (ABC News 1997).

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22
CYBER TERRORISM

Marcus Rogers

"Cyber Terrorism": these words in and of themselves send shivers down the spines of government leaders, military brass and the general public. Since 2001 and the events of 9/11, terrorism in all of its manifestations has become the "bogeyman" hiding under the bed (Rousseau, Jamil, Bhui, & Boudjarane, 2015; Stohl, 2006). Governments have used "protection from terrorism" as the "raison d'être" for new laws, regulations, and increases in budgets for intelligence agencies (Canter, 2009; Coady, 2004; Victoroff, 2005a). The media has embraced the fascination and generalized fear of terrorism and attributes almost every violent event, no matter how minor, to terrorists, either foreign or domestic. The film industry has elevated terrorism and/or the fight against terrorism into its own genre. This societal anxiety toward terrorism over the past decade or so has pushed research in this field into the forefront. Unfortunately, not all of the research has been scholarly or at least empirically-based (Matusitz, 2008). A fair amount of the research has been conducted from a military or intelligence framework, or worse, a journalistic approach that uses unsubstantiated anecdotes and a dubious reliance on informants or supposedly ex-terrorists.

Regardless of the hype and/or sensationalism surrounding terrorism, the truth remains that terrorism is a fact of life, globally, in the 21st century. No country seems to be immune from the reach of terrorists. Modern technology such as relatively cheap international airfare, the ubiquitous Internet and the World Wide Web have extended the reach of these violent organizations to almost every known part of the world. It is this factor of technology and how it is being co-opted by the terrorist groups that is the focus of this chapter.

Let us begin this exploration of terrorism and its use of cyber space and cyber technologies by: agreeing on a definition of terrorism that we will then use to try and understand what exactly cyberterrorism is, what is the real threat of cyberterrorism, what if any unique psychological characteristics cyberterrorists have, and finally what can be done to mitigate the risk of cyberterrorism.

While there are numerous definitions of terrorism that run the gambit from intelligence-based to societal and anthropological, the following will be used as the foundation for this chapter:

> The organized use of violence to attack non-combatants or innocents… or their property for political purposes.
>
> *(Coady, 2004)*

This is a very concise definition that captures the core of terrorism, regardless of how that terrorism is expressed (e.g., bombings, shootings, or cyberattacks). This definition extends well internationally and divorces itself from the mechanism by which the violence is carried out. Being agnostic regarding the choice of how the violence is manifested allows for a much broader and, more importantly, realistic analysis of terrorism and by extension cyberterrorism (Canter, 2009; Coady, 2004; Silke, 2003). Using this as a foundation, we will focus on behaviours that are purposeful, include violence or the threat of violence, and are not aimed at the military or governmental agency that is directly or indirectly tied to the military.

Current landscape

It would be an understatement to claim that in the terrorism space there has been plenty of activity. In the past few years, we have seen unrest in the Middle East that has been referred to as the "Arab Spring", and international relations with North Korea, China, and Iran have been stressed and strained. The presence of international armed forces in the Iraqi theatre and Persian Gulf has ignited tensions with fundamentalist groups such as the Taliban, Muslim Brotherhood, and ISIS. Terrorist threat reports, terror alerts, and coverage of bombings and mass shootings are almost commonplace and not unexpected on the nightly news.

Given the increased attention being placed on the various groups, actors, and nation states, we would expect to find very concrete examples of cyberterrorism, or at the very least, terrorists using technology as a force multiplier. However, to accurately determine what, if any, is the extent of this activity is quite controversial. The media would have us believe that cyber terrorism is running rampant and the "Huns are at the gate". The intelligence agencies claim success in thwarting cyberterrorist attacks, but since they were thwarted, they did not actually occur; thus there is no subsequent record of the event. Certain private sector companies have claimed they were the victims of cyberterrorism, but a "root cause analysis" often points back to a nation state or state sponsored entity. Were these cyberterrorist attacks, or examples of cyberwarfare/operations? The infamous Sony attack is an excellent example. Initially it was deemed to be the work of hackers, but over time it became apparent that it was more likely a state-sponsored, if not a national intelligence agency(ies') offensive cyber operation (i.e., China) (Sanger, 2015). It is obvious that clearly delineating what constitutes cyberterrorism is extremely difficult, yet very important.

Not cyberterrorism

Before we delve deeply into the weeds, let's set the boundaries or scope for what will *not* be considered cyberterrorism. This is actually easier than defining what it is. Cyberterrorism is not hacktivism. Hacktivism, while targeting cyber space and its technology, does not have the goal of causing fear or violence. Its goal is to make a political statement in such a manner that the group gets media and thus the public's attention (Murphy, n.d.). Cyber operations or cyberwarfare are not cyberterrorism. Cyber operations or cyberwarfare largely target military or strategic targets; any damage to purely civilian or non-combatant systems are usually considered collateral damage. This is no different than traditional warfare (Kallberg & Thuraisinham, 2015). Lone hackers attacking healthcare or banking systems are not cyberterrorists, they are petty criminals or in some cases members of criminal organizations, not terrorist groups (Rogers, 2006).

Once we eliminate all of the actual non-cyberterrorists, we are left with very little (if any) research or data on cyberterrorism. This is because most of the research or media stories have focused on the above noted activities or actors; these are the proverbial low-hanging fruit – they

might not really be cyberterrorists, but they are identifiable and willing to talk or participate in research studies – therefore, "close enough".

Psychology

Previous work (including by this author) has tended to focus on how terrorists use technology. It has examined the terrorists' efforts to recruit and market (propagandize) for their organization or group and how the Internet is used for fundraising or covert communications (Denning, 2001; Silke, 2008). While fascinating, this is no different than describing how any modern business uses the Internet/technology and tells us nothing important about cyber terrorism.

Thus, the days of assuming that technology and cyber space were only being used by terrorist groups as marketing and recruitment tools are over. This is no longer the reality of how terrorists place importance on cyber space. This is not to say that these groups are not still using social media to get their messages out, to recruit new members, and/or attract media attention. However, this is just standard business practice in today's wired, globally-connected world.

Several authors have stated that they are doubtful that terrorist organizations attract members with enough technical acumen to allow them to conduct cyberattacks at the level required to be worthy of being coined as acts of terrorism (Denning, 2001; Wilson, 2010; Yunos, Ahmad, & Yusoff, 2014). Two things are troubling about this assertion. The first being, what is the threshold for determining an act to be terrorism? Do we define it solely based on the target or the victim(s) of the attack (e.g., civilian businesses, critical infra-structures), or by the intent of the attackers? If the attacker's objective is to cause widespread fear in hopes of furthering their ideological or political beliefs, is this sufficient to be categorized as terrorism? Do we focus on a group's philosophical beliefs or their instrumental beliefs (Coady, 2004)?

The second troubling aspect of the previous statement is that it almost completely misses the reality of today's younger generation. The generation of young people most at risk of becoming radicalized into terrorism because of frustration, the desire to find meaning, or simply to satisfy the need for glory and excitement, are the "wired generation". This generation has been referred to as "Digital Natives" because of their familiarity and comfort with technology (Prensky, 2001). While there is some controversy whether this cohort is fundamentally different from previous generations in relation to social norms, ideologies, and other cultural norms, it is self-evident that their comfort with technology is unique. Digital natives are those individuals born after 1980 (Prensky, 2001). Businesses have had to re-think their working environment and policies related to personal technology in the workplace due to the high value that these young people place on technology and being constantly connected (Prensky, 2001). Unlike previous generations, where only a select few "geeks" or "techies" understood and used technology, the current generation is just as much at home on the Internet and social media as they are in the physical world (Bennett, Maton, & Kervin, 2008; Gasser & Simun, 2010). Technology holds no mystique and is seen as merely a tool that is used to carry out tasks, keep in constant contact with friends and/or loved ones, or to be entertained. This marginalization results in the majority of young people being more than technically qualified to conduct attacks in cyber space.

Not only is insufficient skill not a limiting factor for cyber terrorism, the current generation of so-called digital natives views cyber space and technology as a right. The ability to be connected 24/7 is viewed as an inalienable right, similar to the freedom of speech and freedom of association. Cyber space is as much a part of their day-to-day lives as the real world is. Self-worth is often tied to the number of friends or "likes" one has. Negative comments online can be so devastating as to cause individuals to take their own lives (van Geel, Vedder, & Tanilon, 2014). Cyber space and technology are integral components of this generation's existential experience.

Their social selves are very dependent on cyber space and the technologies necessary to be and stay connected.

This connection to cyber space makes it a logical medium to carry out attacks that, while they may not have a direct connection to violence in the physical world, are devastating to the denizens of cyber space. As a society and culture, we are even more dependent on technology, and this dependence (now both psychological as well as technological) is only going to increase. The dependency may soon become physiological as well, given the advances in connected medical devices (e.g., pacemakers, insulin pumps), health technologies, wearable devices, and the Internet of Things (IoT) and Virtual and Augmented Reality (VR & AR). These are all game-changers in the discussion of cyber terrorism. The often espoused statement "who cares about terrorists online as they cannot kill people from cyber space?" is no longer valid; now they can, and in the near future, this will become even more frighteningly possible (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008; Matusitz, 2008; Wilson, 2010).

The shift by nation states into the realm of cyber operations is a clear indicator of the "weaponization" of cyber space (Pomerleau, n.d.). Cyber operations can be defined as: "Cyberspace operations is defined as the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace" (GAO, 2011). Cyber operations include offensive network operations as well as the more traditional passive defensive operations designed to detect and protect infrastructures. These offensive operations include direct attacks at the "enemy's" cyber infrastructure in an attempt to destabilize or cripple that infrastructure (Kallberg & Thuraisinham, 2015). Obviously, the military has decided that cyber targets have a value and are part of the doctrine of war in the 21st century, so why wouldn't terrorist groups? Research on terrorist groups has shown that many of these groups are students of modern warfare and read the same materials as students attending West Point or any such other military college (Winterfeld & Andress, 2012). We need to stop underestimating the enemy!

It would appear that researchers examining terrorism are woefully out of touch with the realities of how ubiquitous technology is and how enslaved we are to it. As the importance of cyber space increases, not just from a cyber infrastructure perspective, but also from a personal and cultural identity, the more logical it is that attacks will occur here. In fact, we may have already witnessed real-world examples of cyber terrorism. Examples often cited are attacks against Sony, cyber jihadist activities directed toward Egypt, and attacks directed at various U.S. government systems (although it becomes murky trying to differentiate between terrorist acts, state-sponsored or condoned, and military cyber operations) (Stern, n.d.; Stohl, 2006). Despite these examples and the fact that the younger generation consider cyber space as part of their social self, little if any empirical research has been published on cyber terrorism. The majority of published "research" on cyber terrorism uses an ethnographic approach that relies very heavily on unsubstantiated anecdotes (Horgan, 2012). Anecdotal-based research is problematic in and of itself. It is even worse when the subjects of the research are prone to exaggeration regarding their exploits and skills, and potentially score high on dishonesty and amorality scales (Rogers, Seigfried, & Tidke, 2006).

Automated tools

The claims that terrorists do not possess the requisite skills or knowledge to conduct cyberattacks are further weakened by the reality of automated tools. It is a well-known fact in the computer underground that you do not necessarily have to be technically skilled at coding to be able to attack something or someone in cyber space. You can actually buy the services of someone to carry out the attack, or buy a made-to-order/customized automated tool on the Dark Web. These customized tools, such as Zeus or ZBot, have been available on the hacker black

market for years and have changed the nature of cybercrime. Now any type of attacker profiling has to take into consideration that it might be profiling a tool as opposed to a real person (Rogers, 2003a,b).

Several terrorist groups possess more than enough money to hire top hackers to create customized tools, and in some cases, actually pay hackers (not affiliated with the terrorist group) to carry out the attack. The net worth for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban has been estimated to be in excess of $3 billion, and for ISIS at $2 billion (obviously exact numbers are difficult to come by) (Haltiwanger, 2014). Therefore, if we actually believe that terrorists lack the technical ability themselves, the economic resources of these groups allow them to purchase automated tools from those who are more technical, thus making the argument a moot point.

Personality characteristics

The decades of research on traditional terrorists have revealed that there is no real stereotypical generic terrorist personality (Silke, 2008). The types of people drawn to terrorism are as diverse as the beliefs of these groups themselves (Canter, 2009). To claim that one could provide a profile of a terrorist would be analogous to claiming that one could provide a profile of a generic criminal or hacker; this would be meaningless, as it would be too generic. So how do we go about understanding the psychological makeup of a terrorist that uses or targets technology? I have purposely decided to use the wording "Terrorists that focus their attacks on technology or cyber space" as this provides a much more meaningful, if not accurate, description of the problem we are trying to deal with. It does not make sense to define a terrorist by their choice of attack vectors (e.g., plane terrorist, bomb terrorist). If we continue to think this way, we will be creating artificial silos that will further impede our ability to understand these individuals.

Let's look at what we do know: terrorists are not "insane" or necessarily suffering from some sort of psychopathology (Victoroff, 2005). This notion has been debunked and was never accurate, but it did give us a false sense that these people were the exceptions, and generally speaking, the human race was not so evil. As such, despite evidence to the contrary, this notion of the psychotic terrorist has persisted. The media has long embraced this stereotype as well, which may also account for its longevity.

Understanding cyber terrorists (terrorists who use cyber technology) brings us to the crossroads of research on hackers, cyber criminals, and cyber terrorism. For the sake of this discussion, we will consider suicide bombers outside of the scope, as these individuals likely comprise a special sub-category of terrorism (Kaplan, Mintz, & Mishal, 2006; Post *et al.*, 2009). The current body of work in the area indicates that radicalism and a sense of being disenfranchised are positively correlated with membership in a terrorist group. So too are a need for excitement and the desire for meaningfulness and glory (Victoroff, 2005b). These last characteristics are not that dissimilar from traits found in individuals that join the military establishment. Young people are often drawn to professions that can provide them with a sense of identity by being part of the larger group. An interesting finding has been that there appears to be a positive correlation between thrill-seeking and terrorist membership (Venhaus, 2010). Certain individuals seem to crave stressful situations (aka "thrill seekers") and can satiate these feelings somewhat by carrying out terrorist activities (Post, 1990).

As stated previously, the majority of terrorist members do not suffer from psychopathy nor are sociopaths (Post, 1990). Few would be diagnosed with any type of mental illness outside of what we would find in the "normal population" (Victoroff, 2005). The socioeconomic backgrounds are very diverse, as are the educational levels. As was stated previously, there is no

Table 22.1 Risk indicators

Trait or risk factor	*Hackers*	*Terrorists*
Disenfranchised	X	X
Stress-seeking	X	X
Seeking meaning	X	X
Seeking glory	X	X
Low social morality	X	X
Young males	X	X
High dishonesty morality	X	
Poor social skills	X	
Radicalized		X

generic terrorist personality profile, as environmental pressures play an equally important factor in determining terrorist membership as any psychological trait(s).

Let's recap: there is no one hacker psychological profile, and no one terrorist psychological profile, but what if we combine these groups and look at the intersection of the individuals for any risk indicators? We may discover something different. Granted, risk indicators are a far cry from a psychological profile, but they are necessary steps in the process. Table 22.1 lists the traits of each category separately (hackers, terrorists that focus on technology).

From Table 22.1, we can see that there is significant overlap between the traits or risk indicators between the two groups. Admittedly, this is a very rudimentary model, but it can act as a type of scaffolding in order to derive a more sophisticated framework for researching this topic. Both hackers and terrorists are primarily young males, with low social morality, are seeking fame and glory, stress-seeking, and feel a sense of being disenfranchised (Victoroff, 2005). It would seem that the other important components, like being radicalized, could be developed or result from socializing with individuals that also feel this way (Victoroff, 2005). As Akers (2000) indicated, differential association is a mitigating factor in deviant behaviour. Both hacking and terrorism fall into the general category of deviance, albeit at almost opposite ends of the spectrum. By associating with radicalized youth, this becomes the reference point for how the hacker begins to feel about themselves and the outside world that exerts pressure on the group. The identified overlaps support the theory that we can extrapolate from the findings of studies on computer criminals and hackers to cyber terrorists.

Further evidence to support the assertion that we can extend our understanding of cyber criminals and hackers to cyber terrorists focuses on the organizational structure similarities between the two groups. Matusitz (2008) concluded that cyber terrorist groups may use a somewhat flattened hierarchical model consisting of a loose network of individuals. The structure is also decentralized with flexible structures and associations. By using the lens of social network theory (Degenne & Forse, 1999), he concluded that social connections were very important.

The current research on cybercriminal organizations (e.g., Anonymous) have identified that this criminal group also consists of a loose network of individuals, with a decentralized and flexible structure (Broadhurst, Grabosky, Alazab, Bouhours, & Chon, 2014). These organizations are highly dependent on social connections to carry out and coordinate their attacks. These affiliations are very dynamic and flexible, resulting in different members participating in different attacks and for different reasons (Broadhurst et al., 2014). This characteristic makes stopping these groups very difficult if not impossible to achieve.

Weaponization of technology

Both cyber terrorists and cyber criminals share the same "weapons". For both groups, technology is not only the target, it is the weapon as well. For both of these groups, hacking tools and methods such as botnets, distributed denial of services attacks, cross-site scripting attacks, SQL injection, buffer overruns, Trojan horses, and other near zero-day attacks, allow them to disrupt and infiltrate their targets (Broadhurst *et al.*, 2014). Since the theatre for these attacks (whether by terrorist groups or cybercriminals) is cyber space, both of these groups are presented with the same limitations and opportunities that are inherent in today's Internet technology (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008). The same vulnerabilities that allow a criminal group to steal millions of health records allow a terrorist group access to this information as well, or worse, access into a hospital's network where critical medical systems could be attacked and disabled (e.g., dialysis machines, electrical systems) (Liebowitz & Schaller, 2015). Ransomware attacks cannot only be used by criminals to extort money from hapless victims; they could be used by terrorist groups to disrupt critical command and control systems by encrypting databases, etc.

It is also clear that cybercriminals and cyber terrorists not only use the same "cyberweapons", they also target similar if not identical victims. For the most part, the victim is not a person or single work station, it is usually a network or some component of a country's critical infrastructure, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), air traffic control, or financial servers (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008; Kaplan *et al.*, 2006; Weimann, 2011). Often the attacks focus on key systems and servers that allow for a "toe in the door" in order to launch further, more invasive attacks.

This "weaponization" of technology and choice of targets further emphasizes the overlap between cyber terrorists and computer criminals. Thus, as was stated previously, we can use what we know about the psychology of cybercriminals as a foundation for understanding the cyber terrorist.

Psychology of cybercriminals

The current findings indicate that hackers are not more educated, nor do they possess higher intelligence than everyone else (Baggili & Rogers, 2009; Rogers *et al.*, 2006; Woo, Kim, & Dominick, 2004). There does not appear to be any correlation between cybercriminals/hacking and ethnicity, nor religious preference or educational background (Taylor, Fritsch, & Liederbach, 2014). In order to avoid trying to provide a picture of every conceivable type of cybercriminal, we will focus more on the lone wolves, that while they may be part of a loosely organized criminal group or gang, they are not professional criminals merely extending their trade to the Internet (Rogers, 2006). The psychological makeup of these individuals has been well studied in the fields of white collar and organized crime, and is beyond the scope of this chapter. We will also limit the extrapolation to individuals who become part of terrorist groups and target technology, but not to professional mercenaries or professional soldiers tied loosely to nation states or tribal identities. These, again, are presumed to be a different category that has its own distinct psychological makeup (Canter, 2009; Victoroff, 2005).

What do we know, then, about hacker psychology? Although older research has shown a negative correlation between hacking and low socioeconomic status (SES), the significant drop in the cost of technology and its "ubiquitousness" have offset this finding in more recent studies (Rogers, 2014). Current research indicates that hackers are usually younger (16–25 years), score higher on amoral dishonesty scales (Rogers *et al.*, 2006; Rogers, 2014), and tend to set their moral compasses based on a personal moral code as opposed to an internalized societal

morality (Rogers *et al.*, 2006). Other studies have concluded that hackers are opportunistic and lack mature interpersonal skills and/or person-to-person communications. The majority of the studies, to date, have focused primarily on the personality characteristics and/or traits related to Goldberg's Big Five (Saucier & Goldberg, 2002). The Big Five or its derivative tests (NEO-PI-R, OCEAN) are thought to measure the personality traits of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Amorality, Dishonesty, and Authoritarianism, and Moral decision-making have also been studied within the cybercriminal community (Rogers *et al.*, 2006; Rogers, 2014). The various studies have concluded that cyber-criminals, aka hackers, score low on Extraversion (they are more introverted), low on Openness to experience, low on Agreeableness, high on Authoritarianism, high on Amorality, and follow an internal moral compass for Moral decision-making (Rogers *et al.*, 2006). There is also some support, as was mentioned previously, that hackers are risk takers and may suffer from autistic conditions (Ledingham & Mills, 2015).

What is not clear is that while hackers are significantly different from non-hackers on the traits previously listed, are they significantly different from other criminal classifications (e.g., white-collar criminals, fraudsters)? The last comment aside, we do have a framework, however shaky, to begin understanding cyber terrorists. Once we can better understand the cyber terrorist, from a psychological perspective, then we will be better able to harden potential targets and potentially make an early identification of individuals at risk of becoming cyber terrorists. This predicative component deserves a cautionary statement. As with other early indicators of deviance, whether it is criminal insiders or moles within government organizations, simply possessing or displaying any of the risk factors or traits does not mean that the individual is 100 per cent certain to become a deviant. Human behaviour is not so simplistic. Other factors, such as environmental stressors, situational contexts, or even mental illness, play a role regarding if and when the risk factors lead to the behaviour (Shaw, 2006). In many instances, the factors never lead to aberrant behaviour. It needs to be made clear that we do not and will not possess (at least anytime soon) a crystal ball that will show us who is going to become "bad" and who is not.

Despite the similarities between hackers and cyber terrorists, we need to be aware of at least one major difference: Hackers and cyber criminals are motivated financially, as there is a lot of money to be made from cybercrime (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Rogers, 2006). This economic motivation means that there are limits as to what they will do and how far they will press their attacks. The same is not true for terrorists. We need to recognize that using technology to launch an attack, or targeting technology, does not erase the fact that cyber terrorists are still terrorists, first and foremost. Terrorists don't have defined parameters or rules for their engagements. The more damage, the better. The more carnage, the more the world will sit up and take notice (Ahmad & Yunos, 2012; Stohl, 2006; Wilson, 2010). These individuals are usually very highly motivated by their religion, ideology, or sense of injustice at a very visceral level (Victoroff, 2005). They are not generally interested in financial gain (while they use technology to raise funds, they don't plan their attacks with the notion of a nice return on their investment).

It is very important that we understand how large the gap is between the passion and motivation of cyber terrorists and hackers. The same conventional wisdom that we use to protect and defend systems and networks from hackers is not going to work against cyber terrorists. The strategy of making the cost of the attack too expensive given the outcome is almost useless when dealing with cyber terrorism (Ahmad & Yunos, 2012; Hua & Bapna, 2013). We need new strategies and new ideas based on a fundamental understanding of who our enemy is.

Conclusions

Terrorism appears to be here to stay. Terrorism as a part of our society is a sad truth that the very fabric of our culture needs to adapt to. Since we are a technology-dependent world, we need to also realize that cyber terrorism is a reality as well. Despite the advances we have made in technology and cybersecurity, we are susceptible to hackers, and as such, we are vulnerable to terrorists who choose to employ and attack technology and our critical infrastructures – aka cyber terrorists. We have witnessed the rapid evolution of our businesses and educational systems as they have embraced technology and the new knowledge-based global society. Just as these positive sectors of our society have adopted technology, so too have the "darker" sectors. It has been estimated that cybercrime has eclipsed international drug trafficking as a revenue generator for criminal organizations. The profits are estimated to be in the billions of dollars annually. Given the high profit margins for cybercrime, there is no lack of talent or funding to support this criminal enterprise (Hua & Bapna, 2013).

While we seem quietly resigned to accept cybercrime as a part of our globally wired economy, we still struggle to grasp the real threat of terrorism in cyber space. Whether it is a type of defence mechanism, to be in denial that the same technology that has brought so many advantages has also left us with a huge Achilles heel, or some kind of global blind spot, the consequences are the same. Until we better understand cyber terrorism, we will continue to be in a weakened state, unable to protect, defend, deter, and retaliate against cyber terrorism.

This chapter has attempted to show that due to the commonalities between cyber terrorists and cyber criminals, particularly hackers, we can extend our understanding of the risk factors and psychological characteristics of hackers to construct a foundation or framework to better understand the psychology of cyber terrorists. The element of "cyber" seems to be the unifying force that binds these two groups together. We need to leverage this to our advantage and start to be proactive as well as reactive to the threat of cyber terrorism. Knowledge gleaned from this exercise can be used to harden targets, mitigate the damage in the aftermath of these attacks, and potentially predict attacks and attackers before they strike or become too radicalized to be deterred.

If society continues down its current path, it won't be too long until we have more than enough data on terrorists who target and use technology to have robust and validated behavioural models. These new models will no longer require us to extrapolate from like deviant subgroups, such as hackers. However, until such time, we will have to make do with what we have and resign ourselves to the fact that sometimes a model does not have to be perfect (just good enough) in order to make progress and benefit society.

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Part I: case studies

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23
AL-QAEDA
Formation and evolution

Donald Holbrook

The beginning

1979 was a momentous year for politics in the Middle East. In February the Iranian monarchy was abolished in an Islamic revolution. A month later, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and U.S. President Jimmy Carter gathered on the White House lawn to sign the Camp David Accords, establishing peace between Egypt and Israel. Through the accord, Egypt became the first Arab state to recognise the state of Israel. In July, Saddam Hussain took over as president of Iraq, where his aggressive and opportunistic authoritarianism led to a brutal war with the new Islamic Republic of Iran. In November, a group of Islamist zealots seized the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca to realise apocalyptic visions of the return of the Mahdi.[1] They were defeated only after Saudi authorities called in French commandos to raid Islam's holiest site. Then, on Christmas Eve, a few days after the last rebels were driven out of the Grand Mosque, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, sparking a decade-long conflict in which scores of Arabs eventually mobilised to embark on jihad.[2]

The impact of these events on the development of militant Islam, and Al-Qaeda in particular, was profound. In fact, one could argue that they led to the formation of contemporary 'jihadism'.[3] It was shaped by the ideological currents that preceded it and morphed by the events that followed, but these events, and the ripple effects they caused, were fundamental. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrated to Sunni Islamists that religious rebellion against secular dictatorships could succeed, whilst elevating the position of the Shia, whom Sunni dogmatists view as heretics. Yet, the ascent of the Ayatollahs inspired, as did proxies like Hezbollah and its campaign of suicide terrorism. Peace with Israel enraged Egyptian Islamists, who took their revenge on 6 October 1981 when Sadat was assassinated as he presided over a military parade. The clampdown that followed drove many jihadists to seek refuge abroad or try their luck with the Afghan-Arabs, as the foreign insurgents became known. These experiences nurtured ideas and personalities that would later form a current within Al-Qaeda. After Camp David, moreover, normalisation of relations with Israel became a central grievance inflaming jihadi anger. Soviet withdrawal—after 10 bloody years of war—from Afghanistan created a sense of triumph among jihadists that convinced them to continue the jihad. Ideas popularised during the conflict, such as the responsibility of each individual to aid and participate in wars in defence of religion, persisted (Azzam, n.d.). Saddam Hussain's attempt to annex Kuwait, in turn,

and the region's reliance on the United States, the world's only remaining superpower, to stop him, informed the outlook of Osama bin Ladin and other jihadi entrepreneurs.

All these events—and others—have shaped Al-Qaeda. Ultimately, Al-Qaeda is a political organism moulded by a series of developments and decisions that have affected polities across the globe.[4] Al-Qaeda is a grouping of Islamist revolutionaries[5] who reacted to these events and sought to affect their outcome. This grouping was bound together organisationally and through the personal experiences of its members as well as a collective commitment to a broadly-unified set of objectives. Its normative dimensions have, of late, become more pronounced as traditional organisational components weaken. As a political entity, Al-Qaeda's composition rests on the legacy of resurgent Islamic revivalism—rural, urban and anti-colonial, counter-nationalist.[6] It was formed by individuals who tried initially—and failed—to target local sources of corruption in the Middle East before taking the battle to the perceived facilitator of corruption, the United States and Western alliance. It consisted both of organisational components as well as daring ambitions and radical ideas. Facing adversity, it adapted and mutated—sacrificing organisational clarity for continuity in any other form—as a network with a core group, franchise or simply a frame of reference within the jihadi universe. What 'it'—Al-Qaeda—really constitutes, therefore, has been the focus of much debate.

What is 'it'?

The inception of Al-Qaeda is usually traced to a meeting in Peshawar in August 1988 of senior Arab veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war who resolved to create a 'pioneering vanguard' of Islamist militants (e.g. Wright, 2006; Burke, 2004; Bergen & Cruickshank, 2012). The focus of these jihadi entrepreneurs was, at first, primarily on the Arab Middle East where individual jihadi leaders, such as Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, were particularly preoccupied with their own respective backyards.[7] The emergence of Al-Qaeda as a distinct organisational entity with a global remit was a gradual process, not a single event.[8] Yet during its 'golden years' under the protection of the Taliban's 'Islamic Emirate' in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda could build up an infrastructure without much external interference (Sageman, 2008).[9] 'By early September 2001', Bergen (2011) notes, 'Al Qaeda was at the height of its power the group and its Taliban allies were on the verge of taking over Afghanistan entirely'. The loss of its host weakened Al-Qaeda's centre of gravity, shifted the focus on a broader network of actors and shattered conceptual consensus and clarity.

In a paper published two years after 9/11 Xavier Raufer (2003) complained that 'because of a lack of initial definition, Al Qaeda is floating between contradictory descriptions, comparisons and metaphors. It remains an "unidentified terrorist object"'. The mechanical model, Raufer argued, dominated Western perceptions of terrorism: 'pyramidal, hierarchical'. But this approach would not apply to Al-Qaeda after 9/11: it was a 'biological entity', he argued, not a mechanical one; a 'nebula' or 'the human-fanatic equivalent of AIDS'. Yet, there was still an organisational structure and a leadership that had managed to attract other organisations into its fold. We no longer spoke just of 'Al-Qaeda' as a cohesive unit, therefore, but referred to 'Al-Qaeda Central' or 'Al-Qaeda core' to describe its leadership and founders, and then applied various labels to describe those associated with or inspired by this axis. Even bin Ladin accepted, in a private letter, that the 'Al-Qaeda Central' (AQC) characterisation offered by the popular media seemed apt.[10] Conceptually, David Ronfeldt (2007) described this evolution as a transition from a post-hierarchical 'hub-and-spoke design' after 9/11 to a 'scattered-cluster design' before solidifying again into a multihub design that could best be described as a 'tribe' projecting 'ancient patterns of tribalism on a global scale' through 'segmental warfare'. Mishal and Rosenthal (2005) spoke

of a development from a hierarchical structure to a network phase prior to 9/11 which led to the emergence of a 'dune organization' with clusters of networks existing almost in 'geopolitical vertigo' (cf. Sageman, 2004; Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 2002).

To add clarity, many observers, scholars, journalists and government bodies have chosen to adopt 'layered' conceptualisations of Al-Qaeda. Details differ, but all broadly capture the same fundamental concepts: (1) a central leadership structure (AQC) that hosts Al-Qaeda's *emir* (first bin Ladin, then Ayman al-Zawahiri); (2) official affiliates, i.e. groups whose leaders have pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda's *emir*, where some operate in its name (AQAP, AQIM, Jabhat Al-Nusra, AQIS, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen and Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia/Islamic State of Iraq before it became ISIS and was renounced: see Figure 23.1)[11]; (3) allied or semi-allied organisations outside Al-Qaeda's fold; (4) a broader social movement or ideational base that incorporates the symbols, worldview and identity associated with Al-Qaeda.[12]

Much of Al-Qaeda's energy and potency, therefore, has been attributed to organisations that became allied with or sponsored by AQC. The bloody sectarian insurgency in Iraq, for example, was propelled by Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, an outfit created in 2004 when bin Ladin accepted a pledge of allegiance from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. In 2010 British intelligence chiefs warned of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, formed in 2009 after a merger of AQC loyalists in the region (see Figure 23.1), which was planning innovative attacks and disseminating glossy propaganda (Rugman, 2010; Johnston, 2010).

Yet the most revealing finding from the analysis of internal documents captured by the U.S. military from the Abbottabad compound, where bin Ladin was killed, was the extent of his frustration with the way these supposed affiliates were run and his reluctance to associate with them directly. Bin Ladin, according to these documents, viewed affiliates and apparent allies, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as excessively autonomous and increasingly a liability due to their excessive and careless violence against Muslims that would alienate potential supporters. Bin Ladin thus resisted incorporating more organisations into Al-Qaeda's fold after accepting Zarqawi's pledge of allegiance, which the Al-Qaeda leaders clearly regretted. Others within AQC appeared more accepting of affiliates who could expand Al-Qaeda's reach and keep its name alive, even though they often operated independently (Lahoud *et al.*, 2012).[13] Indeed, Zawahiri has been particularly focused on publicly accepting new 'extensions' to Al-Qaeda's franchise and to urge them to expand their scope. Some of this enthusiasm has backfired. Whilst bin Ladin accepted Zarqawi's organization as Al-Qaeda's representative in Iraq, it was Zawahiri who—in 2005—pushed him to contemplate the transition from a militant group to a more permanent organisational unit. Zawahiri advised Zarqawi to work towards establishing an Islamic 'state' by implementing four stages: expelling the foreign occupiers; exploiting the void that would follow to establish an Islamic emirate over as much territory as possible; extend the jihad to neighbouring countries; and, once the state is solidified, threaten Israel (Zawahiri, 2005; McCants, 2014).

To Zawahiri's eventual regret, Zarqawi set to implement this plan, in his own way, whilst ignoring Zawahiri's plea to temper his excessive violence and sectarian targeting. Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)[14] under the leadership of Zarqawi's successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, in October 2006 and became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013 with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi at the helm, who declared himself Caliph in June 2014. Zawahiri, who took over as leader of AQC after bin Ladin's death, had in turn sworn fealty to the commander of the Afghan Taliban (first Mullah Mohammed Omar, then Akhtar Mohammed Mansour), and renounced Baghdadi and his cohort in February 2014. Thus emerged two rival jihadi entities, ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which both sought to claim the legacy of



Figure 23.1 Selected milestones in the history of Al-Qaeda.

bin Ladin and shape the future of jihad. Given that Al-Qaeda is no longer the only, or even most prominent force, on the worldwide militant Islamist scene, therefore it becomes imperative, for our understanding of the movement, to map what it stands for and how it sees itself.

What does it stand for?

'Al-Qaeda', Bruce Hoffman (2008) once observed, 'is much like a shark, which must keep moving forward, no matter how slowly or incrementally, or die'. In much the same way, Al-Qaeda is a moving target for observers and analysts seeking to capture its raison d'être. Its agenda and composition have changed and evolved through the years, as has its capacity to implement them.

Al-Qaeda was created as an organisation, not just a network, precept or an idea.[15] It was designed as an international base providing a 'wellspring for expertise in military training'[16], a launch-pad for operations that would 'guide and advise'[17] the umma on the implementation of fundamental Islamic concepts (Lahoud *et al.*, 2012). Its latter fragmentation was caused by the pressures imposed by the fall of the Afghan haven and its aftermath. Al-Qaeda's network then gained traction through the strength of its brand. With the death of senior leaders, including bin Ladin, and the rise of ISIS as a more credible jihadi *organisation*, AQC began to emphasise the strength of its *ideas*. 'Al Qaeda is a mission before it is an organization or a group and, in this sense, it is expanding more', Zawahiri insisted in 2014 (Zawahiri, 2014). The first issue of a magazine celebrating Al-Qaeda's new South Asian franchise declared: '[Qaedat Al-Jihad] started as a group engaged in Jihad in the way of Allah. Over the years, it has transformed from an "organization" to become a call, a message, and a movement spanning different regions' (Yusuf, 2014, p. 19).

What the Al-Qaeda leaders have always seen as paramount, however, is the mobilisation of a popular base of support (ideologically if not physically). Public opinion has been at the heart of AQC's strategic logic.[18] Zawahiri wrote in his memoirs of the importance of public sympathy, understanding or support and how quickly this could evaporate if attack plans went awry.[19] He later expanded upon the importance of public support in his letter to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, urging him to mitigate his violence, and has similarly referenced the importance of popular backing of target audiences to sustain revolutionary warfare in his response to the rise of ISIS (Holbrook, 2015). Bin Ladin (2007) warned, both publicly and privately,[20] against excessive use of violence (inflicting Muslim casualties in particular) as this would lead to a general loss of trust. Sustaining the jihad vanguard, therefore, rested on something more than nurturing an operational capacity that could carry out attacks. Al-Qaeda's leaders have always placed 'media operations'—public statements and propaganda production—on an equal footing with military affairs.[21] Indeed, these objectives go hand-in-hand.[22]

The Abbottabad papers reveal how bin Ladin favoured a common media front controlled by AQC in order to harmonise its message. Further in pursuit of public recognition, bin Ladin suggested, privately, that a Memorandum of Understanding could be drafted to provide operational and communicational guidelines for affiliates to follow (Lahoud *et al.*, 2012). Bin Ladin never realised this objective. Just over two years after his death, however, and to the same end, bin Ladin's successor issued 'General guidelines for the work of a jihadi'. Through this communiqué, Zawahiri (2013) spoke of the need to:

> Focus on spreading awareness amongst the general public so as to mobilise it. Similarly, focus on spreading a greater level of awareness and understanding amongst the Mujahid vanguard to create an organised, united, ideological, and aware Jihadi force



Figure 23.2 Public statements from bin Ladin and Zawahiri in the interest of Al-Qaeda (1994–2015).*

* Up to September 2015, Zawahiri statements/publications before EIJ merger excluded.

> that strongly believes in the Islamic faith, adheres to its rulings, shows humbleness to the believers and deals with the disbelievers with firmness.

There were, Zawahiri emphasised, two strands to Al-Qaeda's operations: military functions and propagation. The former would focus on America, Israel and 'international disbelief' in the first instance, but also on their local allies. Excesses in targeting would be avoided at all costs, and the military arm would have to be presented as purely defensive, not sectarian, and explained with reference to the purpose of establishing 'Tawheed [monothesism] by adhering to the commands of Allah, making Shariah supreme and striving to establish an Islamic system and an Islamic state'. Propagation would consist of: (1) 'educating and cultivating the Mujahid vanguard' and (2) 'creating awareness within the masses, inciting them, and exerting efforts to mobilise them so that they revolt against their rulers and join the side of Islam and those working for its cause' (Zawahiri, 2013).

Operational and military aspects of Al-Qaeda's warfare, therefore, are intertwined with its ideas. As Raufer noted, 'to truly understand bin Laden, it is not enough to just collect and process facts about his finances, tactics, communications, and organizational skills. One has to try and understand his vision and worldview' (Raufer, 2003). Both bin Ladin and Zawahiri—and numerous other members of AQC and beyond—have always emphasised the dissemination of public statements. Figure 23.2 provides an overview of major bin Ladin and Zawahiri communiqués relevant to Al-Qaeda's public discourse.[23]

The scope, reach and focus of these messages have changed over the years, with topics often being dictated by key events such as wars, uprisings, summits, passing of laws, by anniversaries of similar events or by more normative grievances such as the publication of offensive cartoons. Declared methods and emphases of war and targeting in this public discourse have also evolved and been reappraised.[24] More permanent features of this discourse, however, concern the stated objectives of combat: to upturn and ultimately replace an unjust world order; to 'liberate' occupied lands and end subjugation of Muslims and others oppressed; to rule by shariah and divinely ordained consultation—not by the whims of the masses, secular law or the auspices of a corrupt international system; and to establish a Caliphate that shuns illegitimate colonial borders. These

goals, Zawahiri acknowledged in his memoir, might take 'generations' to achieve, adding that he had no 'specific end date' in mind.[25] Unless the enemy retreated or capitulated, Al-Qaeda would continue its fight until the Day of Judgement (Zawahiri, 2010).

But the virtue of relying on patience and perseverance was thrown into doubt when a rival jihadi identity emerged and claimed a Caliphate for itself, expanding beyond Syria and Iraq through a network of alliances that created 'provinces' answerable to Caliph Ibrahim (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), not AQC and the Afghan 'Emirate'. AQC had always relied on the obscure and distant promise of ultimate social justice through religious emancipation as a driver, motivator and rationalisation for its day-to-day struggle. The fight would be worth it since all were united in pursuit of a shared objective, a common dream. For many, however, this dream became a reality with the emergence of ISIS and the formation of a Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaeda's present and immediate future, therefore, has become defined less by its own actions or those of its conventional adversaries and more by its bitter rivalry with ISIS.

The future

Al-Qaeda's clash with ISIS is about more than just competition over resources, supporters or spheres of influence. It is a profound and ideological confrontation involving central questions about the true legacy of the Prophet, prerequisites of just and effective political control, righteous leadership and fealty, the scope, direction and boundaries of combat, the legitimacy and efficacy of particular manifestations of warfare and ultimately the sustainability of a movement and a cause against the backdrop of public opinion.

It seems ironic how jihadi organisations such as Al-Qaeda condemn democracy and are generally contemptuous of the masses, peddling exclusivist theocracy implemented by elitist 'vanguards', whilst appealing to notions of public support and legitimacy. This 'public' of course does not represent polities as understood by contemporary liberal democracies but speaks to disenfranchised and radical Sunni Muslims seeking societal reform through religious purity and revival. For Al-Qaeda's future, much depends on its ability to appeal to—or even just be seen as relevant by—this broader population. The rise of ISIS complicates this equation.

The future of Al-Qaeda will also be determined by its ability to renew its central leadership. For example, bin Ladin's son, Hamzah—born in the early 1990s—has been mentioned in this regard. He released a statement purportedly on behalf of Al-Qaeda in August 2015 calling for attacks on the United States (BBC News, 2015). Osama wrote about Hamzah's future in a private letter to a confidante, where he described his son as 'one of the Mujahedeen' and sought to arrange for him to receive religious training in Qatar, from where he could spread 'jihad doctrine'.[26]

Finally, another component concerns the continued resonance of Al-Qaeda's ideas and 'brand'. Indeed, as noted above, the central leadership has sought to highlight these ideational notions in the wake of organisational demise. Here, Al-Qaeda seeks to emphasise four central themes in its message, and these have been informed especially by the rise of ISIS and presented as a counterweight to it: (1) Al-Qaeda fights defensive war, not offensive, which might have broader appeal and fewer legalistic restrictions; (2) its struggle is global, pan-Islamist and its scope is (in this context) inclusive; (3) its methods are pragmatic and sustainable, not excessive or extra-legal; (4) it offers a long-term plan to establish an Islamic state and thus keeps the dream alive.

Al-Qaeda's leaders will hope that the organisational flexibility that it has displayed in the past, combined with the hoped-for collapse of ISIS, and the fluidity of its more ideological manifestation, will provide the key to a successful future. As it reaches the end of its third decade, marginalisation, fragmentation, jihadi infighting and leadership attrition suggest that Al-Qaeda's future

is far from rosy. Yet its obituary has been prematurely written on many previous occasions, and as Al-Qaeda evolves, so do the conceptualisations of those who seek to analyse and describe it. Al-Qaeda's revolution may thus continue in name only but for its leadership that—and the vast attention that the organisation has attracted—may seem like a partial victory.

Notes

1 This is not to suggest a linear or causal link with Al-Qaeda, but al-'Utaybi has, as Hegghammer and Lacroix (2007, p. 115) argued, had 'ideological heirs'.
2 Arabs did not flock to Afghanistan immediately, spontaneously or organically, as subsequent accounts and stories have sometimes suggested, but the impact of the campaign against the Soviets on contemporary jihad was huge. See Hegghammer (2010).
3 Modern 'Jihadism' can refer to a broad ideational milieu incorporating some values of Sunni Islamist revivalism and militant religious rebellion, but there are many sub-types. See for example Wiktorowicz (2006, p. 208); Wagemakers (2012) on nuances of 'Salafi Jihadism'; Meijer (2009); Rabasa *et al.* (2006); Brachman (2008); and Roy (2004).
4 Politics and ideas may not always drive people towards Al-Qaeda—people seek to join such social collectives for a host of reasons—but these thoughts on the status quo and efforts to alter it are central to Al-Qaeda's DNA.
5 Hegghammer (2010, p. 6) proposed the label 'violent pan-Islamists' to describe Al-Qaeda to differentiate it from other Islamist militants with other primary agendas.
6 For an overview of Rural Wahhabism, urban Egyptian Salafism, anti-colonial Deobandism and the thoughts of Qutb, Maududi, al-Banna, Faraj and others, see e.g. Cleveland (2004).
7 Individual jihadi leaders were very much focused on their own backyards. See Harmony Archives (n.d.) and Combating Terrorism Center (2007). The history of these early days is still being written, and Flagg Miller's (2015) painstaking review of audio cassette recordings from this period is particularly valuable.
8 On the name given to the organization, for instance, bin Ladin reflected in an interview shortly after the 9/11 attacks: 'The name "al Qaeda" was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for our mujahedeen against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al Qaeda [meaning "the base" in English]. And the name stayed' (Alouni, n.d.). Fawaz Gerges (2005) explored Al-Qaeda's transition from a preoccupation with local concerns to a transnational entity focused on the 'far enemy'.
9 See on 'Al Qaeda's Structure and Bylaws' in CTC Harmony Archives [AFGP-2002-600048]; on Al-Qaeda's goals, general policies, overall Shura Council (and role-specific advisory councils), Leadership Council (including Foreign Relations Section), Security Committee, Regional Council, Executive Committees, financial policies, Military Committee (including Readiness, Technical, Combat, Laboratory, Repair and Electronics Sections), Political Committee (including Political Studies Division, Foreign Relations Division, The Archives Division, Political Awareness Division, Political Research Coordination with Foreign Media); 'Internal Organization' in CTC Harmony Archives [AFGP-2002-000080] for Al-Qaeda's interior organization (commander, ruling council, Military Committee, Political Committee, Administrative and Finance Committee, Security Committee, Surveillance Committee). www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program [accessed August 2015].
10 In a letter to Jamal Ibrahim Ishtiwi al-Misrati, a.k.a. ``Atiyya,' bin Ladin remarked: 'This term [AQC] was coined in the media to distinguish between Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Al Qaeda in the other territories. In my opinion, there is no problem with using this term in principle in order to clarify the intended meaning'; see document number SOCOM-2012-0000019 from the Harmony Archive: pages 13–14 (in translation). See analysis in Lahoud *et al.* (2012).
11 Additionally, the U.S. military has carried out operations against the 'Khorasan Group', which it described as a 'network of seasoned Al Qaida veterans' that had 'established a safe haven in Syria to plan external attacks, construct and test improvised explosive devices, and recruit westerners to conduct operations'. See US Department of Defense (2014).
12 This is based primarily on Bruce Hoffman's (2006, 2007) work on Al-Qaeda. Cf. Brachman (2008); Burke (2011); and Celso (2015). Albeit capturing a different dynamic, Sageman's (2008) 'waves' are relevant here too. For governments see: Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2008). For journalists see *The Economist* (2008). For the terrorist strategists themselves see: Bakier (2008) and Lia (2007).

13 The authors note: 'The documents show that some of the affiliates sought Bin Ladin's blessing on symbolic matters, such as declaring an Islamic state, and wanted a formal union to acquire the al-Qa'ida brand. On the operational front, however, the affiliates either did not consult with Bin Ladin or were not prepared to follow his directives. Therefore, the framing of an "AQC" as an organization in control of regional "affiliates" reflects a conceptual construction by outsiders rather than the messy reality of insiders' (Lahoud *et al.*, 2012, p. 12).

14 Adam Gadahn, AQC's media guru, later remarked in a private letter that 'the decision to declare the State [in Iraq] was taken without consultation from al'Qaida leadership'. Whilst AQC accepted the move publicly (McCants, 2014), in a letter seized from the Abbottabad compound attributed to Gadhan, he urges AQC to disassociate publicly from the Islamic State in Iraq due to their excesses. See Lahoud *et al.* (2012) and SOCOM-2012-0000004, Harmony Archive, Combating Terrorism Center, NY: West Point, www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program [accessed August 2015].

15 Bin Ladin wrote in a letter to Deobandi scholars during the Bosnian war, for example, that 'there is no Islam without a group, and no group but with an Emara (leadership) and no leadership without listening and obedience'. See Harmony Document number AFGP-2002-901188. In contrast to Abu Musab Al-Suri's notions of autonomous resistance, Zawahiri emphasized, in 2002, the importance of preserving an 'organization and leadership leading change' (Zawahiri, 2002). Similarly, bin Ladin was said to have been suspicious of lone-actor terrorism, preferring well-orchestrated attacks backed by strong organizations (see Lahoud *et al.*, 2012).

16 Harmony Archive AFGP-2002-000078.

17 Document no. SOCOM-2012-0000010, Harmony Archive. www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-2-original-language-2 [accessed August 2015].

18 As it has most other revolutionary movements. See for example Shy and Collier (1986). On public opinion as a factor in strategic thinking for Al-Qaeda and related militants, see McCants' (2006) translation of Abu Bakr Naji's *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass* (2004).

19 In *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, Zawahiri reflected on the outpouring of condemnation that followed an attempted attack on the Egyptian Prime Minister's motorcade which resulted in the death of Shayma Abdel Halim, an 11-year-old schoolgirl.

20 See e.g. letter to Jamal Ibrahim Ishtiwi al-Misrati/Abu 'Abd al-Rahman/'Atiyyatullah/'Atiyya, document no. SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT from the Harmony Archive. The Al-Qaeda leaders, however, have also produced a number of 'own goals' in this respect. Bin Ladin provided Zarqawi with a platform in Iraq which he eventually expanded into an organization that severely damaged Al-Qaeda's standing within its targeted support base. Zawahiri expanded upon the religious concepts that could be used to justify the targeting of Muslim civilians (the 'human shield' argument especially) for example in his 2008 book, *Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of the Pen and the Sword from the Unjust Allegation of Feebleness and Weakness*, whilst both leaders later tried to rein in forces using such justifications to carry out brutal and indiscriminate acts of violence.

21 Some have even suggested that bin Ladin and Zawahiri emphasized media engagement over attack planning (e.g. Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). In a letter to his host, Mullah Mohammed Omar, bin Ladin sought to convince him of the importance of engaging with the media, remarking that it amounted to '90 percent' of battle preparedness (bin Ladin, n.d.). Bin Ladin later referred to media strategy as 'a principal element of the battle', Harmony Archive, document no. SOCOM-2012-0000015.

22 The Al-Qaeda leaders, therefore, are very much like leaders of a (revolutionary) political protest movement seeking to *mobilize* a cohort of *potential participants* by *framing* the world in a way that *convinces* people of the merits of their endeavour. These concepts are theorized in the literature on *collective action frames*. See especially the works of Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. I reviewed bin Ladin's and Zawahiri's public statements according to this framework in my book (Holbook, 2014).

23 Whilst Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad did not 'officially' merge with Al-Qaeda until 2001, significant earlier publications from the author are included for illustration and given his subsequent role.

24 Compare for instance Zawahiri's *Exoneration* from 2008 and later caveats from 2010 onwards on the use of force and the killing of Muslims (often with reference to interpretations of *mas'alatut at-tatarrus,* allowing Muslim fighters to kill captured co-religionists used to provide cover for the enemy).

25 Zawahiri. (2001). *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*; an early draft was leaked by *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (2 December), available in translation from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Zawahiri later published his own reconsidered version after 9/11 where he responded to criticism from Montasser

Al-Zayyat, an Islamist lawyer who knew Zawahiri personally and published a book about the latter in Arabic in 2002 (English version exists as: Al-Zayyat, 2004).

26 SOCOM-2012-0000019-Trans, available from Harmony Programme, see link on www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined [accessed September 2015], p. 34.

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24
BOKO HARAM

Jacob Zenn and Zacharias Pieri

Introduction

Boko Haram is a violent *takfiri* jihadist movement operating in the Northeast of Nigeria and whose operational reach extends into the neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The name "Boko Haram" is often translated as "Western Education is forbidden". While this encapsulates one element of the group's ideology (namely its stance against any teachings that are not strictly based on the Qur'an), it is a name that the movement rejects, and which constricts our understanding of who and what it is. Indeed, in August 2009, Sani Umar, the interim leader of Boko Haram, stated, "Boko Haram does not mean, 'Western Education is a Sin' as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means, 'Western Civilization is forbidden'".[1] Boko Haram leaders have instead long called the movement by its official name, *Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad* (Sunni Group for Proselytization and Jihad), and have published *nasheeds* and statements to reaffirm that they are – at least in their mind-set – part of "mainstream" *Ahl as-Sunna*. They nonetheless changed their name again in March 2015 to rebrand themselves as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (*al-Wilaya al-Islamiyya Gharb Afriqiyyah*) after their leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Joscelyn 2015). The movement has gone through a number of iterations, though its core ideologies have remained relatively stable even as its tactics have changed.

Boko Haram is further an irredentist movement that does not recognize the sovereignty of the Nigerian state, nor of the international system of sovereign nation states. For Boko Haram, the primary goal is to establish an Islamic state or Caliphate in Northeastern Nigeria and parts of neighbouring West Africa where Sharia law will be implemented in its totality, and in which all aspects of secularism, democracy and Western influence can be rejected. This point was demonstrated by Shekau on August 14, 2014, when he declared recently captured territories under Boko Haram's control in Northeastern Nigeria as "part of an Islamic State that has nothing to do with Nigeria anymore" (Zenn 2014). Boko Haram moreover denounces the corruption and nepotism of the Nigerian state, and builds upon local grievances of a mainly disenfranchised and relatively poor predominantly ethnic Kanuri population. The idea of creating an Islamic state is not new. This much is clear in the literature and sermons of the group stemming back to early influential leaders such as Mohammad Yusuf, and remains key to this day.

This chapter argues that Boko Haram is a movement that is adept at negotiating the geo-cultural terrain in which it operates to further advance its aims and objectives. The chapter first focuses on the background of Boko Haram, the origins of the movement and its development, key leaders, and ideologies. The chapter proceeds to examine how Boko Haram has been tactile in changing strategies and tactics while remaining focused on core ideologies. We argue that the movement has developed beyond a local organization that solely affects Nigeria (Forest 2012), but rather that it has managed to establish itself as a regional movement, threatening the stability of not just Nigeria but also the Lake Chad region of West Africa. This we demonstrate through tracking and mapping Boko Haram attacks beyond the borders of Nigeria. We further argue that Boko Haram's recent affiliation with the Islamic State has added a supplementary dimension to the way in which the movement should be understood. We consider Boko Haram in the context of global jihadism and probe what the implications of the alliance between Boko Haram and the Islamic State could mean for the way in which Boko Haram develops as well as the impacts on the region. We end the chapter through looking at the changing tactics of terror employed by Boko Haram to achieve its ends. These include the kidnapping of civilians, attempts to hold territory, and most recently, increased attacks on the civilian population.

We conclude through arguing that Boko Haram is a movement that understands the socio-cultural geography of Northeastern Nigeria and the neighbouring Lake Chad border regions, and as such is likely to remain a force in the region for some time to come.

Background on Boko Haram

Boko Haram initially emerged as a significant movement in Northern Nigeria due to its strong voice against corruption, nepotism, the perceived bias of the Nigerian state against Muslims, and the failure of the Sharia law project in Nigeria that started in 1999 and proved to be as, if not more, corrupt than the Nigerian government in Abuja itself (Brulliard 2009). Boko Haram leaders such as Mohammad Yusuf (1970–2009) were aggrieved that the primacy of Islam was not being upheld, with this developing into a belief that Muslims could only live their lives in accordance with Sharia law through the rejection of the sovereign state of Nigeria and with the creation of a Caliphate in West Africa guided by the teachings of "pure" Salafists, who, according to Yusuf, included Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban.[2] For Boko Haram leaders, such as Yusuf, their Islamic entity would stretch across Northeastern Nigeria and into parts of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, roughly corresponding to the boundaries of the former Kanuri-led and Islamic Kanem-Bornu Empire.[3]

Mohammad Yusuf was an early founder of Boko Haram whose influence over the ideologies of the movement has been immense. His sermons and writings provided a clear indication of the early ambitions of Boko Haram. Yusuf was an Islamic theologian trained in the Salafi strand of Islam. He was also of Kanuri ethnicity – that is, the group of people who make up the majority of the population in Borno State in Northeastern Nigeria (where Boko Haram has found it strongest operational spaces), as well as some parts of the neighbouring West African states of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon (Olson 1996: 272). This factor is important in explaining the geographical scope of the movement's activities as well as how it recruits members (Pieri and Zenn, 2016).

While the Kanuri factor is of huge importance to understanding why Boko Haram has managed to carve out operational spaces in some areas more than others, it should not be taken to mean that Boko Haram is a "Kanuri Movement". The Kanuri foundation of Boko Haram is just one of a number of factors that contributes to its ideology and appeal (including Salafism and anti-Western influence) and membership composition (alongside other Bornoan Muslim

minorities, such as Baburs, and Sunni Muslims in Nigeria more generally) (Pieri and Zenn 2016). To understand Boko Haram and its trajectory – and especially why it has succeeded in winning recruits in specific areas of Borno State and the Lake Chad region – it is also necessary to understand how the relationship between Boko Haram's Kanuri leaders and Kanuri members binds the movement to border region communities and how its historical narratives and grievances resonate particularly with that Kanuri population.

There are a number of different variations of how Boko Haram started, and these are well summarized by Comolli in her recent monograph, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency,* and as such there is no need to further recapitulate these here (Comolli 2015). It suffices to say that under the leadership of Mohammad Yusuf, Boko Haram recruited and expanded their network across the Northeastern states. Yusuf gained permission to establish his own mosque in Maiduguri, and significantly named it after Ibn Taymiyyah. The group strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream "corrupt" society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualize and radicalize the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to the violent takeover of the [Nigerian] state' (Isa 2010: 333). Yusuf established micro-financing programs where he would loan small amounts of money to individuals and attracted a large following of youths who were loyal to him. This tactic allowed him to divorce his followers from the state, and instead create an atmosphere in which he was seen as a provider. Yusuf created a parallel social order in which he operated his own schools, hospital, and newspaper. Young men affiliated to Yusuf were encouraged by him to establish small ventures – shoe-shining businesses, market stalls, rickshaws – and to give a certain proportion of the profits back to Yusuf (Pieri and Zenn 2016). Women were also instrumental in the early workings of the movement benefitting from Yusuf's largess, while he called for all women to be educated in a basic Islamic education.

With the expansion of the sect under Yusuf's leadership, Boko Haram members committed themselves to carrying out the Islamic injunction of "commanding good and forbidding evil". In doing so, they attacked police stations, drinking establishments, Christian places of worship, educational insitutions that taught beyond an Islamic curriculum, and military barracks, and killed thousands of people. When Yusuf was brutally and extra-judicially murdered in 2009, the mantel of leadership after an interregnum fell to Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's deputy (Gorman 2009). Under Shekau, the sect's tactics shifted from addressing local grievances to actively pursuing the establishment of an Islamic State as an immediate goal. Shekau turned the vision of a Caliphate in Boko Haram's ideology into reality and adopting to the internationalist agenda of Al-Qaeda by, for example, situating the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government and Islamic religious establishment as part of a global war between Muslims and "Crusaders" for the survival of Islam; in others words, the enemy was no longer Nigeria so much as President Obama, Francois Hollande, Benjamin Netanyahu, or Ban Ki-moon, leaders who Shekau has since taunted time and time again.[4]

On August 14, 2014, Shekau declared the tracts of land that Boko Haram had occupied in Northeastern Nigeria as "part of an Islamic State that has nothing to do with Nigeria anymore" (Zenn 2014). By October 2014, Boko Haram began to display the Islamic State's flag in its video releases, and the Islamic State confirmed that it received a pledge of loyalty from the "Nigerian mujahidin" in its official magazine, *Dabiq*, in November 2014. The formalization of the relationship would take place only several months later, with Shekau's *baya'a* and al-Baghdadi's acceptance in March 2015 (Almukhtar 2010). Shekau's declaration of an Islamic State as not simply an opportunistic call for attention from the Islamic State, the global jihadist community, or international media; rather, there is a deeply-rooted historical precedent and resonance for a Caliphate in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, the legacy of which Boko Haram seeks to appropriate (Pieri and Zenn 2016).

The impact of Boko Haram's actions have caused large-scale instability in Northeastern Nigeria affecting both Muslim and Christian communities. Tens of thousands of Muslim and Christian residents in the northeast have been forced to flee their homes to live in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre placed Nigeria's IDP population as of April 2015 at 1,538,982 with the insurgency in the Northeast of the country as the most "prominent cause of displacement" (IDMC 2015). Boko Haram has further kidnapped countless young women, radicalizing them and forcing them into sexual slavery (Global Initiative 2015). Farms, shops, and businesses have been destroyed, while infrastructure including roads and bridges been blown up. Boko Haram has destroyed mosques, schools, and hospitals, killing Imams, Muslim traditional rulers, as well as politicians (Pieri and Barkindo 2016).

Regionalization of Boko Haram

Boko Haram as a movement has had a long-term strategic goal of expanding its operational base beyond Northeastern Nigeria and into the West African countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The original rationale for this is that early Boko Haram leaders such as Mohammad Yusuf viewed areas in these states as once having fallen under the jurisdiction of the historical Islamic and Kanuri-led Kanem-Bornu Empire and thus would more naturally fall into place in the Islamic State that Boko Haram seeks to create. Boko Haram does not recognize the sovereignty of Nigeria or of these other states, but rather seeks the (re)establishment of a Caliphate in which these entities are once again reunited. In this sense, Boko Haram is an irredentist movement with a deep grievance over how post-colonial boundaries were seemingly arbitrarily drawn on the map. This much is clear from an early Boko Haram sermon:

> Their [the Mai of Borno] commitment to Islam penetrated into Niger, Chad and other neighbouring countries. However, Europeans divided the countries, cutting off Niger and Chad. They amalgamated us [Northern Nigeria, perhaps Borno province] to infidels and unbelievers. Then they left Niger on their own, knowing that Niger is very poor and poverty will pose no threat. As of Chad, Europeans created ethnic problems, amalgamated them to other infidels and unbelievers and established a rotational system of political authority between the tribes. This led to political instability in Chad since the time of Tumbal Mai and as a result, the country has remained inseparable from conflict. In the case of Sudan, the country was forcefully amalgamated with south Sudan.[5]

Boko Haram have lamented the move away from Islamic to secular and democratic forms of governance and see a return to Islamic rule as the most legitimate form of governance for the people living there. This sentiment is best expressed in the following sermon of Muhammad [Mamman] Nur, a prominent Boko Haram member and interim leader after Yusuf's death, who masterminded the U.N. Headquarters car-bombing in Abuja in August 2011 along with two AQIM-trained Boko Haram members (Ajani 2011). Nur argued that the decline of Islamic governance is directly related to an increase in poverty and suffering:

> In those days, it was the *Shari'a* that was practiced in this country. Dan Fodio and other Islamic scholars carried out the *jihad* and ensured that Qur'anic law was implemented. Allah did not interfere with this situation until when our Muslim leaders accepted from the Europeans secular constitution. Since that time, Allah took away the comfort and peace Muslims used to enjoy, replaced it with suffering and poverty.[6]

Boko Haram is further intent on expanding its activities outside of Northeastern Nigeria due to its developing allegiance with the so-called Islamic State. Following Abubakar Shekau's pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State leader al-Baghdadi in March of 2015, and being brought into the fold of the Islamic State's international program of Jihad as the Islamic State's West African Province, Boko Haram are keen to show that they are worthy of that name. No longer can their activities be confined to Nigeria, but that they are compelled to demonstrate that they are worthy of their name, and that they are able to export their brand of jihad to other areas of West Africa. The pro-Islamic State media organization, Africa Media, has, for example, specifically promoted Boko Haram expanding its operations to Benin, Niger, Chad, and Mali, while the choice of Boko Haram as the "West Africa" province – and not "Nigeria province", as some Islamic State supporters had suggested before Shekau's pledge – suggests that the Islamic State will foster a broader geographic reach for Boko Haram.[7]

It is important to note that these two powerful strands of narratives – the historical and the modern – have converged to provide a refreshed *raison d'être* to a movement that had suffered great defeats at the hands of the Nigerian and Lake Chad coalition forces in February 2015, with Boko Haram losing almost the entirety of their then recently established Caliphate (Blair 2015).

While Boko Haram has carried out small-scale attacks in the Lake Chad border regions for some time, it was not until the summer of 2015 that it managed to establish itself as a truly regional movement. Since June 2015, Boko Haram has stepped up its attacks in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The movement has become ever more adept at negotiating local geographies and drawing on ethnic ties and networks to bring terror across the Lake Chad region of West Africa. Data tracked and analysed by Pieri and team at the Global Initiative on Civil Society and Conflict at the University of South Florida shows the breakdown in the geography of Boko Haram's attacks as follows (Global Initiative 2015):

- In June 2015, 59% of attacks (that is, 23 distinct attacks) attributed to Boko Haram were carried out in Nigeria, 26% of Boko Haram attacks were perpetrated in Niger, and a further 8% respectively in Chad and Cameroon.
- The figures for July 2015 show that 16% of Boko Haram's attacks (or 10 distinct attacks) were carried out in Cameroon, 14% in Chad, 9% in Niger, and 61% in Nigeria.

It is true that in both instances over half of Boko Haram's attacks were located in Northeastern Nigeria, yet when viewed in relations to figures from previous months, the data becomes more significant. By way of example, if one looks at Boko Haram attack data for October, November, and December of 2014, 71%, 92%, and 84% of attacks respectively were carried out in Nigeria. The same is true when looking at January, February, and March of 2015 with the figures showing that 71%, 69% and 89% of attacks respectively were carried out in Nigeria.

Attacks carried out by Boko Haram outside of Nigeria in the summer of 2015 increased dramatically. Chad stands out in particular, for in October, November, and December of 2014, there were no recorded Boko Haram attacks carried out there. Increased attacks beyond the borders of Nigeria served to establish Boko Haram as a regional player as well as to persuade world leaders that the solution to Boko Haram has to be focused across the countries of the Lake Chad region and not just Nigeria itself.

After losing much of the territory it had seized in Northeastern Nigeria and branded as a Caliphate (Blair 2015), Boko Haram have returned to a focus on carrying out attacks and less on holding territory. It is in this context that the movement has managed to assert itself beyond

the borders of Nigeria. This trend became clear on July 4, 2015, when Boko Haram killed 26 people in night attacks on two villages on Lake Chad. According to reports, "the two villages were attacked by surprise" (Nako 2015). In the first incident, Merom village was attacked by armed men who slit the throats of their victims and burned houses before fleeing, while militants also attacked a group of camel herders at the village of Tiskra, cutting 13 people's throats (Nako 2015). These attacks were closely followed by further atrocities where on Saturday, July 11, 2015, 15 people were killed in a suicide bomb attack at a crowded market in Chad's capital (Yahoo 2015). The perpetrator was a male suicide bomber disguised as a woman, and wearing Islamic dress with a face veil. Days later on July 15, 38 people were killed in a twin suicide attack at a police academy and the main police station in N'Djamena, where a French-led operation against sub-Saharan extremists is based. On the same day, Boko Haram militants launched an attack on the prison in Diffa, a town in Southern Niger, in a move to free fellow Boko Haram members held there. Three of the attackers and one soldier were killed before the attack was repelled (Massalaki 2015).

Boko Haram attacks in West Africa increased and intensified throughout July 2015, with at least 12 civilians and a Chadian soldier killed in suicide attacks in the Northern Cameroonian town of Fotokol on Sunday, July 12 (Al Jazeera 2015). The first explosion occurred on Sunday in a bar near a Cameroonian special forces (BIR) camp just after sundown, as many were breaking their daily fast for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The second explosion followed as soldiers approached the bar, with the two attackers wearing burqas. Identifying the use of the burqa as a disguise in militant operations, the Cameroonian government has since decided to ban the burqa in the far North of the country (Andzongo 2015). A week later, on Sunday, July 19, 2015, nine pupils were burned to death following a Boko Haram attack on Kamuna, a Cameroonian border village (Samson 2015). The bodies of the children were found in a bush, and at least 23 people were killed during the attack The seven troops who were present when the militants struck the village were overpowered, with estimates of around 80 militants forming the band of attackers on the village, which lies in the border region between Nigeria and Chad (Sridharan 2015).

The above incidents capture just a snapshot of Boko Haram's expanded regional activities in the summer of 2015. The movement's decision to carry out violent attacks in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon can be explained in a number of ways. First, it is clear that the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria has been somewhat effective. Boko Haram have lost the vast majority of lands that they had seized as part of their self-proclaimed Caliphate in 2014, and have been pushed back into the forests and border regions. As a consequence, it has been strategic for Boko Haram to carry out attacks where they can – for the most part this has meant expanding beyond Nigeria and into areas of the neighbouring Lake Chad countries, where security is not always strong. From Boko Haram's perspective, however, the push beyond Nigeria is not a fallback strategy, but rather the fulfilment of a promise to carry out attacks in those countries due to the increased alliance between Nigeria and those countries as a means to defeating Boko Haram. A third reason why Boko Haram has precipitated its expansion into the neighbouring countries is to demonstrate that it is now a West African movement and not a movement confined to Nigeria. Though establishing a caliphate across the boundaries of the former Kanem-Bornu Empire has long been a priority for Boko Haram, its recent alliance with the Islamic State and its subsequent rebranding as the Islamic State's West African Province have hastened its need to expand its operational field.

The Islamic State–Boko Haram connection

The often discussed build-up of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau's pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not, as some observers have suggested, a

hasty attempt to establish legitimacy for Boko Haram in the wake of a massive military offensive that displaced the militant group from the territories it occupied. Rather, hints at a coming pledge were apparent for nearly a year before the formal allegiance between the two violent militant movements became public. This suggests that the subsequent coordination of media and other operations between Boko Haram and the Islamic State was more deliberate than previously assumed.

The early signs of a Boko Haram-Islamic State relationship emerged on May 5, 2014, when Shekau issued the first of his two claims on the kidnapping of the now infamous case of the more than 250 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria. In the prologue of the video to mark the occasion, Shekau chanted the following to militants surrounding him: "*Dawlat al-Islam Qamat, Dawlat al-Islam Baqiya* (The Islamic State is Established, the Islamic State is Remaining)". Boko Haram members then repeated Shekau's chants, which – likely not coincidentally – are also the main slogans of the Islamic State, as reflected through its propaganda and media.[8]

At the time of Shekau's first video of the Chibok kidnapping, few observers – including Islamic State and Boko Haram followers – were aware that Boko Haram was on the road to pledging loyalty to the Islamic State. It was not until June 2014 that al-Baghdadi formally announced the creating of a so-called Caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria, and then in July 2014 that Shekau first publicly announced his support for al-Baghdadi. However, at that time he also mentioned support for other Al-Qaeda leaders, so a clear connection to the Islamic State and break from Al-Qaeda was not confirmed yet (though even mention of an "enemy" of Al-Qaeda like him suggested Boko Haram could no longer be in the AQIM fold). After Shekau's announcement of support, the Islamic State then reciprocated with recognition and justification of the Chibok kidnapping in its official magazine, *Dabiq 5*, in October 2014. The Islamic State praised the "Nigerian mujahidin" for the Chibok kidnapping and for its "revival of slavery".[9]

By November 2014, in a new issue of *Dabiq (number 6)*, the Islamic State wrote announcing that the creation of new *wilayas* (provinces) in Nigeria and four other locations (Caucasus, Khorasan, Indonesia, and the Philippines) would be delayed until the Islamic State appointed a leader for those locations who had the credentials to pledge *bay'a* to al-Baghdadi. Boko Haram's pledge was accepted in March 2015, although the pledges from Khorasan and Caucasus were not accepted until a later time, in January and June 2015, respectively (Sharipzhan, 2015). Pledges from Indonesia and the Philippines were not accepted at the time of this writing but will likely be once the Islamic State turns its attention to "province-building" in Southeast Asia.

In late March 2015, after Shekau's pledge of loyalty to the Islamic State, an anonymous writer for the credible Tunisia-based pro-Islamic State jihadist media organization, Africa Media, who claimed to be an Ansar al-Sharia (an AQIM front group) defector to the Islamic State, issued a memo about how Africa Media[10] administrators connected Boko Haram to the Islamic State. Among other reasons, he wrote that Africa Media was impressed about the way Shekau:

- vexed unbelievers by chanting Shek-ka-ka-ka-ka-kau and taunted "infidel" leaders like Obama, Netanyahu, Hollande, and Ban Ki-moon;
- stood up for the Chibok kidnapping rather than showing indifference about it like Al-Qaeda; and
- resembled other jihadist leaders like the predecessor to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, especially in videos where Shekau shoots into the air rounds of ammunition from an AK-47 wearing similar clothes to Al-Zarqawi.

The author of the Africa Media post further acknowledged that Boko Haram's media team was finding uploading videos to YouTube to be ineffective because YouTube frequently blocked their videos, which is an issue that Shekau publicly complained about in one video.[11] The writer also commented that the quality of Boko Haram media was poor and that Boko Haram's video production quality and dissemination methods needed an upgrade in order to reach more jihadists. This, according to the writer, was the origin of the Boko Haram-Africa Media relationship in 2014 and subsequently the establishment of the Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha Twitter Account in January 2015, which served as the platform for Boko Haram videos and statements hinting at Shekau's future allegiance to al-Baghdadi between January and March 2015.

From late October 2014 until January 2015, Boko Haram videos showed signs of change – and improvement in terms of quality and production and dissemination. For example, Boko Haram first began to brand its videos with logos of generic news agencies, such as "Media Foundation" (*Mekteb al-Alami* in Arabic) in an apparent attempt to mimic the style of Al-Qaeda's "*As-Sahab* (The Cloud) Media Foundation" and ISIL's "*Al-Hayat* (The Life) Media Foundation". In addition, the videos began to include overt signs of Islamic State symbolism, including using the Islamic State's *nasheeds*, flag, and choreography. Regarding choreography, Boko Haram, for example:

- showed its soldiers shooting members of the Civilian JTF who were lying on the ground one-by-one, which was a scene that the Islamic State had shown in Iraq;
- showed its soldiers doing "wheelies" in a pilfered tank in the same way the Islamic State had done in Iraq;
- showed a scene of "breaking" the Nigeria-Cameroon border in the same way that the Islamic State showed its soldiers "breaking" the border between Syria and Iraq;
- showed a scene of the Boko Haram shooting Civilian JTF in the head and throwing them over a bridge into a red river of blood in the same way that the Islamic State showed its soldiers shooting Iraqi soldiers and throwing them into a red river of blood;
- showed a convoy of dozens of cars, 4x4s, and motorcycles driving through Boko Haram-held territory beeping horns and waving the Islamic State's flag in a similar scene to how the Islamic State showed a large convoy of vehicles driving into Darna, Libya, when the Islamic State attempted to portray control of that city; and
- showed in October 2014 Abubakar Shekau in religious clothing for the first time since 2012 making gestures, including showing the raised index-finger sign of monotheism (*tawheed*) of the Islamic State, similar to al-Baghdadi, and delivering a sermon in a style similar to al-Baghdadi's sermon in Mosul in June 2014 when al-Baghdadi declared the Caliphate.

Boko Haram's fresh media campaign coincided with the movement's occupation of territory for the first time in the history of the insurgency. From October 2014 until February 2015, when the Nigerian government launched a massive military offensive against Boko Haram's "Caliphate", nearly 30 towns fell under Boko Haram's control, including ones populated by more than 100,000 people such as Monguno, Bama, Baga, and Mubi, where Boko Haram implemented strict *hudud* sharia punishments and appointed its own new *amirs* in those territories (Pieri 2014). Altogether, Boko Haram's de-facto control spanned an area almost as large as Belgium in three Nigerian states: Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Although the creation of an Islamic state or Caliphate has been a long-term goal of Boko Haram, this strategic shift also has to be viewed through the lens of Boko Haram wanting to impress the Islamic State, or that the move to take territory came from the urging of the Islamic State. The holding of territory for the Islamic State is one of three essential components of its maintaining legitimacy of the Caliphate; the other two are al-Baghdadi's deca-

dency from the Qurayshi Arab tribe and, at least according to its view, it having received support from the *ulema* for the declaration of the Caliphate.

It also appears that Ansaru, a Boko Haram faction, contributed to Boko Haram's media shift. The rapid introduction and rise of kidnappings in Borno State and northern Cameroon, including one jointly claimed by Boko Haram and Ansaru of the French priest Georges Vandenbusch in November 2013 according to AFP, which received the phone call of the claim, suggests that after the French-led intervention in northern Mali in Feburary 2013, Ansaru and Boko Haram were once again working together (Ghosh 2013). Boko Haram and Ansaru had originally intended to work together after Ansaru's formation in 2011 but failed due to Ansaru's condemnations of Boko Haram's *takfiri* ideology and Shekau's acceptance of collateral Muslim civilian deaths in attacks (Pantucci and Jesperson 2015: 24). Notably, Boko Haram videos began employing Islamic State and Ansaru rhetoric, including stating in October 2014 that the borders of Nigeria and Cameroon were "broken (*kasara* in Arabic)", which was modeled on an Islamic State video also showing its militants "breaking" the border posts between Iraq and Syria, and saying that Boko Haram had "established an Islamic State in *biladis Sudan* (Black Africa)". This is distinctly Ansaru phraseology, and given the experience of Ansaru militants in AQIM and the higher quality of their videos and statements at their founding in 2011–2012, they were well-placed to play a key role in amplifying Boko Haram's capabilities. This was exemplified in the kidnappings of 22 foreigners in Cameroon in 2013–2014 and numerous others in Borno, and raids on several key military barracks during Boko Haram's occupation of territory in its "Islamic State" in 2014–2015.

According to the Africa Media writer (discussed above), as a result of Africa Media's support to Boko Haram's media operation, Boko Haram set up the Twitter account called Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha that became the "official mouthpiece" of Boko Haram in January 2015. It is probable that one of the Islamic State's main media operatives, Shayba Al-Hamad, was involved in the set-up of this account because he used his own Twitter account to direct followers to Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha before its creation and pre-announced Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha Twitter posts before they were launched, suggesting he had inside knowledge. Moreover, Shayba Al-Hamad also claimed a role in setting up the Twitter account of *Ajnad al-Khilafah bi-Ifriqiyyah* (Soldiers of the Caliphate in Africa) Media Foundation, which pre-announced several attacks in Tunisia (Zelin 2015). Al-Hamad also pre-announced other attacks at Bardo Museum in Tunisia and Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli, which further establishes his legitimacy on Islamic State social media operations.

This account then paved the way for Boko Haram's entire *shura*, or "General Command", to make the pledge of loyalty to the Islamic State. One factor that may have further influenced these former Ansaru members to give up on Al-Qaeda was the Boko Haram attacks on Baga and Doron Baga between January 3–7, 2015, which left an estimated 2,000 civilians dead (Adegoke 2015). These attacks reportedly were the final straw for Al-Qaeda, where it realized Boko Haram was too violent for Al-Qaeda's brand; thus, Al-Qaeda itself withdrew from Boko Haram and "forced" the former Ansaru members to follow Shekau into the Islamic State now that the decision had been made for them.

Tactics of terror

Tactics employed by Boko Haram have undergone significant evolution since the start of the insurgency in 2009. In the pre-insurgency period of 2004–2009, when the movement was still in its infancy, Boko Haram attacks were predominantly scattered and disorganized, and almost always resulted in failure of attaining key goals. For example, the clashes at the first compound in Kanamma led to the security forces crushing that uprising and destroying what Boko Haram

had termed their "Afghanistan". Yet, other early tactics of Boko Haram, however rare, were ominous indicators of future attacks, including kidnappings of Christians in Gwoza as early as 2004. Gwoza is near Chibok, where 10 years later 250 girls – mostly Christian – would be kidnapped from their school in one of the most notorious incidents in international terrorism history.

When the insurgency started after Yusuf's extrajudicial killing in 2009 and after Shekau's takeover of the movement in 2010, Boko Haram operations for the next two years were not particularly sophisticated. They involved church and school burnings, drive-by shootings of security force officers, and assassinations of religious scholars and clerics who posed a challenge to Boko Haram's ideology. Notably, Boko Haram focused on Salafist clerics, who were best placed and most authoritative to counter Boko Haram's own interpretation of Salafism (Zenn 2012). The elimination of rivals included the prominent Salafi scholar and one-time teacher of Mohammad Yusuf, Jafaar Adam, in 2007. Though once close, Adam became increasingly critical of Mohammad Yusuf and the tactics that Boko Haram was utilizing in order to achieve the movement's objectives. Sheikh Albani, another high-profile religious scholar who was very critical of Boko Haram, was killed in 2013 (Benjamin and Joseph 2014). This allowed Boko Haram to eliminate or deter public opposition to the group's ideology.

Boko Haram also showed signs starting in 2012 that it had learned from or was at least imitating the Taliban in Afghanistan. For example, in the second half of 2012, Boko Haram systematically destroyed several hundred telecom towers, which not only caused millions of dollars of damages to foreign companies (especially South African) but also prevented the security forces from cooperating with civilians to track down its members. Boko Haram, like the Taliban, also began to master the use of text messages to threaten government officials not to obstruct Boko Haram operations as well as to warn civilians against cooperating with the government. In other cases, text messages were used to extort "taxes" from merchants with the threat of death to the family members of anyone who did not pay. Boko Haram also began to employ complex "Haqqani Network-style" suicide operations with multiple attackers in 2013 in Northeastern Nigeria, which may have been learned or observed from the style of suicide operations that the Taliban had carried out in Afghanistan.

From 2010–2013, Boko Haram attacks in Northeastern Nigeria were not particularly sophisticated. Boko Haram's largest-scale attacks, with 50 and 200 militants, respectively, came in November 2011 and January 2012 in Damatru and Kano. These attacks required strategic planning, such as cutting off the choke-points in each city, but the bulk of the attacks involved indiscriminate gunfire, which is why more than 200 people – mostly civilians – were killed in the Kano attacks (Oboh 2012). The sophistication of Boko Haram attacks improved, however, when signs that some Ansaru members reintegrated into Boko Haram emerged in early 2013. Ansaru's attacks in Northwestern Nigeria in 2011–2013 involved four kidnapping operations that led to the capture – and subsequent killing – of over 10 foreigners (one foreigner, Frenchman Francis Collump, escaped his captors in Kaduna in 2013), an ambush on Mali-bound Nigerian troops, and a prison break in Abuja (Bacchi 2013). Ansaru's broader network was likely also involved in the Mamman Nur-masterminded suicide attack on the U.N. Headquarters in Abuja in August 2011 and Federal Police Headquarters in Abuja in June 2011 (the first two suicide attacks in Nigerian history), as well as the 80% of suicide bombings in Nigeria between 2011 and 2013 that took place in the "Middle Belt" region of Nigeria and mostly targeted churches.

Boko Haram's tactics became more sophisticated when some Ansaru members re-integrated with the militant group in 2013. This occurred in the context of Ansaru's cells, including its shura, being broken up in Northwestern Nigeria in 2012–2013, and Shekau's ordering the killing of Ansaru members or informing on them to the security forces (Umar 2015). At the same time, the French-led military intervention in northern Mali severed the links between Ansaru

and its AQIM and MUJAO patrons. Some of the skillsets that transferred from Ansaru (and its related AQIM and MUJAO patrons) to Boko Haram were, first and foremost, kidnappings of 22 foreigners in Cameroon from 2013–2015 (one of which was jointly claimed, as mentioned above), raids on military barracks that were video-recorded for propaganda purposes for the first time, and the more strategic use of IEDs to limit the mobility of conventional forces.[12]

Later, when some Ansaru members took part in leading Boko Haram's connections to the Islamic State in late 2014, Boko Haram began to occupy territory for the first time and held up to 25 towns at its height. This was partly from a motivation to establish a territorial entity in which Islam could be implemented, but also likely in part to impress the Islamic State, or on the advice of the Islamic State. Although Boko Haram did not set up sophisticated administrative structure, it was eager to film life under Sharia law replete with *hudud* punishments propaganda from Shekau saying they had an Islamic State.

Since the Nigerian military intervention launched in February 2015, Boko Haram has been on the run and essentially surrendered its Caliphate. Nonetheless, Boko Haram has resorted to the tactic of information operations. Its propaganda – now as the West Africa Province brand – has been almost exclusively focused on advertising that it is holding territory even whilst the group in fact is holding few, if any, towns at all. Presumably, Boko Haram will continue this advertising campaign since it is hard to refute and the government does not yet appear intent on refuting it through pictures or videos. If the militants cannot control towns in Nigeria any longer, they may move outwards to the sub-region and see if they can occupy any territory there.

Conclusion

Boko Haram has dominated the security agenda in Nigeria for almost a decade. Initially emerging as a movement critical of the Nigerian state's failures, especially focused on corruption, nepotism, and poor governance, Boko Haram members sought a new form of governance in which they could live their lives in accordance to strict Islamic doctrine. While there have always been undertones of violent extremism to the movement, it was not until after the extrajudicial killing of its leader Mohammad Yusuf that the movement became increasingly violent, emerging as one of the most formidable terrorist organizations in the region. It has graduated from small-scale drive-by shootings to a full-scale insurgency, including the kidnapping of women and children, attacks on Christians and church property, and the killing of Muslims who disagreed with its interpretation of Islam. In recent years the movement has gained traction beyond its primary operational base in the Northeast of Nigeria, expanding its activities of terror into the neighbouring West African countries of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.

As an irredentist movement, Boko Haram does not recognize the sovereignty of the Nigerian state, nor any of the international boundaries between Nigeria and its West African neighbours. Instead, Boko Haram leaders claim that they are guided by a higher inspiration – a vision based on the region's religious and historical past as constructed by Boko Haram through a neo-Salafist lens. The ultimate end for Boko Haram is to establish an Islamic emirate in Northern Nigeria and parts of neighbouring West Africa linked to the Islamic State's Caliphate and where Sharia law will be implemented in its totality. All aspects of non-Islamic influence will be banished, including secularism, democracy, and non-Islamic forms of education and anything deemed to fall under the rubric of Western influence.

This chapter has argued that Boko Haram is a movement that is knowledgeable of the geo-cultural terrain in which it operates and that it is able to use this knowledge to further advance its aims and objectives. Boko Haram has clearly moved beyond a local organization that solely affects Nigeria (Forest 2012) and has established itself as a regional force, threatening the stability

of not just Nigeria but also West Africa. In the summer months of 2015, Boko Haram carried out almost as many attacks outside of Nigeria as within. We further argued that Boko Haram's recent affiliation with the Islamic State has added a supplementary dimension to the way in which it should be understood. Boko Haram cannot be understood outside of the context of global jihadism, and the movement's vision and modes of operation are now tied to the broader goals of the Islamic State.

In that regard, the Islamic State's successes or failures in Syria and Iraq may also affect the new brand of Boko Haram. If the Islamic State becomes "too extreme" and loses legitimacy (for example, by enslaving too many women or killing too many children), or loses in battles with Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, other Syrian and Iraqi militias, or to Russian, Iranian, or Western-backed groups, it could mean that the Islamic State system of Provinces more broadly falls apart, especially since the Islamic State system is very much more of a "virtual Caliphate" than one with clear physical – logistical, financial, training – relationships at present. This would not mean that Boko Haram's ideology and basis for its founding in Nigeria would be defeated, however; it could nonetheless provide an opportunity for a new movement to eclipse a de-legitimized Boko Haram, such as a reformulated Ansaru faction under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda or another Salafi-jihadi movement also appealing to Kanuris in Nigeria and themes of restoring the Caliphate but with perhaps less brutality and foreign-dependence than Boko Haram to maintain its legitimacy.

Notes

1 From a speech by Sani Umar, Boko Haram's interim leader, August 2, 2009.
2 Sermon given by Mohammad Yusuf, "Tarihin Musulmai [History of Muslims]", July 2007.
3 The Kanem-Bornu Empire was a historic Muslim Empire whose territories stretched across much of modern Chad, Northeastern Nigeria, Southern Libya, and Northern Cameroon. The Empire was led by Kanuri rulers. The Kanuri are the predominant ethnic group in Northeastern Nigeria, and also form much of the leadership of Boko Haram.
4 Boko Haram video from August 12, 2013. Shekau taunts Obama, saying, "I am challenging Obama", and making similar statements regarding President Francois Hollande of France and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Shekau says: "they are no match for me".
5 Mohammad Yusuf. 2007. "Tahrin Musulmai [History of Muslims]".
6 Sermon by Muhammad Nur, 2009.
7 Africa Media posted pro-Islamic State statements on Twitter from 2014 until mid-2015 when it no longer continued to recreate its Twitter account after a suspension. Presumably this was because Algeria and Tunisia reported to have killed the Africa Media administrators. Nonetheless, Africa Media has credibility from receiving the endorsements of Islamic State social media propagandists in Syria and for having predicted attacks in Tunisia, including at Bardo Museum. Africa Media described in detail how it assisted Boko Haram's media operations in coordination with the Islamic State and focused on Boko Haram's potential to spread beyond Nigeria to the broader West Africa region.
8 See following video release from Boko Haram from early May 2015: www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrfWS_vL0D4&spfreload=10.
9 All issues of the Islamic State's *Dabiq* magazine may be accessed at the website of the Clarion Project: www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq.
10 This was detailed in a March 27, 2015, statement posted on Africa Media's Twitter account.
11 See: http://news.yahoo.com/boko-haram-leader-denies-peace-talks-nigeria-100847270.html.
12 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjw5l.

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25
HAMAS

Sagit Yehoshua

Introduction

Hamas[1] is considered to be the second biggest Palestinian organisation after the Fatah. It was established in late 1987 with the outbreak of the first *intifada,* the Palestinian uprising, as a religious alternative to Fatah, and hence it represented a dramatic challenge to Fatah hegemony within the Palestinian arena. Unlike Fatah, which was initiated by and operated for many years within the Palestinian diaspora, Hamas emerged within the Palestinian Territories. Further, it was deeply involved socially with Palestinian society from 1945, long before Hamas's formal creation as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, a very dominant Islamic movement that later spread to other Arab countries and Palestine, and was involved mainly in social and cultural activities within civil society (Abu Amr, 1994; Zahid, 2012).

The Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organisation known in Arabic as Ikhwan al-Muslimin, emerged in the late 1920s in Egypt and was initially led by a religious scholar named Hassan al-Banna. The organisation strongly opposed secularism and westernisation in Egypt and other Muslim countries, and viewed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a religious issue that needed to be addressed by both embracing Islam and supporting the Palestinians in their struggle against the Israeli occupier. Consequently, their activities and involvement in Palestine dated back to 1935, before the Jewish state was even established. Their role in Palestine consisted of running branches of the organisation in the area, as well as participating in attacks on British and Jewish interests, and later on actively fighting against Israel since its inception in 1948 by sending to the battlefields their own units, independent of the official Egyptian army. Though the Muslim Brotherhood experienced massive growth and expansion to other Arab countries, up until 1967 the movement was repressed by both the Egyptian and the Jordanian regimes that controlled Gaza and the West Bank respectively (these two territories being roughly the area allocated to Palestinian Arabs according to the UN Partition resolution passed in November 1947).

Al-Banna, who had a more religious and evolutionary approach of creating gradual change within society, was executed by Egypt in 1949. Another very influential member, Sayyid Qutb, served as the intellectual leader of the movement. Qutb was an Egyptian writer, educator, and religious leader, who held a more revolutionary approach and promoted a holy war – 'jihad' – to overthrow secular regimes and establish an Islamic state. He was imprisoned and finally executed

in 1966 (Knudsen, 2005). However, after the Six-Day War in June 1967, Israel took control over those areas and displayed tolerance for their activities as a religious organisation, allowing them to develop their '*Dawa'* system of social welfare and cultural involvement, in terms of charity organisations, mosques, schools, and universities. The Muslim Brotherhood had realised that while focusing only on religious and welfare activities, they would be overlooked by the regimes and would be able to penetrate the civil society and gain the support and strength needed in order to spread their ideology and political goals (Levitt, 2006).

Thus, the foundation of Hamas as the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood by Ahmed Yassin, then a dominant preacher of the Muslim Brotherhood,[2] and his colleagues, required an organisational adjustment and justification for its initiation. Hamas was created originally as an independent organisation, and arguably, had Hamas not enjoyed success fighting for the Palestinian cause via the uprising, the organisation would not have been recognised by the Muslim Brotherhood and may have been overlooked. Due to its massive support and operational successes, Hamas was able to declare itself as the military branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in its charter which originated in 1988.

The establishment of Hamas

For more than 10 years, the senior leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza were preparing the ground for the transformation of the organisation in Palestine, from well-established social institutions and charities to a resistance movement that would promote Islamic values among the Palestinian society, along with fighting against the Israeli occupation. However, the leaders, headed by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, were waiting for the right time, which eventually arrived following the eruption of the first *intifada*, on December 8, 1987.

The violent events were triggered by a traffic accident between an Israeli truck and a van carrying Palestinian workers on their way back home from work, killing three of them and injuring many others. The senior leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip comprised seven leaders: Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Sheikh Salah Shehada, Issa Al Nasshaar, Dr. Ibrahim Al Yazuri, Dr. Abdul Aziz Al Rantisi, Abdul Fattah Dokhan, and Mohammed Shamhaa. They gathered the next day for an emergency meeting in Sheikh Ahmad Yassin's house to discuss these significant developments. A few days later, on December 14, the first organisation statement was released to the press, officially announcing the birth of Hamas – the Palestinian Resistance Movement – and thus creating a united front leading the *intifada* from both the West Bank and Gaza (Tamimi, 2011; Chehab, 2007).

Hamas charter

The Hamas charter (or covenant) is considered to be Hamas's most important ideological document. It was established in August 18, 1988, and it details the basics of the organisation's foundations and main goals. It was edited and approved by Hamas's main founder, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. The main aspect of the charter is Hamas's ideological obligation for the destruction of Israel through a long-term jihad, while using Islamic resources extensively in order to form a strong Islamic base. No changes to the charter were made since then, in spite of the developments and changes within the organisation, and Hamas leaders still insist on its relevance and importance (Maqdsi, 1993; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre at the Centre for Special Studies (C.S.S), 2006). However, according to Tamimi (2011), the charter was written as a reflection of the Muslim Brotherhood's general perception of the world and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and does not represent the true vision of the movement. Accordingly, it is not

quoted or used by its leaders and stands as a historical document that expresses the initial position of the Hamas organisation upon its establishment.

The charter opens with a cry to all Muslims to stand up against the Jews. It is a religious call, but also a national and political one when it comes to the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. The introduction that follows highlights the essence of the creation of Hamas while calling on all Muslims in Arab nations to support and join the fight against the 'enemies of Allah', in order to promise the victory of Allah and Islam. The main points stressed in the charter relate to Islam as a way of life; it calls for Muslim unity and welcomes all Muslims to follow the path of resistance through a holy war. Nonetheless, it is a Palestinian movement in its essence, a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, established to mainly fight against the Zionist movement and the occupation of the Palestinian lands (The Avalon Project, 2008).

Furthermore, the charter expresses an uncompromising stand against Israel, refusing to acknowledge its right to exist. The document perceives Palestine as a sacred Islamic land occupied by the Infidel Jews, while it is strictly forbidden to give up on any piece of it, or to make any agreements with its occupiers. There is a dominance of anti-Semitic statements throughout the document, where the Jews are presented as the source of all evil, worthy of the worst, and it is an Islamic duty to wage holy war against them in order to liberate Palestine (Maqdsi, 1993; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre at the Centre for Special Studies (C.S.S), 2006).

Finally, since the mid-1990s and even more acutely so after the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, Hamas leaders have issued policy statements that sought to clarify the ones detailed in the charter to reflect changing conditions and circumstances. They openly acknowledged that the charter is 'a piece of history and no longer relevant', but it served the purpose of its initiator during a unique situation. Hence they do not see the need to formally change it but instead have striven to adapt it to the new reality and needs of the organisation (Davice, 2016).

Ideology

According to the charter, Hamas endeavours to create a Palestinian Islamic state based on the principles of the 'Sharia' (Islamic law), over lands occupied by Israel. Hamas does not recognise Israel's right to exist and seeks to eliminate it by armed struggle (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre at the Centre for Special Studies (C.S.S), 2006).

Further to the debate regarding the relevance of the Hamas charter, in the late 1990s, Hamas's political bureau issued a new document, a memorandum titled: 'This is what we struggle for'. The document, which is written in quite a different way from the high religious language of the charter, was published in order to provide an explanation of Hamas's main goals and ideology, as was requested of them by a European diplomatic mission in Amman. In the document, Hamas defined itself as the Palestinian national liberation movement that strives to liberate the Palestinian land and recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It details that Hamas is guided and inspired by the principles and values of Islam, which stands as its ideological orientation. There is no place for dialogue or negotiations with Israel, due to the imbalance of power between the two. Accordingly, Israel should be eliminated by armed struggle, as this is the only way for liberation. The peace process is considered irrelevant and has been proven to be a failure. Furthermore, in this document, Hamas is trying to highlight its other political, social and cultural functions that are all active in the forms of social and educational institutions and services available to the Palestinians in Gaza and (to a lesser extent in practice) the West Bank. These functions and services are separated from the Hamas military wing, which has its own leadership and objectives of armed struggle against Israel (Tamimi, 2011, pp. 265–270).

Nonetheless, although Hamas does not accept any negotiations for a long-term agreement with Israel, it does offer the option of 'Hudna', a truce, which is a concept that originates from Muslim tradition. The hudna is based on the idea that when it is not possible to conquer, a truce is a practical, temporary solution that allows a calm period to rebuild and gain back strength (Yaghi, 2006; Mishal, 2003).

Another strategic tactic Hamas is famous for and which it uses extensively is suicide bombings (Gupta and Mundra, 2005). Hamas initiated its suicide attacks in 1993 in order to disrupt the implementations of the Oslo Accord, which was an on-going peace process between Israel and the PLO. This tactic has some substantial advantages, such as technological feasibility, as it is operated by a human being who can manoeuvre to the best location to explode the device, in order to cause the most casualties. Furthermore, the assailant does not need to figure out an escape route, as he/she expects to die anyway. This particular approach is also cost-effective and causes a lot of panic and fear within the enemy due to the latter's lack of control over it. Lastly, it influences the image and status of the group as a determined group that cannot be ignored (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, 2002).

Organisational structure

As was mentioned previously, Hamas developed from the Muslim Brotherhood, which represented a range of institutional and security establishments. Hence, upon its transformation into a political and militant organisation, Hamas needed a more structured formation that could provide the leadership for the armed struggle as well as the political, religious and social perspectives of the organisation. Consequently, the Hamas structure is distributed between various areas:

1 Gaza is the main location of the 'internal' political wing of the organisation, 'the consultative council' headed by Ismail Haniya, previously the prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in Gaza;
2 the West Bank and Israeli prisons where Hamas maintains some leadership; and
3 abroad, the 'external' political bureau which is responsible for mainly financial and political support. This bureau is currently headed by Khaled Mashal; it was previously based in Damascus, Syria, and now operates from Qatar.

The decision-making process goes through a shared communication, 'Majlis al-Shura, or consultative council', between the varied geographic areas and aspects. Under this 'Shura' are different committees that are in charge of other basic organisational and social aspects. Furthermore, since the death in 2004 of Sheikh Yassin, who acted as the indisputable spiritual and political leader of the organisation, Hamas is more multi-dimensional and spreads over varied locations, leaderships and areas of interests (Janssen, 2009).

Initially, Hamas created two military units; the first, Al Mujahidin Al Filastinun, was established five years before the creation of Hamas itself, and was placed in charge of accumulating weapons and military activities. The second was the security branch, the Majmouath Jihad u-Dawa, which was charged with dealing with collaborators and 'internal jihad', or, to put it in other words, supervising the societal implementation of Islamic rules. However, in 1991, during the first *intifada*, Hamas gathered the different military groups that operated under its name into one military wing: 'Izz Al-Din Al Qassam Brigade'. It was named after a Syrian Muslim scholar and preacher who led the battle against Zionism and the British in Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s, and who died due to these actions (see Chehab, 2007, pp. 39–41; Knudsen, 2005, p. 1378; and Levitt 2006, pp. 10–11).

Accordingly, the Hamas structure is based on three main elements: the military wing, the social wing (the dawa) and the political wing. The political wing is involved in both the military wing and the dawa, while the military wing works separately from the political wing, with its own leadership and structure. Though it has to receive orders and guidelines from the consultative council, which is the political wing, the military wing works under secrecy, due to security reasons, while keeping its distance, and operates with discretion regarding its operations and activities (Hroub, 2006).

Leadership

The political analyst Khalid Hroub (2006) indicates that the profile of the Hamas leadership, especially from the internal wings of the group, shares very common features. Most of them come from poor refugees' families, were affiliates with the Muslim brotherhood from an early age, are very religious and educated, have spent some time in Israeli prison and live a modest and simple life.

Founder – Sheikh Ahmed Yassin

Ahmed Yassin was considered to be the most popular person in the Gaza Strip. He was a very charismatic figure, born in 1936 to a large, middle-class family of nine children in the village of al-Jora, near Ashqelon. He was disabled and had to sit in a wheelchair since the age of 16 due to an accident. Previously, at the age of 10 he became a refugee, forced to move from his home with his family, along with thousands of other Palestinians, during the course of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. This experience influenced Yassin immensely, and despite his disability he became very active politically and religiously. He was exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood doctrine from a young age, and later went to study Islamic studies at the University of Cairo, where he came into contact with the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood. Subsequently he continued this involvement when he was back in Gaza, which during the period 1948–67 came under Egyptian control (Levitt, 2006; Joffe, 1996).

Yassin led the development of the Dawa system, the 'calling' for Islam, by socioeconomic support for the Palestinian people via such activities as: religion, education, welfare and health in both Gaza and the West Bank. He established three organisations which served as the umbrella for all the religious, educational and social organisations in Gaza. The main institution is the Islamic Centre (al-Mujama al-Islamia) built in 1976, as well as the Islamic Society (al-Mujjama' al-Islamiyah) and the Islamic University of Gaza. This system, leaning mainly on donations and charity organisations, proved to be highly effective and useful for attracting the people and recruiting the society to the Hamas ideology and cause (Levitt, 2004; Tamimi, 2011).

Further to his substantial involvement in the 'Islamisation' of the Palestinian population through education, social and philanthropic activities, Yassin was a strong believer in the eradication of the 'Zionist entity' and the return of the land to the Palestinian people through Jihad. During his leadership, the military wing was attentive to his decisions and orders. He led and authorised major terrorist plots and attacks against Israeli targets, among them the kidnap and murder of Israeli soldiers, as well as numerous suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. In all such activities, Yassin emphasised the necessity and importance of Hamas in achieving the anticipated victory for the Palestinian people (Eldar, 2012).

Yassin was assassinated by Israel on March 22, 2004, as part of Israel's policy of targeted killing, which aimed to undermine Hamas and cause as much destruction to the movement as possible. His death, however, caused a massive upheaval among the Arab world and raised the

sympathy and popularity of Hamas immensely within the Palestinian territories and outside. Furthermore, the assassination of Yassin's predecessor, Dr. Abdul Aziz Al Rantisi, less than a month later, on April 17, led to a major shift in the balance of power between the internal and the external leadership, leaving the latter with more power and media weight regarding their ability to represent the movement (Hroub, 2004).

External political wing, 'the political bureau'

After openly joining the armed struggle during the first *intifada*, Hamas faced severe retaliation from Israel, starting with massive detention of Hamas affiliates and leaders in 1988 and further in 1990, as well as immense deportation of others to Lebanon in 1992. These actions caused severe damage and imbalance to Hamas's organisational structure and encouraged the leadership to seek for a solution by creating a leadership branch based abroad that could continue leading the organisation in spite of the circumstances the internal leadership was facing. The external leadership led fundraising operations and propaganda initially mainly from the United States by Mussa Abu Marzuk, who established the Holy Land Foundation, until his deportation from the United States in 1990 to Jordan, where he remained until 1999; as well as from Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Qatar (Tamimi, 2011, pp. 57–61).

Khaled Mashal has been the top leader of the Political Bureau since 2004 and is considered to be the most senior leader of Hamas since the assassination of Abdul Aziz Al Rantisi. He was born in 1956 in a village in the West Bank but lived most of his life in exile after his family moved to Kuwait in 1967. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 15 and become very active within the movement when Hamas was established in 1987. He took leadership roles, initially from Kuwait but later on in the 1990s from Jordan, where he become the head of Hamas's political bureau in 1996. At the end of the 1990s, the Jordanian King Abdullah II made clear that he did not approve of Hamas activities and closed the movement's offices in Amman. Soon afterward, Mashal was expelled from the country. He spent two years in Qatar but then relocated to Syria, basing the main headquarters of Hamas in Damascus. He led the bureau from there until the end of 2011. When the Syrian civil war erupted later that year and took on a strong sectarian colour, Sunni Hamas felt compelled to side with the largely Sunni opposition to Assad's Alawi sect-dominated regime, and the organisation took the opposition side against Bashar al-Assad. Consequently, Mashal had to leave and moved the Hamas offices to Qatar in early 2012. At the end of 2012, Mashal visited Gaza for the first time since 1975, urged the Palestinian people not to recognise Israel and promised to continue with the armed struggle. Later on in 2013 he was re-elected as the chairman of the political bureau of Hamas, and since then he has led the group from his exile in Qatar (Kaplan, 2006; CNN Library, 2015).

Internal political wing, 'the consultative council'

The internal political wing runs today from Gaza. It is headed by Ismail Haniya, who is considered to be number two in the hierarchy of the organisation today, since the death of the main leader Yassin and the appointment of Khaled Mashal as the head of the political bureau of the organisation. Haniya was born in 1962 at a refugee camp west of Gaza and went to Gaza University to study Arabic literature, where he become involved with the Islamic movement and the first *intifada* against Israel in 1987. He was imprisoned by Israel a few times and was also deported to Lebanon along with other Hamas leaders and activists in 1992. Upon his return a year later, he became Yassin's assistant and consequently strengthened his reputation within the group. After Hamas participated in and won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, Haniya

was elected as the prime minister of the government in Gaza until it collapsed in 2014. He is thought to be more pragmatic and open to dialogue than his colleagues within the external political bureau of Hamas (BBC News, 2006; Wilson, 2015).

The Hamas leadership in the West Bank is quite weak, since it is undermined by the longer established and more secular-oriented Fatah, who is traditionally stronger in this area, as well as by Israel. Furthermore, relationships between the external wing and internal wing are known to suffer from disagreements and a lack of mutual understanding, where the external leadership is at times considered to be more radical and uncompromising, while also being out of touch with – and detached from – the suffering of the Palestinian people. Nonetheless, both political wings seem to have undergone a process of pragmatism and moderation, mainly since joining the political game and wining the elections in 2006. At the same time, frictions remain with the military wing that still presents a strong pro-violence stance (Gunning, 2008; Ben Menachem, 2015; Levitt, 2004).

Military wing

Upon its establishment, Hamas created an umbrella organisation for all the military groups operated in their name until then, named Al Jihad Wa Da'wa (MAJD). Initially, their main operations were against Israeli military targets, kidnapping of IDF soldiers as well as acquiring weapons and dealing with (punishing, sometimes killing) Palestinian collaborators. Nevertheless, in 1991, a specific Hamas military wing was established named 'Izz Al Din Al Qassam Brigades'. This outfit was initially led by Salah Shahada, a veteran member of Hamas since its initiation who developed into a prominent leader, until his death in an Israeli raid in 2002. His successor was Mohammad Deif, who was seriously injured in an Israeli attack a few months later. Deif, who had survived previous Israeli assassination attempts, was wanted by Israel due to his involvement in the kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers, and also for leading suicide bombers and attacks that killed many Israeli civilians. He was mentored by Yehye Ayash, a bomb-maker who was responsible for the construction and development of numerous bombs and suicide attacks, which killed many Israelis. Ayash also took on prominent leadership roles within Hamas until he was killed in an Israeli attack in 1996. Another prominent commander of the Qassam brigades was Ahmad Jabari, who took the leading role of the military wing while Deif was recovering from injuries. Until his own death in an Israeli raid in 2012, Jabari had spent 13 years in Israeli prisons and was considered to hold very extreme views. His successor is Marwan Issa, who had previously served as deputy to Deif and as Jabari's right-hand man, as well as a pivotal operations officer (Davice, 2016; Gritten, 2012; Khoury, 2012).

Key events

From its initiation in 1988, Hamas posed as an alternative to the PLO, not just as a religious force, but also as a firmer national and social option. Initially, the Hamas leadership, led by Yassin, had some hesitations regarding joining the first *intifada*. They were concerned with its impact on the widespread and developed Dawa system in terms of the numerous institutions such as schools, nurseries, mosques, university, medical and social institutes, as well as donations and charity organisations. However, they understood that *not* joining the armed struggle at this stage would have had severe consequences on their image in the eyes of the Palestinian people. The Hamas leadership thus decided to change its priority from the Dawa system to armed struggle in the name of jihad against Israel. They took part in numerous operations against Israeli targets in Gaza, and at the beginning of 1989 they were also involved in the kidnapping and murdering of

Israeli soldiers, actions which marked the organisation's first operations outside of Gaza (Mishal and Sela, 2000).

Hamas opposed the development of the peace process which the PLO was trying to implement with Israel, initiated at the Madrid conference in 1992 and continued with the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. As a reaction against it, Hamas escalated its involvement in the conflict by the use of suicide bombers, and during the years 1993 until 1996, more than 200 Israelis were killed and hundreds more were injured due to Hamas suicide operations and actions. These efforts proved to be successful. By 1996, after the killing of Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish right-wing extremist, the Israeli public's support for the peace process was diverted out of fear and distrust, and a right-wing government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed the Oslo Agreement, was elected (Kristianasen, 1999; Davis, 2016).

A final attempt for peace was led in 2000 by American president Bill Clinton, who hosted a meeting in Camp David with Ehud Barak, the new left-wing Israeli prime minister, and Yasser Arafat. The ability of the two leaders to compromise, however, was minimal, and as a result they left Camp David without an agreement, and the Oslo peace process finally collapsed. This led to a rise in frustration and hopelessness. Later in 2000, the visit of Ariel Sharon, then the head of the right-wing Likud Israeli opposition party, to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, acted as the trigger for the second *intifada*, also called the 'Al Aqsa' *intifada*. This uprising lasted until early 2005 and was marked by numerous suicide attacks that killed hundreds of Israelis as well as many more Palestinians due to Israeli retaliation. It also resulted in Israel building a security wall around the West Bank and the firing of rockets by Hamas into Israeli civilian-populated areas in the south of Israel (Davis, 2016; BBC News, 2004).

From 2005 Hamas seems to have changed its strategy and has sought to enter the political arena by reducing violence and participating in the Palestinian Authority legislative election, for the first time in 2006. Hamas surprised the world, and probably themselves as well, by winning the majority of seats in these elections. However, Hamas and Fatah failed to sustain a Palestinian national unity government, and in June 2007, Hamas security units forcibly took over the Gaza Strip, where they formed their own government, separate from the Fatah-dominated entity that continued to rule from Ramallah in the West Bank. Hamas has controlled Gaza ever since then, in spite of opposition from Israel backed by Egypt, the United States, and even the Arab League. The fracture with Fatah has deepened, almost to a state of a civil war (Long, 2010).

Consequently, Hamas commenced a process to become a fully-fledged military organisation rather than a guerrilla one, employing advanced military capabilities of specialised units and operations involving the launching of various types of rockets. In addition, Hamas built offensive and defensive tunnels that run underground from Gaza to Israel and to other influential places. As a result, Israel launched two major operations directed against Hamas's firing of rockets on the southern areas of Israel from Gaza. Operation 'Cast Lead' in 2008 represented the first real challenge for Hamas, as it emphasised the imbalance of power between the IDF and Hamas. Following this, excluding a few periods of ceasefire, rockets continued to be launched towards the south of Israel, which led in turn to another operation in 2012, named 'Pillar of Defence'. This latter conflict started with the assassination by Israel of Ahmad Jabari, the head of the Hamas military wing, the Qassam Brigades, and continued with the killing of other senior Hamas members. The last operation, 'Protective Edge', took place in 2014 during a Netanyahu administration in Israel. It came as a reaction to the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. This conflict included a ground invasion of IDF units into Gaza in order to destroy Hamas tunnels, and it resulted in major destruction of Hamas infrastructure and military capabilities (Cohen and White, 2009).

Over the years, Hamas has relied on Iranian and Syrian support as well as Hezbollah guidance. Today, the financial support comes mainly from Qatar. The organisation has improved its capabilities for rocket launching with massive help from Iran, but lately also through self-production within Gaza, the result of Hamas being more isolated since the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt in 2013. Since then, the military generals have taken control in Egypt and have blocked all smuggling operations from the Rafah border, where southern Gaza meets the Egyptian-ruled northern Sinai. Nonetheless, in spite of Israeli retaliations, there is no attempt to remove Hamas from its control over Gaza, and the organisation maintains its strong ideological stand against Israel and its campaign for the Islamisation of the Palestinian population (Wilson, 2015).

Notes

1 Islamic Resistance Movement (in Arabic: Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia), an Arabic word that means 'zeal'.
2 For more information on Yassin and his activism, see Mishal and Sela (2006, pp. 19–20) and Levitt (2006, pp. 34–37).

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HIZBULLAH

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Before the outbreak of war in 2006 between Israel and Hizbullah, which captured the world's attention, Hizbullah was mainly known to specialists in the terrorism field because of its hostage taking and kidnappings of Westerners during the chaos of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989). Several large-scale terrorist attacks against Western targets throughout the 1980s and 1990s solidified Hizbullah's image as a global terrorist organization. Most notably, the October 1983 truck bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. servicemen and 58 French soldiers in a simultaneous attack, was attributed to members of Hizbullah and carried out under Iranian direction (Geraghty 2009). Despite its bloody militant and terrorist history, Hizbullah's organizational identity is increasingly complex and multifaceted, as the group concurrently developed its guerilla warfare capabilities while engaged in protracted conflict with Israel, bolstered its involvement in the Lebanese political system (and governing cabinet), and expanded its vast social services program. This has made scholarship on Hizbullah increasingly contentious, as debates rage over which one of Hizbullah's competing militant, political, social, and terrorist identities is primary.

In order to better understand the issues surrounding Hizbullah that have attracted academic interest over the last four decades, this chapter first outlines and summarizes the prevalent scholarship on Hizbullah. It helpfully categorizes the various conceptual 'schools of thought' that have emerged in the academic community regarding analyzing Hizbullah. It references the most important and relevant works and succinctly recounts the central focus of each group of works, which will assist in guiding future research.

After this brief literature review, this chapter provides a concise organizational profile and broad overview of Hizbullah. It first outlines the origins of Hizbullah, and discusses how its emergence was shaped by internal shifts in Lebanon amidst the civil war and significant regional events related to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hizbullah's ideological foundations, closely tied to Iran, are assessed, as well as the group's overall strategic aims as laid out in its 1985 'Open Letter' manifesto. Next, the chapter describes Hizbullah's organizational development and military expansion throughout its protracted conflict with Israel. It highlights key events and milestones, and also discusses the group's political expansion in tandem. It illustrates how Hizbullah adapted and moderated itself politically to appeal to broader segments of Lebanese society while concurrently maintaining its militant posture against Israel. It briefly recounts Hizbullah's involvement in terrorism and recent events

surrounding Hizbullah's listing on the European Union's terrorist group blacklist. This chapter illustrates Hizbullah's multifaceted identity, but ultimately highlights the centrality of its militant capability that enables Hizbullah to maintain influence and project power domestically and regionally.

Reviewing the literature on Hizbullah

A moderate amount of literature exists on Hizbullah in English, with most focusing on the general history of the group and its origins and development in Lebanon, and the group's relationships with Iran and Syria. There are a number of solid generic histories of Hizbullah, often relaying similar narratives related to the group's organizational and military development amidst the conflict with Israel. These core works assess Hizbullah's entry into politics and highlight the group's pragmatism and flexibility both theologically and ideologically as it adapted to its domestic political environment. These texts act as excellent foundational texts for students and scholars alike (Hamzeh 2004; Jaber 1997; Harik 2005).

Important works focus on sociological trends within Lebanese Shiite society that provided the fertile soil for the emergence of Hizbullah, and discuss the historical and political issues surrounding the origins of the group (Shanahan 2005; Nakash 2006). Others discuss the social basis of Shiite militancy in Lebanon, which includes in-depth analyses of the Shiite group Amal, which Hizbullah later surpassed in strength and popularity Norton 1987, 1985; Deeb 1988). The early influence of Iran and Syria on Hizbullah's leadership has been scrutinized (Ranstorp 1994), as well as the monumental ideological influence of clerics like Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah on Hizbullah's development (Kramer 1993, 1997; Ajami 1986). These works are critically important as they provide detailed assessments of the social, political, and militant context from which Hizbullah emerged.

The ideological adaptation of Hizbullah has been comprehensively analyzed throughout its organizational development and political evolution. Alagha (2011a) provided a nuanced analysis of shifts in Hizbullah's ideology and identity construction and discussed how Hizbullah shifted from propagating a hardline religious ideology towards a more encompassing ideology that incorporated a systematic grass-roots political and social program. Nevertheless, Alagha (2006) noted that Hizbullah's identity as a jihadist movement remains one of its consistent and 'immutable' set of values. Ghrorayeb (2002) provided an incisive analysis of how Hizbullah's political transformation and its adaptation of core strategic principles have been reconciled and rationalized by Hizbullah both ideologically and theologically.

Highlighting the multifaceted nature of Hizbullah, scholars have focused on Hizbullah's sophisticated media and propaganda program, including its Al-Manar Television channel, which has strengthened Hizbullah's ability to publicly shape its own distinct narrative (Jorisch 2004; Harb 2011). A significant part of Hizbullah's widespread appeal in Lebanon and abroad pertains to its strikingly sophisticated political communications strategy, which has remained resourceful and adaptive (Khatib, Matar and Alshaer 2014).

Hizbullah's political and military identities have been deeply studied, and scholars have debated Hizbullah's shift away from a militant-centric identity towards a more 'moderate' political identity as part of an attempt to broaden its appeal in Lebanese society throughout the 1990s and 2000s, in a process referred to as 'Lebanonization'. On one side, scholars argue that Hizbullah moderated its extremist ideals and shifted towards political and parliamentary accommodation that made it more appealing for all Lebanese, often by delicately maneuvering through the domestic system and local politics (Norton 1999, 2007; Hamzeh 1993, 2000). Other studies clearly illustrate how Hizbullah's 'Lebanonization' and institutionalization were simply

means to secure its own interests and power in Lebanon, as it delicately balanced military, political, and social services efforts in order to advance its own agenda (Ranstorp 1998; Zisser 1996, 2000; Azani 2011). Scholars sympathetic to Hizbullah have debated Hizbullah's militant identity, as Harik (2005, pp. 1–2) prosaically examined whether Hizbullah 'is a terrorist group or a resistance force' and concludes that over the decades, Hizbullah 'transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate mainstream political party with a resistance wing.'

Hizbullah's long involvement in global terrorist and criminal activity has been documented, highlighting another important identity of the group that was generally neglected for rigorous analysis until recently (Levitt 2013). Seminal works assess Hizbullah's kidnapping and terrorism campaign in the 1980s and the role of Iranian influence and training during Hizbullah's formative years (Ranstorp 1994, 1997, 2005). Blanford (2011) provides one of the best assessments of the development of Hizbullah organizationally and militarily throughout the conflict with Israel, though it is from a journalistic perspective without rigorous sourcing of data. Notably, these works often neglect a correspondingly thorough analysis of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Very little literature methodically deals with Hizbullah's military development from the 1980s onwards and processes of organizational change in relation to Israel's own military adaptation and shifts in strategy (Marcus 2018).

With world attention attracted by the 2006 war to the Israel-Hizbullah conflict, a flurry of military analyses surfaced of varying quality and depth. A moderate amount of new literature appeared, mainly descriptive assessments of the war that examined the IDF's experiences in 2006 (Harel and Issacharoff 2008; Kober 2008; Johnson 2011), as well as assessments of various milestones of the conflict in historical and comparative perspective (Bregman 2010; Jones and Catignani 2010). Hizbullah's capabilities and fighting style in 2006 were scrutinized and analyzed in the defense community (Hoffman 2007; Exum 2006; Biddle and Friedman 2008). While important for understanding Hizbullah's operational approach in 2006, these studies often neglected a thorough examination of the two decades prior to the war, and failed to adequately examine how the experiences in the 1980s and 1990s influenced both the IDF's and Hizbullah's actions in 2006. Those which did discuss the 1985–2000 period often did so too briefly (Matthews 2008; Helmer 2007).

Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem's (2010) oft-cited book lays out the group's thinking and perceptions related to important milestones in the group's history. For a Western audience, this is an immensely valuable resource, despite its obvious limitations related to objectivity and bias. For students and scholars alike, two recent volumes, one that contains translations of 32 speeches and interviews given between 1986 and 2006 by Hizbullah's current secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah (Noe 2007), and another that translates Hizbullah's important official documents (Alagha 2011b), are invaluable research tools. Hizbullah's own media office also releases official translations of speeches, interviews, and press briefings in English through its various websites, as well as on Al-Manar TV and Iran's Press TV. There are many other important resources in Arabic (and Hebrew), but they are beyond the scope of this review, which is intended primarily for English speakers. A broad analysis of Hizbullah follows.

Early origins and ideological foundations of Hizbullah

While there is some debate regarding the exact formulation of Hizbullah in Lebanon in the early 1980s, Hizbullah's ideological roots are grounded in the process of Shiite empowerment, triggered from 'a fusion of many discontents' (Kramer 1997, p. 85). Most scholars agree Hizbullah initially emerged as a loose umbrella for radical Shitte militancy between 1982 and 1983, but formally announced its existence in its 1985 manifesto, known as the 'Open Letter Addressed

by Hizbullah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World.' The group's fundamental goals and objectives were outlined in the 'Open Letter,' which included Israel's 'obliteration from existence' and the departure of 'imperialist powers,' namely America and France, from Lebanese territory. The United States was singled out for condemnation as 'the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice.' Hizbullah also sought to replace the unjust and oppressive Lebanese sectarian system by establishing an Islamic system in Lebanon, and urged a strong allegiance and adherence to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini (for the full manifesto, Norton 1987, pp. 167–187).

The trigger for the emergence of Hizbullah is often attributed to the continued presence of the IDF in Lebanon, who attempted to (and succeeded in) ousting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) militants from Lebanon in 1982. However, this is a gross over-simplification, as Shiite resistance against the IDF in Lebanon was only the immediate manifestation of a much more significant process of Shiite empowerment that had been developing in Lebanon and the greater Middle East for at least the previous two decades. The ideological and theological context of Hizbullah deeply affects its organizational culture and strategy as both a militant and political force.

The militarization of the Shiites in Lebanon on the pretext of self-defense amidst the chaos of sectarian fighting during the civil war was brought about through a monumentally significant process of Shiite communal empowerment. The historic political, social, and economic marginalization of the Shiites of Lebanon eventually led to a 'Shiite Awakening,' largely due to the influence of key clerics who studied in the theological seminaries in the holy cities of Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran). These seminaries are where many in Hizbullah's future leadership met and were exposed to the teachings of respected Islamic jurists who called for a transition from historic Shiite quiescence and political passivity to communal activism and clerical leadership. The prominence of these 'activist' clerics was enhanced by the weakening amidst the civil war of the traditional patronage networks and feudal leaders in Lebanon (the *zuama*) that had contributed to the historical marginalization of the Shiites. This 'awakening' was coupled with migration of poor Shia families from the southern Lebanon hinterland to the urban centers in search of greater economic opportunity amidst a process of social and economic transformation (Shanahan 2005).

This Shiite 'awakening' gained traction in Lebanon with the arrival in 1959 of Musa al-Sadr, an influential Iranian cleric of Lebanese descent. The impact of Musa al-Sadr on Shiite political consciousness in Lebanon cannot be understated, as he sought to transform the engrained notion of provincialism and passivity amongst the Shiite clerics and urged that they should become active community and political leaders (Nakash 2006, p. 117; Ajami 1986). Musa al-Sadr also shared a similar outlook with his cousin and brother-in-law, the esteemed Iraqi cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was the founder of the activist Iraqi Shiite militant group, the Dawa Party, whose Lebanese branch was eventually incorporated into Hizbullah (Shanahan 2005, pp. 166–167). Musa al-Sadr rallied the Lebanon Shiite population through his 'Movement for the Deprived' (*Harakat al-Mahrumin*), established in 1974, which was created as a mass protest movement to pressure the Lebanese government to address the community's marginalization.

In response to the perceived need for self-protection of the Shiites amidst the civil war that erupted in 1975, Amal (acronym for *Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyyah*, 'Lebanese Resistance Detachments') was created as an adjunct militia to the mass-protest Movement for the Deprived, but eventually subsumed it militarily and politically (Norton 1987; Shanahan 2005, pp. 107–108; Deeb 1988). The formation of Amal marked the rise of Lebanese Shiite militancy.

The shocking disappearance of the iconic al-Sadr while on a trip to Libya in 1978 reverberated throughout Lebanon (Al-Sadr's unknown fate still attracts significant political and media

attention in Lebanon to this day). The parallel of al-Sadr's disappearance to the occultation of the Twelfth Imam strongly resonated for Shiites, who believe that the Twelfth Imam (a messiah-like figure) went into hiding to avoid religious persecution and whose reappearance will bring about the establishment of Islamic governance and a restoration of justice. The disappearance of al-Sadr contributed to increased fervor and motivation for revolutionary self-empowerment (Shanahan 2005, pp. 10–12).

The 1979 Iranian Revolution, referred to as 'the earthquake' by the Lebanese Shiite ideologue Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, is the most significant catalyzing event of the period and acted as a potent and inspirational model for realizing Shiite empowerment and revolutionary activism. The abstract ideals of a Shiite Islamic state became a realization as Ruhollah Khomeini swept into power on a 'wave of popular revolutionary fervor' (Kramer 1997, p. 101).

In Shiite dogma, the martyrdom of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, and his son, Hussain, are cornerstones of the faith and signify the importance of the need to resist oppression and the reverence of self-sacrifice. Hizbullah's ideology, heavily influenced by these sentiments as well as the teachings of Khomeini, was grounded in the Shiite theological concept of *wilayat al-faqih,* ('guardianship of the Islamic jurist'). This concept implies that the cleric acts as the absolute authority in religious, judicial, and political matters, which led Hizbullah to view Iran's Supreme Leader as the arbiter of spiritual and state affairs and as the ultimate 'source of emulation' (in Arabic, *marjah al-taqlid*). After Khomeini's death in 1989, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei became the main authority and 'source of emulation' for Hizbullah.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to prevent guerrilla incursions by the PLO. While Israel was initially tolerated tacitly due to Lebanese disdain of the Palestinian militias, the IDF overstayed its welcome after driving the PLO out of Lebanon and soon found itself facing a bloody attritional conflict against various militant groups. Like-minded radical Shiite fighters coalesced from secular Palestinian militant groups, leftist militias, Shiite groups, and Iranian-linked groups to form Hizbullah, with its original support base in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. As Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin lamented in 1985, Israel's involvement in Lebanon 'let the Shiite genie out of the bottle' (Rabin, 1985).

In the early 1980s, Iran dispatched political emissaries and military advisers to Lebanon in an attempt to export the Islamic revolution globally, which significantly contributed to the formation of Hizbullah. Due to heavy ideological influence, sponsorship, and armament by Iran, and oversight from various Iranian official and unofficial organizations, Hizbullah became the most potent of the 'resistance' groups fighting Israel (Ranstorp 1994). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had thousands of troops based in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley throughout much of the 1980s and provided much support and training (Jaber 1997, p. 51; Ranstorp 2005). Such assistance marked the beginning of a long history of Iranian military support for Hizbullah which continues to this day.

Hizbullah's military development

In the mid-1980s, the nascent Hizbullah was ideologically extreme and very active in targeting Western journalists, politicians, and diplomatic staff with kidnappings, and also carried out several hijackings, terrorist attacks, and bombings. The kidnapping crisis throughout the 1980s was partially influenced by the broader regional conflict between Iran, Syria, and the West throughout the decade, as well as internal rivalries between Lebanese militant groups (Ranstorp 1997). Hizbullah pioneered suicide bombing in 1982, whose use was justified theologically by leading Shiite figures like Ayatollah Khomeini and Mohamad Hussein Fadlallah. Hizbullah members were responsible for several notable attacks, including the November 1982 suicide bombing

of an Israeli military government building in Tyre that killed 91 (the first suicide attack for which Hizbullah officially claimed responsibility), and the April 1983 suicide bombing of the American embassy in Beirut that killed 63. The group was also responsible for the 1984 abduction and murder of CIA station chief William Buckley, the 1985 skyjacking of TWA Flight 847, and the 1988 abduction and murder of Lt.-Col. William Higgins, an American Marine serving as chief of a U.N. peacekeeping group in south Lebanon (Levitt 2013).

In its formative years, Hizbullah focused solely on its militant role, waging a violent insurgent and terrorist campaign against Western targets, the IDF, and Israel's proxy South Lebanese Army (SLA) militia. In the mid-1980s Hizbullah was developing its still modest abilities to operate in small teams and would target IDF troops using primitive explosives; they would carry out relatively unsophisticated ambushes with small arms, especially at night against lone vehicles, and launch rockets occasionally against Israeli villages near the border. From 1989–1990, Hizbullah's strategic posture shifted as they began operating a greater number of combat elements, including several thousand highly-trained fighters, and carrying out more advanced guerilla operations; this was partially due to professional training from the IRGC, which involved explosive demolitions, field intelligence, reconnaissance, and other military skills, as well as its own innate organizational learning (Eshel 1997). Hizbullah would eventually move away from their strategic orientation as a clandestine militia using terrorist tactics and suicide bombings and towards a sustained campaign of guerrilla warfare.

The end of the Lebanese civil war in October 1989 was marked with the signing of the Taif Accord by major Lebanese factions, which defined the principles of the country's future political system and dictated the total disarming of all militias in Lebanon. However, with the Lebanese government unwilling and unable to confront them, Hizbullah maintained its weapons, which they claimed were ostensibly for use only against Israel. Hizbullah is the only militia from the civil war era that still overtly maintains its arsenal, which remains a major point of contention with other Lebanese factions to this day.

Following its triumph in clashes with rival Amal between 1987 and 1989, upon succeeding the more hardline Subhi Tufayli, Abbas Mussawi's short tenure as Secretary-General (1991–1992) was innovative and groundbreaking, as he solidified Hizbullah's new dominant role in Lebanon. This enabled Mussawi to concentrate on strengthening Hizbullah's military posture against Israel, and he led various reforms to improve Hizbullah militarily (Marcus 2018, pp. 46–49). The IDF's assassination of Abbas Mussawi in February 1992 elicited a strong reciprocal reaction from Hizbullah, which launched short-range Katyusha rockets into northern Israel on a larger scale. Hassan Nasrallah assumed control as Secretary-General in 1992 and continued the process of organizational expansion started by Mussawi.

Hizbullah's political and social development

September 1992 marks Hizbullah's innovative and transformative decision to participate in Lebanese politics. Hizbullah's participation in parliamentary elections was a historical milestone, as the group emerged with eight seats in the 128-member parliament. As Hizbullah integrated into the Lebanese political system, 1992 was also the year Hizbullah released its last Western kidnapping hostages and began to focus its military efforts more centrally on Israeli troops based in Lebanon (Ranstorp 1998, p. 116). Notably, Hizbullah's decision to participate in national elections resulted in a schism in the movement: Hizbullah's first Secretary-General, the hardliner Subhi Tufayli (1987–1991), opposed any involvement in the 'rotten' sectarian Lebanese system and criticized Hizbullah's decision because he thought the group would lose its reformist zeal by being co-opted into sectarian politics (Shanahan 2005, p. 123). Tufayli was eventually expelled from Hizbullah over the disagreement and retreated with supporters to his stronghold in Brital in the Bekaa Valley.

In a 1993 interview, Hassan Nasrallah described the rationale for electoral participation:

> [Political participation was] to prove to friends and foes alike that Hizbullah is not a group of combatant youths, but a popular trend with a vast base in Lebanon. … The military resistance requires political backing. … Our entry into the ranks of parliament gives us the opportunity to defend our resistance on the political plane. … Today we have our representatives that speak about our sacrifices and our selflessness and defend our resistance.
>
> *(Nasrallah 1993)*

Further illustrating Hizbullah's reasoning for entering politics, in the words of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a venerated cleric from whom Hizbullah draws much inspiration:

> This is not to say that the Islamists have embraced the parliamentary system but parliament does provide a forum where they can express their views and urge others, if not to adopt those views, at least to be more accommodating towards them. Participation in this system may enable Hizbullah to realize some transitional goals.
>
> *(Fadlallah 1995)*

As the 1990s progressed, Hizbullah went through a process of political and social institutionalization within the internal Lebanese system (Azani 2011; Norton 2000). After the successes of 1992, Hizbullah won seven seats in the 1996 elections, and in 2000 it won 12 seats. Hizbullah's electoral victories, especially in the 1998 municipal elections, were a sign of the spreading and popularity of Hizbullah's large social services programs into areas not usually supportive of the group. It also indicated Hizbullah's successful gradualist-pragmatic approach regarding maneuvering through the sectarian Lebanese political system, and even compromising aspects of its ideological roots (Hamzeh 2000; Harik 2005, pp. 43–52).

Hizbullah's increasingly sharp crafting of its political strategy, evident in a comparison of Hizbullah's electoral platforms, led to its growing appeal to a broader and more diverse spectrum of Lebanese society (Alagha 2011b; Harik 1996). Hizbullah also made great efforts to expand its social services beyond the Shiite community and established health clinics, women's associations, construction firms, and youth scout programs (Harik 2005, pp. 81–94; Jaber, pp. 147–168). Nasrallah's rhetoric at the time complements Hizbullah's attempts to reemphasize its Lebanese, rather than distinctly Shiite identity, illustrated in a 1997 interview:

> Hizballah is a movement whose members are Lebanese, its leadership is Lebanese, the decision is Lebanese and it is made by a Lebanese leadership. The movement is fighting on Lebanese soil in the cause of liberating Lebanese territory and for the honor and freedom of the Lebanese people and the nation in general. … Hizballah is an Islamic-Lebanese movement.
>
> *(Zisser 2000, p. 34)*

Throughout the 1990s, Hizbullah notably toned down its declaration to establish an Islamic system in Lebanon, since it knew this goal was not shared by other Lebanese sects. It sought to continuously garner increased popularity throughout its guerilla campaign against Israeli troops as a nationalist Lebanese movement and made strides to illustrate the group's autonomy from Iran. In recent years, Hizbullah continues to maneuver its way through the Lebanese political system by 'walking on the edge' and carefully balancing its use of force and political posturing (Azani 2012).

The military conflict with Israel

In response to Hizbullah's increased military effectiveness, the IDF launched two large-scale operations throughout the 1990s. In response to Hizbullah provocations in July 1993, Israel launched 'Operation Accountability,' and in April 1996, the IDF unleashed 'Operation Grapes of Wrath.' Both operations were air and artillery campaigns that utilized standoff-precision firepower directed against Hizbullah. In 1996, the IDF also targeted select Lebanese infrastructure in an attempt to coerce the Lebanese government to restrain Hizbullah and limit support to the group. Hizbullah responded by firing barrages of rockets into civilian areas in northern Israel. Forebodingly for the IDF, its artillery and airpower in 1993 and 1996 did not stop Hizbullah's short-range rocket fire, which proved to be a critical lesson learned by Hizbullah.

Hizbullah and Israel fought each other throughout the decade by following the 'rules of the game,' originally specified in a tacit agreement after the 1993 Operation Accountability and later in the written (but unsigned) 1996 'April Understandings' following Operation Grapes of Wrath. The understandings stipulated that both sides would avoid targeting civilians, Hizbullah was forbidden to launch attacks or fire rockets at the Israeli home front, and the IDF could not target Lebanese civilian infrastructure (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996). However, the agreement was fundamentally lopsided, because it legitimated Hizbullah violence against IDF soldiers based in Lebanon while hindering the IDF's response against Hizbullah, who operated from within southern Lebanese villages.

Hizbullah's persistent and effective guerrilla tactics, the Israeli public's war fatigue and societal pressure, and increasing ineffectiveness of the SLA eventually led the IDF to withdraw from the Lebanese 'security zone.' The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on 25 May 2000 marked a triumphant moment for Hizbullah, as Hassan Nasrallah declared victory in a famous speech from the village of Bint Jbeil and proclaimed: 'Israel, which owns nuclear weapons and has the strongest air force in the region is weaker than a spider's web – I swear to God!' (Nasrallah, 2000).

Hizbullah did not end its militant activities after the Israeli withdrawal, but continued to increase its potency as a fighting force due to Iranian and Syrian support while also creating a new cause: the 'liberation' of Shebaa Farms, a small piece of hillside land disputed by Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. However, it should be understood that Hizbullah's continued incursions into Israel from 2000 leading up to the 2006 War were attempts by Hizbullah to test Israel's limits, wear down Israeli resolve, and continue to justify their raison d'être under the new 'rules of the game,' and not to goad or provoke Israel into full-scale war (Zisser 2002; Sobelman 2004). Hizbullah maintained a provocative stance against the IDF by carrying out a limited number of high-profile infiltrations and kidnappings on the border, particularly around the disputed village of Ghajar, and in Shebaa Farms/Mount Dov. The IDF responded with very limited air and artillery fire at Hizbullah targets close to the border, as well as Syrian military targets within Lebanon, and even negotiated a large-scale prisoner exchange with Hizbullah in 2004. The IDF consistently avoided escalation by practicing a policy of containment and restraint, arguably setting a detrimental precedent by inviting more Hizbullah attacks.

These key events illustrate some important lessons that are entirely relevant to the future failures of the IDF in 2006: Hizbullah's effectiveness as a versatile fighting force, the failure of ongoing IDF airpower and artillery strikes, particularly in 1993 and 1996, to stop Hizbullah rocket fire, the failure of the IDF to positively influence the Lebanese public or coerce the Lebanese government into curtailing Hizbullah's militant activities, as well as an Israeli public growing increasingly weary and intolerant of military casualties (Marcus 2018).

The road to the 2006 war

Following the Israeli withdrawal, Hizbullah was able to operate with increased impunity and prepared the Lebanese battlefield in the eventuality of further conflict. The group scattered rocket launcher sites across southern Lebanese villages in well-hidden and highly sophisticated bunkers, which the IDF later dubbed 'nature reserves.' Hizbullah prepared to barrage northern Israel and its civilian population with short-range Katyusha rockets and long-range Iranian Fajr and Zelzal rockets. They also trained rocket squads in sophisticated low-signature firing tactics in order to avoid IDF reprisals. Hizbullah acquired advanced technology, including Iranian-made UAV drones, surface-to-ship weapons, and anti-tank weapons (ATMs), which caused the greatest number of IDF casualties. Hizbullah planned to aggressively confront any ground incursion to protect rocket sites by engaging the IDF in an attritional guerrilla campaign, with explosive-ridden areas, an elaborate system of tunnels, roadside bombs, and ground units armed with advanced anti-tank weaponry (Matthews 2008, pp. 16–22; Blanford 2006).

Amidst simmering cross-border violence in the years after the Israeli withdrawal, war broke out between Israel and Hizbullah on 12 July 2006 following an unprovoked attack in which Hizbullah killed three IDF soldiers and kidnapped two others from the Israeli side of the border. In response, Israel launched a large-scale aerial assault, followed by weeks of indecisive ground incursions, in what became known as the 2006 Lebanon War. Overall, Israel was prepared to fight a totally different war than the one it faced, as Hizbullah had adopted a unique operational paradigm tailored to challenge the IDF's techno-centric, casualty-averse mode of warfare (Marcus 2015b). Hizbullah prevented the IDF from achieving decisive results by adopting an attritional mode of warfare that included irregular elements and asymmetric tactics, hit-and-run guerilla attacks, and indiscriminate and persistent rocket fire that targeted Israeli civilian population centers. This was coupled with conventional fighting elements that sought to hold ground in an attempt to prevent, or at least delay, the IDF from capturing Hizbullah's rocket-launching areas (Author interviews with IDF officers; Matthews 2008, pp. 18–19; Biddle and Friedman 2008). Hizbullah's heavy use of ATMs proved to be a special challenge for the IDF, which suffered a number of casualties in several high-profile incidents (Marcus 2015a, pp. 518–520). Despite some significant IDF achievements in part due to its technological capabilities, 34 days of Hizbullah rocket fire on the Israeli civilian front made it impossible for Israel to proclaim any sort of decisive victory in the immediate aftermath of the war.

With the implementation on 14 August 2006 of a U.N.-brokered ceasefire (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701), Hizbullah was propelled to the epicenter of Lebanese politics and gained further legitimacy and support from the Lebanese population. However, 500–700 Hizbullah combat fatalities, Israel's destruction of most of Hizbullah's long-range and medium-range rockets, damage to Hizbullah's infrastructure in Beirut, and the deployment of a U.N. international force in Hizbullah's southern Lebanon strongholds, has led to a curtailment of Hizbullah's military operations in the 12 years since the war. Revealingly, Nasrallah admitted that he was surprised at the ferocity of the Israeli reprisal for the kidnapping that sparked the war in a 2006 interview:

> If there was even a 1% chance that the July 12 capturing operation would have led to a war like the one that happened, would we have done it? I would say no, absolutely not, for humanitarian, moral, social, security, military and political reasons.
>
> *(Nasrallah 2006)*

However, Hizbullah's ability simply to survive and fire rockets throughout the duration of the war allowed it to transform a relatively bad situation into a propaganda victory and ultimately win the 'war of perceptions' (Feldman 2006). The Lebanese and Israeli civilian populations both suffered immensely during the conflict, and with the IDF and Hizbullah both achieving only limited successes, the war is best viewed as a stalemate.

Hizbullah and terrorism

Another important identity of Hizbullah is its terrorist identity. It is noteworthy that prior to the 11 September attacks by Al-Qaeda, Hizbullah was responsible for more American deaths than any other global terrorist group. Ever since the 1983 U.S. Marine Barracks bombing, several Hizbullah operatives are featured on the FBI's Most Wanted list. Largely due to Hizbullah's sophisticated capabilities, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said in 2003 that 'Hezbollah may be the A-team of Terrorists and maybe al-Qaeda is the B team' (*CBS News* 2003). Reaffirming American threat perceptions and referencing Hizbullah's sophisticated arsenal and global reach, the head of the Department of Homeland Security stated in 2008 that Hizbullah 'makes al-Qaeda look like a minor league team' (*Fox News* 2008).

Hizbullah's organizational capability for international terrorism remains intact today, as illustrated in the 2012 suicide bus bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and their Bulgarian bus driver. Bulgarian authorities linked the attack to Hizbullah through the forged identity documents utilized in the attack, as well as organizational and financial connections (*BBC News* 2013; Levitt 2013, pp. 354–356). Other recent plots in Europe include a foiled attack in Cyprus, where a Lebanese-born Swedish national was arrested and linked to a Hizbullah plan to attack Israeli tourists. He was later convicted in Cyprus of belonging to a criminal organization as well as planning and fundraising for Hizbullah, which added incentive for the European Union to designate the group (Kulish, 2013). The Bulgaria and Cyprus attacks, in conjunction with Hizbullah's deep involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad, acted as a major impetus for its terrorist blacklisting by the European Union in 2013.

Hizbullah has been designated in its entirety as a terrorist organization by Israel (1989), the United States (1997), Canada (2002), the Netherlands (2004), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (2013), due to the group's involvement in international terrorism, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. The United Kingdom (2001), Australia (2003), and recently the European Union (2013) have designated Hizbullah's 'military wing' (or in Australia's case, 'external security organization') as a terrorist organization, leaving Hizbullah's 'political wing' un-blacklisted. Interestingly, Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem highlighted the unified leadership of the multifaceted Hizbullah and the false dichotomy between the military and political echelons:

> Hezbollah has a single leadership. … All political, social and jihad work is tied to the decisions of this leadership. The same leadership that directs the parliamentary and government work also leads jihad actions in the struggle against Israel.
>
> *(Qassem 2009)*

Conclusion

Throughout its four-decade history as an adaptable and pragmatic organization, Hizbullah has shifted its focus between militant, political, social, and terrorist activities. Hizbullah's hard-fought guerilla campaign, which led to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, brought the group much prestige

and popularity. The success of its political and social involvement in the 1990s and its political communications strategy enabled Hizbullah to successfully maneuver the Lebanese domestic system. The group's leadership has flexibly appealed to both religious and secular elements across the Lebanese societal spectrum, by emphasizing patriotism and nationalism on one hand, while concurrently maintaining its Islamic framework on the other, which has kept core elements of the group satisfied (Khatib, Matar and Alshaer 2014). However, Hizbullah's pragmatism and willingness to adapt domestically does not mean the group has given up its hardline ideological goals or fundamentally compromised its major tenets. Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem revealingly declared in a 1994 interview:

> Adaptation usually means a relinquishment of principles. This is wrong and unacceptable. … On the internal level, we believe that ideological and political differences should not lead to military clashes. … It is unfair to say that we are fighting Israel to increase our domestic weight. Fighting against Israel is part of our ideology, plan, and strategic conviction.
>
> *(Qassem 1994)*

Hizbullah has adhered to core tenets while being forced to adapt due to challenges in the Lebanese domestic arena, throughout the evolution of the conflict with Israel, in its complex relationship with Iran and Syria, as well as due to external pressures from the West. The recent accusations by the United Nation's Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) of Hizbullah's involvement in the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Hizbullah's ongoing military involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime and Hizbullah's clashes with ISIS and other Sunni militants in Syria and Lebanon, each provide ample new challenges for the group. Future scholarship should focus on how Hizbullah navigates the stormy waters of the Middle East based on its previous lessons learned, and how the group adapts militarily, politically, and socially to its complex geopolitical environment.

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27
ISLAMIC STATE

Francis Gaffney

Islamic State is an extremist Islamic organisation that grew out of a violent insurgent group that has changed its name a number of times to reflect its geographic ambitions. Islamic State has previously been referred to as 'Islamic State in Iraq' (ISI); 'Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham' (but also 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria' – ISIS); 'Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL); and, more recently, as Daesh (from the Arabic al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham). However, this title can be understood in two ways – as a play on words and as an insult ('to trample down and crush' and 'a bigot who imposes his view on others') (BBC News, 2015; Wedeman, 2015).

The name changes have also been intended to reinforce the group's global ambitions, forming one nation based on a shared faith but also in an attempt to remove the previous colonial boundaries (Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916) that had split tribes along 'arbitrary' borders. In November 2015, the United Kingdom followed other Western countries in adopting the use of the name 'Daesh' to refer to the group in order to reflect that the group is not a *de facto* State by any international interpretation or recognition.

Islamic State is a transnational Sunni insurgent and terrorist group that claims the Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as its founder and inspiration. Its religious legitimacy for its actions is based on an extreme Salafist/takfiri interpretation of Islam that essentially means that anyone who opposes its rule is, by definition, either an apostate ('murtad') or an infidel ('kafir'). Although much of the Middle East is Salafist, takfirism is widely considered too extreme for most (with even the ideologues who support Al-Qaeda criticising the absolutism adopted by Islamic State – the perceived indiscriminate violence and atrocities against non-Sunnis risked alienating its Muslim support) (Malsin, 2015).

Islamic State's successes thus far can be attributed to a number of factors: a large number of supporters it has attracted to its goals; significant cash reserves; shrewd use of social media and the Internet; and its capacity to operate as a military organisation. It has thrived in states where the respective administrations have failed to govern due to conflict or political instability (Maliki's Iraq, Assad's Syria, Hadi's Yemen, and the political vacuum left in Libya after the deposition of Gaddafi, but also in the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria), seizing territory, critical national infrastructure (energy resources and financial institutions), and military equipment.

Within territory it has seized, Islamic State maintains structures observable in State-run towns and cities (*The New York Times*, 2014); shops, schools, roads, energy utilities (Hubbard and

Schmitt, 2014), infrastructure, welfare services, and security (Zelin, 2014). Such activities require large budgets, and this is achieved through multiple sources of revenue (Bahney *et al.*, 2015) such as oil sales (Solomon, Chazan and Jones, 2015), commercial and personal taxes, transport tolls, kidnap, looting, and racketeering Its monopoly over the management of these services provides another measure of control and a form of penalty for adjudged offences.

Islamic State's influence outside of the Middle East can be attributed to its strong ideological religious appeal that represents different things to different audiences (Cronin, 2015). It is the widespread belief of Salafists that the Muslim congregation can and should return to the simplicity and consensus that existed in the earliest days of Islam. Islamic State reinforces the perception that the influence (and interference) of the West in Muslim countries has made these countries corrupt, blasphemous, and decadent and, therefore, sanctions violent revolution and the overthrow of these 'puppet' administrations. Its occupation of large areas of Iraq and Syria underpins the focus of the group's efforts in the Middle East; however, a series of attacks inspired or directed by Islamic State have claimed hundreds of lives outside the region, including in the West. Such attacks are linked to religious radicals attacking the Western sponsors, or those perceived to be supporting such administrations (e.g. Russia in Syria).

Essentially, Islamic State's interpretation of Islam demands the harsh and absolute rejection of any innovation since the time of the Prophet. It argues that any diversion from the puritanical precepts that they draw from a literal reading of the Qu'ran (and the Hadith) is blasphemy, and must be eradicated. It follows, therefore, that Shi'ism, Sufism, or essentially anything (or anyone) that does not conform to their interpretation of Islam, should be destroyed and that all actions are in the interest of reviving Islam, returning it to its pure form (Bunzel, 2015).

The establishment of Islamic State

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad ('Group of One God and Holy War') organisation in Jordan in 1999. Following his release from prison (for possession of weapons), he moved it to Iraq in 2004, and after pledging its loyalty to Al-Qaeda (AQ), renamed it Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi had been linked to Al-Qaeda while in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, and his AQI group was instrumental in the collapse of order in Iraq in the early part of this century – particularly in attacks on Shi'a.

Zarqawi believed an alliance with AQ would give him access to essential funding but also attract new recruits (and other avenues of funding) to his group. AQ also gained from the relationship Zarqawi's group – it gave it a much-needed presence in Iraq (where Western troops were also fighting) as another front for its jihadist goals. Zarqawi centred his activities in Fallujah in the Anbar Governorate – a home for many Sunni Muslims with a history of resistance to central government control – that gave him access to the main trade routes in the west of Iraq.

Many observers and media commentators (including Rabil, 2014; Jeffrey, 2014; Weiss and Hassan, 2015) have proposed that the fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni Arab-dominated administration and the subsequent rise to power of the majority Shi'a population resulting in deep Sunni resentment was the most significant factor in Islamic State's growth and influence. The appropriation of energy resources from Sunni tribal areas to fund a Shi'a administration angered many Sunni leaders. Zarqawi took advantage of this animosity by the Sunni minority to this new Shi'a leadership (and its Western backers) to foment sectarian division. The sectarian focus, however, led to a major disagreement between Zarqawi's AQI and Al-Qaeda's senior leadership (Fishman, 2006). Zarqawi thought the focus should be fighting to oppose leaders in the administrations in the Middle East that did not adhere to the Sunni tradition, rather than conducting attacks against the West.

The fall of Hussein's administration, and the succeeding (Shi'a) Maliki government, caused many Sunni Army personnel to be dismissed. This left thousands of Sunni men unemployed (including many Ba'athists), disaffected, and marginalised (but still armed). With many weapons still readily available, the AQI's ranks swelled with new recruits. Many Sunni in Iraq were sympathetic to AQI's cause (driving the Western Coalition from Iraq and preventing a Shi'a Government) (Eisenstadt and White 2005). As Coalition operations started in 2004 to clear AQI-controlled areas in Anbar, the group moved north along the Tigris River Valley towards Mosul.

After Zarqawi's death in June 2006, AQI leaders (including Zarqawi's long-time friend, Abu al Masri) rebranded the group's number of factions into "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI). Despite some commentators' assessments that Zarqawi's death would cripple the group, Masri initially managed to maintain much of the group's momentum (overseeing some of its bloodiest sectarian attacks). However, eventually he and his successor (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) were both killed by a tank shell in 2010, severely limiting the group's ability to launch attacks until the appointment of its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2010. ISI rebuilt its capacity – made much stronger by the Coalition withdrawal in 2011/2012 – and by early 2013, the group was back to conducting the same number of deadly attacks (over a thousand deaths a month) as it had achieved when it was at its peak.

Although Baghdadi originally regarded the 2011 Syrian uprising as a distraction from his Iraq-centric campaign (he even forbade his Syrian-born followers from leaving Iraq to join the conflict), in mid-2011 Baghdadi did allow Abu Mohammed al-Golani to set up a base of operations in northern Syria. These efforts in Syria proved so successful (attracting recruits from both inside and outside the country) that it eclipsed the activities in Iraq.

In April 2013, Baghdadi (in an attempt to reassert his authority on both sides of the border) announced the merger of ISI with the Golani's Syrian Sunni opposition group (and sworn to AQ), Al-Nusrah Front, under the new name of the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham" (ISIS – it was also referred to as 'Islamic State in the Levant' – ISIL). However, after many disagreements between the two, the leadership of Al-Nusrah (including Golani) complained to Al-Qaeda's senior leadership and asked for a ruling.

In February 2014, after a number of months of negotiations and attempts at reconciliation, Al-Qaeda rejected the merger, ordering Baghdadi to curb his operations in Iraq, and appointed Golani as AQ's leader in Syria. Baghdadi refused to accept this ruling, increasing the division between himself and AQ (and therefore competition for Sunni support in the region). This forced AQ's senior leadership to rule that AQ was no longer affiliated with ISI, nor was it responsible for Islamic State's actions (notably the bombing of Shi'a mosques) and ordered it to disband. Baghdadi then, with the help of Amr al-Absi (a Syrian fighter), set about re-establishing himself in Syria, becoming a dominant force, drawing away many of the foreign fighters of Golani's Al-Nusrah group. ISIS/ISIL became a beacon both as an opponent of Assad's administration and as a successful Salafist/takfiri group.

On 29 June, Baghdadi changed the group's name to 'Islamic State' and declared the revival of the 'Caliphate' with himself as 'Caliph Ibrahim II' (Joshi, 2014). He demanded the Muslim world recognise his 'Caliphate' and him as 'Caliph' (DW, 2014), and for all jihadist organisations to pledge allegiance to his Islamic State or be declared apostate. By October 2014, his self-declared 'Caliphate' was in control of territory stretching from north of Aleppo to south of Baghdad and included the cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq; about six million people on either side of the Iraq-Syria border were living under his rule[1] (representing a partial control of the former Caliphate). Since 2014 many groups (and individuals) have pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, describing themselves as Provinces ('wilayah') of this broader Caliphate.

The declaration was intended as a rallying call to all *observant* Muslims, but in particular those who shared the Salafist views expressed by his group, and so drew more support from like-minded groups in Syria (and the wider Middle East region) that might compete for recruits and resources. There has since been an ongoing power struggle between AQ and Islamic State for the role of global authority on Muslim undertakings (and for recruitment of more people willing to take up jihad). Not only was Baghdadi's group becoming more financially independent of AQ, its success in committing attacks against the non-believers and in the West (AQ had not carried out any significant attack since the July 2005 London bombings) was contributing to a very successful recruitment of new fighters to its cause versus joining AQ.

The failure of states to ensure security and stability within their territorial borders eroded their legitimacy and allowed groups such as Islamic State freedom to operate. Such operations/activities could be either as an insurgency to a perceived oppressor (who has become more intolerant and repressive as the hold on power deteriorated) or as a conscience to perceived corruption in an administration (by exposing their un-Muslim activities and Western influences). Islamic State attempted to provide Muslims with religious guidance, thereby legitimising its ignorance of national boundaries and challenging the legitimacy of traditional States in the region.

Islamic State's acknowledgement of high-profile attacks elevated its status with the world media (and governments) as the new primary exporter of transnational terrorism (usurping AQ's global jihadist agenda). Its proficient publicity apparatus (both Internet and its *Dabiq* publication) surpassed other jihadist originations in its global reach and sophistication.

Islamic State charter

There is no formal charter for Islamic State, however, on 12 June 2014, having captured the city of Mosul, ISIS released a 'Charter of the City' (wathiqat al madina),[2] which outlined its laws in 16 points. These included such things as: the daily prayers to be observed on time; the proscription of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes; the banning of non-ISIS flags or paraphernalia; the banning of weapons; all shrines and graves to be destroyed (they were considered polytheistic); women to wear the niqab; and thieves to have their hands chopped off.

The Islamic State identifies with a hard-line version of violent Jihadi-Salafism (or jihadism). Throughout its existence, this has been a central tenet and is predicated on an extremist interpretation of Islamic texts and the life of Mohammed (and the example of his early followers) with its 'jihad' primarily directed against the Shi'a tradition (but also all non-Salafists) (Meijer, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2006). Its two objectives appear to be the governance of territories it has seized to establish a Salafist concept of authority and to win support to gain more territory.

The Islamic State's aim is to restore the 'Khalifa' (Caliphate) that existed before the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement of the First World War and be governed by Sharia law. It sees the national boundaries as being unnatural, having been imposed by (Christian) European states. This objective advocates a strategy that could include violent jihad against local opposition but also (as a global adaptation) the defeat of Western powers that prevent the establishment of a true Islamist State. The 'Caliph' would also be one worthy to be considered a successor to Mohammed's political authority. Baghdadi's reported descent from the Quraysh tribe (the same as Mohammed), and his religious education, advances his claim and legitimacy to be called 'Caliph'. His choice of 'Ibrahim II' was an attempt to demonstrate his lineage to Ibrahim I, who ruled the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century.

Ideology

The Islamic State's ideology evolved within the context of the Iraq conflict in the early 21st century. This period saw the overthrow of the minority Sunni administration and Ba'athist Party in Iraq to be replaced by the majority Shi'a government supported by the West. This was accompanied by the arrival of a young generation of jihadis influenced by the more extreme Salafist tradition, and later the Arab Spring caused the destabilisation/or removal of many of the administrations in the region, with many States experiencing deteriorating security conditions.

Zarqawi contributed to two main tenets of Islamic State's ideology: anti-Shi'ism and the restoration of the Caliphate. Zarqawi called for the execution of Shi'a in Iraq (even AQ did not go this far in its interpretation of Salafist teaching), apostates, and non-believers, the elimination of idolatry (including Western fashions), and the promotion of true Muslim beliefs. Islamic State claim they are the successor and defender of Mohammed's approach, instigating a conflict between true Muslims and those they consider non-believers.

Another influential strand in Islamic State's ideology was that of Ba'athism, evident in its organisation (Baghdadi's two deputies) and political objectives. Following the fall of Hussein's administration, many ex-Ba'athists joined forces with the Sunni insurgency (and ultimately Islamic State) with sufficient joint benefits to overcome any ideological divergence.

Organisational structure

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the self-appointed Caliph, who governs an administrative and religious organisation that includes close advisers, role-specific, regional, and provincial councils. It has a clear, top-down leadership that attempts to manage and grow its aspirational Caliphate. Under the Caliph, as part of the leadership, sit the Shura and Sharia Councils. These two councils oversee the compliance of all the other parts of the group's activities with Sharia law (including supervising the discipline, laws, police, and courts), and ensuring directives from the Caliph are carried out.

The councils (which include the Provincial, Military, Security & Intelligence, Religious Affairs, Finance, and Media) are responsible for the military and administrative order of the group, including asserting and maintaining control of seized territory, campaign-planning for the capture of new territory, financial management of seized assets, and communication.

The method of governance at the central level (with a mirrored regional structure) was similar to bin Laden's AQ in the late 1990s (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010). The central management machinery was to be replicated at lower geographical levels and locations – each with a measure of autonomy to achieve the group's objectives within a local context/operating environment.

Islamic State divided its regions into a number of provinces or governorates (wilayat) led by a Governor (wali) who controlled a local structure of councils (this also included the subordinate 'sectors' led by 'sector emirs'). The number of provinces increased as more 'satellites' added their allegiance to the group's Caliph and ideology (Zelin, 2015). In addition to the Iraq Provinces and Syrian Provinces, other provinces included:

- Wilayat Khorosan (comprised mainly of factions split from the Afghanistan/Pakistan Taliban)
- Wilayat al Barqah (comprised of Libyan youth movements)
- Wilayat Fizzan (comprised of Ansar al Shariah in Libya)
- Wilayat al Tarabulus (based in Libya)

- Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (based in West Africa and made of factions from Nigeria's Boko Haram)
- Wilayat al Jazair (Algeria)
- Wilayat Sana'a (Yemen)
- Wilayat al Haramayn (KSA)
- Wilayat Sayna (formerly Ansar Bait al Maqdis (ABM) in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula).

Islamic State's three strands of activity (terrorist activity, state-building/governance, and insurgency) require significant amounts of financial support. For strategic reasons, the group chose to raise its revenues locally (rather than relying on external donors); first, so that it could maintain its autonomy, and second, to avoid sudden changes in donor support. Initially, the fundraising activity was through criminality (petty theft, etc.), but as the group grew (and more significant amounts were needed), other sources were sought. The fundraising takes place throughout the organisation, at the Provinces, and sectors – each level retaining most of what it has raised (with a tithe back to the central leadership).

Leadership and membership

Apart from the declared most-senior leaders, the names and even the roles of the respective council leaders are difficult to ascertain (due to changes within the structure and the ongoing airstrikes on the group's leadership). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph, has two deputies – Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (a former Iraqi military intelligence officer who oversees the Iraq Provinces) and Abu Ali al-Anbari (a former Iraqi military officer who oversees the Syrian Provinces) – both are former Ba'athist Party members. The Caliph and his deputies set the overall objectives of the group for the subordinate Provinces to carry out.

As described above, the group's exact number of members is ambiguous, but it is thought to include several thousand people living in Iraq/Syria (as not all people in the areas under Islamic State control are voluntary supporters) and many more sympathisers globally (*The Telegraph*, 2016). Furthermore, not all the people fighting alongside Islamic State are true members; these include Ba'athist groups, Sunni tribes, and other Islamist groups. By the nature of the group's activities, many supporters outside of the region do not openly declare their support. Such support could include fundraising, financial donations, recruitment/radicalisation, and kinetic activity (including terrorist attacks).

Islamic State has been immensely successful in its recruitment of fighters and radicalisation to its jihadist ideals. This has been due in part to its perceived success in Syria and terrorist activity in the West, and in its use of the Internet (especially social media sites and apps) (Berger and Morgan, 2015; Winter, 2015). Its recruitment agenda has meant some radicalisation processes have become shorter, with networks expanding rapidly and spreading to countries previously unaffected by Islamist extremism (but this could also be attributable to population migration for persons displaced from the conflicts in the Middle East).

Key events

Islamic State extends is influence by taking advantage of both the environment in which it has conducted its activities (political instability in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and the isolation of the Sunni minority in Iraq by the Shi'a government structures), and the delayed response from the international community in first acknowledging the potential risks posed by Islamic State, and then in the time taken to achieve some sort of consensus on how these risks could be mitigated/eliminated.

The evolution of Islamic State can be articulated in six stages:

1. **Establishment of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ)**
   Following Zarqawi's release from prison in 1999, he travelled to Afghanistan and quickly established his own jihadi group, the JTWJ; his aim was to bring down the Jordanian monarchy, without success.
2. **Allegiance with Al-Qaeda – Establishment of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)**
   Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi moved to Iraq and pledged his group's allegiance to Al-Qaeda, renaming it in 2004 Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR), also known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Following Zarqawi's death in 2006, Abu al-Masri was appointed leader, and the TQJBR, in an attempt to unify Sunni insurgent activity in Iraq, created the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC).
3. **Establishment of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)**
   On 15 October 2006, al-Masri established ISI, naming Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader. ISI's policy was to overthrow the Shi'a Government and establish an Islamic State. It quickly established a stronghold in the Sunni Anbar Governorate, announcing the creation of its independent Islamic State, but was not successful due in part to its loss of local support from its over-zealous punishment of those that did not follow its interpretation of Sharia Law, but mostly from the military offensives by Iraqi and Coalition military forces

   In 2007, the U.S.-led Coalition and local Sunni fighters' backlash against ISI (the Sunni Awakening) drove ISI from Baghdad into Diyala, Salahideen, and Mosul. The organisation retained only a fraction of its leaders, cells, and capabilities, which were concentrated in Mosul (almost 80% of its leadership were killed or captured (Hashim, 2014)). However, in response to Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's 2008 targeting of Sunni leaders (increasing sectarian tensions), support for ISI began to increase in Sunni tribal areas with an increase in attacks in Baghdad.
4. **Establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)**
   In April 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeded Omar al-Baghdadi as leader (after both Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu al-Masri were killed by a tank shell). He quickly rebuilt ISI's capacity and capability, and in July 2011 sent Abu Mohammed Golani and nine other Syrian operatives to set up a base of operations in northern Syria. In January 2012, Golani formed JN, which quickly established itself as the most successful fighting force in Syria.
5. **Merger of JN with ISI to establish Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL)**
   In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced that he was extending ISI into Syria and changing the name of the group to ISIL. In January 2014, ISIS took over Raqqa and declared it the capital of the emirate. Neither JN's nor AQ's leadership agreed with Baghdadi's unilateral declaration, and in February 2014, formally rejected the merger. In June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul and issued its 'Charter of the City'.
6. **Re-establishment of the Caliphate – Islamic State (IS)**
   In January 2014, ISIL expelled JN from Raqqa and Iraqi Security Forces from key cities in western Iraq. Bolstered by these successes, on 29 June 2014 Baghdadi declared the re-establishment of the Caliphate (and renamed the group 'Islamic State') with himself as 'Caliph Ibrahim II'. Baghdadi's legitimacy as Caliph stems from his leadership of Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah (one of the first jihadist groups to join MSC), his doctorate in Islamic Studies (University of Baghdad), and, most importantly, his claim that he is descended from Mohammed (in the Islamic tradition, it is believed only a descendant of Mohammed's tribe can be Caliph), allowing him to be the supreme religious and political authority of the Caliphate. Many of the national and international responses to date have massively reduced

its expansion in Iraq/Syria, but despite these losses, Islamic State has shown it is resilient and able to maintain concentrated attacks on several fronts.

Comment

Islamic State, in addition to its military operations, has also laid claim to some of the most horrific acts of terror observed in the West. Many of these events have elicited international responses, but also they have acted as inspiration for other would-be terrorists to emulate. These have included the very graphic and public beheading and burning of prisoners and Western hostages (also posted online) and terrorist attacks in Western cities and resorts (including suicide bombers, gun and knife attacks, and 'lone-wolf' attacks). Attacks such as those in Paris (January and November 2015), the Bardo Museum and Sousse beach resort, Tunisia (March and June 2015), the Russian passenger plane explosion of the Sinai Peninsula (November 2015), Brussels airport (March 2016), and an attack at a nightclub in Florida (June 2016) having become defining moments in the group's history of violence and atrocity (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). Although not all attacks have been directed by the Islamic State leadership, its acknowledgement of these being perpetrated by its adjuncts increases the perception that its message is far-reaching.

The reduction in Al-Qaeda's capacity and capability in recent years (although there are still some strong elements in south Yemen) is perceived to have been due to a concerted effort by international actors to mitigate its ability to operate but is also likely to be due to its progressive loss of support from its members (due to a lack of strategic direction, increasing internal discord, and their defection to Islamic State). Islamic State has taken its place in the embodiment of Salafist/takfirist jihadist ideals, transforming what had been for Al-Qaeda a powerful means of recruiting.

Since the re-establishment of the Caliphate, many new jihadists have flocked to its banner, many having been influenced by the sophisticated use of social media, but all to participate in a jihad against 'non-believers' (including Shi'a). Islamic State continues to appeal to an audience outside of the territories it has seized and controls, impacting global security measures. Its recruitment ideology and innovative use of the Internet for its radicalisation methodologies has thus far succeeded in fomenting division between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in the region but also fuelling a wider distrust of Muslim advocates by distorting the understanding of the Islamic tradition.

Countering Islamic State's appeal and inspiration to would-be jihadists is unlikely to yield fruitful results in the short-term because of the diversity in the motivations of the individuals who answer its call. Furthermore, the success of Islamic State's rapidly evolving media exploitation (and its ability to adapt to increased security measures and countermeasures to take advantage of the ever-expanding media availability – including the new methods of social media messaging) works in its favour, as it is able to adapt faster to dynamic conditions than the more bureaucratic agencies it opposes.

The international community is finally reaching consensus that 'something must be done' to counter Islamic State activity. To date, international activity has been similar to how it dealt with Al-Qaeda's attraction and domination of jihadist activity and recruitment. In the years since its founding, Islamic State has lost much of its former territory[3] (and with the international community's increasing momentum to end the group's activities,[4] looks to lose control of the remaining urban areas under the group's control). In both Iraq and Syria, Islamic State has battled simultaneously with government forces, anti-government forces, Kurdish forces, and various elements from the international community. Over 60 countries have engaged in different

efforts to counter Islamic State's activities.[5] Military campaigns in Iraq and Syria account for just one aspect of a broader international strategy that includes measures to restrict the flow of foreign fighters, stop foreign financing, and counter the group's virtual footprint on the Internet and social media. The targeting of Islamic State's economic vulnerabilities (financial institutions, funding streams, and energy infrastructure) has also had a significant impact on its ability to operate (purchasing weapons, paying its fighters, maintaining its welfare state (Hubbard, 2015)). Such interventions by a united international community appear to be finally having an impact, however, restricting its global terrorist impact/reach will not be achieved as quickly as its eviction from Iraq/Syria. Like Al-Qaeda, following the military campaigns to displace it from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, it is likely Islamic State will become a 'stateless' terrorist network inspiring jihadists around the globe to take up its call to convert/kill 'non-believers'.

Notes

1 Estimates vary between 6 and 8 million, but the true figure is unknown, especially as many inhabitants of the area have fled. See for example www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n16/patrick-cockburn/isis-consolidates and http://online.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-fillscoffers-from-illicit-economy-in-syria-iraq-1409175458. Accessed 9 November 2015.
2 https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shc481m-charter-of-the-city.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2016.
3 By mid-May 2016, the Pentagon suggested that ISIS had lost 45% of the territory it once controlled in Iraq, and about 20% in Syria.
4 As of 10 May 2016, Coalition aircraft had flown an estimated 91,821 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria. Of those, 12,199 were airstrikes (Iraq – 8,322 and Syria – 3,877). Approximately 68% of airstrikes in Iraq and 94% of airstrikes in Syria have been conducted by U.S. aircraft (Mills, 2016).
5 For example, the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) is made up of the Arab League, China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States.

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28

THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

John F. Morrison

Overview

> The leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has formally ordered an end to the armed campaign … All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.
>
> *(Seanna Walsh, 2005)*

When former republican prisoner Seanna Walsh read out these words in July 2005, he was announcing the end of the violent activities of one of the world's longest-serving terrorist groups, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Since their birth in 1969, the PIRA mounted a sustained terrorist campaign with the nominal aim of bringing about a 32-county united socialist Ireland, independent of the United Kingdom.

They depicted themselves as the 'legal representatives of the Irish people,' which led to their moral justification in 'carrying out a campaign of resistance against foreign occupation and domestic collaborators' (Coogan, 2000, p. 544). Their modus operandi included bombings, shootings, beatings, assassinations and kidnappings (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). This self-anointed moral justification for violence resulted in the deaths of 1771 people, and the injuries of countless others (Thornton *et al.*, 2001). These victims constituted members of the British, Northern Irish and Irish security services, politicians and republican and loyalist paramilitary rivals. However, predominantly they were innocent civilians who had no connection with any paramilitary, political or security services organisation. The Provisionals' campaign was one with the stated aim of fighting for, and protecting, the republican and nationalist communities of Northern Ireland. However, the victims of their violence consistently came from within these very same communities they claimed to both represent and protect.

It is impossible to achieve a comprehensive overview of the PIRA in this short chapter. Even if the entirety of this book were dedicated to analysing the group, there would be significant themes and events left unmentioned. Therefore, the purpose here is to introduce a number of key themes, issues and events relating to the Provisional Republican Movement. In order to grasp this introductory understanding, there is an analysis of the organisation from their inception in 1969 through the violence of the Troubles and up to their politicisation during the peace process.

Origins

The origins of the PIRA can be traced back to the split in the IRA in 1969 and the subsequent splintering of their political wing, Sinn Fein, in early 1970 (Morrison, 2014a). The split in the movement had been on the cards since the failure of *The Border Campaign*[1] of the late 1950s/early 1960s to gain any momentum or support. The IRA's new leadership under Cathal Goulding was evaluating the future trajectory of the movement. Under his leadership, it was proposed that they were to move away from violence, align themselves more closely with left-wing groupings and to abandon the traditional abstentionist policy.[2] By making these changes all at the same time, it is proposed that the leadership were changing 'too much, too soon' for many of the existing members. Prior to 1969, this was causing the factionalism within the organisation, predominantly at a leadership level (Morrison, 2014a).

Parallel to the internal debates within the Provisionals, the civil rights movement was emerging across Northern Ireland. Led by the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the movement aimed to challenge discrimination against the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland. The discrimination they were challenging included issues relating to political representation, housing, policing, employment and education. In 1968 and 1969, violence and resistance from unionist and loyalist[3] counter-protestors were commonplace at the civil rights marches.

Throughout 1969 the tensions in Northern Ireland grew significantly, with the violent manifestations of this coming to the fore in August 1969. Sectarian rioting was commonplace around the country. However, it was the Battle of the Bogside, a communal riot that lasted for three days, from August 12 to 14, and the nationalised violence surrounding it, that saw the British government send the army to man the streets of Northern Ireland. With the Battle of the Bogside in Derry showing no sign of abating, in Belfast hundreds of houses were burned to the ground, leaving thousands of people, mainly Catholics, homeless. With the British government calling in their military forces to protect the streets of Northern Ireland, significant proportions of the republican communities were calling on the IRA to provide weapons and protection for the Catholic population of the North. The leadership refused these requests. Coupled with the wider strategic changes, this decision ultimately led to the split in the IRA, which saw the formation of the PIRA. Those remaining under the leadership of Goulding adopted the moniker of the Official IRA (OIRA).

Internal violence against the nationalist and republican communities

As with any newly-formed terrorist organisation, the initial period involves organisational development. This development ran in parallel to the ensuing violence on the streets of Northern Ireland, a campaign of violence that would last for approximately 30 years under the understated moniker of 'The Troubles.' While the split among existing members was fairly even, the influx of new recruits taking up arms and membership largely went on to join the newly-formed Provisionals. These new recruits included figures such as Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, Danny Morrison and Gerry Kelly. It was these 'young Turks' whose future leadership would shape the trajectory of the PIRA's campaigns of politics and violence.

In the immediate aftermath of the split, much of the Provos'[4] violent attention was spent on their nascent feud with their former comrades. This feuding was especially prominent in west Belfast, where the two organisations were operating in close proximity. However, the feuding was not isolated to Belfast, or even Northern Ireland. While the groups both shared a common goal and enemy, a significant proportion of their initial paramilitary capabilities were concentrated on a series of attacks against their former allies. The violence directed against the OIRA

was as a result of the perceived threat they posed to the development of the Provisionals' membership and support.

Provisional violence within the nationalist and republican population was not solely directed against organisational rivals. In order to gain power and control within their own group and communities, they also conducted a long-standing campaign of violent vigilantism across republican areas of Northern Ireland. This saw the group targeting those they perceived to be posing a threat to their internal security, as well as individuals portrayed as being threatening to the social fabric of the nationalist and republican areas. Their vigilante campaign saw kneecappings, punishment beatings, expulsions and executions become commonplace on the streets of Northern Ireland. Through their extended vigilantism, they were presenting themselves as the protectors of the communities. Their actions and statements were saying to the communities that it was the PIRA, and not the RUC, who would protect them from the social ills of joy-riding, drug dealing and wider criminality. Their aim was two-fold: to gain passive and active support from within the communities, and to delegitimise the police force, who they portrayed as having no right to patrol the streets of Northern Ireland (Hamill, 2010; Silke, 1999).

A significant proportion of the Provisional's vigilante activity targeted petty criminals, drug-dealers and anti-social entities. However, some of their most serious forms of vigilantism were reserved for their own membership, or those who they felt were threatening to the security and survival of the organisation. In his autobiography, *Killing Rage*, former Provo Eamon Collins discussed in detail the operations of the internal security unit commonly referred to as 'the nutting squad' (Collins and McGovern, 1998). This was a section of the Provisionals whose purpose was to root out, interrogate and assassinate potential informers within the organisation. This was their own way of maintaining power and control over their membership while preventing the likelihood of intelligence leaks.

The PIRA similarly targeted those who they deemed to be 'collaborating' with the Northern Irish and British security forces. Numerous people were abducted and executed for their perceived interactions, relationships and collaborations with the security services. The remains of many of these individuals were left for their families and loved ones to grieve and mourn. However, there was a small group of 16 individuals who were separately abducted, killed and covertly buried by republican paramilitary groups. Their remains were disposed of in unmarked graves across both the Republic and Northern Ireland. Throughout the course of the Troubles, responsibility for these deaths was denied. However, in 1999 an acknowledgement of these abductions and murders was given by Republican paramilitaries, most notably the PIRA. As of March 2016, the PIRA had claimed responsibility for 13 abductions and murders, and the INLA had claimed one. These individuals collectively referred to as *The Disappeared* include members of the Provisionals who were accused of collaboration with 'enemy forces' as well as those members of the Republican communities who were accused of working for the security forces. Included amongst them was Jean McConville, a widowed mother of 10, killed in 1972. It was not until 1999 that the PIRA claimed responsibility for her abduction and subsequent murder. Even with this claim, her body was not recovered until August 2003, in County Louth. McConville was accused by the PIRA in west Belfast of passing information on to British soldiers. However, this claim has never been proven (Peake and Lynch, 2016).

Throughout The Troubles, the external violence of the Provisional IRA was clear for all to see. From the assassination of Lord Henry Mountbatten in Mullaghmore, County Sligo, in 1979 to the multiple bombings of the Europa Hotel in Belfast, the group wished to put forward a message of defiance against 'British occupation of their country.' However, in parallel to this was their less public face of community control and discipline. The vigilante violence of the group has been well documented (e.g. Hamill, 2010; Silke, 1999). However, in recent years, largely

through the statements of Maria Cahill and others, it has been revealed that the Provos were also involved in the development of a 'kangaroo court' system where victims of sexual assault at the hands of Provisional members were interrogated about their claims of abuse and strongly discouraged from reporting any assaults to the police. Cahill, the grand-niece of former leading Provisional Joe Cahill, told of how she was summoned to an interrogation as a teenager to assess whether she was telling the truth or not in her accusation against a leading PIRA member. Within this 'inquiry,' she was forced into a face-to-face exchange with the accused (McDonald, 2014). While there has long been the suspicion of the existence of such a system, it is only in post-Troubles Northern Ireland that the full extent of this is being revealed.

British attempts to counter the PIRA

When the British soldiers arrived in Northern Ireland in 1969,[5] the Catholic minority initially welcomed them, as they were seen as potential protection against loyalist mobs. But this relationship soon soured. Three core operations and events can be strongly linked to this souring: The Falls Curfew (1970), Operation Demetrius/internment without trial (1971) and Bloody Sunday (1972).

In mid-1970, there was growing violence and tensions in Belfast. In light of this, the British Army carried out a search for weapons within the Falls Road on July 3. Rioters throwing stones, petrol bombs and other missiles met them after their first search. In turn, they responded with the deployment of CS gas. What started as a riot soon turned into a gun battle between the OIRA and the British Army. With this surge in violence, the Army imposed a 36-hour curfew on the Falls Road area. During this, house-to-house searches were carried out in this predominantly Catholic area. As the searches continued, the soldiers were engaged in recurrent battles with both the OIRA and PIRA. The curfew was finally brought to a close on July 5 when women and children from the surrounding areas marched into the cordoned area with supplies for the locals. Over the three days of the Falls Curfew, the Army killed a total of four civilians. This included one who was run over by a heavily armoured car (Moloney, 2002).

By the middle of 1971, the PIRA bombing campaign of Belfast city centre was in full flow, snipers were regularly targeting soldiers and the paramilitaries were growing in strength. From January to August of 1971, there had been over 300 explosions and 320 shooting incidents across Northern Ireland (Taylor, 1997, pp. 91–92). This rise in violence led to calls for strong political and security responses. As a result, internment without trial was introduced in August 1971, under Section 12 of the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act (McCleery, 2015). During its initial deployment on August 9 and 10, a total of 342 people were arrested and interned. By the end of the internment policy in December, close to 2,000 people had been detained. Of these, the vast majority were Catholic/Republican. The introduction of internment was ostensibly brought forward to bring about peace in Northern Ireland. However, it resulted in the future intensification of paramilitary violence and civilian-led rioting and protests. While some paramilitary members were incarcerated, it also saw a significant number of innocent civilians imprisoned under suspicion of paramilitary engagement. With the introduction of internment, the paramilitary violence intensified. The fatal targeting of soldiers, police officers, loyalist paramilitaries and civilians significantly escalated from August onwards (English, 2003, p. 141).

Parallel to the rise of PIRA violence, the civil rights movement was growing in strength. While the campaign was still fighting for their original demands, they now also campaigned against the continuation of internment. On January 30, a crowd of around 10,000 gathered in Derry for an anti-internment march organised by NICRA. This was at a time when all parades and marches were banned. The Army had cordoned off parts of the original route. They had

set up barricades to stop entry into Guildhall Square, the original destination. The organisers resultantly rerouted the march to end at 'Free Derry Corner.' During the march, some participants diverted to continue their march through to where the army barricade was set up. As a protest ensued at the barricades, rubber bullets, CS gas and a water cannon were deployed to try and disperse the protestors. This escalated as members of the 1st Parachute Regiment opened fire on the crowd. Their actions ultimately killed a total of 14 male civilians aged between 17 and 41. This day was to become known as 'Bloody Sunday' (English, 2003, pp. 148–155). The initial response from the British Army was to justify the soldiers' actions, stating that they were responding to coming under fire. The resulting Widgery report, commissioned after a tribunal of investigation, exonerated the army while simultaneously implicating many of the victims in the process. However, a fresh public inquest was granted in 1998. When the final report of this inquiry, led by Lord Saville, was published in 2010, it fully exonerated all of the victims from any wrongdoing (Saville, Hoyt and Toohey, 2010). It in turn placed sole responsibility for the casualties at the hands of the army. This led Prime Minister David Cameron in 2010 to state that the deaths on Bloody Sunday were 'unjust and unjustifiable' (BBC, n.d.).

Provisional response

Each of the above 'interventions' was ostensibly justified as methods of bringing peace to the streets. Yet, each served to strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the Provisionals, who utilised each as recruitment tools (Gill and Horgan, 2013). They portrayed the nationalist minority of Northern Ireland as the victims of inhumane treatment at the hands of the security forces. These and other actions were used to validate their continued terrorist activity.

By mid-1972, they were attempting to portray themselves as peace-seekers. They offered to suspend all paramilitary operations if Prime Minister William Whitelaw would agree to meet with them. However, in order for these talks to take place, they demanded that all republican prisoners be granted political status, an independent (non-political) witness to be present in the talks, the meetings were to take place away from Stormont, there were to be no restrictions on the team selected by the Provisionals and that it should include the detained Gerry Adams. These demands were all, eventually, met. With this, the PIRA announced a cessation of violence on June 26, 1972. The negotiating team the Provisionals had brought together was one that represented both the old leadership and the new membership coming through. In the talks, the Provisionals' demands were significant. They called for a declaration of intent from the British to withdraw troops from Northern Ireland by January 1975, an amnesty for political prisoners and recognition of the right of the people of Ireland to act as a unit to decide the future of the island (Bishop and Mallie, 1987, pp. 176–179).

Just 48 hours after the talks had ended, the truce was over. The PIRA believed that the British Army had broken their part of the truce. In response on July 21, the Provos detonated over 20 bombs across Belfast. In total, nine people were killed and 130 were injured. While two of the dead were soldiers, a further five were civilians. The bombings took place across less than two hours and left the security forces completely stretched. So brutal was the day of attacks that in 2002, on the 30th anniversary of what is now known as 'Bloody Friday,' the PIRA issued an apology (see CAIN Web Service, 2002).

The majority of the PIRA campaign took place in Northern Ireland. However, their violence also stretched across the Irish Sea. While the OIRA had bombed Aldershot in 1972, it was not until March 1973 that PIRA activities first ventured across to England with four car bombs planted in London in one single operation. Two were defused. However, the remaining two, one outside the Old Bailey, exploded, killing one and injuring 180 others. The active service unit

(ASU) responsible for these bombings included two young sisters, Marian and Dolours Price, and the future Junior Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly, Gerry Kelly. This attack was to spark the start of an extended campaign of violence in England. Targets ranged from a bus carrying servicemen and their families to the bombings of pubs in Guildford and Birmingham. Most notorious of the PIRA ASUs in Britain was a group retrospectively known as the Balcombe Street Gang. The team comprised of Joe O'Connell, Eddie Butler, Harry Duggan and Hugh O'Doherty. However, their membership was constantly shifting. Their aim was to generate panic amongst the British establishment. In autumn of 1974, they started to strike targets, including pubs frequented by soldiers and institutions symbolic to the British establishment.

The Balcombe Street Gang serves as an illustration of the organisation of the PIRA's small units. Each member had a strictly defined role. O'Connell was in charge of gathering intelligence, plotting the mission and assembling the bombs. Duggan planted the bombs, while O'Doherty was lookout. For his part, Butler was a 'spare' man who stayed in the background until needed (Bishop and Mallie, 1987, pp. 201–203). This England bombing campaign was to continue intermittently until the 1990s. The targets and purposes of their attacks ranged from the targeting of the political establishment with the Brighton bombing of 1984 to the ending of a ceasefire with the targeting bombing of Canary Wharf in 1996. The England bombing campaign also serves as a noteworthy illustration of a strategic shift in the late 1970s. It was then that the group reorganised from their traditional military structure to a more cell-based system. Within this new structure, each cell was theoretically isolated from the larger organisation, designed so as not to compromise the wider group if arrested. A number of cells were placed across Britain, waiting for the order or the opportunity to carry out their attacks.

The 'Long War'

In the initial years of the Troubles, it was the stated aim of the leadership of the Provisional to bring about a swift military victory over the British. The political and security forces of the state likewise believed that they would be able to bring about an end to the PIRA without much endeavour. By the mid-1970s, it was clear that neither were going to have their wish granted. It was within this context that both sides entered secret meetings in 1974 leading to the 1975 PIRA ceasefire. These meetings turned into negotiations, which the PIRA negotiating team believed were leading to British 'withdrawal.'[6] As the process continued without any resolution, it became clear to the leadership, and the wider movement, that the British had no intention of leaving Northern Ireland. Resultantly, the ceasefire and talks were brought to a close with a resumption of violence. The failure of these negotiations can be seen as the beginning of the end of the old-guard Southern leadership and the beginning of the Northern dominance of the 'young Turks' led by Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and others (Morrison, 2014a).

This gradual change of leadership was facilitated by a parallel strategic and organisational shift in the movement in the mid to late '70s. In the early years, the movement was being led from Dublin. However, as the paramilitary campaign intensified, there were calls for structural change (McKearney, 2011, p. 141). Resultantly, the PIRA was divided into the Northern and Southern Commands. The Northern Command was in charge of 'war-zone' related activities, namely the planning and execution of operations. The Southern Command provided logistical support to sustain the campaign. This included the hosting of training camps, bomb factories and quartermaster duties. This operational change brought further prominence to the growing influence of the Northern leadership.

With no immediate end to the armed campaign in sight, the PIRA leadership adopted 'the long war' strategy (McKearney, 2011). No longer were the Provos aiming for a speedy retreat.

They stated that they were now going to partake a 'war of attrition' so as to bring about a demand from the British people for withdrawal of their troops. In turn, they wished to make Northern Ireland ungovernable and economically unviable. The military activities were to be supported by an international and national publicity campaign designed to gain support for the ongoing conflict. It was under this new doctrine, much of which was designed from within the prisons (see Moloney, 2002; Morrison, 2014b), that the terrorist campaign was sustained until the late 1990s.

Prisoners

Throughout the history of Irish republicanism, prisoners have held a revered position. They are portrayed as sacrificing their lives for 'the cause.' In the midst of the Troubles, this life sacrifice took on a more literal meaning. In 1976, the British government withdrew the Special Category Status for all paramilitary prisoners. As a reaction to no longer being recognised as political prisoners, PIRA and INLA prisoners went on the 'blanket protest,' refusing to wear prison uniforms. In its place they wrapped themselves in prison blankets. In 1978, their protest escalated to incorporate a 'no wash' protest, in response to reported attacks by prison officers on prisoners leaving their cells to wash. In protest, prisoners refused to 'slop out,' instead covering their cell walls with excrement.

With little to no progress being made in having their demands met in 1980, seven prisoners, led by Brendan 'Darky' Hughes, engaged in a simultaneous hunger strike. Their demands were for the right to wear civilian clothes; exemption from prison work; freedom of association; organisation of their own leisure activities; and the restoration of remission. After 53 days, with a number of strikers close to death, they called off their protest. They had been misled that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had agreed to meet their demands. Resultantly, a second hunger strike was called on March 1, 1981, led by Bobby Sands. For the purpose of maintaining pressure on the British government, the strikes were staggered. A new hunger striker was to join each week until demands were met. The early days of the strike failed to garner much support for the prisoners. This all changed with the death of Frank Maguire MP. As a result of Maguire's death, a by-election was held to fill his vacant Fermanagh and South Tyrone seat. Sands stood for the seat on an anti H-Block[7] platform. On April 9 he was elected, defeating Ulster Unionist candidate Harry West.

The election raised hope among the republican communities that a resolution to the hunger strikes would be found. However, Thatcher refused to grant political status. In her words, 'crime is crime is crime, it is not political' (Coogan, 2000, p. 493). On May 5, on the 66th day of his strike, Bobby Sands MP passed away. The British government's reaction was that he was a criminal who had chosen to take his own life. In the two weeks that followed, three more hunger strikers, Francis Hughes, Raymond McCreesh and Patsy O'Hara, died. The staggered deaths insured that their protest remained within the public consciousness. This led to increasing pressure, both nationally and internationally, on the Thatcher government. The swell of positive sentiment directed towards the strikers led to further electoral. As the strike continued, there were a number of interventions by representatives of the Catholic Church to bring an end to the strikes, and from the strikers' families seeking medical intervention. By October 3, the strike ended. In total, ten PIRA and INLA prisoners lost their lives; from Bobby Sands on May 5 to Michael Devine on August 20. Three days after the strikes ended, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, announced partial concessions to the prisoners' five demands, with only the demand not to do prison work unmet.

Peace process and politicisation

The success of the hunger strikes to gain national and international recognition, as well as electoral success, led the leadership to re-assess their strategies. As a result, by 1986 they were officially adopting a dual political and paramilitary campaign, with the Armalite[8] in one hand and the ballot box in the other (Taylor, 1997, pp. 281–282). At the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis[9] and PIRA General Army Convention of 1986, it was voted that elected candidates could take their seats in the Irish parliament in Dail Eireann. However, unlike the leadership of Goulding, they would still refuse to take their seats in Westminster or Stormont. Importantly, they also pledged to retain the 'armed struggle.'

The late '80s saw a return of the England bombing campaign. The most lethal of these attacks was the 1989 Deal Barracks bombing, which resulted in the deaths of 11 bandsmen of the Royal Marines Band Service. On Remembrance Day, November 8, 1987, using Libyan Semtex, 11 people were killed, with over 60 injured during a Remembrance Sunday commemoration at the cenotaph in Enniskillen, County Fermanagh. Of the causalities, many were pensioners. At the dawn of the '90s, the PIRA launched their 'human proxy bomb' tactic. This involved individuals being forced to drive explosive-laden vehicles to British military sites. Upon arrival at the target, the explosives were detonated remotely. On October 24, 1990, proxy bombs targeted three separate British Army outposts. In Coshquin, Cloghoge and Omagh, a total of eight people were killed and 14 were injured. The Provos used people accused of collaborating with the security forces as their 'drivers.' This tactic caused outrage in the Catholic and nationalist communities (Bloom and Horgan, 2008).

It seemed like there was no end to the violence in sight. However, behind the scenes moves were being made to bring an end to the armed campaign. In 1988 John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), began a series of secret discussions with the Sinn Fein president, Gerry Adams. It was Hume's belief that the peace would only come to Northern Ireland if the PIRA could be persuaded to promote their agenda exclusively through their political wing. He believed that the British government were now prepared to negotiate over the future of Northern Ireland from a position of neutrality. Involved within this was an acceptance of the principle that the onus was on the people of Northern Ireland to reach a consensus of the country's future. In April 1993, Hume and Adams released a statement arguing that the self-determination was the right of the Irish people as a whole (BBC, 1993). This marked a significant stepping-stone that moved the conflict away from terrorism and towards political negotiations.

In December 1993, the U.K. Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds published the *Joint Declaration on Peace*.[10] Central to this declaration was the British denouncement of any 'selfish strategic or economic' interests in Northern Ireland (British and Irish Governments, 1993). Despite opposition from the members of the unionist political parties, the table was set for the establishment of negotiations. On August 31, 1994, the PIRA announced a ceasefire, during which significant progress was made, but not without its setbacks. February 1995 saw the publication of the *Framework Documents* dealing with the establishment of North/South institutions and the development of a single-chamber Northern Irish Assembly elected by proportional representation (British and Irish Governments, 1995). The early to mid-'90s also saw the development of U.S. political assistance and mediation in the peace process, most marked by the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as the United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland. Ultimately this cessation was not to remain permanent. It ended with the bombing of Canary Wharf in February 1996. The Provos declared that the British Prime Minister and unionist politicians had failed to rise 'to the challenge' of enhancing a 'democratic

peace process.' However, it is widely believed that the end of the ceasefire came due to internal discontent in the membership of the Provisionals directed towards the leadership of Adams and McGuinness (Morrison, 2014a).

With the resumption of the armed campaign, the PIRA resumed their attacks in England, detonating multiple bombs in London and Manchester in 1996. On June 7, 1996, their violence also spread south of the border. During a post-office robbery in Adare, County Limerick, members of the Provisionals shot dead Detective Garda Jerry McCabe, an act that lost them what little sympathy they had amongst the general population of the Republic. This continued into 1997 with the targeting of RUC, British Army and civilian targets across Northern Ireland. However, on July 19, 1997, the Provos declared a restoration of the 1994 ceasefire (IRA, 1997). This paved the way for the PIRA and Sinn Fein's acceptance of the Mitchell Principles and the ultimate signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The Mitchell Principles are a set of ground rules put forward by Senator Mitchell and agreed by the Northern Irish political parties and the British and Irish governments. Central to the Principles was the statement that all of those engaging in talks gave a commitment to 'democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues' (Taylor, 1997, pp. 351–352). In order for Sinn Fein to sign up to the Mitchell Principles, the PIRA convened a General Army Convention in October 1997. Although hotly contested, the proposal to accept the Mitchell Principles was accepted. However, in the aftermath of this Convention, leading members of the Engineering and Quartermaster Departments exited to form their own autonomous paramilitary force, the Real IRA (RIRA). This was reminiscent in the split in the aftermath of the 1986 Convention with the formation of the Continuity IRA (CIRA). Both of these violent dissident groups, alongside Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH), Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and others have continued their paramilitary activity in spite of the peace process (see Morrison and Horgan, 2016; Horgan and Morrison, 2011).

After 29 years of violence, the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was the major political breakthrough that laid the foundation for peace. The document was agreed by most of the major parties. It was then put to a referendum both north and south of the border. In Northern Ireland, 71.1% of the voters, and 94.39% in the Republic, voted for the acceptance of the document. The Agreement includes a legal agreement between the British and Irish governments and a broader political agreement between the Northern Irish political parties and the two governments. There is an acknowledgement that Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom until the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wish otherwise. But most relevant for the PIRA, and other paramilitary groups, signing the Agreement committed participants 'to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues.' For their part, the British and Irish governments gave a commitment to the early release of prisoners servicing sentences in connection with paramilitary activities.

With the Belfast Agreement, and the subsequent St. Andrews Agreement (British and Irish Governments, 2006), now in place, and the PIRA placing their arms beyond use (IRA, 2002), Northern Ireland is largely at peace. The PIRA is no longer waging a war against 'British occupation.' In fact, some of their leading members are now shaking hands with the Queen of England, a once-viable target (Greensdale, 2012). The road to peace has brought them from the murder of close to 2,000 people to having their political wing in a power-sharing government with their former adversaries, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). However, this road to politicisation has come with violence, criminality and controversy. In late 2004 and early 2005, with the Northern Bank robbery (Glendinning, 2008) and the murder of Robert McCartney (McCartney, 2007), it was clear that some members of the PIRA were still involved in criminality and vigilantism. Similar accusations have been made in relation to the continuation of

cross-border fuel smuggling by members of the Provos (Cusack, 2015). But, a recent assessment of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland states that while the structure of the PIRA remains in existence, its strategy 'has a wholly political focus,' and its leadership 'remains committed to the peace process' (*Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,* 2015, p. 4).

Notes

1 The Border Campaign was a 1956–62 IRA campaign. It is also known as *Operation Harvest*.
2 Abstentionism was a political cornerstone of what it was to be an Irish republican, since the nineteenth century. The policy stated that if elected, members of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, would not take their seats in Westminster, Dail Eireann or Stormont; the seats of parliament for the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively.
3 Unionists and loyalists wish to maintain Northern Ireland's position in the United Kingdom and largely come from the Protestant majority of the country.
4 This is a colloquial term for the Provisional IRA.
5 There was not a full withdrawal of troops until July 2007, when Operation Banner officially ended.
6 Detailed notes taken by Ruairi O'Bradaigh during these talks are available to access in the James Hardiman Library of the National University of Ireland Galway.
7 This was a name used to refer to the H-shaped blocks within Maze prison, where Sands and many other paramilitary prisoners were incarcerated.
8 This was the firearm of choice for many PIRA operations.
9 Irish political party convention.
10 This is more commonly referred to as the Downing Street Declaration.

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29

LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE)

Ahmed Salah Hashim

Introduction

For almost three decades from 1983 to 2009, the island nation of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon until 1972) was wracked by a bloody conflict between the forces of the government of Sri Lanka and one of the most fearsome terrorist and insurgent organizations of contemporary times: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The goals of both sides were mutually incompatible; the government, dominated by the Sinhalese majority, wanted to maintain the unity of the island-nation while the LTTE wanted to create a separate Tamil nation on one-third of the island and incorporating two-thirds of the coastline. Numerous attempts, often mediated by external powers, to reach a peaceful settlement acceptable to both sides went nowhere (Nadarajah and Vimalarajah, 2008). The conflict ended with a decisive military victory by the Sri Lankan military in May 2009 in which virtually the entire senior leadership of the LTTE was killed and the LTTE military capabilities wiped out.

The civil war was divided into four phases: Eelam War I (1983–1987), Eelam War II (1990–1995), Eelam War III (1995–2000), and Eelam War IV (2006–2009) (Diaz and Murshed, 2013, p. 288). Each phase from I to III was bloody, with human rights violations by both sides (Somasundaram, 2010a; Barnes, 2013). On the battlefields, though, each side fought with fortitude and tenacity (e.g. Harris, 1996). In Eelam War I, neither side proved to be militarily effective, as both military forces were novices in the art of war. The Sri Lankan armed forces were small, under-equipped, poorly trained, and largely either ceremonial or tasked with internal policing duties, putting down Sinhalese terrorism, and countering maritime smuggling (Marks, 2005).[1] In its early days, the LTTE's military capabilities were even less impressive. It relied primarily on terrorism. However, the LTTE knew what it wanted to do and did it: terrorize its Tamil opponents into submission through killing their leaders and cadre, provoke the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to overreact by committing acts of terrorism against innocent civilians and off-duty military and police personnel, and launch assaults on military camps (Samaranayake, 2007; Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre, 2008).

Eelam War I was ended by an ill-fated Indian intervention (1987–90), much to the chagrin of the Sri Lankan government and military, which seemed to have been making some headway against the LTTE. The Indians came in with a peacekeeping force that eventually found itself in a small vicious counterinsurgency campaign against the pugnacious LTTE. The intervention,

which became focused on controlling the LTTE, earned India the enmity of the Tamil organization and its leader, and caused domestic concern in Tamil Nadu, the Indian state in the south-eastern part of the country which was sympathetic to the LTTE. India withdrew in 1990, much to its own relief (Sengupta and Ganguly, 2013). With the Indians out of the way, the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE resumed their bloodletting. Both sides were now better equipped and operational capacities improved, but neither side was able to attain a decisive advantage over the other in these first three phases. The Tamil Tigers gradually developed the capacity to conduct conventional warfare against the SLAF. The SLAF expanded its personnel size and acquired more assets, but it was not able to prevail over the LTTE. Moreover, it suffered serious casualties, faced constant desertion, and acquired material and weapons that were often ill-suited or minimally effective for the kind of war it was fighting. Eelam War III ended with a comprehensive ceasefire, coupled with efforts to move towards a negotiated settlement (Fernando, 2014). These negotiations went nowhere, as each side made demands that the other could not accept. Each side was convinced that the other was using the ceasefire and negotiations to build up its military power. The lack of trust was reflected in the constant ceasefire violations by each side.

The dispute was decided on the field of battle in 2009 when the government forces crushed the vaunted LTTE, much to the amazement of the world, which was convinced that the government of Sri Lanka would never be able to triumph militarily over this organization. The fourth phase, Eelam War IV (2006–2009), spelled disaster for the LTTE. A new government under the populist Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power in 2005. The senior leadership, both civilians and military, rebuilt and revamped the SLAF and were determined to end the conflict once and for all. The LTTE under its leadership was losing ground politically and strategically. However, its leadership was convinced that it was invincible and that there was nothing that the GoSL could do to it militarily. It did not realize that the situation had changed dramatically in favour of the GoSL until it was too late.

Origins of the conflict in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an island nation barely 30 miles off the south-eastern coast of India, from which it is separated by the Palk Straits. It has an ancient history and is a multi-ethnic society comprised of two primary linguistic divisions: Sinhala and Tamil. The Sinhalese, an Indo-Aryan people who migrated from northern India, constitute the island's majority population (74 percent), and the vast majority are Buddhists. The minority Tamils do not make up a single monolithic ethnic bloc but were made up of the native Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils whom the British 'imported' to work on the tea plantations, and the Moors. The Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6 percent of the population) and Indian Tamils (5.5 percent of the population) are mainly Hindu. The Moors (7.4 percent of the population) are Muslims who primarily speak Tamil but also have a significant bilingual population. Christians are found on both sides of the ethno-linguistic divide and make up about 7 percent of the population. Other minorities include Burghers, who are descendants of the mixed marriages of Europeans, primarily Dutch and Portuguese, and natives. Their numbers have dwindled through mass migration to Western countries such as Australia and Canada.

For 450 years, the island's history was shaped by European colonial powers, until the middle of the 20th century. First came the Portuguese, who brought Roman Catholicism; then came the Dutch, who were primarily interested in trade. Finally, the British conquered the island, and over the course of time they succeeded in creating a prosperous colony. When Ceylon, as it was known until 1972, attained independence from Britain in 1948, it was widely perceived as one of the post-colonial countries most likely to succeed; in the words of its first post-independence

Governor General, 'the best bet in Asia' (quoted in Neal, 2015). Ceylon was blessed with natural resources, a healthy and literate population, an efficient and effective bureaucratic and administrative infrastructure, and a well-educated native elite that had seemingly absorbed all that was positive about British parliamentary democracy. The British had instituted a remarkable education system, which the Tamil minority, the Christians, and urban Sinhalese had taken advantage of. Under the British and during the early years of independence, access to education was non-discriminatory and was open to all. The Tamil and Christian minorities, which put great stress on modern education, availed themselves of these opportunities more readily than the agrarian Sinhalese. Tamils valued education, and many Tamils attended English language schools, which were the paths to higher education and better employment in the colonial period. The Tamil-dominated Northern Province had comparatively better facilities for English language and pre-university education. There was also a limit beyond which Tamils could not be absorbed within the traditional land-based occupations in the arid areas where they predominated. This further encouraged many to seek employment through education. The net result was the relative over-representation of Tamils in higher education, professions, and the administration, in comparison to their status in the general population. Per capita income was a fifth higher than the South Asian average; indeed, Ceylon was one of Asia's wealthiest nations on the eve of independence (Sally, 2009, p. 31). The colony got independence smoothly and without the communal bloodshed and political turmoil that was the lot of India, Pakistan, and Burma.

Barely a decade after independence, Ceylon headed towards growing ethnic and religious hostilities between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil populations. Sinhalese populist nationalists emerged weaving narratives of permanent conflict with Tamils and pointing to the 'dominant' position of this minority in Ceylonese life (Radhakrishnan, 2010; Selvadurai and Smith, 2013). Resentment grew at the perceived disproportionate influence of the Tamils in the universities, the civil administration, the army, and the white-collar professions. At independence, Tamils accounted for over 30 percent of government services admissions, a share larger than their proportion in the general population. By 1956, it was estimated that Tamils constituted 50 percent of the clerical personnel of the railway, postal, and customs services, 60 percent of all doctors, engineers, and lawyers, and 40 percent of other labour forces. They dominated the tiny armed forces in the pre-1956 period where Tamils, particularly Christian Tamils, constituted three-fifths of the officer corps (Cave and Manoharan, 2009, p. 296). In order to pander to the growing political aspirations of the agrarian-based Sinhalese population, the suave and educated ruling elite resorted to populist politics.

In 1956, S.W.R.D Bandaranaike was elected Prime Minister with a main election promise of establishing Sinhalese as the official language of the country, replacing English. The new government fulfilled this promise through the passage of the so-called 'Sinhala Only Act' (Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956) soon after the election, giving no status of parity to the Tamil language. The rise of ethnic politics led Tamil politicians to argue for the implementation of autonomy or a federal solution in the island nation. Since the 1930s, and much more clearly since the 1950s, Tamil political parties have been asking for greater political autonomy for the areas in which they predominate. Such devolution of power has been recognized at different times as a means to diffuse tensions between the two groups. A number of pacts had been formulated to define the devolution of power, including the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in July 1957 that offered a framework for regional devolution, which would have given the Tamils greater control over their affairs. Due to various political pressures, the provisions of the pact were never implemented.

The failure to implement these proposals led to Tamil demands for separation instead of federalism, which they had been mostly seeking up to that point. For many Tamils, particularly

the younger generation, which was increasingly fed up with the incremental steps taken by their elders, the failure of these pacts also marked a disintegration of confidence in parliamentary politics. Many began to think that the time for violent political action had come. In 1977, a large group, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), won an overwhelming electoral victory on a platform of separatism. Until the early 1980s, the growing ethnic tensions were limited to the political arena. Nonetheless, there were clear indications that the politics of Tamil society were shifting from the commitment to parliamentary democracy espoused by conservative older generation politicians to a commitment to armed struggle encouraged by disgruntled Tamil youth. Some of these youth organized themselves into armed groups dedicated to wresting freedom by means of violence. The first of these groups was the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which later came to be known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE. In 1978, the Tamil New Tigers carried out a series of bank robberies and also assassinated a number of police officers, many of which were Tamil.

As violence began, the gap between the communities began to widen further. The Sri Lankan government did nothing to stem the tide of polarization; indeed, it contributed to it. In 1980, a government minister said:

> Sri Lanka is inherently and rightfully a Sinhalese state … This must be accepted as a fact and not a matter of opinion to be debated. By attempting to challenge this premise, Tamils have brought the wrath of the Sinhalese on their own heads; they have themselves to blame. (Quoted in Pape, 2005, p. 147)

This was not a particularly enlightened statement to make and merely confirmed the Tamils in their increasing justification to remove themselves from Sri Lanka by any means.

On July 23, 1983, members of the TNT, now renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and led by a dynamic individual who believed in the efficacy of violent politics, Velupillai Prabhakaran, initiated a landmine ambush against a truck carrying 13 Sinhalese soldiers in Jaffna. The attack left all 13 soldiers dead. The ensuing chaos that erupted across the country over the next four days, known as Black July, included widespread ethnic violence and looting aimed at Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils and their property by the Sinhalese majority. Reports suggest that as many as 2,000 Tamils were killed during the riots that started in Colombo. These incidents, first the ambush on the Sri Lankan military and then the subsequent race riots, constitute the starting date for the first phase of the war, which was known as Eelam War I. President Jayewardene, in response to the anti-Tamil violence of 1983, blamed Tamils for the violence brought on them by the Sinhalese. Though this was not a religious conflict but more of a civil war over separatism, neither side could avoid the addition of religious motifs to their burgeoning respective and exclusivist nationalisms. In this context, the baleful impact of strong political involvement by the Buddhist Sangha (monastic order) in formulating the Sinhalese counter-narrative, in infusing the Sinhalese population with an exclusivist nationalism, and in motivating the armed forces through religious indoctrination, cannot be denied.[2]

Ideology and goals of the LTTE

The LTTE's primary goal was to create an independent state for Sri Lankan Tamils, known as 'Tamil Eelam,' in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka, where the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils reside. Prabhakaran repeatedly stated that the struggle for Eelam (a Tamil state) was a demand of the Tamil people and not only of the LTTE. The Tamils were a distinct people with their own ancient history; they could no longer live under an increasingly exclusivist Sinhalese state, as

he stated several times over the course of the conflict. In 1987, when India and Sri Lanka were engaged in talks to devolve power to the Tamil minority, a chagrined Prabhakaran addressed a huge crowd of Tamil supporters: 'I have unrelenting faith in the proposition that only a separate state can offer a permanent solution for the problem of the people of Tamil Eelam. Let me make it clear to you here, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that I will continue to fight for the objective of obtaining Tamil Eelam' (quoted in O'Duffy, 2007, p. 262).

The LTTE leadership outlined the contours of this future state and intimated that it would be a socialist and progressive state in which oppression and exploitation would be eventually eradicated.[3] In 1986, Prabhakaran claimed that 'revolutionary socialism is my political philosophy.' By socialism, the LTTE leader meant, in his words, 'the construction of an egalitarian society where there is no class contradiction and exploitation of man by man; a free, rational society where human freedom and rights are protected and progress enhanced' (This Week, 1986). Given his adherence to socialist principles, it was not surprising that Prabhakaran declared that the 'government of independent Eelam will be a socialist government; there will be only one party supported by the people. I do not want a multi-party democracy. Under a one-party government Tamil Eelam can develop and change much faster. In a socialist constitution the needs of the people will have priority' (quoted in Hellmann-Rajnayagam, 1994, p. 65).

However, although separatist ideology dominated the LTTE's outlook, Prabhakaran stated in a 2002 press conference that the LTTE was willing to consider autonomy and self-rule, and not necessarily outright statehood and session from the rest of Sri Lanka. It is not clear that after years of sacrifice he was genuine about his willingness to merely accept autonomy. Prabhakaran's seeming willingness to put autonomy on the table was designed to show an LTTE that was reasonable and willing to negotiate.

Structure and organization

Like many contemporary terrorist and insurgent organizations, the LTTE was divided into political and military wings. It also had a well-developed international wing with access to the large Tamil diaspora around the world, which provided the organization with much of its funding and outreach to the outside world.

The political wing

Velupillai Prabhakaran headed the overall organization, directing both its political and military wings through the articulation of its ideology, its goals, and military strategies. Though he had help from very able political and military leaders, it was his charisma and sheer ruthlessness that allowed him to remain on top from the early days right up to his death and the demise of the organization in 2009. The political wing articulated LTTE ideology and goals, negotiated with the GoSL and third-party mediators, determined the state-formation and nation building enterprises of the LTTE, and represented the LTTE internationally.

Despite the fact that Prabhakaran was the uncontested leader, this did not mean that the LTTE did not face internal crises that rocked its cohesion. The first organizational rift occurred in 1994 when Mahattaya (aka Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah) apparently challenged the leadership of Prabhakaran with the support of a number of unhappy cadre and allegedly in cahoots with India's premier intelligence arm, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Their 'plot' was discovered, and a significant number of cadre and leaders were executed by firing squad.

A more serious blow to the cohesion of the LTTE came on the eve of Eelam War IV. In early March 2004, the LTTE's eastern commander, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka 'Colonel'

Karuna, rebelled against the rebel organization's predominantly northern leadership. Karuna felt that the 'easterners' were bearing the brunt of the war's cost and were not adequately represented at the senior command levels. The feud may have started with a major act of insubordination on his part when he turned down the leadership's request for about 1,000 eastern fighters for deployment in the north.

Karuna aired his defiance to the media and wrote an open letter accusing the LTTE of discrimination against the easterners. The LTTE responded swiftly; it accused Karuna of treason and fired him. Its units in the east began a military campaign against Karuna and his loyalists, which forced him to seek the protection of the GoSL. The significance of his rebellion was immense, and in the end fatal for the organization. Karuna exposed the deep rift between the LTTE's northern and eastern wings, and he took with him several thousand well-trained LTTE cadre, which included Sea Tiger naval personnel. The loss of the eastern Tamils reduced LTTE control over a significant portion of the eastern coastline, where much of the LTTE's naval capabilities were based, and it allowed the Sri Lankan ground forces to put pressure on the LTTE positions in the LTTE stronghold in the Vanni sector. Karuna seemed to have provided the Sri Lankans with a considerable amount of relevant information on LTTE doctrine, strategy, and forces in place (Obayashi, 2014). He was, however, prone to exaggerating his role in the Sri Lankan victory in 2009, stating unequivocally that without him, the government could not have won the war (Wax, 2009).

Building Tamil Eelam: state-formation and nation-building

Within the areas they controlled, LTTE set up a *de facto* state administration, which includes revenue collection, police, and judiciary, as well as public services and economic development. This political-territorial division means that Sri Lanka has a *de facto* dual-state structure, with LTTE also exercising considerable influence on state institutions and officials in the government-controlled parts of the Northeast province. The embryonic LTTE state-formation benefited from experience acquired in the period from 1990 to 1995, when LTTE controlled Jaffna and parts of Vanni, during which it set up local administrative bodies. When the LTTE lost control of Jaffna, it moved its institutions deep in the Vanni jungle in the north-central part of the island where the *de facto* capital was the town of Kilinochchi. At the same time, the Sri Lankan government's local government institutions and officials continue to function within LTTE-controlled areas, which means that there was a dual-state structure also *within* the areas that are held by the LTTE (Stokke, 2006).

However, much of the LTTE state-building enterprise relied on the activities of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that worked in Sri Lanka. The LTTE would often claim the efforts of the NGOs in providing basic services and supplies as its own. The LTTE did better at nation-building efforts, which refers to inculcating the population with a strong nationalist narrative. This was a reflection of the LTTE's strong emphasis on indoctrination and propaganda.

The international wing and the Tamil diaspora

In its early years, the LTTE received direct support from India and from sympathetic Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Tamil militants were trained and equipped in Tamil Nadu by India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). From September 1983 and July 1987, RAW trained an estimated 1,200 Tamil militants in southern India. Indian sponsorship did not last long due to differences between India and the LTTE; India feared that support for a secessionist group would encourage such groups in India itself. However, the

two most important factors in the loss of India's support were the Indian military's negative experience with the LTTE during the 1987–1990 peacekeeping mission and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. After losing the sponsorship of India, the LTTE began to build up its international network of both licit and illicit commercial ventures and businesses and to rely extensively on the half-million plus Sri Lankan Tamil global diaspora. The international commercial network provided the means for the Tamil Tigers to wage a protracted insurgency against the GoSL. By infiltrating the diaspora, the LTTE was able to raise funds, often through strong-arm methods, procure weapons, start legitimate enterprises, and disseminate propaganda to gain sympathy and support globally (Chalk, 2000). With access to funds, material resources, and skilled personnel through its base of external support, the LTTE became the world's first insurgent group with the ability to operate on land, in the air, on the seas, and under water.[4]

The military wing of the LTTE

In addition to mastering guerrilla warfare, the LTTE fielded a formidable conventional force, including a maritime arm capable of challenging the Sri Lankan Navy and a nascent air wing capable of striking targets inside government-held territory. Yet despite its military prowess, the LTTE suffered a crushing military defeat by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in May 2009.

The organization out of which the LTTE eventually emerged, the aptly named TNT, was a purely terrorist organization. To advance its cause, the TNT began prosecuting a campaign of terror against both pro-government Tamils and Sinhalese, which included the assassination of Albert Duriappa in 1975, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna. When the leader of the TNT was apprehended, Prabhakaran stepped into the leadership position and renamed the organization. In its early years, the LTTE was a small and poorly resourced organization that could only conduct acts of terror against civilians, rival Tamil organizations, of which there were many, government officials, and policemen.

The 'Black Tigers': the suicide bombers

On July 5, 1987, an LTTE soldier, 'Captain Miller,' drove an explosive-laden truck into a Sri Lankan army base and detonated it, killing himself and approximately 100 army personnel. Suicide bombing was not an LTTE invention; it had already been experienced in the Middle East. However, it was still a rare phenomenon. Hundreds followed, and when they signed a cease-fire with the Sri Lankan government in February 2002, the Tigers had by then accounted for around a third of all suicide attacks in the world (Perry, 2006). The feared LTTE suicide bombers targeted innocent civilians, military, and police, and managed to kill a remarkable number of VIPs (see Somasundaram, 2010b; Bloom, 2003; and Biziouras, 2014). In May of 1991, the first female suicide bomber of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) got through the crowd in Madras, which was surrounding former Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and detonated herself. She killed her target and 11 others. 'Dhanu,' as she was known, became the trendsetter for many female members of the LTTE to join this highly regarded unit of the organization. In terms of the employment of female bombers, the LTTE is credited with committing the most attacks, using 200 women, a 30 percent to 40 percent representation of their total attacks.

The ground forces

As the LTTE evolved from terrorist operations, such as assassinations, attacks on civilians, and sabotage against infrastructure, it began to focus on building a force structure that could con-

duct insurgency and then later conventional operations. As it developed from a 'lower form of warfare,' namely terrorism, through to higher forms, such as insurgency, to conventional warfare, this was reflected in changing military structures and the attainment of greater capabilities. On April 10, 1991, the LTTE created its first conventional fighting formation, the Charles Anthony Brigade. During the early 1990s, the LTTE leadership realized they needed a conventional regiment to fight Sri Lanka's conventional armed forces and to show the world that the Tamils had the capability of defending themselves through conventional means. Although an expert on psychological and guerrilla warfare, Balraj was the first commander of the first conventional LTTE regiment formed on April 10, 1991 – the Charles Anthony Brigade, named after the LTTE's senior leader and the leader's close friend, Charles Anthony of Trincomalee, who was killed on July 15, 1983. Although the brigade was formed just a few months before the LTTE's failed attempt to capture the Elephant Pass military base in 1991, it did not take part directly. The Charles Anthony Brigade was crucial in the capture of Elephant Pass base in 2000. Balraj led the brigade from 1991 to 1993 and from 1995 to 1997, playing a crucial role in conventional war training for LTTE cadres (Kumaasan, 2008). The LTTE, however, never managed to complete the setting up of its conventional force structure in preparation for the final phase of the civil war, known as Eelam War IV.

The naval wing

The LTTE developed the most extensive and sophisticated naval capability and 'merchant marine' fleet of any non-state actor to date.[5] Given the fact that Sri Lanka is an island, the maritime arena was important for the LTTE, whose early maritime operations were limited to smuggling of weapons, materials, and personnel from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Prabhakaran reportedly said once:

> Geographically, the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. It's only when we are strong in the seas and break the dominance our enemy now has that we will be able to retain land areas we liberated and drive our enemies from our homeland. (Quoted in Manoharan, 2005)

In 1990, the LTTE established a dedicated naval arm known as the Sea Tigers (De Silva-Ranasinghe, 2009). The Indian Navy had trained the first cadre of Tamil naval personnel in underwater sabotage operations; this group constituted the nucleus of the Sea Tigers (Jayaram, 1995). Initial attempts by the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to hinder these operations using its fleet of offshore patrol vessels were somewhat successful, but those efforts led the Sea Tigers to adapt. The insurgents locally manufactured their own fiberglass fast-attack craft, equipping the larger boats with four 250-horsepower, outboard engines, and the smaller boats with two engines. These faster craft, with their more powerful engines, allowed the Sea Tigers to outrun the slower SLN patrols. The Sea Tigers lacked their own harbours, so they adapted by launching their boats using tractors and trailers from beachfronts. This enabled them to launch from any beachfront location they could access. The LTTE would hide the craft inshore, sometimes more than 10 kilometres away from the beach, and would launch only when necessary.

The Sea Tigers' most successful innovation was their use of the 'wolf pack' tactic. Once the Sea Tigers identified a target, five or more of their small boats would approach the target craft, engage it from all directions, and prevent it from fleeing the area. While these small boats engaged the target, a suicide craft would move toward the target boat using the cover of the larger command vessels. These suicide boats were usually small, fiberglass boats manned by a

single Black Sea Tiger. The hull of the boat would be packed with high explosives and rigged to a pressure trigger located at the craft's pointed prow, set to detonate the explosives when the suicide pilot rammed the target vessel.

Unlike the Sea Tigers' naval operations, the organization's commercial maritime operations functioned quietly and secretively. Its work involved carrying legitimate ocean cargo, involvement in human smuggling, and transporting contraband and narcotics, which provided the LTTE with funds. The fleet also ferried weapons and military equipment purchased abroad to the LTTE forces on the ground in Sri Lanka (Ramachandran, 2006).

Tamil military intelligence and TOSIS

From the very earliest days of the conflict, the LTTE leadership recognized the importance of creating an intelligence infrastructure as a force multiplier against the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE created a two-tiered intelligence infrastructure composed of military intelligence, which focused almost exclusively on assessing the Sri Lankan military's order of battle (ORBAT) and table of organization and equipment (TOE); or to put it simply: keeping abreast of the enemy's capabilities during the course of the conflict. Military intelligence did a good job until Eelam War IV, when it blundered badly, being almost totally unaware of the significant changes that took place in the Sri Lankan military between 2004 and 2006, when the 2000 ceasefire collapsed.

The Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (TOSIS) was the main intelligence service, and its writ extended beyond the purely military to encompass political, socioeconomic, and international issues of concern to the LTTE. Yet, despite its vaunted reputation, in the end it also failed miserably. It failed to assess correctly the impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the fortunes of violent non-state actors around the world. It did not understand the nature of the right-wing government that won the elections in Sri Lanka in 2005 and which was determined to find a military solution to the seemingly endless war. Finally, despite the importance that Prabhakaran allegedly gave to the intelligence wing, particularly TOSIS, under its leader, 'Pottu Amman,' it is not clear that towards the end, in particular, that the LTTE leader listened to intelligence that contradicted his world-view and his sense of infallibility.

The 'Air Tigers' wing

Air Tigers was the air-wing of LTTE.[6] The LTTE was the only insurgent organization in the world to have initiated the development of a combat air wing (Hezbollah was the only one to have developed a formidable rocket and missile inventory). Its existence had been subject to speculation for many years, but was only revealed after the first attack in March 2007. LTTE credits the formation of the Air Tigers wing to 'Colonel Shankar,' alias Vaithilingam Sornalingam, who was variously described as an aeronautical engineer or pilot. On November 27–28, 1998, TamilNet reported the first flight of the 'Tiger Air Force' during a military parade.

On August 11, 2006, there were reports that at least one unidentified aircraft had flown over the Sri Lankan military base at Palali, firing rockets at government forces. However, these aircraft were identified for the first time only when they carried out an attack on Katunayake Air Force base in March 2007. Two Zlín Z-143 light aircraft of Czech-manufacture were used for the surprise air raid. This was followed by eight more attacks on military targets, with the final one being a suicide air raid targeting Sri Lanka Air Force HQ in Colombo in February 2009. During the final stages of Eelam War IV, the Sri Lankan army allegedly captured seven makeshift airfields used by the LTTE's embryonic air force.

Eelam War IV: the end of the LTTE

The final phase of the civil war, Eelam War IV, has not yet received a definitive account that tells the full story of how and why the Sri Lankan army succeeded in its counterinsurgency campaign between 2006 and 2009 *and* how and why one of the world's most formidable terrorist and insurgent organizations succumbed to defeat in that time period. A number of works have addressed the politico-strategic, operational, and tactical factors behind the Sri Lankan military victory (e.g. Hashim, 2013; De Silva-Ranasinghe, 2009, 2010; Fish, 2009; Mehta, 2010; Woodhead, 2011; Chandradasa, 2012; Perera, 2012). However, very few have addressed the factors behind the LTTE's defeat (e.g. Hashim, 2013; Jayasekara, 2009; Anderson, 2011; Moorcroft, 2012; Vicat, 2013; Bae, 2015). The defeat of the LTTE in the final phase of the civil war, which was known as Eelam War IV (2006–2009), came as a surprise to the outside world, as a profound shock to LTTE cadre who survived, and as gratifying conclusion to a bloody war as far as the GoSL was concerned.

The LTTE misread the politico-strategic environment in the world after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Indeed, governments had begun to tighten up against non-state actors' international activities even some years before that event. The organization's leadership also misread the political environment in Sri Lanka, particularly after the election of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, whose top leadership worked hard to put together a coherent plan for victory and to rebuild the exhausted armed forces.

In Eelam Wars I-III, the LTTE was generally more innovative and had greater initiative than the hidebound Sri Lankan military. This enabled the non-state actor to catch the military flat-footed on many occasions (Chalk, 2007). However, this was to change in the lead up to the final phase. The LTTE had little inkling of the dramatic changes that were being undertaken to revamp the Sri Lankan military until it found itself facing a different military during Eelam War IV. It conventionally took on a military that had changed and had greater firepower and better command, communications, and control. The LTTE's conventional capabilities had not been sufficiently built up because of the difficulties of procuring weapons by maritime means due to the increasing effectiveness of the Sri Lankan Navy and the loss of trained cadre and senior commanders. When the LTTE tried to revert back down the spectrum of violence to guerrilla warfare, it found itself faced with well-trained and better equipped Sri Lankan special forces and long-range deep penetration units that wreaked havoc on LTTE small units and logistics. Finally, its attempts to revitalize its terror campaign were stymied by better intelligence in the hands of the Sri Lankans and implementation of robust security measures in the cities. In the end, the LTTE found itself outclassed and checkmated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Its greatest military losses came in the climactic battles of April and May 2009, when it lost hundreds of cadre and most of its political and military leadership.

Military victory does not equal political victory

The Sri Lankan military crushed the LTTE *militarily*. The manner of its counterinsurgency victory was controversial in light of the thousands of innocent civilians reportedly killed in the final stages of the war.[7] Moreover, as is often the case with many wars, particularly internal or civil wars, military victory by one side does not necessarily resolve the political *conflict*. The consensus is that the Tamil issue has not been resolved in Sri Lanka despite the crushing victory (Weiberg-Saltzmann, 2015). The Sri Lankan government of Mahinda Rajapaksa, which won the war, kept alive the threat of revival of Tamil terrorism to remind the people of President Mahinda Rajapaksa's achievement in 2009. Rajapaksa cashed in on his national popularity after the war

to get elected a second time as President and to secure an absolute majority in Parliament for his coalition. Using the parliamentary majority, Rajapaksa had the Constitution amended to remove the bar on an incumbent President holding office beyond a second term. However, this did not help him in the end, because he lost to Maithripala Sirisena in the presidential elections of January 2015.

President Sirisena vowed to 'eradicate the LTTE ideology,' which was still present locally and globally, to ensure long-lasting peace in Sri Lanka. 'I want to eradicate the LTTE ideology completely both locally and internationally'; and added that he 'will ensure a country where all communities live together in peaceful co-existence, harmony. We ended the war and silenced the guns, but for long lasting peace we have not been able to eradicate the LTTE ideology (of a separate state).' Sirisena promised to win over the Tamil community, who had preferred him over Mahinda Rajapaksa during the elections. There has been some progress in reconciliation and acquiescence to some of the political and socioeconomic demands, but Tamils are unhappy with the results to date (Colombo Gazette, 2016).

Moreover, it is not clear whether the LTTE has been eradicated completely, assuming that this is within Sri Lanka's capabilities. Since the end of the civil war, the government of Sri Lanka has maintained a heavy military and intelligence presence in the territory previously controlled by the LTTE, and the government retains complete control over all areas of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE's international network remained largely intact. LTTE elements made three attempts to establish an LTTE foothold in Sri Lanka between 2012 and 2014.[8] In 2014, security forces shot and killed three LTTE members leading an attempt to revive the LTTE in northern Sri Lanka (Jane's Intelligence Weekly, 2014). Apparently, 65 people were arrested in connection with the revival attempt. Hundreds, possibly thousands, of LTTE members escaped Sri Lanka in the final half-year of the war and are now living outside Sri Lanka. It is also certain that there remain many Sri Lankan Tamils outside Sri Lanka who once worked actively to support LTTE activities through fundraising and propaganda work. It seems likely that some of them still retain control over funds originally gathered to support the LTTE. This cadre could form the nucleus around which a new LTTE could arise.

Nonetheless, the consensus of informed opinion in both Sri Lanka and the outside world is that there is no chance of the return of the Tamil militancy to Sri Lanka in the immediate future. While many Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad may still be sympathetic with the political goals of the LTTE, it is highly unlikely it could easily regroup within Sri Lanka. Despite the existence overseas of a significant number of disgruntled and vengeful Tamils, as well as remnants of the LTTE, the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 was followed by the virtual collapse of its remaining international infrastructure following the arrest and rendition of the LTTE's international head, S. Pathmanathan (aka KP), in August 2009. The Sri Lankan military maintains a vigilant watch within the country and has a significant, some say heavy-handed, presence in the eastern and northern parts of the country where there is a Tamil majority. It can be said in conclusion that never have the fortunes of a once formidable terrorist-cum-insurgent organization changed so suddenly and so unfavourably as they did in 2009.

Notes

1 For a readily available, brief history of the Sri Lankan military from origins to 2004, see Brian Blodgett (2004).
2 On the role of the Buddhist establishment in the war in Sri Lanka, see Tilakaratne (2003) and Weiberg-Salzmann (2014).
3 The analysis of LTTE ideology is drawn from their various political documents and pamphlets and the works of Sahadevan (1995) and Loewen (2013).

4 For an extensive analysis of the international network of the LTTE, see Becker (2006) and Solomon and Tan (2007).
5 The best studies of the LTTE maritime capabilities are provided by Murphy (2006, 2009), Smith (2011), Povlock (2011), and Colombage (2014).
6 This section relies on the sprawling and poorly written but information-packed book by Chandraprema (2012).
7 Though both sides killed innocent civilians, the focus of attention has been, of course, directed at the victor's failings rather than those of the defunct LTTE. The attacks on the Sri Lankan government have ranged from flippant observations by Western journalists to more serious analyses by Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and more academic observations by researchers. For a very good analysis, see Niland (2014).
8 On the issue of the *military* defeat of the LTTE but non-resolution of the *conflict*, see Clarke (2011), Hariharan (2014), and Blair (2014).

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30
RED ARMY FACTION

Jennifer Schmidt-Petersen

The Red Army Faction (RAF) was a German terrorist movement that officially came into being on 14 May 1970. During its existence, the group caused the death of 59 people, including 25 of its own members. The financial damage exceeded 500 million Deutschmark (DM), including 7 million DM that were taken during various bank robberies perpetrated by the group (Moghadam, 2012) in order to finance itself.

Of the four waves of terrorism that can be distinguished (Rapoport, 2004) in the modern era, the Red Army Faction is clearly located in the new left social wave, which saw parts of the young generations in the Western world rebel against the ideals and values of their parents as well as the established regimes of the time. Especially in Germany, which was recovering from the Second World War and facing the realities of the Holocaust, a disillusioned youth rebelled against what they perceived to be a fascist state. The name Red Army Faction was intended to reflect the political ideology while simultaneously sending the message that the group was only a small part of a larger movement.

Origins and history

The social and political contexts of the time are paramount for understanding the actions of both the Red Army Faction and the state. What is more, only through understanding, as opposed to condemning or judging, can change and long-term prevention of similar events be facilitated.

The increasing police brutality against student protestors and a perceived failure of traditional ways to facilitate political change due to a 'Grand Coalition' in the German parliament in 1966 created a climate from which the RAF arose. What made the situation worse was the fact that many high-level positions in Germany were filled by former members of the Nazi party. This failure of the German state to successfully confront and deal with its history led to an increased polarization between the generations. It further highlights the need for an open dialogue and for the acceptance of responsibility in order to successfully integrate historical traumas.

Perceptions of procedural injustice are not only a key facilitating factor in the aetiology of terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005), but in conjunction with a perceived exclusion from meaningful decision-making, they are likely to lead to the displacement of aggression and to a lack of support for the authorities (p. 164). In the current example, this is likely to have been amplified by the wound of the Nazi past that lies deep in the German psyche. First-generation RAF member

and lawyer Horst Mahler, whose parents were both loyal Nazis, openly spoke about the internalized shame and the perceived obligation to act in the face of injustice.

> The essential, highly personalized problem was this: how did your parents behave. The question had implications for us, namely, that whenever events occur that even in a distant way recall the twelve years (of Nazi rule), we must resist them. (Horst Mahler, as cited in Varon, 2004, p. 247)[1]

This lack of a German national identity, independent of the Holocaust atrocities, is likely to have aided the radicalization process and contributed to the RAF's emphasis on action over discussion. Particularly the Vietnam War had a catalysing effect on left-wing movements in both the US and Europe (Michael, 2009). In the face of what was seen to be a further involvement of the German state in genocides and injustices, the young generation perceived the state to be morally disengaged, while the state accused the RAF of the same stance. This shows the presence of strong attributional biases amplified by ingroup/outgroup thinking on both sides. More importantly, however, the differences in perspectives, with regards to what is just or unjust and what are and are not legitimate means to achieve change, raise fundamental questions about issues surrounding democracy in a complex world.

It has been said that terrorism is bi-directional, and whether an act of violence is seen as an attack or as an act of retaliation depends on the point of view (Silke, 2006a). The excessive action and brutality of the German State certainly aided the categorization process of 'Us vs. Them' that is so well-documented in the psychological literature (e.g. Moghaddam, 2005; Pearlstein, 1991; Silke, 2006b). Furthermore, the state's clampdown on free speech and the labelling of 'terrorist' of many who dared to openly question government policies provided an example of exactly the kind of authoritarian control the RAF was criticizing, thereby ironically and unintentionally playing into their hands by increasing sympathy for them. For example, Gutmann (2008) reports the case of an anonymous student who expressed some sympathy for the RAF in an obituary for one of their victims. When a 'harsh response from the government and media' led a group of professors to enter the debate by pointing out the 'complex and thought-provoking nature' of the obituary, many of them lost their posts (p. 374).

An answer as to why the German state reacted so excessively, not only towards the student protests but also towards the comparatively small RAF group itself, may be found in the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the ensuing belief that democracy must be defended at all costs, and if necessary, violently (Varon, 2004). However, the young generation who refused to remain silent in the face of injustice perceived this attempt to maintain order in the newly formed democracy as little more than authoritarian hypocrisy:

> This fascist state intends to kill all of us. We must organize resistance. Violence can only be answered with violence. This is the generation of Auschwitz, you cannot argue with them. (RAF founding member Gudrun Ensslin, as cited in Moghadam, 2012, p. 158)

Ideology and strategy

Like so many other groups of the time (e.g. Italy's Red Brigades, France's Action Direct, Japan's Red Army, Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium, the US's Weather Underground and Peru's Sendero Luminoso/Shining Path), West Germany's Red Army Faction adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology. While no concrete alternative to the

current system was ever proposed, the group did highlight a number of issues that are still very much the focus of current debates.

> It is an important question how much longer the state will foment racism against refugees and treat them as 'subhuman creatures' in order to avoid its own and the economy's responsibility for unemployment, the housing shortage, poverty of the elderly, etc.; and how much longer it will be able to send these people back to the misery that the state continues to coproduce. (RAF, April 10, 1992, Communiqué, as cited in Pluchinsky, 1993, p. 151)

The concept of 'urban guerrilla', borrowed from the Brazilian Revolutionary Carlos Marighella, was central to the group's ideology and strategy. The idea was that through individual attacks, the state would be forced to reveal its repressive face, which in turn would help mobilize the population, particularly the working class, and facilitate a proletarian revolution.

During its existence, the group collaborated with various other terror groups and received weapons training in Jordan, at a camp run by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and in Lebanon, where they trained with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The identification with the Palestinian struggle is particularly interesting when seen against the background of the German past and the group's condemnation of the crimes of the previous generation against the Jewish population. However, not only did Germany at the time have the highest concentration of Palestinian students in Europe (Michael, 2009), but the US was now perceived as the global imperialist enemy, with the German state as an important and powerful supporter.

> It remains to be seen whether German soldiers will again be able to march against other peoples, and how much longer fascist regimes will be able to massacre their people with German Weapons and support. (RAF Communiqué, as cited in Pluchinsky, 1993, p. 151)

This Communique highlights the importance of several issues surrounding globalization, the weapons trade and the role of the support of the domestic population in international politics as well as the danger of home-grown domestic terrorism if the government is not perceived to be acting in the interest of the people it is supposed to represent. In fact Passmore (2011) states how the strategies of terrorism and violence can be seen as a means of communication between the terrorists, public, media and the state. As Van Dongen (2013) points out:

> The success of a terrorist campaign is not decided on the operational level, but in the support it generates in the hearts and minds of the target audience. (p. 431)

The fact that the RAF managed to sustain its campaign over three generations highlights, at least to a certain degree, the failure of the traditional law enforcement strategies of arrest, trial and detention (Van Dongen, 2013). However, the redirection of the group's attention from political action onto itself, to which the state contributed, lowered the group's political success and alienated it from many of its supporters. Especially after 1978, many perceived the group to no longer be fighting for freedom and justice, as their attacks were primarily seen to be based on revenge and were considered unnecessarily brutal or politically pointless.

While research related to crowd policing and social psychology (Bond, 2009; Van Dongen, 2013) clearly indicates how the excessive use of violence against the group and its supporters

would contribute to its formation, the demise of the first RAF generation can certainly be credited to the massive counterterrorism effort conducted by the German state (Moghadam, 2012). At the same time, the escalation of violence and development of 'shoot at first sight' attitudes on both sides (Gutman, 2008, p. 373) led to suspicion against many young Germans, who were increasingly affected by the massive security clampdown. This further polarization, in conjunction with an impressive media campaign run from prison by the RAF's first generation, facilitated the public support that sparked the second generation.

One event that proved to be highly successful in attracting media attention for the RAF was a meeting between the imprisoned RAF leader Andreas Baader and the French Philosopher Jean Paul Sartre. It is unsurprising that the German authorities perceived this to be a 'foreign interference in… internal affairs' (Passmore, 2009, p. 42). Not only did the attention the group receive elevate their status and make them seem more powerful and dangerous than they actually were (Van Dongen, 2013), but the detention in the purpose-built high security prison in Stammheim also began to raise issues with regards to whether or not a fair trial was possible, as the prisoners appeared to have already been condemned by the state and media.

As pointed out by Passmore (2009), in terms of self-promotion and recruitment, the incarceration benefited the RAF much more than their time in the underground. This can be credited to a large degree to the ability of the group to continue to communicate with its members through a fairly sophisticated internal and external communication network, allowing the RAF to not only retain a sense of group identity, purpose and hierarchy but to also exert discipline over its members to prevent them from collaborating with the state.

While the German national press agency increasingly worked with the government, when covering and publicizing RAF actions and communications, the group still succeeded in capturing the interest and attention of the public via organized demonstrations and press conferences (Passmore, 2009). One tool used for communication were the RAF lawyers. While some of the lawyers were highly sympathetic towards their clients, or even RAF members, the actions of the state against them and the disbarring of lawyers, as well as changing the law in the middle of the trial, only furthered the image of an increasingly repressive and biased police state.

Not only did the changes restrict the rights of the defendants to speak to their lawyers in private, but the government later admitted to having listened to some of the conversations between prisoners and lawyers through wiretappings. This makes the case highly relevant to debates surrounding the American Patriot Act as well as current issues surrounding government espionage and the proposed changes to the Human Rights Act in the UK.

The prison conditions of the RAF members were a prominent point of propaganda. From the point of view of the state, isolating the prisoners was intended to be detrimental to the whole group by lessening the control it had over its imprisoned members and allowing individuals to distance themselves (Pluchinsky, 1993). For the RAF inmates, who perceived themselves to be political prisoners, the isolation was seen as an instrument of psychological torture. While the early prison conditions, after the 1972 arrests of the first-generation leadership were indeed 'severe' (Passmore 2009, p. 38), they changed over the course of the years, and marked differences between prisoners and prison facilities have been documented.

Another important theme that kept surfacing in the public discussion was the issue of ethics surrounding the brutal force-feeding practices utilized by the government in response to the RAF prison hunger strikes. The strikes formed part of a strategy to oppose the government's portrayal of the terrorists as mentally ill by allowing them to 'literally embody their established rhetoric of "anti-fascism" and "anti-imperialism"' (Passmore, 2009, p. 33). Particularly noteworthy is the RAF's rhetoric which compared the results of its self-starvation and their consequences with the treatment of concentration camp prisoners. This further evidence for the

intergenerational transmission of trauma and its subsequent re-enactment allowed the prisoners to turn themselves into visual reminders of the Nazi atrocities and of the colonized third world. This in turn led to a huge amount of sympathy and recruitment success for the group. The state responded by making changes to the law in order to allow for medical treatment against the will of prisoners (if their lives were at stake). The intention was to reduce the scope for negotiations and thereby undermine the hunger strike strategy of the RAF. However, photographs of concentration camp prisoners had been used by the Allies as part of the 'denazification' process (Passmore, 2009, p. 52), and the stories and images of prisoners being strapped down and force-fed, publicized in alternative media reports, served as a reminder of the violation of bodily integrity of camp inmates characteristic of Nazi experiments.

The first hunger strike was initiated by Baader and took place in 1973. He was joined by 40 prisoners, as well as some of the RAF lawyers, who went on a shorter symbolic hunger strike (Passmore, 2009). How well the strikes were organized became apparent when a manual for self-starvation was found in the cell of the prominent RAF member Ulrike Meinhof in July 1973. By November 1975, two RAF members had died as a result of a third hunger strike, which lasted 145 days. One of them was Holger Meins, who was elevated to martyr status. It was this strike that made parts of the German government realize that finding a different way of dealing with the imprisoned terrorists could undermine the support and stream of recruits. This development highlights the importance of the issue of prison conditions for suspected terrorists, and it appears highly relevant in light of the historically recent debates surrounding the utilization of 'advanced interrogation techniques' in Abu Ghraib and the detainment of suspects at Guantanamo.

Key figures

Most of the RAF members were well-educated, middle-class students, and their high level of education and sophistication of political analysis is evidenced in some of the group's communiqués cited in this text. The high level of education and eloquence contributed to the large amount of public sympathy the first RAF generation received. It also confirms a well-supported finding in terrorism research illustrated by the level of education of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorists. Further support comes from Krueger and Maleckova (2003), who found that Palestinians with higher levels of education tended to be more supportive of attacks against Israeli targets (for a thorough analysis of the level of education as a correlate of terrorism, see Moghaddam, 2005 and Silke, 2006b).

The first RAF generation can be seen to have lasted from 1970–1972 and attempted to cause a social revolution by utilising a Vanguard strategy. The leading figures were Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Horst Mahler and Ulrike Meinhof. The German media often referred to the group as the 'Baader-Meinhof Group', a term that the RAF itself never utilized and that gives a misleading impression regarding the roles of Ensslin and Meinhof. One reason for changing the name is likely to have been the prominence of Meinhof as a left-wing journalist, but it is even more likely that the name 'Baader-Meinhof', which omitted Ensslin's leadership status, was used to deflect from the group's political ideology (Gutman, 2008).

Two years prior to the formation of the RAF, Baader and his girlfriend, Ensslin, were arrested for setting fire to a department store in Berlin. At the ensuing trial, which due to the 'fashionable outfits, heavy laughter, and smoking' (Moghadam, 2012, p. 159) received a lot of attention, the couple first met Ulrike Meinhof, who on 14 May 1970 would help Baader escape from prison. Three days later, the first RAF communiqué, featuring its logo of a Heckler & Koch submachine gun in front of a red star, was received by the German press.

In 1972, the majority of the first generation of RAF members were imprisoned or had died as a result of being shot while resisting arrest. Five years later, on 18 October 1977, Baader, Ensslin and others are said to have committed suicide in prison following the failed hijacking of the Lufthansa airliner Landshut by members of the PFLP. The hijacking had been intended to facilitate the prisoners' release. It ended in Mogadishu when the German counterterrorism GSG9 successfully stormed the aircraft, releasing the hostages. Baader and Jan Carl Raspe, another prominent RAF prisoner, were said to have shot themselves, while Ensslin was found hanged.

Ulrike Meinhof had been found hanged in her prison cell prior to the other deaths in 1976, and theories range from suicide, as a result of being ostracized by the group, to murder staged as suicide and suicide staged as murder (Passmore, 2011). Whether the leaders of the first generation did indeed commit suicide or were murdered by the state is still a topic of popular debate. A 1976 report by the International Investigation Commission contradicted the official autopsy report, suggesting that Meinhof was already dead when she was hanged (ibid.), and various different versions of the events of the night that Baader and Ensslin died have since appeared in the German media. Former RAF member Irmgard Moeller, who is said to have stabbed herself four times with a bread knife in an attempt to commit suicide in prison that night, still insists that she was attacked and that the other prisoners were murdered (Varon, 2004).

In recent times, first-generation RAF member Horst Mahler has been of particular interest to the German media and authorities, as he joined the far right National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany. Michael (2009) provides a thorough analysis of this seemingly contradictory ideological reversal by explaining how

> Mahler has synthesized much of his original left-wing ideology into a far right Weltanschauung [World-view] that features nationalism, anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, with a strident critique of capitalism. (p. 346)

The second generation of the RAF can be seen to have lasted from 1972 to the arrest of its leading figures, Christian Klar and Birgitte Mohnhaupt, in 1982. Many members of the second generation joined out of sympathy for the imprisoned first generation but never managed to facilitate the same level of personality cult and public sympathy themselves (Passmore, 2009). In fact, Moghadam (2012) suggests that due to the loss of support, the group was forced to recruit unfit members, leading to a high rate of disengagement between 1977 and 1982. In what used to be one of the best-kept state secrets prior to the German reunification, some members of the RAF's second generation found refuge in the communist East German Democratic Republic (GDR), where they lived under false identities until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Some of them had negotiated an 'organized exile' to the GDR with the RAF leadership, who wanted to prevent those who abandoned the armed struggle from turning into state witnesses (Moghadam, 2012, p. 168). Furthermore, the East German Ministry of State Security (Stasi) provided material and financial support as well as weapons training for some RAF members.

The third RAF generation is commonly seen to have lasted from 1984 until the official dissolution of the group in 1998. According to the German authorities, the leaders during this phase were Wolfgang Grams and Birgit Hogefeld, who was the last member of the RAF to be released from prison in 2011 (Moghadam, 2012).

This last generation of the RAF managed to elude the authorities with a lot more success than its predecessors. Not only were their methods and structure more sophisticated, but they also succeeded in launching a number of successful attacks, which cost the lives of 10 people (in total), many of which remain unsolved (Moghadam, 2012). The attacks were primarily focused on state

representatives, businessmen and leading politicians and showed a returned focus on facilitating revolution rather than the release of prisoners, as had been the case for the second generation. To this end, the group collaborated with other left-wing terror organizations. However, due to its ability to elude law-enforcement, much about the third generation remains unknown.

The dissolution of this third generation began with a split in the group that was facilitated by the 'Kinkel Initiative', which offered amnesty to those imprisoned who renounced violent action. In conjunction with the increasing organizational isolation, strategic confusion and ideological fatigue (Pluchinsky, 1993, p. 135), it furthered the group's downfall. In April 1992 the RAF released a self-critical statement proclaiming that in an exchange for the release 'of those who are unfit to undergo detention, those who have been the longest jailed' (RAF Communiqué as cited in Pluchinsky, p. 138), they would discontinue their violent attacks against individuals in order to aid the de-escalation of the conflict. According to Pluchinsky (1993), the April 1992 communiqué was particularly significant, as it came from the commando level, while the major ideological statements in the RAF's recent past had come from the prisoners. In addition, some former members had started to cooperate with the German authorities, and on 20 April 1998 the group officially declared its dissolution.

Critical events

As pointed out by Silke (2006a), catalyst events are crucial in the formation and radicalization of terrorist movements. In the case of the RAF, one such event occurred on 2 June 1967 when student protestor Benno Ohnesorg was shot in the head and killed by a police officer during a demonstration. Another crucial incident leading up to the formation of the RAF occurred on 11 April 1968 when student leader Rudi Dutschke was assassinated by a right-wing extremist. Many members of the political left felt that the right-wing Springer press had influenced the assassination which sparked the 1972 RAF attack on the publishing house.

Until the deaths of Baader, Ensslin and several other prisoners in 1977, the primary goal of the second generation was to facilitate the release of the first generation. In the aftermath of the deaths, the group shifted its focus on assassinating high-profile figures, and a wave of terror that became known as the 'German Autumn' followed. Among the 34 victims of the RAF were banker Jürgen Ponto, federal state prosecutor Siegfried Buback, and several policemen and bystanders. The most prominent victim was Hanns-Martin Schleyer, head of the employers' federal organization and a former SS officer, who was kidnapped and killed in the aftermath of the failed Lufthansa hijacking. Other famous attacks by the second generation include a siege of the West German Embassy in Stockholm in 1975 in order to facilitate the release of imprisoned members, and an attack on the U.S. air force base in Rammstein in order to assassinate U.S. Army General F.J. Kroesen in 1981.

Especially when taking the group's ideological orientation into account, it becomes clear that the collapse of communism and the Soviet bloc had a significant impact on what was perceived to be a revolutionary struggle against imperialism. This is likely to have contributed to the ideological fatigue of the third generation (Pluchinsky, 1993).

> We consider resistance to the power politics of Greater Germany to be domestically and internationally important… But we are convinced that at this point, we cannot further this process through military operations… To achieve a new beginning, we need a common, profound, and fundamental discussion… In view of the global transformations, as a result of which the number of people whom capitalism no longer needs, and who according to its logic no longer have a right to exist… is constantly growing, it is quite

> clear that we must completely rethink the turnaround process in accordance with the new situation. (RAF Communiqué, as cited in Pluchinsky, 1993, p. 155)

In 1992, the then-German Justice Minister Klaus Kinkel initiated steps to reconcile with long-time imprisoned RAF members. This turned out to be a highly effective move towards a peaceful solution of the conflict. Unlike U.S. law, the German law dictates that even those who receive life sentences are eligible for parole if they no longer pose a risk and have served a minimum of 15 years in prison (Pluchinksy, 1993). In accordance with the principle of reciprocity and well-established negotiation techniques (Cialdini, 1993) offering amnesty in exchange for a withdrawal from violence, the RAF elicited a communiqué which further paved the way towards its ultimate dissolution six years later.

> After 20 years of struggle against torture and annihilation of political prisoners, it has finally happened that factions in the government structure have begun to understand that a solution has to be found in the matter of these prisoners… Justice Minister Kinkel was the first official to make it clear that there are groups in the apparatus who understand that resistance and social inconsistencies cannot be countered with police-military methods. (RAF Communiqués, as cited in Pluchinsky, 1993, pp. 139, 150)

By selectively and legally releasing reformed prisoners over a period of time, the state entered into an 'unofficial dialogue' (Pluchinsky, 1993, p. 143) with the RAF that ultimately led to reconciliation. Valuable lessons need to be taken from the success of the 'Kinkel-Initiative', as it illustrates that, even though it may be difficult, communication and forgiveness are crucial steps towards a peaceful long-term solution in the war against terrorism.

Major trends and issues in the conflict

In the recent German past, there has been a renewed interest in the RAF and its history. This is not only due to popular films but also due to the release of long-term terrorist prisoners (Bauer, 2009). While many of the relatives of the victims have criticized the predominant focus on the perpetrators, others remain critical of the state's one-dimensional presentation of events. For example, Homewood (2007) refers to the 'highly selective process of cultural remembrance in the German nation-state' (p. 119) and the 2001 documentary, *Black Box BRD*, which carries the poignant tagline, 'The struggle is over the wounds are open', and attempts to break down the simplistic and reductionist 'ideological deadlock' between the terrorists and the state (p. 115). This is achieved by the portrayal of an ironic twist highlighting the failure of binary thinking and dehumanization: for, according to his widow, banker Alfred Herrhausen, killed by the RAF in 1989, had been working on relieving Third World debt, an undertaking very much in-line with RAF ideology (*Black Box BRD*, 2001).

There are several other issues highly relevant to contemporary events that can be observed from the case of the RAF. While the current scientific consensus is that there is no unique pathology or psychological characteristic that distinguishes terrorists from the normal population (Post, McGinnis & Moody, 2014; Silke, 2006b), the German media, with the help of contemporary science, portrayed the terrorists as blood-crazy monsters (Homewood, 2007; Moghadam, 2012; Passmore, 2009). While these labels served as an attempt to discredit the people in question and turn the public against them, they unfortunately also distracted from some of the, then and now, very pressing and legitimate issues that the group was raising. Important issues raised included:

> the struggle for living space, against destructive and senseless work, the destruction of the environment, the struggles of the prisoners, the organization of protection for refugees and antifascist mobilisation, all the way to the demand for debt forgiveness or reparations from the imperialist states to the colonial nations. (RAF Communiqué, as cited in Pluchinsky, 1993, p. 153)

Due to her prominence, Ulrike Meinhof in particular was portrayed as psychopathic and mentally ill. The media claimed that she was radicalized as a result of brain surgery in 1962, and the decision of the authorities to keep her in a psychiatric wing of the prison strengthened the public perception of that crazy psychopath (Passmore, 2009), further delegitimizing the political message of the group. Meinhof herself referred to this process as the 'scientification' of the public discourse in order to replace political concepts (Passmore, 2009, p. 48). Homewood (2007) highlights the fact that popular perception and media in Germany, during and especially after the conflict, was determined by the state, who had won the fight against the terrorists and who was now presenting itself as 'the gallant defender of a democratic system' (p. 116). Such a unilateral, distorted and simplified version of the past is unhelpful. It increases the chance that the same political issues raised by terrorists will resurface, albeit in different forms, due to the attempt to erase them from the public consciousness, thereby leaving them unaddressed and unexplored.

Another factor that is very much in line with current events is the importance of the ideological grip and group dynamics. Passmore (2009) highlights the integral nature of peer pressure and verbal abuse within the group dynamics of the RAF, and Baron-Cohen (2012) describes how the identification with an ideology can facilitate an erosion of empathy. Together with the unquestioning dedication to what is perceived as a just cause, the taking of life – that of others as well as one's own – is seen as legitimate and necessary.

As is now well established, terrorism is a process. The reason it continues to exist is because the same structural issues and facilitating factors continue to exist across time and cultures. It appears particularly ironic that many of these factors are, according to RAF claims, what motivated its campaign of terror. While 'the vast majority were either arrested, killed or committed suicide' (p. 173), a small number of RAF members voluntarily desisted from violence. Moghadam (2012) provides a thorough analysis of individual and contextual factors that led to disengagement from the armed struggle in the RAF, and results show that interpersonal/organizational, strategic/doctrinal, and tactical differences were prominent factors in the decision to drop out (Moghadam, 2012 p. 174-177). Former RAF member Silke Maier-Witt stated years later

> I reached the conclusion that the RAF's policy was and remains senseless, and that social transformation could never be achieved through the perfected killing of a few, that, on the contrary, this only leads to an escalation of violence. Violence cannot contribute to solving problems. Humanity cannot be achieved through inhumanity… (Moghadam, 2012, p. 166)

This awareness that violence can only ever create more violence and will lead to conflicts sustaining themselves, with the same issues resurfacing across history and generations, raises important questions about how outdated and repressive political systems can be transformed without further bloodshed.

The successful use of the media, particularly by the RAF's first generation, is another factor that contains important lessons for a world of ever-expanding virtual information platforms. This is especially so in light of the current issues with regards to the recruitment of isolated

Muslim youth via radical Internet websites (Post *et al.*, 2014). Related to this is the issue of age and intergenerational tensions that is evident in the case of the RAF. While most young people do not get involved in criminal or terrorist activities, age can be seen as an important risk factor, as it is correlated with a number of other predisposing factors like higher impulsivity and greater attraction to risk-taking. Support for this comes from the finding that it is generally the younger members of terrorist organizations who carry out the most violent attacks and who hold the most positive attitudes towards vengeance (Silke, 2006b). More importantly, however, the concept of identity threat, as described by Moghaddam (2005), is likely to be more pronounced in young people that have not yet fully established an individual, national or cultural identity, or, as in the present case, who actively want to distance themselves from their cultural legacy. In conjunction with the experience of marginalization, often associated with youth, and the resulting feeling of powerlessness, this is likely to have reinforced the decision of some student protestors to turn towards radical ideologies in order to change the existing social order. Support for this comes from Moghadam (2012), who highlights the irony that many of the now-released members of the RAF have adopted rather 'bourgeois lifestyles' later in life (p. 172).

In addressing the roots of conflicts in order to prevent them from returning in different shapes, the inoculation of new generations with guilt about past deeds needs to give way to a process of mourning and understanding. Educational systems that encourage rigid 'Us vs. Them' dynamics by forming a national identity that is linked to a perpetrator status, as seen in the German example, do little more than facilitate a culture of blame. Until policymakers employ a preventative approach that can be culturally integrated and that is favoured over short-term military and technological solutions (Moghaddam, 2005), the world will continue to pay the high psychological, social and economic price associated with terrorism.

Note

1 This early quotation from Mahler is particularly interesting in the context of his later denial of the Holocaust and support of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with regards to such claims. This stance led to several legal troubles for him in Germany (for a full analysis, see Michael, 2009).

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PART II

Counterterrorism

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31

CONCEPTUALISING COUNTERTERRORISM

Ronald Crelinsten

> I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.
>
> *(Abraham Maslow 1966, p. 15)*

Introduction

The war on terror that emerged in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and later morphed into the war against the Islamic State group (IS) has faced challenges and created problems across a wide range of policy domains: international humanitarian law and the laws of war; criminal justice and the rule of law; international diplomacy; development programs in post-conflict societies and transitional states; harmonization of social and cultural policy among allies; free trade and open borders; banking, international finance, aviation and tourism; migration; and resource development and environmental policy. The wide range of issues where threats to democratic freedoms and values have arisen, such as torture and extraordinary rendition (Crelinsten & Schmid 1995; Jaffer & Singh 2007; Sands 2008; Fried & Fried 2010); surveillance and the right to privacy (Parenti 2003); data mining; limits on freedom of expression and assembly; restriction of religious symbols; regulation of charitable organizations and giving; and border, visa, immigration, and refugee controls; starkly demonstrates the pervasive impact of this global counterterrorism (CT) effort. The way in which its impact has rippled so far and wide highlights how complex and multifaceted CT has become in today's world.

It is now widely recognized that CT policy can no longer remain compartmentalized in one or two policy areas, but must be coordinated across a wide array of policy domains (Crelinsten 2009; van Dongen 2010). This has come to be called the "comprehensive", "whole-of-government", or "whole-of-nation" approach. Yet it is not always easy to clearly demarcate one policy domain from another, since action in one area often affects other areas. Grey areas between domains complicate the overall picture and can pose daunting challenges most often related to a need to balance different and often competing values and goals (Crelinsten 1998, 2009). A comprehensive approach involves multiple levels of government and society: subnational, national, international, transnational; state and non-state actors. Here, too, blurry boundaries between "inside" and "outside", domestic and foreign, and public and private, complicate matters further.

CT is most often linked with "hard power" – intelligence, law, policing, and military power – but it increasingly makes use of "soft power" – political, social, and economic control – as well as broader policy areas dealing with the environment, development, critical infrastructure, migration, and humanitarian intervention.

Conspiracy theorists often imbue government efforts at coordination across separate policy domains with nefarious intent. Honest efforts to achieve a whole-of-government approach can have unintended consequences that feed such theories. Many have recognized the unique problems faced by democracies in fighting terrorism, and the costs to democratic values and governance that can arise in areas such as human rights, openness, accountability, legitimacy, and public trust in government (Barber 2003; Bhoumik 2004; Bianchi & Keller 2008; Bowyer Bell 1978; Cox, Levine & Newman 2009; Crelinsten 1989, 1998; Reinares 2000; Schmid & Crelinsten 1993; Weinberg 2008; Wilkinson 1977).

As a whole-of-government approach becomes the new normal, institutional cultures, bureaucratic organization, information flows, and coordination and interoperability present new challenges. The same can be said for a whole-of-nation approach that involves partnerships and cooperation among government, the private sector, civil society, NGOs, and international organizations.

CT can take a variety of forms, some of which will be surveyed in this chapter. Each approach conceives of terrorism differently, though there is some overlap. Some are more traditional; others are not. As suggested by Abraham Maslow's quote above, the tools that a particular CT approach uses can often reflect a particular conception of terrorism and the threat it poses. Those responsible for countering terrorism must therefore broaden their toolboxes so as to avoid narrow, truncated conceptions of the terrorist threat or exaggerated depictions of the threat as existential or evil incarnate. Both can limit policy options and undermine effectiveness, legitimacy, and democratic acceptability. If CT mirrors the violence of the terrorist, it can be considered terrorism itself – just as freedom fighting can. In a world where boundaries are blurring between internal and external security, international and domestic jurisdictions, and state and non-state actors, it is important to cast our eyes wide in developing an effective approach to CT that can apply across a broad variety of policy domains, reflect democratic values, and outlive the electoral horizon of individual governments.

Varieties of counterterrorism

Coercive counterterrorism

The criminal justice model

A criminal justice approach treats terrorism as crime. If one considers the most common terrorist tactics, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombing, and armed attacks, the end result is usually the infliction of injury or loss of life on persons, or the destruction of property, all of which are universally proscribed in the criminal law of all nations.

Treating terrorism as ordinary crime, not as a special offence requiring special procedures or punishments, performs a delegitimization function. By criminalizing the acts that terrorists commit, emphasis is placed on their criminal nature and not on their political or ideological motive (Crelinsten, Laberge-Altmejd & Szabo 1978).

All this changed after 11 September, 2001. Many Western countries created special terrorist offences after the 9/11 attacks: the US and Canada in 2001; Australia and Norway in 2002; and Sweden in 2003 (U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005). In many of these special offences, motive became a central element of the legal definition of terrorism. Offences have included committing terrorist acts or committing acts for terrorist purposes, as well as mem-

bership in a terrorist organization and providing material support for terrorism, such as money, weapons, or technical expertise, and recruitment.

The creation of speech offences has also increased. U.N. Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) calls for Member States to take steps aimed at prohibiting by law and preventing incitement to commit terrorist acts. Glorification of terrorism has become an offence in several countries, such as the UK and Spain.

The criminal justice model relies on a complex bureaucracy with strict rules of governance and many interacting institutions, with their own traditions, culture, and language. It can be slow and ponderous, with appeals stretching the process out for years. While the criminal justice model can achieve some important goals in terms of deterrence, retribution, education, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, these benefits are largely dependent upon how the system is used, how fair it is seen to be used by others, and how committed individuals are to terrorist violence either as a means to other goals or as an end in itself.

The war model

The war model treats terrorism as if it were an act of war or insurgency. Because wars are usually fought between states, countering terrorism within a war model implies that the terrorist group represents the equivalent of a state. Treating terrorism as war therefore tends to credit the terrorist with the status of equal partner in a zero-sum conflict. This is why many terrorist groups use the word "army" in their names. IS even presents itself as a functioning state (al-Tamimi 2015).

Although the central element of the war model is the use of maximal force designed to overpower the enemy, the conduct of war does not occur in a legal vacuum. The laws of war lay down rules for how wars should be fought and how non-combatants should be treated. The 1949 Geneva Conventions represent a kind of trade-off that legitimizes killing or detention without trial in time of war, as long as it is directed at overpowering an enemy combatant. The trade-off is that once a combatant is captured and disarmed, or gives up and abandons the fight, s/he must be accorded humane treatment, protection, and care (Rona 2005, p. 164).

In a war model of CT, success tends to be defined in terms of victory or defeat (Angstrom & Duyvesteyn 2007). A "war on terror" only ends when the terrorist enemy is defeated. If the struggle is a protracted one, even spanning generations, then CT efforts must be maintained as long as a state of war exists. This has led some to argue that we are engaged in a "long war" or even a "never-ending" war with Islamist terrorism (Harris 2002; Hironaka 2005; Podhoretz 2007; Wittes 2008; but see Danner 2005).

The war model is considered by many to be quick, effective, and ideally-suited to the new kinds of threat posed by decentralized, ideologically-driven terrorist networks whose adherents are not deterred by traditional criminal justice or contained by traditional military power. It places great value on the remarkable things that science and technology can achieve: remote sensing, satellite imagery, spy drones, missile technology, smart bombs, facial recognition and other biometrics. The idea that a nation's military can watch, listen, record, and track anyone or anything anywhere in the world (Zachary 2007) and strike at will with guided, pilotless attack planes or space-based weaponry, is the ultimate individualized war model, designed to fight an atomized, dispersed enemy rather than the traditional hostile state or terrorist group. The global CT effort now routinely makes use of intelligence-led drone strikes and targeted assassinations (Aslam 2011; Becker & Shane 2012; Harris 2012; Junod 2012; UNOHCHR 2010).

The war model carries a high risk of unintended consequences that can escalate violence, undermine the legitimacy of governments that use it, or pull governments along a dangerous path to

anti-democratic governance (Crelinsten 2009; Parker 2007). Despite these risks, the war model can be a useful tool in an overall CT strategy. As in just war theory, the use of force can be justified under certain strict conditions (Elshtain 2003; Robinson 2003; Walzer 1977). It must be discriminate, proportionate, declared by a proper authority, used for a justifiable cause, with just intentions that outweigh the evil of the means used by the good of the ends sought, have a high probability of success, enjoy public support, and be used only as a last resort, when all other means have been pursued.

Proactive counterterrorism

The intelligence model

In a proactive approach, intelligence becomes central to any CT effort (Gill & Phythian 2012). In proactive policing and security intelligence, information is not gathered for evidentiary purposes but for intelligence purposes. The ultimate goal is not necessarily criminal prosecution. Instead, the goal of intelligence operations is to learn more about what the targets are up to. The demands of information-gathering can therefore conflict with those of criminal investigation and due process.

Proactive CT is therefore a double-edged sword. It can nip a burgeoning threat in the bud or destabilize a terrorist network enough so that its operatives cannot move from the planning stage and go operational. On the other hand, it can permanently erase any chance of learning more about the enemy's plans or to identify and apprehend those who have not yet appeared on the radar screen.

The intelligence model of CT has led to massive surveillance of a wide swath of individuals and detention without trial of citizens as well as resident aliens. Much of the debate post-September 11 surrounding CT efforts in the area of surveillance relates to how wide the net should be cast and whether profiling of specific target groups is justified or acceptable.

Two opposing concerns underlie honest efforts to address both security concerns and concerns about democratic acceptability. On one hand, a fear of false negatives (failure to detect a threat) can lead to widening the surveillance net as much as possible, thereby running the risk of infringing upon civil liberties of those targeted and, ultimately, facilitating the commission of human rights violations by control agents. On the other hand, a fear of false positives (targeting innocent individuals, organizations, or communities) can lead to the imposition of onerous judicial restrictions upon intelligence gathering, the creation of oversight committees with political agendas, and the creation of sunset clauses on anti-terrorism legislation that activate at inappropriate times, thereby running the risk of attenuating the effectiveness of intelligence-gathering operations.

Persuasive counterterrorism

The communication model

All response options convey information of some sort to different audiences; they are expressive and symbolic as well as instrumental. The particular messages that are actually received by a particular audience may not be what the sender intended to convey. This lends an inherent complexity to CT and can lead to unintended consequences. It is therefore important to understand the different kinds of messages, audiences, and communicative pathways involved in the complex web of terrorist-counterterrorist interaction (Crelinsten 1987a, b).

Persuasive CT can try to promote desired perceptions among individual members of terrorist organizations, their sympathizers, and their foreign supporters, such as the message that terrorism is counterproductive and that other means are more useful to achieve their goals. Counter narratives that foster cross-cultural and inter-ethnic understanding can undermine those aspects of terrorist propaganda and ideology that promulgate hatred and demonize particular groups of "enemies" (Crelinsten & Özkut 2000).

Two of the most powerful beliefs that bind individual members to a terrorist group are the idea that once violence has been committed, you can't go back, and the idea that the group is the only place where a sense of identity, belonging, importance, or existential meaning can be achieved. Laws can provide reduced sentences for those who cooperate with authorities, or offer amnesty for renouncing violence. Official assurances that exit from the group is always possible, and that those who cooperate and who renounce violence can be accepted back into society, could help to prevent certain individuals from remaining trapped in the self-contained world of the terrorist (Crelinsten & Schmid 1993).

Psychological, material, and economic concerns that make individuals vulnerable to recruitment can be addressed by creating alternative incentive structures for people to move away from embracing violence and terrorism. Talking to one's enemies and their constituencies, though anathema to many governments, can serve an important function in challenging, and perhaps refuting, undesired perceptions whose very existence can be missed in the absence of dialogue and exchange of views (Atran 2010; Goerzig 2010; Perry 2010). Counterradicalization efforts aimed at potential recruits and communities at risk, and deradicalization efforts aimed at current or imprisoned members, are central to preventing undesired perceptions and belief systems (Bjørgo & Horgan 2008; Horgan 2009; Kessels 2010; Neumann 2011; Satloff 2004).

A central element in persuasive CT is the maintenance of public trust and confidence in government. Public education about the nature and extent of the terrorist threat, as well as the limits and feasibility of policy options, can help to promote public understanding both before and after a terrorist attack.

Promoting public awareness without fuelling insecurity, apathy, or intolerance and hate is an essential element of such an approach. An explicit policy to downplay the impact of terrorism, while condemning the terrorism itself, can help to promote the idea that terrorism is unacceptable in democratic society, while minimizing the risk of public calls, fuelled by insecurity and terror, for repressive measures that undermine the rule of law and individual freedoms. Incessant warnings by politicians and security experts about the dangers of radicalization or the risk of terrorist attack can create a kind of learned helplessness in the face of seemingly inevitable catastrophe. As the rule of law and individual rights are increasingly whittled away in the name of increased security, many citizens simply accept the fact that their rights have to be sacrificed (Guarino 2013).

The challenge is to prevent the legitimation of terrorists and terrorism without resorting to censorship, intimidation, or outright repression. The controversies surrounding WikiLeaks, the trial and harsh punishment of Private Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning, and the Edward Snowden case all suggest that transparency and accountability have become a casualty of the war on terror.

Defensive counterterrorism

Prevention (before an attack)

The preventive model

There are three primary means of prevention.

First, target hardening aims to make potential targets less attractive or more difficult to attack. It has traditionally focused on important people (e.g., VIPs, government officials) and important places (e.g., government buildings, military bases) at particular times (e.g., major sporting events, international summits, special anniversaries). Making favoured targets less vulnerable to attack forces terrorists to innovate and to find alternatives, tying up resources and planning. This often leads to target substitution or displacement to softer targets. The hope is that deterring attacks

against obviously important targets can channel potential terrorists towards less damaging or less costly forms of attack.

Government and industry are often at odds over financing, training, effectiveness, technology, responsibility for and timetables for implementation, and potential impacts on operations. Partnerships between government, industry, and other stakeholders are therefore essential, though challenging (Bailes & Frommelt 2004; Chesterman & Fisher 2009).

The second aspect of prevention is critical infrastructure protection (CIP). While opinions vary on what infrastructure is critical, the areas of energy, transportation, industry, communications, banking, and urban living are widely recognized as key sectors. Potential targets include hydroelectric and nuclear facilities, oil and gas refineries and pipelines, telecommunications, banks, airports, railways and bridges, urban transport, and shopping malls.

Most critical infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. Government regulation is often weak or non-existent, and industry resistance to any attempts to strengthen security can be intense. Therefore, the most important part of CIP is to identify fruitful points of intervention where physical, structural, or procedural changes can be made that reduce the likelihood of attack, and to share this information across government departments and agencies, across levels of government, and with stakeholders in the private sector.

The third prong of the preventive model is to track the movement of people, money, goods, and services in an effort to discover plots in the making and thwart them or to impede their preparation. Terrorists need food, shelter, training, weapons, explosives, safe houses, communications, travel documents, and financing. When these are not available or difficult to acquire, the risk of terrorist attack drops. Border and passport controls, customs and immigration, refugee determination, and the monitoring and regulation of the flow of people and goods in and out of a country as well as within its borders, can help identify and track potential terrorists and the plots they devise. The regulation of banking and money transfers can impede terrorist financing, which in turn can make the implementation of terrorist attacks more difficult (Biersteker & Eckert 2007; Trinkunas & Giraldo 2007; Zarate 2013).

Illegal arms sales, weapons smuggling, theft of poorly guarded materials, corruption, and collusion to break sanctions or to circumvent tracking and monitoring efforts, or simply seeking profit at the expense of considering the impact of sales on future security, all constitute persistent impediments to reducing the likelihood that dangerous goods fall into terrorist hands. Terrorist groups often engage in auxiliary criminal activity to support their terrorist activities, and the possibility that they could cooperate with transnational criminal organizations to procure weaponry or other material has long been a concern (Berdal & Serrano 2002, pp. 201–2).

Mitigation (response to an attack)

The natural disaster model

Moshe Dayan, Israeli Minister of Defence from 1967–1974, suggested that "terrorist incidents more closely resemble natural disasters than acts of war" (cited in Bowyer Bell 1978, p. 124). Terrorist attacks do share many of the same elements as any natural disaster: dead and wounded people; damaged or destroyed infrastructure; uncertainty about what may happen next; people fleeing in panic or rushing to the scene to help; an urgent need for rescue workers, ambulances, transportation routes to hospitals; and intense media coverage that may interfere with rescue operations or create pressure on crisis managers and other authorities. Contingency planning, established chains of command and communication networks, stockpiles of emergency supplies, training of first responders, and strategies for dealing with victims, their families, and the media can all be arranged in advance. Such an "all-hazards" or "all-risks" approach means that

it can be more cost-effective to prepare for a wide spectrum of risks (Abbott & Hetzel 2005, pp. 121–2).

The public health model

Terrorism, particularly mass-casualty terrorism, has an impact on public health and the psychological well-being of citizens (Levy & Sidel 2002). Since the 9/11 attacks, public health, environmental safety, and local emergency preparedness have all been incorporated into defensive CT. Strengthening public health systems creates an infrastructure that can respond efficiently and effectively to a whole range of threats, whether a disease like MERS, SARS, or swine flu, an industrial accident, an environmental disaster, or an intentional release of a pathogen or explosion of a radiological, chemical, or biological device.

The psychosocial model

Interest in social and psychological defences and the development of citizen resilience in the face of terrorist threats has increased greatly in recent years (Butler, Morland & Leskin 2007). The terror in terrorism is most directly felt by those who fear terrorist attack themselves because of specific threats, or because they belong to the same category of past victims. In the case of indiscriminate, mass terrorism, the terror is much more widespread. Add to that the power of television, the Internet, and social media, and the psychological impact of terrorism can be quite pervasive and invasive. Chronic anxiety and stress about the threat of terrorism can be a serious problem in societies geared to expect that an attack is imminent or inevitable. It can even increase the risk of cardiovascular disease (Holman *et al.* 2008). Promoting citizen resilience means preparing people ahead of time and strengthening their capacity to cope with the stress, anxiety, and fear that particular kinds of terrorist attack provoke. This can help to take the terror out of terrorism.

Long-term counterterrorism

The development model

Development issues and resource utilization can have social and political repercussions that go far beyond purely economic concerns, and violence and terrorism often become part of the equation (Duffield 2001, 2007; Keefer & Loayza 2008). Trade, foreign aid, and development projects can undercut the ideological fuel that drives terrorist radicalization and recruitment in a world of haves and have-nots.

Land distribution and reform, environmental management, market regulation, and resource extraction and commodification have become increasingly important ideological motors in areas such as WMD proliferation, anti-globalization movements, environmental activism and protest, and anti-Western, anti-capitalist, and religious fundamentalist movements (Klare 2001; Le Billon 2008).

Capacity building in weak and conflict-riven states, including police and military training, judicial reform, and strengthening democratic governance, can be another aspect of the development model, where foreign aid and development are integrated into a long-term CT strategy (Rashid 2008; Wright 2006).

The human security/human rights model

The concept of human security reflects the view that international security cannot be achieved unless the peoples of the world are free from violent threats to their lives, their safety, or their rights. The focus of security is the individual, not the state.

Promoting social and economic rights can reduce the inequities that fuel radicalization and facilitate terrorist recruitment. Many of the U.N. conferences of the 1990s, such as those dealing with social development, women's rights, population, and habitat, focused explicitly on the need to strengthen legal regimes requiring States to protect different baskets of rights.

The promotion of political and civil rights can clearly have an impact on the attractiveness of the terrorist option. By giving voice to disenfranchised or oppressed groups, other options are provided that make the terrorist option less compelling. When rights are fully entrenched and institutionalized, and applied uniformly to all societal groups, not just to the majority, the use of violence becomes counterproductive. This was made painfully clear by events in Tunisia, Egypt, and especially Syria, where the early optimism of the Arab Spring gave way to the rise of IS.

Many international conventions on human rights single out education as a fundamental right and emphasize education as a vehicle for promoting democratic, pluralistic, and anti-racist values. Teaching methods that foster an understanding of the interdependence of human beings and an appreciation of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and historical diversity can contribute to reducing the fear and cultivated ignorance that lie at the root of much hatred and violence. Support for extremist and terrorist groups would become harder to sustain and recruitment would become more difficult (Crelinsten & Özkut 2000; Nelles 2003; U.N. News Centre 2013).

Education can also inform people of injustices and inequities around the world. Many seek refuge in the past or in the rigid authoritarianism of political or religious dogma. This is why critical thinking is more important than mere learning of issues and facts. The ability to think for oneself and to research issues by collecting data from many sources is a good antidote to ideological fads or exclusionary, racist theories. Many educated terrorists come from the professions, like engineering and medicine, including Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers. Few terrorists come from the humanities, where literature, history, and philosophy promote critical thinking and self-awareness (Allemang 2010).

The gender model

The vast majority of terrorists are young men. The practice of sex selection, such as female infanticide or sex-selective abortion, has led to a surfeit of males relative to females, especially in Asia. This means that many young men will never be able to find a mate, marry, or raise a family. These "bare branches", as the Chinese call them, are perfect fodder for terrorist recruitment (Hudson & Den Boer 2004).

Studies have found that the more educated a woman becomes, the less children she has (Ainsworth, Beegle & Nyamete 1996). In the long term, then, the best antidote to the bare-branch problem would be the promotion of education and empowerment of women and girls, particularly in those regions where the sex ratio significantly favours males.

In countries where the sex ratio may be more balanced than in Asia, but women are denied access to education or the workforce, the bare branch problem is manifested differently. Overpopulation and failing economies mean a lack of job opportunities for young men and therefore a reduced likelihood of finding a mate and raising a family. Idle, unemployed young men are ideal targets for radicalization and recruitment.

Traditional women's roles usually emphasize child-rearing at the expense of other contributions that a woman might make to society or the economy. Empowering women and girls could reduce the birth rate overall, addressing the bare branch problem, but also allow half the population to contribute to social, political, and economic life, and to resist the pressure of family and tribal traditions that can sometimes drive "deviant" girls and women along the terrorist path.

The environmental protection model

Disturbances brought on by climate change, such as flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification, and factors that drive global changes in climate, such as land use, pollution, and over-exploitation of resources, all have important implications for the broader socio-political climate in which terrorism develops. More than 60 nations, mostly developing countries, face a risk of exacerbating tensions and conflicts over resources due to climate change, including the threat of environmental refugees. Countries that are now at peace risk the emergence of conflict triggered by the impact of climate change (Parry *et al*. 2007). The impact of climate change could also bring unprecedented reversals in poverty reduction, nutrition, health, and education (UNDP 2007). These warnings suggest that many long-term CT strategies are vulnerable to being undermined over time by the impact of climate change. Any long-term CT strategy should take this into account (Fetzek & Mazo 2014; Mayer 2015; The White House 2015).

Conclusion

Democratic forms of government are not perfect. What makes them imperfect is that delicate balances must be maintained between seemingly contradictory elements: loyalty and dissent, as embodied in the "loyal opposition"; public representation and private conscience, whereby elected officials vote their private conscience and are judged by the electorate on their public record; and freedom and law, whereby individual rights are enjoyed within the confines of the law and, when the law is applied, the State's monopoly on violence is exercised in deference to the freedom of others and the rights of the accused (Hampden-Turner 1981, pp. 200–203, Map 58/Level 9).

All this makes CT more difficult. It cannot be merely reactive or coercive. Otherwise it risks creating a bunker mentality, triggering resentment and backlash that facilitates terrorist recruitment, and missing the next new development. It must therefore be proactive, looking ahead and trying to out-think the terrorist. It must also be persuasive, convincing terrorists to abandon their destructive paths, and supporters and sympathizers to seek non-violent ways to achieve their goals. CT must think in the long term, even as it acts in the short term to respond to attacks and outwit terrorist planning, financing, and targeting. It must go beyond legal and military approaches to include political, social, cultural, and economic initiatives aimed at undermining the viral spread of radicalizing and violence-glorifying ideas that fuel the use of terrorism in social and political life.

A truly comprehensive approach that recognizes the complete range of options and understands when to use which, in what combination or order, and for how long, promises to be much more effective than a reductionist approach focusing exclusively on a few options, remaining blind to all others.

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32

POLICING IN COUNTERTERRORISM

Lindsay Clutterbuck

Terrorist acts are crimes, and criminality of this type can occur in two ways. Laws applicable to everyone, such as committing murder or attempting or conspiring to do so, are frequently broken during terrorist attacks or other terrorist actions, and consequently they are investigated as crimes by the police. Additional laws may also exist that criminalise acts that are specifically defined or designated as 'terrorism', such as raising and distributing money to further terrorist acts, or travelling to another country intending to participate in terrorism. These crimes are investigated too, primarily by the police, although other law enforcement agencies may also do so directly, e.g. customs, border control, etc.

The police role in countering terrorism is focused at the nexus where the crime and criminality referred to as 'terrorism' adversely impact on public safety and national security. As a consequence of this, policing is at the core of counterterrorism, and as a result of the long history and interdependent 'cause and effect' relationship between terrorism and policing, it has been the case for a very long time.

The police are not the only agency or organisation with a responsibility to counter terrorism. There are others, e.g. the military and the intelligence agencies. In the case of the United Kingdom, there is close coordination and cooperation between all three of them, depending on the prevailing circumstances.

It is important to note that in a democracy, the primary responsibility of the police is not 'national security', although they contribute towards it. Protecting the security of the state is the main responsibility of the national intelligence agencies and the military. The responsibility of the police is to ensure the safety and security of citizens, communities and society as a whole. Consequently, there can be an inherent tension between public safety and security, and national security, and this can manifest itself in the operational approaches of the police and the national agencies when they are dealing jointly or separately with terrorism.

Evidence suggests that in the vast majority of cases, terrorist groups do not end solely because of the use of military force against them, and they do not end because the terrorist group or groups have successfully achieved their ends. They do so either because the group ceases to use violence and joins the political process (as in the case of the IRA) or because the police and criminal justice system has defeated them (Jones and Libicki, 2008).

In the latter case, the police do not only function as part of the criminal justice system by investigating terrorist crimes after they have been committed. Their day-to-day activities may

expose or impinge upon terrorism prior to this, when it is in its planning or preparatory stages. This could happen directly, for example, by stopping a vehicle for a traffic offence and then, during a search, discovering items for terrorist purposes being transported in it. It may happen indirectly, perhaps arising initially from police suspicions or observations, or from information and intelligence passed onto them by individuals within the community. Finally, the police also act as a deterrent to crime and terrorism by their visible presence, and when deterrence has failed, they are the emergency service that is expected to immediately respond to counterterrorist actions and neutralise the terrorist threat.

Exactly what the responsibilities and main functions of the police within each country are in respect to counterterrorism depends on two things. First, how police and policing are carried out generally, and second, the current threat from terrorism and its history. To illustrate this, the United Kingdom will be used as an example.

The rise of terrorism and police counterterrorism in the United Kingdom

Terrorism in the form in which it is recognisable today has a long history stretching back into the late nineteenth century, a time when almost the only means of detecting those who planned it, prepared for it or perpetrated it was through the actions of the police. Policing itself was then also in its infancy, and thus the evolution and development of the two, terrorism on the one hand and police counterterrorism on the other, became inextricably linked over the years.

Terrorism did not have a single origin or arise in a single location but began in at least two different countries from the 1870s onward, Russia and the United Kingdom (Clutterbuck, 2004). In Russia, groups such as Narodnaya Volya began to form, determined to destroy the existing feudal society. To achieve this, their stated aim was to assassinate Tsar Alexander, his officials and functionaries. Here too began the political creeds of Anarchism and Nihilism that were to spread throughout Europe and beyond from the late 1880s. The pursuit of these ends by those prepared to use extreme violence saw the murders of Italian and Austro-Hungarian royalty, Heads of State in Russia and Spain and the Presidents of both France and the United States.

In France, bomb attacks were launched against cafes and places of public entertainment, seen by the perpetrators as haunts of the privileged and the wealthy. Attacks and murders of this type culminated in 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo in Serbia by members of the 'Black Hand' secret society who were seeking to advance their cause of Serbian separatism. The spark of Sarajevo plunged Europe into the four years of bloody conflict of World War I.

The United Kingdom also suffered a number of attacks inspired by the ideologies of anarchism and nihilism from 1892 onwards, and more than one significant plot was disrupted. However, by this date the police forces on the British mainland had nearly 20 years of experience of terrorist attacks carried out by violent extremists whose cause was the establishment of an independent Irish state across the whole country of Ireland, and consequently, they were organised and prepared to deal with terrorism.

The end of the American Civil War in 1865 saw a movement burgeoning in the United States, its aim dedicated to achieving independence from Britain for Ireland. Those within it who formed its 'physical force' wing were determined to pursue a new strategy. Their thrust would no longer be to foment a successful 'rising' in Ireland itself but to use bomb attacks on the British mainland to coerce the British government to withdraw. To do this, the different groups involved would not only carry out attacks against selected targets in Britain but also against British interests in other countries. The men and explosives required were to be sent to Britain

from America, and the money to finance all this was to be raised there from those who looked to Ireland as their spiritual home or sympathised with their aspirations.

At the beginning of 1881, the first bomb attack occurred in Salford, near Manchester. It was the opening shot in what was to become a five-year-long campaign carried out by three different Irish separatist groups against targets in cities across the country (Kenna, 2013; Short, 1979). The following year, a number of simultaneous bomb attacks were carried out in Glasgow, while other explosive devices were planted in London. The next two years saw the police discovery of a 'bomb factory' in Birmingham and the arrest of a number of Irish Americans concerned in it. There were explosions at left-luggage offices at London railway stations and even on the Underground system itself. Bombs exploded regularly, including at the Tower of London and even within the Chamber of the House of Commons itself. A number of explosive devices were discovered and defused, including one planted at the foot of Nelson's Column.[1] There were other failed attempts and several wide-ranging conspiracies were uncovered and disrupted by police action. Three would-be bombers died in 1884 when the bomb they were carrying by rowing boat on the River Thames to plant under London Bridge exploded prematurely. By the time the last major conspiracy was countered, aimed at the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria in 1887, countering terrorism had become an accepted responsibility of the police.

Initially, even before the Salford bomb, the Metropolitan Police in London contained detective officers specifically organised to operate against Irish-related threats (Porter, 1987). In 1883, they were reinforced and became known as 'Section b' of the Central Criminal Investigation Department. Their role was to gather intelligence and when evidence was available, to carry out arrests and prosecutions. They worked closely with other British police forces, particularly in Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, but also as far afield as Dublin, Paris and America itself. A year later, to counter the infiltration into Britain of Irish American bombers and their explosives, a 'Section c' was established, and over 50 officers were posted to ports across Britain and even to France, Holland and Sweden. The final step was taken in 1887 when a small 'Section d' came into being. It had a national remit, and after an amalgamation with the other Sections, the first police 'Special Branch' came into being within the Metropolitan Police in London.

By the end of the twentieth century, the threat from terrorism and the need to counter it were an integral part of the responsibilities of national and urban police forces across Europe and beyond. The motivations of its perpetrators covered a spectrum from nationalism/separatism to political and religious ideology and diverse single issues. The next section will examine how the police are organised and tasked to counter terrorism in all its main manifestations.

The police and policing in contemporary counterterrorism

The world is now immeasurably more complex than when terrorism began to evolve in the nineteenth century, and yet, many of the challenges it presented then are still present today. The early terrorists devised, manufactured and planted bombs at specific targets they had previously identified and reconnoitred. In order to do this, they acquired the necessary materials and assembled the explosive devices, found 'safe house' accommodation to operate from and paid for it all with money raised for the purpose by their sympathisers and supporters.

On the other hand, the early police counterterrorist officers needed to identify these individuals (most of whom were Irish-Americans) as early as possible if they were to have the best chance of preventing them from carrying out attacks. If they succeeded in carrying out an attack, then the detectives had to use all their skills to identify, pursue and arrest them. At the same time, efforts had to be made to identify and stop more terrorists, their equipment and finances from arriving in the United Kingdom.

Table 32.1 The core elements of police counterterrorism

Police *responsibilities*	–	Public safety and public security
Police *aims*	–	Prevent; Respond
Police *roles*	–	Detection; Investigation; Deterrence; Response
Police *functions*	–	Evidential investigations; intelligence operations; uniform patrol/initial response; incident response/tactical firearms, hostage/siege specialists, IED mitigation

The tactics, techniques and procedures the police now use to counter terrorism reflect its modern day complexity, yet the basic tenets of police counterterrorism are little changed. This reflects the fact that much of the modus operandi of terrorists remains unchanged, while the police still need to detect, arrest and prosecute those who commit terrorist offences. To do this they must gather information and intelligence on those who are, or may become, involved in terrorism and also be prepared to respond at any time to protect the public from terrorism and deal with its consequences.

Dealing with terrorism in all of its guises is intimately linked into the wider responsibilities of the police. In terms of countering terrorism, what tasks the police carry out and how they are organised to do so flows from their primary responsibility in most 'Western' societies – to ensure the safety and security of the public (see Table 32.1). To achieve this, two core functions are required of the police. The first is to do their utmost to prevent terrorism from occurring, and second, if terrorist activity does occur, to respond to it quickly and effectively.

These core functions in turn require the police to take on four significant but different roles, namely that of detection, investigation, deterrence and finally, counter-operations. From a police organisational perspective, detection is generally grouped together with investigation, and deterrence tends to sit with counter-operations. In functional terms, 'detect and investigate' is usually carried out by elements of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), plus its various forensic, evidence-collecting and intelligence-gathering specialists, while 'deter and counter' roles fall to uniformed patrol officers and specialist police intervention units.

In order to illustrate how the long-standing historical elements in this hierarchy of police counterterrorism activity are still very relevant in the modern police response to terrorism, a case study is presented below focusing on a recent series of terrorist attacks and related events. They all took place in or around Paris, France, in January 2015 over a period of three days and are now generally known together as the 'Charlie Hebdo' attack, after the satirical magazine of that name and at whose offices the first and greatest number of victims were killed.

The 'Charlie Hebdo' attack in Paris and the police response[2]

At 11:30 a.m. on the morning of Wednesday, 7 January 2015, two men, Said Kouachi and his younger brother, Cherif Kouachi, arrived at the door of the office of the satirical magazine, 'Charlie Hebdo', located at number 10 Rue Nicolas-Appert in Paris. They were wearing body armour and heavily armed with Russian AKS-74 military assault rifles. The magazine had already come under the threat of violence as a consequence of frequently publishing cartoons featuring the prophet Mohammad. The threats were taken seriously enough for the editor of the magazine, Stephane Charbonnier, to be assigned a close protection officer from the Police Nationale Service de la Protection (SDLP).[3]

Almost immediately after being admitted to the lobby, the Kouachis opened fire on the office caretaker, killing the first of what would eventually become their 13 victims that day. Making their way to the second floor, where a staff meeting was taking place, over the next 5–10

minutes they shot and killed the magazine editor, Stephane Charbonnier, his police protection officer, Lieutenant Franck Brinsolaro, and eight members of the magazine staff. They also shot and killed a visitor to the office. They left the building shouting slogans, apparently in no great hurry, and returned to their car.

As they drove away from the scene, police officers responding to events began to arrive. One of them, Ahmed Merabet of the Police Nationale, who was based at the local police station, was suddenly confronted by the escaping gunmen. He was shot and wounded, falling to the ground, where he was then cold-bloodedly executed by one of the brothers. Continuing their escape, the brothers drove off in the direction of Porte de Pantin, firing at pursuing police officers as they did so. Their car hit a pedestrian, and they quickly hijacked another car, vanishing from sight as the police combed the area.

Later, in the evening of that day, a male jogger was running through a park in Fontenay-aux-Rose, a quiet Paris suburb to the southwest of the 'Charlie Hebdo' office. As he did so, a hooded man who he did not see clearly fired five shots at him with what was later established to be a Russian-made Tokarev 7.62mm semi-automatic pistol, causing him serious but ultimately non-fatal wounds in the leg and back. There were no witnesses to the attack, and no clear motive was apparent. Investigating the case then became the responsibility of the local Division of the Police Judiciare (DPJ) in Paris, an element of the criminal investigation division (CID) of the National Police.

The day after the 'Charlie Hebdo' attack was Thursday, January 8, and sometime before 8 a.m., Clarissa Jean-Phillipe, an officer newly appointed to the Police Municipale and stationed in the suburb of Montrouge, was sent to deal with a routine road traffic accident, located about 100 metres away from the Yaguel Yaacov Jewish School in Rue Gabriel Peri. As she was doing so, a car drew up on the opposite side of the road, and the driver, said to be wearing body armour and carrying more than one weapon, opened fire on her. She was hit in the back by several shots and killed. A street cleaner was also hit and seriously injured. The vehicle drove away, leaving behind a balaclava worn by the driver.

Two-and-a-half hours later, at 10:30 a.m., the two suspects in the 'Charlie Hebdo' attack were seen in Aisne, northeast of Paris, where they stole food and fuel from a petrol station near the town of Villers-Cotterets. Soon there was a strong police presence in the area, and a search for them began.[4] As darkness fell, the Kouachi brothers abandoned the car they were using and were believed to have gone to ground in woodland near Longpont, situated in the extensive Foret de Retz.

The next day began dramatically, as a car hijacked by the suspects near Crepy-en-Valois was seen and chased south by police for 27 kilometres along the N2 main road. At one stage, explosions were reported and a gun battle ensued with pursuing Gendarmerie. Said Kouachi was reported to be wounded in the neck, but both brothers escaped again. By 8:10 a.m., they found themselves in the vicinity of Dammartin-en-Goële, on a small industrial estate and standing at the office door of 'Creation Tendance Decouverte'.

Entering the building, they came upon one man, who they quickly released. They did not find a second, who was able to remain hidden and to communicate with the police by sending text messages. Communications were established by phone with a police hostage negotiator, while the brothers also called and spoke to the French TV channel, BFM-TV. They repeated the claim they had made at the 'Charlie Hebdo' office; that they were acting on behalf of the Yemen-based 'Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula' (AQAP), who had supported and financed the attacks. As the siege continued in Dammartin-en-Goële, other events began to unfold.

At 12: 30 p.m. at the Hyper Cachet kosher hypermarket in Portes de Vincennes, Paris, a single gunman in body armour, armed with a Skorpion submachine gun and a Tokarev pistol, burst

into the shop and opened fire on staff and customers. Three were killed immediately, while a fourth was shot dead after picking up one of the weapons the gunman had put down when it malfunctioned. Others escaped or were hidden in the cold store by a staff member. As time passed, the attacker was identified as Amedy Coulibaly, a 32-year-old of Malian descent with a previous history of involvement with violent jihadists. He had been released from prison in October 2014 after being sentenced to five years imprisonment for his involvement in a plot to free a known jihadist terrorist.[5]

Coulibaly spoke to a police hostage negotiator by using a phone in the shop and demanded that the Kouachi brothers be allowed to go free. He also made a phone call to the French BFM-TV station (the same station contacted by the Kouachis earlier in the day), and in it he claimed he had sworn allegiance to 'ISIL', the Islamic State in the Levant.[6]

As these events unfolded, at 3:55 p.m. in Dammartin-en-Goële, the door of 'Creation Tendance Decouverte' burst open as, amidst heavy gunfire and explosions, the Kouachi brothers reacted to a police assault by running outside and opening fire. Both were shot dead. Two police officers from GIGN were critically injured, but the 'hidden hostage' escaped unharmed. A painstaking search for booby traps then began.

Inside the Hyper Cachet at Portes de Vincennes, the police team capitalised on an audio link created when Coulibaly failed to hang up the phone after he had talked to them. At 4:12 p.m., they heard the sounds of Coulibaly praying. It could only be a matter of time before he became aware of the turn of events in Dammartin-en-Goële and the deaths of the Kouachi brothers, and as his attention now appeared to be distracted away from the hostages, the BRI team, supported by RAID, began their assault. By 4:23 p.m. it was all over, and the final shots had been fired. Coulibaly was dead, and 15 hostages had been released unharmed. One RAID team officer had been shot and wounded.

In the initial forensic search that took place at the crime scene, a Tokarev pistol was recovered, and in turn it was forensically linked as the weapon used in the shooting attack on the jogger in Fontenay-aux-Rose two days previously. There were more revelations in the days to come, as Coulibaly was also named by the police as the attacker who had shot and killed Police Officer Clarissa Jean-Phillipe the day before his attack on the hypermarché. His DNA had been found on the balaclava found at the scene.

On Sunday, 11 January, there was a further twist to events when pre-prepared footage of Coulibaly was posted on Twitter after his death, showing him as late as 8 January in front of a symbolic black banner often used by 'ISIS', discussing the Charlie Hebdo attack and claiming that, 'The brothers of our team, they did Charlie Hebdo. I also went out a bit against the police so that it has more impact. We managed to synchronise to come out at the same time' (Cook, Crossley, Kelly and Duffin, 2015). The perpetrators were dead, and all the hostages had been successfully released, 15 in Paris and one in Dammartin-en-Goële, but for the police, this was not the end of their involvement but merely the beginning.

The events of those four days in January illustrate many aspects of police counterterrorism. This case study will now be used as a template to examine more closely some of the wider issues relating both to the immediate police response to them, their initial investigations and the longer term post-incident investigative effort that is often required for many months, sometimes years, after events have ended.

Police functions in counterterrorism

The terrorist attacks described above highlight the 'Deterrence' and 'Response' roles of the police in counterterrorism. They range from the assignment of a personal protection officer to

the editor of the magazine in response to the threat he was under already, to the initial response to the attack by local police units, followed by the mobile 'active shooter' threat of the Kouachi brothers as they escaped the area. This hot pursuit then became a manhunt and finally, a siege and a shoot-out with the suspects. An almost simultaneous, separate but closely-linked strand of events required the immediate response of the police to the murders, hostage-taking and siege at the hypermarché in Paris that ended in their storming of the building and the death of Coulibaly.

However, these events were not all that the police had to deal with. They also illustrate the necessity for the police counterterrorism roles of 'Detection' and 'Investigation' that have for many years formed the backbone of the police response to terrorist attacks. The primary objective of a police investigation when a terrorist attack has occurred is to gather evidence to detect the perpetrators, to find, arrest and charge them, and enable a successful prosecution to be mounted in a court of law. Of necessity, the immediate investigative focus is to determine who carried out the attack, but the police must also operate more widely to discover who else may be involved and what motivation lies behind it. The lines of enquiry into motivation are of particular importance in suspected cases of terrorism, as finding out the answer to the question 'why?' is often a significant step in discovering the answer to the question of 'who?' and to uncovering who else may have been involved. Potentially, others could still be at large whose role in a wider conspiracy is to launch sequential attacks.

To achieve these objectives, the police must acquire vast amounts of information and fact. Some of it will be categorised as evidence, and eventually the 'best evidence' will be used to mount any prosecution. Some of it will not be strong enough to be put forward as evidence, or it may not be admissible in a court of law. Along with intelligence from police sources and the intelligence agencies, all this evidence and information is fused to give the widest possible picture surrounding the attack and its perpetrators. This is then used to develop new leads that may result in the finding of new or better evidence.

In Paris, the police initially began a painstaking investigation into the murders of the 12 victims at the 'Charlie Hebdo' office, plus the murder of the Police Nationale officer Ahmed Merabet in a nearby street and the escape of suspects. Less than 24 hours later, another investigation had to begin to find the murderer of Clarissa Jean-Phillipe, a Police Municipale officer shot dead in the street by an unknown gunman. A third, separate investigation was also underway, focusing on the shooting of a man out running in a park at Fontenay-aux-Rose in the evening of the same day as the 'Charlie Hebdo' attacks. In total, the police had to deal with major crime scenes in at least seven different locations.

The deaths of the three main perpetrators did not mean the crimes had been solved and therefore the investigations could be wound down. Much remained to be discovered and examined. Coulibaly was found to have rented a flat in Gentilly, Paris, a week before the attacks, and a cache of weapons and explosives were found there. Meanwhile, detectives in Spain determined that he had travelled to Madrid in December, leaving his wife at the airport before driving back to Paris. She had then flown out to Turkey. Coulibaly's prison record revealed his connection to Cherif Kouachi, as both had served prison sentences for offences related to violent jihadism.

The meticulous forensic work at each and every crime scene soon made it clear that all the attacks were linked. The Tokarev pistol used by Coulibaly during the 'hypermarché' attack was ballistically identical to the gun used to shoot the runner in the park, while a black balaclava recovered from the scene of the murder of Clarissa Jean-Phillipe revealed the presence of Coulibaly's DNA.

From the establishment of facts such as these, like ripples on a pond, the investigation moved beyond the initial crime scenes and further and further into the background of the perpetrators,

their movements and their contacts. For example, the weapons acquired and used were quickly traced to an arms dealer in Brussels and then on to Slovakia, while the ammunition could be traced to its manufacture in 1986 in Bosnia (Alexander, 2015; Samuel, 2015). Based on all the information uncovered by all the lines of enquiry from the police investigations, operational and tactical lessons can be learnt and then disseminated amongst all the organizations involved in counterterrorism, so enabling them to better carry out their own roles. This not only applies within France but also internationally, as this information and learning is shared with many other countries as well.

The future of police counterterrorism

The development of police counterterrorism is inextricably linked to the evolution of terrorist modus operandi and their tactics, techniques and procedures. It is driven by the contemporary threat from terrorism and the prevailing risks it poses, but it also must seek to prevent or mitigate opportunities for terrorists to exploit in the future. At the same time, the past cannot be ignored, as once a terrorist attack or conspiracy has demonstrated what they are able to achieve, countermeasures to it must always remain in place, even as terrorists continue to innovate and devise new ways to strike. Consequently, there will always be a spectrum of potential terrorist modus operandi, from attacks carried out by 'lone wolves' to complex attacks mounted by a group or cell.

Looking to the future, the core elements of police counterterrorism are unlikely to change. Their responsibilities for public safety and public security and their aims of prevention and response are the foundation stones of modern policing. The police roles of detection, investigation, deterrence and response are also likely to remain stable, but it is inevitable that the 'sharp-end' of police counterterrorism functions must always be in a state of continuous development.

Police counterterrorism roles and functions will be subject to changes driven by the scale and scope of terrorist activities. The 'Charlie Hebdo' case study demonstrates not only how widespread the size of the operation it generated became, but also how quickly it had to do so. This situation was mirrored in the detection and investigation roles, where they rapidly expanded from local crime scenes to investigations requiring national and international investigations.

In turn, changes of this type will inevitably act as a catalyst for changes in police capabilities and capacity. In the well-established areas of detection and investigation, challenges now arise from the greatly increased number of terrorism-related activities that have become criminal offences. Each one requires evidence to be gathered, examined and assessed before being presented as 'best evidence' in court. Where intelligence is involved, complex issues can arise as decisions must be made on whether a piece of intelligence should, or must, be submitted to a court as evidence, and if so, the risks and implications this may have for ongoing operations or the protection of sources.

Increasingly, there is a need for the police to carry out new counterterror-related functions, and to have sufficient trained and qualified personnel to do so. Two examples of this lie in the areas of targeting and monitoring online and digital communications and participating in the multi-agency efforts needed to counter the violent extremism that may lead individuals on to commit terrorist offences.

It is clear that while the police have a key role to play in countering terrorism, they cannot do so in isolation. Within each country, there is a need for close cooperation between the police, intelligence agencies and, when required, the military. Many countries have already put in place systems and structures to achieve this. However, even the best efforts of the core counterterrorism organisations acting in tandem may not be sufficient. As well as having their own effective

national structures, the police must also be able to cooperate both regionally and globally, and in Europe they can do so through the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), EUROPOL and INTERPOL. However, when dealing with sensitive information relating to terrorism, it is often the 'old-fashioned' methods of bilateral communication that are the quickest and most effective.

Underpinning these efforts lies one key fact: the great strengths the police have to counter terrorism flow from the general support of individuals, communities and societies for their prime responsibility to ensure their safety and security. As long as this situation prevails, then police and communities together can successfully confront terrorism.

Notes

1 The original bombs were crude, relying on a fuse being lit to detonate guncotton, not a particularly powerful explosive. However, by 1883 the 'infernal machines' (as they had become known) consisted of several pounds in weight of the new explosive called 'dynamite', plus a combined timer and initiator made out of a small loaded pistol and an alarm clock, with all of the components then contained in a box.
2 The case study has been drawn from extensive reporting in the British press and media during and after these events and for the sake of clarity it is not individually referenced.
3 Under the French Ministry of the Interior, there are two national police forces: the Police Nationale (operating mainly in urban areas) and the Gendarmerie (operating mainly in rural areas). In addition, the city of Paris and district has its own force, the Prefecture of Police. The Police Municipale are responsible to the Mayor of the town or city in which they operate. See Libeau (2015).
4 Each one of the three main forces deployed their own specialist armed units in response to the Charlie Hebdo incidents: the Police Nationale RAID (Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion), the Gendarmerie GIGN (Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie) and the Prefecture BRI (Brigade de Recherche et d'Intervention) (Libeau, 2015).
5 Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi had both been imprisoned in connection with a 2010 plot to free Smain Ait Ali Belkacem from prison. He had been convicted of the bomb attacks on the Paris metro in 1995, when 30 people had been injured (Cook, Crossley, Kelly and Duffin, 2015).
6 In contrast to Coulibaly's claim to represent ISIL, the Kouachi brothers had claimed they were part of AQAP.

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33

THE MILITARY APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM

Michael J. Boyle

One of the perennial debates within the terrorism literature concerns whether counterterrorism should be understood as a police or military matter (Schmid, 1993). Advocates of a police model of counterterrorism have long argued that foiling the activities of covert cells of terrorists is a law enforcement task because only the police are equipped with legal and investigative powers needed to find, arrest and prosecute terrorists. Some governments strictly limit the ability to obtain warrants or to seize evidence to domestic law enforcement; others, such as the United States, forbid militaries from engaging in domestic law enforcement tasks outside of extreme natural disasters or emergencies.[1] Especially in cases where counterterrorism success is measured by successful criminal prosecution, the role of law enforcement remains paramount. Law enforcement also has a critical role in the prevention of terrorist attacks. Only police forces are capable of engaging in the kind of sustained presence and trust-building in local communities that is necessary for gathering intelligence about potential terrorist activities (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009). This presence – coupled with the legal right to investigate and build a case for prosecution – can exert a subtle deterrent effect and may stop terrorist attacks before they happen (Trager and Zagorcheva, 2005). For both of these reasons, policing remains an indispensable, if incomplete, part of the counterterrorism equation, especially when the terrorist threat takes the form of covert cells operating in well-developed or democratic societies.

At the same time, few would argue that the military should have no role in counterterrorism. Military forces are an indispensable complement to law enforcement and bring with them a number of organizational resources that are crucial to dealing with terrorism. Among their advantages are their high levels of training, their sophisticated command and control structure, and their generous budget and hardware allowance compared to the police. Military forces are also more capable of rapidly gathering and employing intelligence information for their operations and often receive better, more detailed intelligence than comparable law enforcement agencies do. These factors give militaries some comparative advantages in dealing with certain kinds of terrorist incidents. For example, professional military forces are generally better equipped to manage national disasters such as the aftermath of terrorist strikes than police forces are. Against particularly dangerous terrorist organizations, the ability of the military to use force in a careful, controlled way is crucial. Advocates of a military approach to counterterrorism argue that careful applications of force can change the cost-benefit calculation lying underneath terrorist attacks (Ganor, 2012).

To capitalize on these differing advantages, many successful domestic responses to terrorism have included a blend of police, intelligence and military capabilities, sometimes in the form of paramilitary forces. Examples of these forces include the gendarmerie in France and the carabineri in Italy, both of whom have the domestic jurisdiction of the police but have the training, equipment and intelligence assets of the military. In other countries, this blending has gone even further, with paramilitary forces fighting wars externally and operating against internal terrorist groups. Examples of these include the Turkish jandarma, the Russian MKD (Interior Ministry) forces, and Indian Border Security (BSF) and Rashtriya Rifles (Hughes, 2011). These examples illustrate that for many countries, the distinctions between police and military forces, and even domestic and foreign jurisdictions, are not as sharply drawn as they are in the United States and Europe. The division of labour between police and military for counterterrorism functions is best conceptualized as a continuum rather than a chasm, with many counterterrorism organizations falling in between.

The contours of the debate over the proper role of the military in counterterrorism have been sharpened over the last decade due to the declaration of a 'war on terror' following the September 11th attacks. By any measure, the declaration of the war on terror led to a rapid militarization of counterterrorism, with many governments joining the United States in declaring a war against al-Qaeda and other affiliated groups.[2] The change was dramatic: many governments poured resources into military and domestic intelligence services and considered a range of aggressive, often military, responses that previously would have been considered too costly or unacceptable. In their initial phases, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should be seen as examples of a military approach to counterterrorism, as both conflicts were premised on the oft-stated view that fighting them 'over there' is better than waiting until terrorist attacks at home (Bergen, 2001). These fronts expanded over time to the point where the United States was depicted as fighting a 'five front war' across the Middle East and North Africa (Byman, 2008). The 'war on terror' also led the United States to follow many European democracies and accord some military functions to domestic law enforcement agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. In the post 9/11 era, the military dimension of counterterrorism began to loom larger than the policing element, leaving some to question whether the excessive use of military force had begun to distort counterterrorism priorities and produce a backlash in the Islamic world. Others responded that those advocating a policing model for counterterrorism misunderstood the nature and severity of the existential threat posed by al-Qaeda, and that a military approach is inevitable given that seriousness of the threat (Crelinsten, 2009).

The pitfalls of an overly military-focused or militaristic approach to counterterrorism are well-known. While force is necessary against some incorrigible terrorist groups, the overall success rate of military approaches to counterterrorism is poor.[3] A RAND study found that only 7% of terrorist campaigns that ended were brought to a conclusion by military force (Jones and Libicki, 2008). One general problem with applying military force to terrorist organizations is that they are so heterogeneous, and vary so much by constituency and organizational structure, that few 'best practices' for applying military force to them are available.[4] More generally, there is also a considerable danger that military approaches to counterterrorism will produce a backlash among the civilian population and fuel recruitment to the terrorist group (e.g. Silke, 2005; Rodgers, 2002). When military force escalates into repression, it can damage the legitimacy of the government waging the counterterrorism campaign and undercut the tactical advantages flowing from its actions (Cronin, 2009). The danger, as Paul Wilkinson (2001) once articulated, is that liberal democracies pursuing an overly military-focused response to counterterrorism might disfigure themselves by becoming less democratic and tolerant. This danger necessitates

a kind of a balance, however fragile, between military responses and other tools, such as law enforcement, intelligence and political negotiations.

This longstanding debate over the military dimension to counterterrorism has been transformed over the last decade due to two developments: (1) the growing popularity of counterinsurgency as a model for destroying terrorist groups in ungoverned spaces; and (2) the rise of a light footprint approach, based on new technology like drones, which appear to give governments the opportunity to be discriminate, even surgical, in their air strikes against terrorist groups abroad with a costly occupation. Seen in a historical context, these responses are related, as the failure of a counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a swing in the opposite direction towards a 'light footprint.' Both of these developments hold out the promise of being able to reduce the risk of terrorist strikes in the United States and Europe by keeping the fight located in the countries where the most powerful terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, have taken root. Both have also made governments more likely to turn to their militaries for counterterrorism tasks and tilted the balance even further away from the law enforcement. Yet both carry serious risks that are often not acknowledged by proponents of a military approach to counterterrorism.

COIN of the realm

The first major development that has transformed the military's role in counterterrorism has been the rise of counterinsurgency (COIN) as a way of dealing with terrorist groups. The theory and practice of counterinsurgency is not new. The systematic study of counterinsurgency began with the anti-colonial revolts of the early twentieth century.[5] The rise of national liberation movements, especially those influenced by Communism, produced another wave of scholarly and policy attention on counterinsurgency during the Cold War (e.g. Taber, 1970; Galula, 2006a, 2006b; Trinquier, 2006). The Vietnam War was the high point for the study of counterinsurgency during the Cold War, with dozens of studies devoted to finding ways to separate the Viet Cong from the local population through either force or economic and political inducements. Despite the attention paid on winning 'hearts and minds' in Vietnam, the United States was unable to defeat the Viet Cong and retreated from the country in 1975. This defeat produced what can best be described as an active process of 'forgetting,' where the United States and other major militaries turned away from the lessons of counterinsurgency in favour of fighting a conventional war against the Soviet Union (Schafer, 1988). The reasons for this were varied. Many militaries had a strong institutional preference for warfighting and did not want to devote resources to other tasks; organizational culture also played a role, as few soldiers wanted to do the messy tasks associated with policing and governing a foreign territory (e.g. Nagl, 2005). In the United States, many commanders believed that they would never fight a Vietnam-like war again and constructed doctrines – such as the noted 'Powell Doctrine,' which required that wars were fought only with overwhelming force and with clear public support – designed to ensure that this was impossible.

The rejection of counterinsurgency (COIN) as a doctrine and the associated costs was clearly recognized after the initial phase of the Iraq War (2003–present). After expecting a 'catastrophic victory' in Iraq, where the United States would be able to quickly reconstruct the institutional pillars of the state and leave, the United States found itself bogged down fighting a vicious insurgency, comprised of both Sunni rejectionists and Islamist militant groups, against its occupations and efforts to construct a new regime (Bremer, 2006; Ricks, 2006; Gordon and Trainer, 2007). The insurgency was not a coherent group, but rather a heterogeneous collection of armed groups, including some with links to terrorists groups and others supported by foreign govern-

ments (Boyle, 2014). Amidst this violent clamour, al-Qaeda saw an opportunity for expansion. It deployed foreign fighters to Iraq and made alliances with Sunni militant groups fighting the American soldiers. Over time, its operatives coalesced into an insurgent group called al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was responsible for some of the most horrific bombings seen during the insurgency. A similar pattern was in evidence in Afghanistan, as Taliban insurgents cooperated with al-Qaeda and local militant forces, such as the Haqqani network, to attack U.S. troops. The blending of terrorist violence with ordinary insurgent activity led to a substantial increase in indiscriminate, large-scale terrorist attacks – such as IED attacks and suicide bombings – and raised the death toll in both cases. It also led many to ask whether counterinsurgency doctrine should be dusted off and refashioned for a new era.

As Fred Kaplan (2014) has documented, the result was an intellectual movement, composed of academics, military officers, and government officials, who attempted to reconceive of counterinsurgency in an age where threats from al-Qaeda and likeminded Islamist groups remained paramount. Led by General David Petraeus, this group popularized counterinsurgency as a way of dealing with extant terrorist threats and stopping new ones (Evans, 2015). The logic was straightforward: if terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda flourished in the chaos of ungoverned or lightly governed spaces, such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan, it follows that restoring order to those regions would uproot them and prevent future terrorist organizations from growing. This model conceives of terrorist organizations as a symptom of disorder and poor governance and links their ability to operate and launch attacks on the degree to which those conditions prevail in a certain country (Schultz and Drew, 2006). The policy prescription that follows is that the United States and other states should establish legitimate local governments and improve governance as a way of countering terrorist threats. In other words, it conceives counterinsurgency as a form of counterterrorism, rather than a competing way of battling violent non-state actors. This doctrine was codified in the United States in the Army Field Manual FM 3-24, published in 2006 and implemented in varying degrees in Afghanistan and Iraq (U.S. Army Field Corps, 2007).

Among the most influential COIN advocates was David Kilcullen. Kilcullen, a lieutenant colonel in the Australian armed forces and a senior advisor to Petraeus, published an influential series of articles linking counterinsurgency principles to counterterrorism goals against al-Qaeda. He described the inter-relationship between al-Qaeda and local insurgents as the 'accidental guerrilla' syndrome, where foreign Islamist forces infect local struggles with their ideology, tactics and organizational skills and turn them more lethal as a result (Kilcullen, 2009). The policy prescription that follows from this is that governments should engage in counterinsurgency to separate the local population from the Islamist interlopers and the most unyielding members of local insurgent groups. This approach sees greater risks in long-running conflicts between governments and insurgent forces that are susceptible to al-Qaeda's narrative of a global struggle against the forces of the Crusaders, personified by the United States and its Western allies. This blending of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism was reflected by Kilcullen's argument that the struggle against al-Qaeda should be conceptualized as a 'global counterinsurgency' against an international order led by the United States (Kilcullen, 2005).

One consequence of the new emphasis on counterinsurgency as a means to counterterrorism operations was to highlight the importance of flexible, adaptive militaries in countering al-Qaeda and similar groups. Although COIN advocates called for greater emphasis on local policing and civil affairs tasks, often emphasizing a 'whole of government' approach to COIN, the military was seen as the leading actor in countering al-Qaeda and other groups in ungoverned territories. The degree to which it emphasized fighting terrorism 'over there' so that the United States, United Kingdom and Europe would not fight them at home, transferred lead

responsibility for counterterrorism towards the military and away from the police. This had real effects on the ground. In Afghanistan, U.S. military officers settled tribal disputes, established local services and schools, and began to preach the values of good governance in order to separate local insurgents from al-Qaeda and the hardened core of the Taliban. In Iraq, the U.S. military began to set up local policing forces – called Awakening groups – to provide local governance, especially in Sunni areas where al-Qaeda was powerful. The COIN model of counterterrorism was exported in reduced form to countries like Somalia and Yemen, where U.S. forces did training and encouraged good governance as a way of eliminating terrorist groups.

This blending of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism was not uncontested. Some critics pointed out that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have different assumptions about the nature of the enemy and the way that they can be defeated (Boyle, 2010). They are sufficiently dissimilar that to conflate them, like Kilcullen did, carries a significant risk of goal displacement. Since counterinsurgency involves establishing a functioning and legitimate government, a number of distinct activities – for example, reconstruction, economic development, and even reversing long-standing ethnic and gender discrimination – in the service of boosting the legitimacy of that government can be justified (and funded) on counterterrorism grounds. The result is mission creep that can prolong nation-building missions and even occupations indefinitely, as an ever-increasing number of tasks are folded into a 'hearts and minds' approach of defeating the enemy.

It is also important to note that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency may not be wholly compatible in the same theatre of war. Some COIN advocates conceptualized counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as distinct but complementary activities that can be simultaneously pursued in theatres like Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet there was considerable anecdotal evidence that trade-offs between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism exist and that success in one may undercut gains made in another. For example, in a country with ungoverned spaces like Afghanistan, a counterterrorism approach (CT) would involve the use of force by foreign militaries against terrorist groups and their local allies. Such kinetic activities by outsiders can sideline a local government and undercut its legitimacy, thus making the goals of a counterinsurgency campaign hard to achieve. A COIN approach presumes that the ultimate goal is to improve the legitimacy of a government, but that legitimacy may be damaged if that government expends political capital approving U.S.-led counterterrorism strikes on its territory. The U.S. occupation in Afghanistan was arguably caught on the horns of this dilemma for a decade or more, ultimately producing a central government which was enraged at U.S. actions but unable to fight the Taliban.

Another general problem with confusing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is that it distorts the limits on the use of force by the military (Boyle, 2010). In a counterterrorism approach, the military should use force sparingly and precisely, against only the terrorist organizations plotting attacks. By contrast, some models of counterinsurgency – especially the direct or combat model – assume that the use of force is a near-constant presence in the society, applied in a steady way against insurgents while protecting the civilian population (e.g. Nagl, 2005). In other words, one model imagines the use of force as a rare event, while the other imagines it as a fact of life. Applying a counterinsurgency model to fighting terrorist groups can lead the military to overuse force, thus producing the backlash that undercuts their gains. Part of the reason for this is different underlying assumptions on how the terrorist organization relates to the population. A counterinsurgency approach assumes that insurgents are imperfect representatives of the aggrieved within the population. By contrast, a counterterrorism approach assumes that terrorists are parasitic on that population. The former model assumes that the insurgents must be contained and transformed, while the latter assumes that they must be eliminated.

Merging counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, as the United States tried to do in Afghanistan and Iraq, emphasized the military's role in counterterrorism but came at some cost. It distorted the traditional balance between police and military forces and located an ever-greater number of distinct tasks under the military response to terrorism. The effectiveness of this approach has come under doubt in recent years due to setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. The renewal of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the escalating violence against civilians has suggested that a long-term occupation blending both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency may be a mistake, especially if a credible central government does not restore control. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq further suggests that the gains from a counterinsurgency approach to fighting terrorism groups may be illusory. The United States thought it had defeated the Sunni insurgency through a combination of a surge of American troops and the co-option of Sunni Awakening groups, only for these gains to be destroyed after the Islamic State incubated in Syria and returned in force in 2011. For these reasons, the United States and United Kingdom have now turned to a radically different military approach – one which has a light footprint and takes advantage of their technological advantages – to achieve their counterterrorism goals.

Drone warriors

The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 heralded some change in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. President Obama abandoned the language of the 'war on terror' or the less common 'long war' and focused rhetorically on defeating al-Qaeda and its allies. Obama ended the use of torture and limited extraordinary rendition; he promised, but failed, to close Guantanamo Bay. In many respects, this was a significant change in strategy. Yet some continuities between Barack Obama and George W. Bush existed. Perhaps the strongest one was in the use of military force. Despite President Obama's move away from war rhetoric, he embraced the use of the military for counterterrorism purposes, but adopted a leaner and more covert role for the military than his predecessor. Under the Obama 'light footprint' approach, the military's role in counterterrorism was amended in two ways: (1) through the use of Special Forces to conduct raids on high-value targets (HVTs); and (2) through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones to kill targets. Special Forces and drones have been used in tandem in an array of theatres of war (such as Afghanistan and Iraq) and also in countries where the United States is not officially at war, such as Pakistan and Yemen.

The use of Special Forces abroad represents an evolution of the military approach to counterterrorism. To some extent, it takes advantage of the combined advantages of the police and the military, as French gendarmerie do, but it applies these advantages to war zones as opposed to domestic counterterrorism operations. In other words, it takes a paramilitary approach to fighting a war against terrorist actors, where open combat is eschewed and most operations are targeted and covert. The logic of this approach is clear: if substantial long-term military occupations proved ineffective in Afghanistan and Iraq, a light footprint approach with fewer forward-positioned forces might be able to keep pressure on terrorist organizations without alienating the civilian population and producing backlash.

Under the Bush Administration, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) began to use Special Forces in raids against alleged terrorist targets, sometimes without the knowledge of the government in the territory where the raid took place. The Bush administration removed geographic limits from JSOC's operations and authorized a legal right to conduct operations worldwide (Scahill, 2013; Naylor, 2015). Their operations were conducted by small teams of highly-trained JSOC military officers and consisted of 'snatch and grab' missions against al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. In 2001, JSOC was relatively small and operated under limited rules

of engagement; these operations were sporadic and unacknowledged. Under President Obama, their operations expanded dramatically. By 2011, JSOC was regularly involved in high-profile operations against al-Qaeda targets along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, despite protests from both governments. In May 2011, Seal Team 6, under the joint command of JSOC and CIA, conducted the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan. In the eyes of Obama, this success only reinforced the wisdom of a Special Forces-led approach to counterterrorism. By 2015, JSOC was estimated to have a budget of nearly $1 billion and approximately 4,000 soldiers and civilians, supplemented by its own drone fleet and intelligence capacity (Shah, 2015). Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Israel and Russia, have also followed suit, directing additional resources into Special Forces to battle terrorists at home and abroad.

A crucial complement to this military approach has been the explosion in the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones. This development is one of the most remarkable in the last decade. By the late 1990s, the United States had only a few drones with limited surveillance capabilities, and it struggled to affix missiles to the drones it had. By 2001, it had fixed this problem and begun using drones for combat operations in Afghanistan. By 2002 the United States conducted its first drone-based targeted killing outside a war zone by killing a prominent al-Qaeda commander in Yemen (Williams, 2013). As the United States ramped up its drones program, other countries took notice. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of states with active drones programs doubled from 40 to over 80 (General Accounting Office, 2012). The U.S. government raced to keep up, and was estimated by 2011 to have approximately 7,000 drones in its fleet, with plans to build up to a thousand more (Finn, 2011). Today, drones are a central part of U.S. combat operations and are used for targeted killings, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat support (Smith, 2016).

Drones are now used for a wide array of purposes, including surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted killing. For counterterrorism purposes, the United States had expanded the use of drones for targeted killing, striking targets on 'hot' battlefields such as Afghanistan and Iraq but also in undeclared conflicts like Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere. The advantages of drones – their persistence, low cost and the absence of risk to pilots – renders them a particularly attractive way of eliminating terrorist operatives without engaging in ground campaigns or paying for a costly occupation. U.S. counterterrorism officials insist that drones are a highly effective way of keeping pressure on terrorist organizations and causing their collapse. In 2011, former Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta argued that drones had vastly improved American counterterrorism operations and left the prospect of 'strategically defeating al Qaeda' in reach (Miller, 2011). President Obama has touted their success, arguing that drones keep senior al-Qaeda members on the run and in such organizational disarray that it is difficult for them to develop plots (The White House, 2013). There is also evidence that targeted killings are removing senior figures from the battlefield. One estimate in 2013 suggested that over 50 senior al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed by drone strikes (Byman, 2013). Senior al-Qaeda officers were terrified of drones. Before his death, Osama bin Laden recommended a number of operational measures to his followers so that they could shield themselves from U.S. drones (CNN, 2012).

Obama administration officials have argued that drone-based targeted killing should now be the foundation of U.S. counterterrorism strategy because it allows for terrorist operatives to be removed from the battlefield without causing substantial civilian casualties. For example, John Brennan, the Obama administration's chief counterterrorism advisor, claimed that civilian casualties from drone strikes have 'typically been in the single digits' (quoted in Pilkington, 2013). In a May 2013 speech at the National Defence University, Obama acknowledged civilian casualties happened, but insisted that 'before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set' (The White House,

2013). For these reasons, some experts have argued that drones are a comparatively humane form of counterterrorism, killing far fewer civilians than the alternative options (Shane, 2012). Yet a number of private organizations, including the New America Foundation and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, have criticized these claims as either factually incorrect or misleading given the absence of public, verifiable data (Boyle, 2015). A number of independent reports have suggested that drones kill far more civilians than the U.S. government suggests (Zenko, 2016). One reason for the disparity in estimates concerns the methodology of counting victims. The Obama administration used a classification scheme which counts any male between the ages of 18–70 killed in a drone strike as a 'militant' unless posthumous evidence is presented to clear their name (Becker and Shane, 2012). As a result, it remains unclear whether this military approach to counterterrorism is as humane as its advocates suggest.

There are also three reasons to question whether it is as effective as claimed (Boyle, 2013). The first is that the United States may be conflating tactical victories – removing a specific individual from the battlefield – with strategic ones (Cronin, 2010). The strategic goal of a light footprint approach remains to reduce terrorism and stabilize the state where violence occurs. The laser focus on removing specific individuals that drones enable may allow counterterrorism officials to get so immersed in the details of strikes that they lose sight of these wider goals. The second is that removing leaders may have an indeterminate effect on a terrorist group. While U.S. officials often argue that removing leaders is decisive to damaging an organization, the evidence for this claim is less clear, especially as groups are capable of regenerating and finding new leaders (e.g. Byman, 2006; Mannes, 2008; Lotrionte, 2003; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Jordan, 2009; Johnston, 2012; Carvin, 2012).[6] Finally, analyses of the effectiveness of drone-based targeted killing often exclude the other side of the ledger: that is, whether the actions are fuelling the recruitment of militant networks by alienating the population. While reliable data on the recruitment of terrorist and militant networks is hard to come by, there are some conflicting reports on whether drones produce the kind of anger that leads militant networks to grow (Boyle, 2013; Fair, Kalthenhaler and Miller, 2014). At a minimum, they produce hatred of the United States. One Pew Foundation Global Attitudes poll in 2012 revealed that 74% of Pakistanis now consider the United States an enemy as a result of drone strikes (Pew Research Center, 2012). This has led a number of critics, including General Stanley McChrystal, to question whether this 'visceral hatred' is increasing the ranks of the enemy (quoted in Alexander, 2013). The effectiveness of drone-based targeted killing has been heralded by advocates of a military approach to counterterrorism, but it is not clear that the evidence supports the confidence with which this claim is made.

Conclusion

The military role in counterterrorism remains central, but controversial, today because of these two major policy developments. The first development, a shift towards counterinsurgency as a means of counterterrorism, marked the early stages of the war on terror especially under the Bush administration. The second, a shift towards a light footprint characterized by Special Forces and drones, was the Obama administration's reaction to the failure of the setbacks associated with a counterinsurgency approach. While these approaches differ in their intellectual emphasis and core assumptions, they share one important similarity: both have disrupted the traditional balance that exists between police and military approaches to counterterrorism. Both models have left counterterrorism far more militarized today than it was in previous decades, but neither has proven to be a magic bullet which has eliminated the terrorist threat 'at home.' On the contrary, the unacknowledged danger of both approaches is that militarizing counterterrorism

can produce adverse public reactions and even social alienation among minority communities, which in turn may make the threat of home-grown terrorism worse. If that is the case, finding ways to restore the balance between the police and military dimensions of counterterrorism will be crucial in the years ahead.

Notes

1 This prohibition originated in the Insurrection Act (1807) and later the Posse Comitatus Act (1871), but has been amended and weakened since.
2 This was explicitly the goal of the National Security Strategy in 2002 (see Boyle, 2008; Kohn, 2009).
3 For a defense of military force in counterterrorism, see Ganor (2012).
4 One of the few volumes that takes this issue seriously is Davis and Cragin (2009).
5 For an early theory of insurgency, see T. E. Lawrence (1929). For a summary of early counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, see Beckett (2001).
6 On the effectiveness of drones, see in particular Johnston and Sarbahi (2016), Byman (2013), and Cronin (2013).

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34

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Julian Richards

Introduction

Over the centuries, a number of key military strategists have stressed the central importance of intelligence to success in conflict. The sixth-century-BC Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, is purported to have said that "foreknowledge" is what distinguishes successful generals and ensures their victories in conflict (Sun Tzu, trans. Griffith, 1963: 144). Similarly, the Prussian military strategist, Baron Karl Von Clausewitz, spent a great deal of time considering intelligence in his classic, *On War*, noting that good judgement in interpretation of intelligence was absolutely essential for ensuring success (von Clausewitz, 1982). In these ways, intelligence can be seen as a critical tool of power for states in conventional conflict scenarios. Since the end of the Cold War, which defined security through the second half of the twentieth century, many states have shifted a large portion of their national security discourse towards international terrorism rather than threats from other state actors. The controversially named War on Terror has been, in the view of many, the wrong way to conceptualise the struggle against transnational non-state terrorist actors (Howard, 2002). This might seem like a semantic argument of little import, but it is relevant when we consider the emergency powers that states contract to themselves when they officially declare a major terrorist threat. Many of these powers are to do with intelligence-gathering capabilities.

In this sense, a critical discourse analysis of terrorism could suggest the phenomenon is a complex and sometimes Machiavellian element of power, whether it is exercised by the state or by a sub-state competitor. This is perhaps not the place to rehearse the very extensive debates around definitions of the "evanescent" notion of terrorism (Rapin, 2011), but merely to consider how states justify their levels of intelligence-gathering capabilities in the face of supposed terrorist threats. At the conceptual level, consider, for example, how the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the official news agency of President Assad, describes all of the forces against which he is fighting as "terrorists", rather than the complex rainbow of insurgents, terrorists and freedom fighters described in Western media. Motivations here are both to emphasise Westphalian duties in protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, but also to attract international sympathy to the cause, since Western nations in particular can hardly disagree with the need to battle terrorists. In such a state of emergency, the state can make a claim to use the widest range of military and intelligence capabilities.

The interaction between terrorist and state actors has often been analysed using Game Theory approaches, since these allow for a notion of the critical interdependence between each side of the equation (Arce and Sandler, 2005). In this way, the gathering of intelligence by a state on a terrorist group can be seen as a legitimate and effective element of proactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism policy: essentially, the "foreknowledge" of which Sun Tzu spoke. Similarly, terrorists will always be aiming to outwit the state, and they themselves will need information about the capabilities of counterterrorist policies and agencies in order to do so.

All of this leads to a complex contemporary debate in Western liberal democratic states in particular, whereby the expansion of intelligence capabilities runs up against civil liberties lobbies, who sometimes recall memories of totalitarian states such as communist East Germany in opposing their government's supposedly oppressive designs. In response, the spectre of terrorism is often invoked to provide moral justification for enhanced intelligence-gathering capability. Thus we can see an inextricable link between an appropriately articulated terrorist threat, and the intelligence component of counterterrorism policy.

Definitions of intelligence

Much as Terrorism Studies has undergone a long and laborious debate about how to define terrorism, so Intelligence Studies has had its fair share of definitional dialogue. The question of "what is intelligence" is one that has vexed and exercised many analysts. As Laqueur noted, intelligence can be seen both in terms of the agencies doing it, and the information they are gathering (Laqueur, 1985: 12). Much of the discussion centres around the differences between information and intelligence, with the latter viewed as some sort of refined or developed form of the former. In focusing on the nature of the information itself, many see secrecy as being a defining feature, not necessarily in the official governmental definition of being Secret, but in the sense that intelligence is generally information that an opponent or foe does not want you to see or to know. The father of structured intelligence analysis at the CIA, Sherman Kent, described this essential feature of intelligence as an inherent "clandestinity" (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 172).

However, other theories look more at the potential utility of the information, that is, the fact that intelligence is a form of information that is actually useful for planning or strategizing in some shape or form (Sims, 1995: 4). This approach has the double benefit of giving an indication of the quality of potential intelligence (some of it is just data, which might look good but be of little benefit for policymakers); and of widening our conception of intelligence usefully beyond traditional national security arenas and into the world of business, sport, and any number of other disciplines.

In the realm of counterterrorism, additional factors are important. First, there is the question of intelligence tradecraft. In very broad terms, traditional clandestine intelligence-gathering falls into two categories of activity. The first is human intelligence (Humint), which is famously one of the oldest human activities in history. This involves human beings gaining intelligence about their adversaries, either through persuading individuals to pass on sensitive information from inside a target group or going undercover and penetrating a group. The second category of intelligence tradecraft can be loosely gathered under the umbrella of technical intelligence-gathering (Techint). This entails gathering intelligence using technical means, such as the interception of electronic communications or other signals (Sigint) or the gathering of imagery data from satellites or other covert platforms (Imint).

Cutting across these activities is the business of clandestine surveillance. Traditionally, this has been undertaken using human beings covertly following or observing targets, but increasingly,

electronic means of surveilling targets are coming into the picture. These include geolocating targets through their satellite phones or other electronic devices, tracking vehicles using number-plate recognition cameras (ANPR), using CCTV and a growing range of other capabilities.

Numerous other "ints" are sometimes mentioned in the realm of intelligence, such as open-source intelligence (Osint), which entails gaining intelligence from openly available documentation or sources, such as documents on the internet or listening to radio broadcasts; financial intelligence (Finint) and several others.

All of these forms of tradecraft are essentially about the methods of gathering intelligence and its sources, but returning to the end-to-end process of intelligence, one of the key debates in the field of particular pertinence to counterterrorism is the question of the connection between intelligence and action taken on the ground. This is the debate about covert action, which is as much an ethical debate as one about business process.

The traditional British model is that state intelligence agencies gather the intelligence but have no executive arm; whether and how the intelligence is acted upon is the realm of other agencies who receive that intelligence, such as the military or police. This allowed Herman to ponder whether the ethical debate about intelligence was pertinent at all, since "no-one gets hurt by it, at least not directly" (Herman, 2004: 342). In many other countries, however, intelligence agencies do have executive arms and will often act on their information. Classic examples include the CIA, who can use drones to fire missiles at terrorist targets on the basis of their own tactical intelligence, or indeed, in the past, engage in political assassinations. Similarly, Israel's Mossad agency has an avowed policy of assassinating senior members of terrorist organisations such as Hamas or Hezbollah if the right intelligence comes their way. The ethical questions are not just about whether a state should use extreme violence to protect its national security but also about the risks of the intelligence being wrong in such scenarios. On this point, the British or American systems are not necessarily any better than the other and both can be prone to fatal errors. The shooting dead by the police of a Brazilian citizen, Jean Charles de Menezes, in London in July 2005 when he was mistakenly identified as a fugitive terrorist is a case in point. Similarly, extreme scrutiny has been levelled at the time of writing towards the assassination in Syria of two British citizens by an RAF drone strike on the basis of intelligence that they were close to undertaking terrorist attacks on British interests. It is not clear what the outcome of such investigations will be, but at any rate, the incident clearly challenges Herman's point above about the limited effects of intelligence.

It should also be noted that, particularly in the post-9/11 era of terrorism and counterterrorism, not all significant intelligence on terrorism is gathered by state intelligence agencies. There has been an increasing emphasis in this period on "community intelligence", since the targets of interest for the state have moved into domestic religious and ethnic communities that are potentially harder to reach, and are traditionally less engaged with the state authorities. Thus, police services in many countries have invested resources into community engagement activities, whether these are Homeland Security sub-stations in policing districts in the United States, as Thacher's fascinating account of Dearborn, Michigan, describes (Thacher, 2005), or Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs) in the United Kingdom, and numerous other models. Such activities in large part reflect the strategic policy shift in the post-9/11 era in counterterrorism towards a greater element of pre-emptive and preventative action rather than solely on pursuit and interdiction activities. In the United Kingdom, this strand of activity is spearheaded by the Prevent strand of the Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), and is mirrored in the European Union's overarching strategy, launched under the United Kingdom's presidency in the second half of 2005. For all its logic, however, preventative strands of counterterrorism policy have come to encapsulate many dilemmas for

the state which are central to contemporary questions about the role of intelligence in this area of policy.

A brief history

For much of the twentieth century, state intelligence capabilities against defined national security threats were seen in a somewhat realist way, coloured in large part by the supposedly existential requirements of the Cold War, in which espionage and counter-espionage played large and highly significant roles. For many countries, traditionally defined security in the shape of military threats was the dominant priority, until the latter part of the twentieth century when a broadening of notions of security began to take shape (Sheehan, 2010; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). This led in turn to a notion of "human security", which encapsulated a much wider range of security concerns than had previously been the norm (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and sudden end to the Cold War only served to accelerate a major reappraisal of security threat and response.

For intelligence capability within the liberal democratic state, this conceptual shift in the latter part of the twentieth century led to a greater awareness of the need for accountability in what had previously been seen as an essential, if somewhat ugly, tool of national security policy. In the United Kingdom, for example, 1989 saw the passing of the Security Service Act, which openly avowed the Security Service (MI5) and placed it and its authorised activities on the statute books for the first time. This was closely followed by the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, in which the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) were similarly placed on the statute books, and a parliamentary oversight committee, the Intelligence Services Committee (ISC) and associated process were put in place. (The United States has had a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for much longer – since 1976 – in part due to its history of apparent misuses of intelligence during the 1960s and '70s.)

For parts of Europe, the Cold War period was also a time in which violent secessionist terrorist movements were active, such as ETA in Spain and the IRA in the United Kingdom, and revolutionary Marxist movements such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the RAF in West Germany. Some of these groups, notably Baader and Meinhof's RAF, had flirtations with the Palestinian terrorist movement, which grew to become an international security concern in the 1970s.

The United Kingdom's long struggle with the Provisional IRA (PIRA) effectively came to an end in 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed and militant groups including PIRA agreed to lay down their arms in favour of the workings of the devolved National Assembly of Northern Ireland. (Subsequent history shows that breakaway Irish Republican factions could continue to pose a terrorist threat, albeit on a smaller scale.) Assessments of the period of the Troubles, as they became known, which began in 1969 with the deployment of the British Army to Northern Ireland to quell inter-community sectarian violence, are that intelligence played an absolutely critical role in the disruption and eventual collapse of the PIRA's activities (Kirk-Smith and Dingley, 2009; Bamford, 2005). Within this picture, Jeffery suggests that Humint from inside of a terrorist organisation is the best intelligence a state can obtain (Jeffery, 1987).

The experience of this period seems to be that Humint in particular had a double effect on the PIRA organisation of anticipating attacks and plans and thus being able to avoid or counter them; while also tying-up the organisation's leadership with a continual paranoid investigation into who might be working for the enemy. For an organisation such as PIRA, this was not just administratively inconvenient, but also meant the physical loss of many of its operatives, since

the penalty for being suspected of being a spy for the British was severe beating at best, and more often murder.

For the state, meanwhile, the brutal logic of using intelligence in this way had a further benefit of avoiding the costly and complicated process of having to bring people to trial, and having to consider whether and how sensitive intelligence could be used evidentially in court. As Robertson suggested, someone going to trial could actually have been considered a failure for intelligence, since it was much better to use it for further disruption and penetration of the target organisation (Robertson, 1987).

A modern corollary of this concept might be the manner in which intelligence could be used to physically neutralise terrorist suspects in the field through drone strikes or other attacks. Such assassinations, happening as they tend to do in a context of "war" rather than a civilian context, also avoid the need for a judicial process of the victims. Whatever the utility of such actions, however, experience suggests that states can suffer from this policy through challenges to their commitment to human rights and proper judicial processes.

Britain faced similar complications during its struggle with PIRA on two fronts. The first concerned interrogation techniques of terrorist suspects used by the British army, which the European Court of Human Rights ruled amounted to torture in 1976 (although this judgement was later overturned on appeal). The second involved accusations of an unspoken "shoot to kill" policy by counterterrorist forces. Various cases inflamed the latter debate, including the shooting dead of eight PIRA suspects in Loughall in 1987, and of three further PIRA members a year later in Gibraltar, in both cases by Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers. In each case, the state claimed that intelligence (which, in the Gibraltar case included that obtained through liaison with the Spanish authorities) indicated a real likelihood of a major terrorist attack, and that pre-emptive action was appropriate on grounds of national security and self-defence. This is exactly the same argument used by the state to justify the September 2015 drone attacks which killed Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin in Syria. Here we can see the point that intelligence, if assessed correctly, can allow a state to take exceptionalist action on the grounds of national security, similar to actions undertaken under the Laws of Armed Conflict. Many would welcome the protection of national security and likely avoidance of wider deaths so delivered, but the state also has to battle critics in these scenarios who will claim both that fundamental principles of human rights are compromised, and that intelligence cannot be scrutinised as to its veracity and utility since it always remains secret. As discussed below, this is one of the many dilemmas with which the liberal democratic state finds itself confronted on the boundaries between intelligence and counterterrorism.

More contemporary history shows that the hoped-for peace dividend of the post-Cold War period was punctured by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2011, which ushered in a new period of conflict and counterterrorism policy. In the United States in particular, the intelligence sector suffered a wave of criticism in the wake of the 2011 attacks for demonstrably having failed to anticipate the nature and extent of a new wave of terror. Comparisons were made with the Pearl Harbor attack during the Second World War, when a fatal lack of imagination about what the adversary might do proved pivotal (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Furthermore, the fact that such a low-cost and relatively primitive attack could be wrought on a nation that had spent billions of dollars on intelligence seemed all the more perplexing.

A more detailed analysis of the intelligence failure of 9/11 and its implications shows that the problems were multifaceted. As the British and many others had discovered with earlier terrorist problems, terrorism situates itself in a complicated position between military and policing matters. Terrorism is both war and crime. Institutionally, this boundary often lies between different

state agencies that must therefore cooperate and share data with one another. In the United States, as in most other countries, institutional rivalries and differing business practices between the likes of the FBI and CIA can mean that intelligence is not always shared as extensively and easily as should be the case. In many cases, the problem might even be a simple yet infuriating one of having different databases that are not easily connected to one another.

The need to move intelligence across institutional boundaries extends further in the case of contemporary counterterrorism, from high-level state intelligence agencies all the way down to local policing bodies, since the connection between complex international intelligence and that from street-level community policing is increasingly central to the task. Much as notions of security have become broadened and more pluralistic since the end of the twentieth century, so the implications for security actors are that the picture has become wider, deeper and spatially more stretched in terms of who needs to be involved (Gill, 2006).

In practice, this makes the data-sharing picture even more complicated, since intelligence that may have been gained using highly sensitive techniques cannot always be shared very easily all the way down to the local-level police officer. Conversely, small scraps of information that local policing may come across in its daily work can often be extremely useful for the intelligence agencies in helping to contextualise what they are seeing, but often this information does not make its way up the information stack for a whole host of data recording and data-basing issues.

At the level of tradecraft, Berkowitz suggests that the intelligence failure epitomised by the 9/11 attacks was also a failure of the Western intelligence machinery to re-orient itself from the "big and noisy" Cold War Soviet target to the low-signature world of Al-Qaeda terrorism. There was also a concomitant failure in tradecraft whereby the old "case officer" model that had served well in Cold War embassies was finding itself of little use for the caves and fields of Afghanistan (Berkowitz, 2002). At a deeper level, there has also been a debate about whether Humint, which, as we have seen, is claimed by some to be the best and only way of effectively tackling a terrorist group (Jeffery, 1987), is realistically possible any longer when faced with a group such as Al-Qaeda, which is far more difficult for Western agencies to penetrate for a host of cultural, linguistic and logistical reasons. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the initial intelligence successes against an organisation such as the PIRA, which was a traditional hierarchical organisation mirroring a state army, led to a decision to establish a flatter and more cellular structure from the 1970s onwards which could not be so easily penetrated (Bamford, 2005). This mirrors a similar evolution of large transnational crime groups, such as Colombian drugs trafficking cartels, which appear to have reorganised themselves into a much more dispersed and difficult target group following successful counter-narcotics operations in the 1990s (Kenney, 2003). It is certainly the case that one of the central challenges for counterterrorism agencies that Al-Qaeda poses is its almost ephemeral and inspirational nature, which is very much at odds with the ways in which traditional terrorist groups were organised formerly.

Berkowitz's conclusion on the Humint versus Techint point is a nuanced one: first, we should not throw up our hands at the complexities of the new threat and consider that Humint is now impossible. There have been some great difficulties in this area, notably the case of the triple agent Humam al-Bilawi, whose suicide detonation inside a U.S. security facility at Khost, Afghanistan, in December 2009, inflicted the CIA's worst ever peacetime loss of life. For all such headline cases, we can reasonably assume there have been a number of Humint successes behind the scenes that have thwarted or disrupted potential attacks.

At the same time, technical intelligence gathering such as that from communications intercepts, for all its difficulties of language and code, is still going to be important in counterterrorism intelligence (Berkowitz, 2002). Indeed, Edward Snowden's revelations about the nature and

extent of NSA and GCHQ's interception and data-mining capabilities in recent years have only served to underline the seriousness with which the major intelligence agencies are viewing the development of cutting-edge Techint capabilities. Similarly, the keenness of governments such as that in the United Kingdom to enhance their data interception capabilities, and particularly the question of being able to move into the realm of internet-based communications, also underlines the continued significance of technical intelligence-gathering activities within the realm of counterterrorism.

In suggesting that the terror threat in the United Kingdom was at its highest level since the end of the Cold War, the head of MI5, Andrew Parker, recently focused on technical capabilities by making the bold claim that it was no longer possible for the police and intelligence agencies to obtain all the communications about suspected terrorists that they need from traditional warranted access (Dearden, 2015). Clearly, governments suspect that a combination of diverse and obscure methods of communication over the internet, enhanced almost every day by the appearance of new applications and technologies, and coupled with the increasing ability for non-state actors to use sophisticated encryption methods, are going to make a serious dent in their ability to continue to collect intelligence on the key terrorist targets. Some of these challenges require expensive technical solutions, as Snowden has uncovered, while some will require legislative changes to allow the government to intercept and analyse more data than it can currently.

Complications and dilemmas

However, calls by governments to be able to enhance their legal and technical capabilities in the realm of the surveillance of internet-based communications inevitably lead into a general public anxiety about the potential pitfalls of a Big Data world. Lyon describes a sort of "pan-optic panic" that is increasingly entering the discourse in modern liberal democracies, whereby fears of "mass surveillance" (itself a concept misconstrued by the media in many situations) and potential abuses of power by governments are looming large (Lyon, 2014). The MI5 chief's warnings about the level of terrorist threat in the United Kingdom, and the coupling of this warning with the need to enhance Techint capabilities, could be seen in a critical analysis as a form of official speech act that aims to ensure intelligence retains a central role in the discharge of counterterrorism policy, and continues to be resourced accordingly. Such warnings could be seen as evidence of Ulrich Beck's "risk society" (Beck, 2002). In Beck's analysis, prediction and risk are interrelated concepts: fear of the latter leads to an increasing desire for capability in the former, to attempt to block risks before they happen (Kerr and Earle, 2013: 68). Such pitfalls also underline the importance of trusted and reliable processes of parliamentary oversight of the intelligence agencies, such that the public can have trust in the government not exceeding its powers.

Orwellian fears of a Big Brother state, however, are not the only dilemmas faced by contemporary counterterrorism policymakers in the post-9/11 era (Richards, 2012). The dangers inherent in "policing the underside of globalisation" (Aldrich, 2009: 29), in which contemporary international terrorism poses one of the archetypal threats, are not only present in requirements for complicated new interfaces between policing and national security agencies already described, but also put pressure on governments to work with a wider, and in some cases, more unsavoury range of international partners.

The case of Afghanistan's reconstituted intelligence agency, the NDS, has been a prescient one. As an important part of the security sector reform process in Afghanistan during ISAF's campaign from 2001 onwards, difficulties in dealing with an intelligence agency that has

an extremely dark history from a human rights point of view has placed many of the ISAF partners in a perilous position. A number of accusations have arisen of systematic torture of suspects in NDS facilities (Gardham, 2010). In 2009, both Britain and Canada had to temporarily suspend handovers of detainees to the NDS when they were denied access to interview suspects in some Afghan facilities, suspecting that the suspects in question had been severely mistreated.

Such problems feed into the wider picture of extraordinary renditions and black facilities that seemed to be a feature of the immediate post-9/11 period, and which threatened to place Western powers in a seriously difficult ethical and moral position as the details emerge. There is no doubt that the aforementioned difficulties with Humint against contemporary terrorist targets have led Western intelligence agencies to widen the net of partner countries in the Middle East and beyond with whom they are prepared to have intelligence exchanges, since those countries will often have advanced Humint networks of their own in the relevant places and organisations. But this runs the risk of exchanging intelligence with regimes for whom torture and mistreatment of detainees is an established part of counterterrorism policy. The negative effects of this are twofold: first, the Western intelligence agencies and their governments are potentially placed in a very invidious ethical position, which can feed into radical anti-West narratives. Second, intelligence derived from torture usually leads to subsequent court cases collapsing and very substantial damages being awarded in order to avoid embarrassing exposure of sensitive material, with all the negative publicity attached. The case of Binyam Mohamed and his co-defendants, who ended up in Guantanamo Bay and were eventually awarded "millions" in compensation in 2010 (Wintour, 2010), is an indicative case among many.

Back in the domestic scene, the elevation of community intelligence within counterterrorism policy can deliver its own complications. The logic behind community intelligence strategies for the police is fairly clear; not least as a successful police service has a wider need to establish cooperative and supportive links with the communities it serves. The difficulties are that the state, through the police, must dance a difficult line between good community policing and accusations of spying on a particular "suspect community". As Heath-Kelly (2012) identified, there is also a contingent dilemma for the community itself, in that it can end up being both a critical friend and ally of the police in delivering security, and, at the same time, experience a degree of othering as a suspect community. There is some evidence that both Irish and Muslim communities have experienced such a dilemma at different times in the United Kingdom's history of terrorist threat. Moreover, in a major study of the effect of security policy on citizenship in the United Kingdom, Jarvis and Lister found amongst ethnic minority communities a "diminishment of citizenship that stems from anti-terrorism measures" (Jarvis and Lister, 2013: 672). The sense is that many in these communities feel they cannot fully participate in the political process since they are treated as othered, suspect communities without access to the key levers of power.

Policies such as Prevent in the United Kingdom have been shaped and reshaped a couple of times since its inception in 2005, reflecting the fact that this is a relatively new area of counterterrorism policy and will probably take several years to get right. In many cases, the police have enjoyed good links with the relevant communities and have been able to disrupt and pre-empt a number of potential problem cases. But complainants such as Arun Kundnani see these programmes as sinister fronts for gathering intelligence on the Muslim community at large, and this can have serious consequences for inter-community relations, not to mention cause problems for intelligence-gathering on terrorist threats (Kundnani, 2009). The moral hazards for any contemporary Western state in this area are wide-ranging.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that intelligence has been, and should continue to be, an inescapable part of counterterrorism policy. As Frank Kitson famously said of counterinsurgency operations, "the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him" (Kitson, 1971: 95). The same is true of terrorism today. Those planning terrorist operations are well aware that the state has a number of surveillance capabilities available to it, and that the terrorists will need to formulate their plans as covertly as possible if they are to be successful. The game for both sides is one of cat and mouse. It may be the case, as the PIRA famously informed the British government when it narrowly failed to assassinate the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in 1984, that the state has to be "lucky always" (Howard and Sawyer, 2002: 92). But the state can enhance its chances in the game by making sure it can obtain good intelligence on its foes.

The gathering of intelligence may be a morally dubious activity in essence. As the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson said in 1929, intelligence is not something done by gentlemen (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 169). At the same time, there could be an argument for intelligence-gathering having a strange sort of moral purpose and justification. This could apply on two levels. First, as a former Permanent Secretary at the U.K. Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan noted, it could be argued that some of the principles of "just war", such as actions of last resort to avert a major loss of life, could be applied to intelligence against the actions of terrorists plotting mass casualty attacks and thus given more than a little moral justification (Quinlan, 2007). Such sentiments were invoked by another British intelligence chief, Sir John Sawers, in a rare public speech when he was head of MI6:

> Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be seized. I'm glad they don't worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe. … You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.
>
> *(The Guardian, 2010)*

Here, the intelligence chief is echoing the words of the United Kingdom's Counter Terrorism Strategy, which states that the aim is to reduce the risk from terrorism, such that "people can go about their lives freely and with confidence" (HM Government, 2011: 3). His speech included many positive words about his staff, such as "pride" and "commitment", which emphasised both principles of public service and a moral legitimacy in the work of intelligence in countering terrorism.

Secondly, historical experiences of the use of intelligence against terrorists is that it can deliver a safer and more effective outcome than would be the case in a "shooting war", in the sense that disruption and foiling of plots is better than having to confront terrorists in violent confrontations or deal with the aftermath of attacks. As the experience of the long war against PIRA showed, instances in which terrorist suspects were shot by Special Forces were relatively few: far more important over the years was the continual undermining and disruption of activities through intelligence actions. In this way also, rather than being an uncomfortable activity of moral dubiousness, intelligence might actually be an ethically sound and justified part of counterterrorism.

With all of that said, it is clearly the case that intelligence in counterterrorism scenarios faces many moral hazards and pitfalls. Arguably, the post-9/11 period and the process of globalisation

that has run alongside it are showing these risks to be wider and more complex than ever before. For states conducting intelligence in the contemporary era, a fine line must be walked between effective intelligence-gathering to protect the security of citizens, and a host of ethical and reputational risks, the consequences of which can be deeply profound if the wrong choices are made for any government and its intelligence capability.

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35
ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS
The United Kingdom's unfinished history

Clive Walker

Introduction

Dates, events and anniversaries seem to loom large in reviews of anti-terrorism laws. For many scholars, the history of anti-terrorism laws (or at least their interest in them) commenced on 11 September 2001, the day that 'changed everything' (Cheney, 2003). However, for the United Kingdom, turning points in legal regimes can be located in both more distant and more recent events, all still marked by commemorations. In the past, signal events might include: the Omagh Bombing of 15 August 1998, the brutal message that the Good Friday Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland did not command universal acclaim amongst Republicans. Further back are tragic attacks such as the Lockerbie air disaster of 21 December 1988 (*HM Advocate v. Al Megrahi*, 2002 and 2008) and the Birmingham pub bombings of 1974, which not only sparked into life a new legal regime of anti-terrorism laws but also, through the miscarriages of justice which followed, shook the criminal justice system and prompted major revisions (Walker and Starmer, 1999). UK anti-terrorism laws can readily be excavated back to more ancient times (Walker, 2004), through a stratum of colonial regulations ending with rebels becoming statesmen and laws of Irish suppression and coercion over two or more centuries, including the infamous or glorious date of 24 April 1916 (the proclamation of the Irish Republic in Dublin). With such deep attendant controversy over the meanings of such events and the propriety of the anti-terrorism laws in response, it may be safer for the purposes of this chapter to remain in contemporary times and look forward from 11 September to include later significant dates, such as 7 July 2005, the London transport bombings which killed 52 civilians and four 'homegrown' extremists, who had been inspired by the violent ideology of Al-Qaeda (Home Office, 2006; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006). The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, issued a stark warning on 5 August 2005: 'Let no one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are changing' (Blair, 2005). In reality, the history of anti-terrorism laws has long been fluid and without a definite finish line, and Blair was no more able to master the tides of history than King Canute.

The starting points of 11 September 2001, and 7 July 2005, are appropriate for this contemporary survey since they emphasise the era of jihadi terrorism, with its global ambitions and disregard for mass civilian casualties, in contrast to the more confined nationalist and ethnic campaigns which predominated before those times. Though it remains debatable whether a 'new' terrorism has dawned (Neumann, 2009; Kurtulus, 2011; Spencer, 2011), the recognition

grew that individuals living in Muslim-heritage communities in Britain (and also elsewhere in Europe, especially France and Germany) would henceforth pose the major danger of terrorism. Thus, what might be termed 'neighbour terrorism' (Walker, 2009) has taken centre-stage rather than terrorism from alien or nationalist sources. The human and material wreckage of 7 July was also the catalyst for signalling major changes in U.K. counterterrorism policy and laws. A comprehensive strategy, entitled CONTEST, which had been prepared in secret by 2003 (Omand, 2010, p. 64), was unveiled to the public in 2006 (Home Office, 2006). The strategy includes the traditional approaches of 'Pursuit' (policing and criminal justice tactics). Protective security (dubbed 'Prepare' and 'Protect') is also highlighted, and this element builds on the Promethean and expensive duties of planning and resilience established in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Walker and Broderick, 2006). However, CONTEST also addresses the more pioneering and problematic agenda of 'Prevent' – 'tackling disadvantage and supporting reform… deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists… engaging in the battle of ideas' (Home Office, 2006, para. 6). Other major changes have included the reorganization of counterterrorism agencies, especially within the police service. There has also occurred the passage of further and often controversial counterterrorism laws, adding to the extensive catalogue already in place. The overall trend in law has been an increasing attention to criminal law, with greater emphasis on two trends – precursor crimes and crimes of expression and information. However, these trends in criminal law are not exclusive, and further developments in summary executive (Ministerial) powers have also continued to be manifest.

This chapter will consist of four substantive parts. First, the chapter will offer a sense of how counterterrorism laws evolved in the period from 11 September 2001 until 7 July 2005. In this way, a clearer understanding of the dynamism in terrorism and counterterrorism can be acquired. Second, the chapter will detail and analyse the changes after 7 July 2005. Third, the chapter will reflect upon the more contemporary policy re-evaluations which are being pushed by the phenomenon of the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Finally, some observations about the future will be offered.

UK anti-terrorism laws emergent in the 21st century

The Millennium was a major turning-point for UK anti-terrorism laws, but their initial transformation did not owe anything to the events of 11 September. Instead, the Terrorism Act 2000 marked an important new phase in the laws against political violence within the United Kingdom. That act established a more unified and permanent regime and brought about important modifications, with a greater emphasis upon international terrorism, and can be explained by four motivations.

The first is the growing awareness that the threat of terrorism is changing from modernist variants, which are typically based on organisations which champion nationality based on narrow ethnicity, to late modern internationalist networks, characterized by a multifaceted threat, unbounded by instrument, organization or location, and motivated by religious and cultural ideals rather than rooted in nationalist or political ideology. Thus, an inquiry by Lord Lloyd (1996) highlighted the need to adapt legislation to international terrorism, and, once the Terrorism Act 2000 was put in place, Al-Qaeda was legally proscribed (banned) right away in February 2001.

The second motivation for action was a more generalized concern to increase security and to reassure the public, reflecting a more fundamental switch away from reactive policing of incidents to proactive and pre-emptive policing and management of the risk from people and to places. The changes in favour of risk management are perhaps best explained by the development of a 'risk society', to use the idiom of Ulrich Beck, in which the inherent destabilization

involved in the process of 'reflexive modernization' (1992, p. 87) heightens the demand for security. This trend of proactivity exerts influence well beyond just counterterrorism legislation, which has derived shape from, and has influenced in turn, other areas of legal activity, including those relating to public order, drugs control and organized crime (Ashworth, Zedner and Tomlin, 2013).

A third policy strand adverts to the desire to deliver counterterrorism in a way which is entirely consistent with the protection of rights to liberty, privacy and expression. This issue had already been highlighted by official reviewers such as Lord Lloyd in 1996. However, the issue was given even more prominence and authority by the coming into force in 2000 of the Human Rights Act 1998. But the demand to take rights seriously is an easy mantra to express but more complicated to execute in this context. In particular, this third policy strand did not rule out the resort to derogation under Article 15 which was lodged on 18 December 2001, to allow for detention without trial under Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. However, it has placed parameters on the indefinite reliance on extreme measures which would require derogation notices and has ruled out the recourse to a 'war on terror' approach which would involve explicit breaches of human rights beyond even the indulgence of a derogation at least as a matter of domestic policy and to some extent even abroad (Walker, 2012). However, the standards of international humanitarian law and not international human rights law alone govern activities abroad in areas where there is no effective exertion of state authority, including the use of drones in 2015 to kill two British citizens in Syria who were allegedly plotting attacks in the United Kingdom on behalf of Islamic State in Syria (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2016).

The fourth policy strand has involved a determination to justify and adopt distinct anti-terrorist laws as a permanent code, represented by the Terrorism Act 2000. That legislation contrasts with its predecessors, as indicated by the words 'Temporary Provisions' in their titles and by sunset clauses which required periodic affirmation and renewal. The switch to a permanent code can be justified by at least three reasons: the need to signal the determination of the state through express powers and duties, including to defend life and democracy; the illegitimacy of terrorism as a mode of political expression; and the need to respond to terrorism as a specialized form of criminality that presents peculiar difficulties in terms of policing and criminal process because of atypical methods and targets, as well as the sophistication of their organization and training and the transnational scale of their activities in some cases.

Although the Terrorism Act 2000 represented a new phase in counterterrorism, it was by no means a revolutionary legal restatement. Whilst its permanent format was a significant departure, its substantive contents were still largely shaped by predecessor codes and can be divided into three broad themes (Walker, 2011). The first, and arguably most important, is the empowerment of police investigators, with wider than normal powers to arrest, detain (the limit being currently set at 14 days after arrest: Schedule 8), question, search, and forensically test. The second involves additional criminal offences to ensure that suitable charges could apply at an early stage of terrorist plots – what might be termed precursor terrorism crimes (sections 57, 58). Third, Ministerial powers of intervention have remained, such as the proscription (banning) of groups.

In summary, 9/11 did not inflict as much of a shock on the United Kingdom's system as on many other countries. Nevertheless, the attacks of 11 September 2001, which inflicted 67 British deaths in New York, did evince a further response in the shape of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, under which detention without trial was introduced for foreign terror suspects. These powers became untenable in late 2004 because of the House of Lords' 'Belmarsh' decision (*A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*, 2004, as confirmed in 2009). Yet, the determination to hang onto this executive strand of powers is demonstrated by their

replacement with control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and then the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMs). Ministerial powers also remain available to freeze terrorist assets under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 2; the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Part 5; the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010; the Afghanistan (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1893; and the Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/2742.

Unfinished business after 7/7 and beyond

Already forearmed with most conceivable varieties of powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, there were few manifest legal gaps exposed by the events of 7 July 2005. Nevertheless, the ensuing months witnessed the delivery of some startling assaults on individual rights, especially through the Terrorism Act 2006, for which the European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 was cited as providing added legitimacy, and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. As a result, anti-terrorism laws continued to evolve.

The mixed picture of high-profile executive powers – detention without trial, control orders, and TPIMs – alongside criminal prosecution altered but did not disappear. In this period, the emphasis shifted to the primacy of criminal prosecution. Thus, the then-Home Office Minister Tony McNulty announced in 2008 that 'prosecution is – first, second and third – the government's preferred approach when dealing with suspected terrorists' (2008). The United Kingdom policy of criminal prosecution has been implemented in at least five ways by legal reformulations since 7/7.

The first is that police investigation powers have been further expanded in an effort to find viable evidence against suspects. There are several such examples in Part 1 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, whereby the police gained powers to remove documents for examination, to take fingerprints and bodily samples, and to share information with other agencies. More controversial is Part 2, which allows for post-charge questioning and only came into force, after many doubts about the propriety of the reform in an adversarial setting, in 2012 (Walker, 2016). However, this expansive trend has also been subjected to the selective application of liberalization, with two noteworthy results. One has been the reduction of post-arrest police detention powers in terrorism cases from 28 to 14 days maximum, albeit with a reserve power to restore 28 days in an emergency (under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, sections 57, 58). Even more drastic (since it has potentially affected tens of thousands of people and not just hundreds) has been the reform of suspicionless stop and search counterterrorism powers, involving stricter criteria for invocation, application and review (under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 59). These reforms have brought about the effective termination of the use of area searches for terrorism purposes in Britain, though other powers remain vibrant at ports/airports and in Northern Ireland under the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, sections 21, 24.

The second way in which criminalization has been reinforced is by additions to the catalogue of precursor crimes which are formulated to allow early intervention. These had existed since the Terrorism Act 2000, whereby sections 57 and 58 allow for conviction on the basis of materials or information which might be useful to terrorism. A high proportion of terrorism prosecutions were for these offences (Walker, 2014, chap. 6). But the possibility of prosecution for precursor crimes was significantly augmented by the Terrorism Act 2006 which added three offences: engaging in conduct in preparation of terrorism contrary to section 5, and training offences contrary to sections 6 and 8.

A third aspect, and reinforcing policies both of precursor crimes and 'Prevent', are the extra offences set out in the Terrorism Act 2006, sections 1 and 2, of direct and indirect incitement to terrorism (Walker, 2014, chap. 2). These are complex offences which demand a little more than an 'apology of terrorism' because they contain a requirement of the likelihood of emulation in present circumstances of terrorism activity. Few prosecutions have ensued, and so the main impact has been the symbolic denunciation of extremist speech and also the issuance of a standing threat designed to chill extremist speech. The main site of contestation is the Internet, which is policed not by prosecutions but by administrative modes of engagement between police and communications service providers in which requests through the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit for the take-down of extremist materials are readily actioned.

A fourth aspect of criminal justice net-widening is that the Terrorism Act 2006, section 17, extends jurisdiction for offences in the Terrorism Act 2006, sections 1, 6 (in part), and 8 to 11, and in the Terrorism Act 2000, sections 11 (1) and 54. Section 17 gives effect to Art. 14 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in regard to the offences in sections 1 and 6. Section 8 is included, since it is notorious that much terrorist training occurs abroad. Article 9 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 is the basis for the extension to sections 9 to 11. The extensions did not include sections 57 or 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 or sections 5 and 6 (in part) of the Terrorism Act 2006. In view of the growing activities of FTFs, these 'loopholes' in regard to the Terrorism Act 2006 offences only were closed by the Serious Crime Act 2015, section 81, though evidence-gathering from Iraq and Syria will often be reliant upon Internet communications provided by the boastful FTFs themselves.

The fifth aspect of boosting criminal prosecution involves the provision of harsher penalties. The English judges have long emphasised punishment, retribution, and deterrence, without much weight for rehabilitation (Lennon and Walker, 2015, chap. 30). This trend culminated in a whole life sentence for Michael Adebolajo, one of the killers who attempted to decapitate a soldier, Lee Rigby, in Woolwich in 2013 (*R v. Adebolajo and Adebowale*, 2014). Nevertheless, harsh sentencing has also been endorsed by Parliament. Thus, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Part 3, ensures that terrorism is treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. Furthermore, Part 4 sets up a system of notification and restrictive conditions for decades after release from prison. Next, Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 increases the maximum penalty on indictment for various terrorism-related offences and also adds some terrorism offences to the enhanced dangerous offenders sentencing scheme. And it creates a new custodial sentence for certain terrorism-related offenders in order to rule out automatic release halfway through their sentence and requires Parole Board approval after a risk assessment as well as adding a mandatory year of release under supervision for those who serve out their whole custodial terms.

Has this policy of criminalization worked? It has in the sense that there is a steady stream of arrests, with a low charge rate but a high conviction rate, and also far fewer recent allegations of police maltreatment or miscarriages of justice. Around 120 terrorist convicts are held in prison at any one time. Amongst the drawbacks are the financial costs of trial and imprisonment, the need for high levels of proof, and the dangers of proof in open court to the viability of investigative techniques and informants. Despite the latter drawbacks, the criminal courts have largely remained open and normal, though non-jury trials persist under the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 for that jurisdiction alone, and civil litigation can be subjected to Closed Material Procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013 so as to protect national security interests (Walker, 2015).

An important proviso to this emphasis on criminalization is that one should not discount the executive measures against terrorism. While detention without trial ended in 2005, there were

successive replacements with control orders and now TPIMs, which have both allowed severe intrusions into the lives of designated suspects. Furthermore, the slightly more relaxed regime of TPIMs compared to control orders has now in part been reversed by the reintroduction in 2015 of a power of relocation (or what critics call 'internal exile') under that Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, section 16. At the same time, the numbers of persons affected by TPIMs (or other executive powers such as proscription or financial sanctions) are very modest compared to arrests and prosecutions.

Aside from criminalisation, arguably the most important development in anti-terrorism has been the elaboration and eventual legalisation of the 'Prevent' element in the United Kingdom's CONTEST strategy. 'Prevent' has become an unprecedented and high priority element within United Kingdom anti-terrorism and is addressed at many levels, both domestic and international. While the policy development of 'Prevent' is in principle sound, its delivery since 2006 has proven highly problematic. Challenging aspects include uncertain and confused policy boundaries with community integration agendas, weak analysis and rationales in terms of alleged causal links between radicalization and terrorism and therefore programmes of 'treatment', the perception of net-widening and spying on minority communities, the state employment of former extremists with highly disreputable records, and inadequate audit (Home Office, 2011; Thomas, 2012; Huq, 2013; Spalek, 2013; Ali and Stuart, 2014). As a result of these criticisms, the 'Prevent' policy was subjected by the Home Office to a major review in 2011 (Home Office, 2011), as a result of which the policy became more security-oriented, with aspects of community cohesion being left to other policies. One impact has been a reinforcement of counselling of individuals at risk through the 'Channel Programme' (Home Office, 2012).

Conspicuously absent from the formulation of 'Prevent', even after 2011, was any legal basis. Given that critics were not noticeably assuaged by the 2011 reforms and that the advent of the FTF phenomenon after 2011 reinforced official determination to address 'indoctrination' and 'de-indoctrination', despite some local resistance, further legal reforms have followed in 2015. Part 5 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, entitled the 'Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism Etc', puts 'Prevent' (including the flagship Channel Programme) on a statutory footing, but the legislation does so in a selective way by which an unembellished framework approach is adopted (Blackbourn and Walker, 2016). Still, it is to be hoped that this belated legal intervention will engender greater standardization and transparency through the checking of outputs and their quality, though the initial iteration more modestly underpins existing arrangements rather than strikes out in new directions.

The general 'Prevent' duties are set out in Chapter 1 of Part 5. Section 26 (1) imposes on specified authorities the general 'Prevent' duty that they must have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Schedule 6 lists the specified authorities as local authorities, prison and probation authorities, education bodies, health and social care bodies, and the police. Back-up enforcement Ministerial powers are set out in sections 29 and 30. The broad and undifferentiated duty under section 26 is moderated in the cases of higher and further education, which forlornly sought total immunity because of the greater importance and fragility of academic freedom but did manage to secure some special attention. Thus, by section 31 (2), the proprietor or governing body of a higher and further education institution must have 'particular regard' to the duty to secure freedom of speech, as specified by section 43 (1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, and to the importance of academic freedom, as described in section 202 (2) (a) of the Education Reform Act 1988. Section 31 (3) places corresponding duties on the Secretary of State to pay regard to those values when issuing guidance or directions. The other concession to academic sensibilities is in section 32. Relevant higher and further education bodies can be monitored by authorities already in that sector rather than by

the Secretary of State, subject to an order of delegation. However, the Secretary of State retains under section 32 the power to give directions. The details of the new duties remain based on general and sector-specific guidance.

Chapter 2 of Part 5 deals with 'Support etc for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism', which essentially is a reference to what in England and Wales is called the 'Channel Programme'. Under section 36, the Programme becomes a statutory obligation for local authorities to maintain. Chapter 2 is another welcome step towards legality, but is the Channel enterprise worthwhile? The official assertions that the Channel Programme has been successful are not sustained by published evidence. Performance measures in terms of referral rates, costs, and outcomes are not specified. Furthermore, the definitions of 'extremism', 'radicalization', and 'Britishness' remain lacking in legal certainty.

The FTF phenomenon

The shockingly flagrant killing on 22 May 2013 (another landmark date) of Lee Rigby in Woolwich by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale (*R v. Adebolajo and Adebowale*, 2014) was instructive. It revealed that the phenomenon of FTFs existed before the advent of the Islamic State and other extreme groupings in Syria and Iraq. Thus, Adebolajo had been intercepted in Kenya in 2010 before he could join up with Al-Shabaab in Somalia. But for every such instance of interception, a greater number of would-be jihadis manage to evade the checks. After the battlefields of Iraq and Syria became more readily available than those of Afghanistan or Somalia, some debate ensued as to whether FTFs represent a greater terrorism threat than what existed before. Only a minority of returnees engage in attacks at home, but those who do resume militant operations are more effective exponents than non-veterans (Hegghammer, 2013; Hegghammer and Nesser, 2015; Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, 2015). After the major attacks in France and Belgium in late 2015 and early 2016 (as well as attacks on Western tourists in Tunisia and Egypt), the need for a review of security laws became pressing. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 (UNSCR 2178) delivered an unequivocal call to action by requiring states to address the FTF threat by preventing suspects from entering or transiting their territories and by passing legislation to prosecute FTFs (art. 1–10). There is also mention of 'Countering Violent Extremism in Order to Prevent Terrorism' (art. 15–16). The international demand for action has also been answered by the Council of Europe's Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2015, which demands the criminalization of participating in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism (creating for the first time an international power of proscription), receiving training for terrorism, and travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism.

The two abiding concerns of UNSCR 2178, foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) activities and Countering Violent Extremism responses, became the principal pillars of the United Kingdom's Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The implementation of 'Prevent' has already been considered, but the U.K. government has indicated an intention to legislate even further – against 'extremism' which is not related to violence but will be subject to executive orders about banning, disruption and closure (HM Government, 2015).

As for direct measures against FTFs, Part 1 of the 2015 Act seeks to interdict FTFs by preventing suspects from travelling and dealing with those already here who pose a risk (Blackbourn and Walker, 2016). For outgoing FTFs, section 1 provides that when a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is attempting to leave the United Kingdom for the purposes of involvement in terrorism-related activity abroad, powers to require production of, search for, inspection of, and retention of, that person's travel documents (meaning a passport and tickets)

may be applied. In order to retain any travel document, the constable must seek authorization from a senior police officer (at least of the rank of superintendent) as soon as possible, and authorization may be granted on the same reasonable grounds for suspicion. If authorization is granted, the travel document may be retained for up to 14 days. Extension of the 14-day period is considered by a judicial authority and must be granted (for up to 30 days in total) if satisfied that the investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously. After 30 days, and in the absence of other independent legal proceedings, the travel documents must be returned.

Alongside powers to interdict suspected outgoing FTFs, the legislation equally seeks to interdict incoming FTFs with a system of Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) in section 2 to 15 and Schedules 2 to 4. By section 2 (2), the Secretary of State may impose a TEO provided five conditions (A to E) in subsections (3) to (7) have been satisfied: the Secretary of State must reasonably suspect that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorist-related activity outside the United Kingdom, must reasonably consider that it is necessary to impose a TEO to protect the public in the United Kingdom from a risk of terrorism, must reasonably consider that the individual is outside the United Kingdom when the order is imposed, and the individual must have the right of abode in the United Kingdom. In addition, the TEO may be imposed only after a court has given prior permission or, if the case is urgent, with subsequent referral and permission. The prime purpose of TEOs is not actually exclusion but managed return. Therefore, sections 5 to 8 deal with arrangements for a form of supervised return. The management of the returnee does not end at the border. Instead, by section 9, obligations can be imposed after return. The obligations amount to a kind of TPIM-lite regime. The main policy objection to TEOs is that they represent a disincentive to return and thereby encourage the adoption of terrorism as a way of life. The result is to some extent to 'export risk' to third countries, especially as affected foreign authorities probably will have less information and capability to deal with the risk than the United Kingdom.

Conclusion

The official assessment is that 'the UK faces a serious and sustained threat from terrorism' (Cabinet Office, 2010, para. 2.77). As a result, the security threat level was increased to 'severe' on 29 August 2014, signifying that an attack is highly likely. Within this heightened sense of public vulnerability, a holistic counterterrorism strategy, such as represented by CONTEST, seems appropriate. It is hoped that the United Kingdom will continue to emphasise the need to respond to 'neighbour' terrorism primarily through prosecution, backed by the further management of anticipatory risk through tactics of Prevent, Prepare and Protect. But with risk-based responses comes uncertainty, giving rise to the inevitability that innocent persons and communities will be unevenly affected and that the discomfort of state intervention will not easily be confined to exceptional situations bounded by temporal, spatial or communal divisions.

Even after paying the price of the existing discomforts of counterterrorism policies, laws, and practices, one can be certain that not every catastrophe will be averted. The cultural induction of immigrant communities into Western values and lifestyles will prove very difficult owing to the perceived shallowness of those lifestyles and the hypocrisy in the adherence to proclaimed ideals. It is also difficult to compete in the marketplace of ideas against the narratives of jihadism which speak in simplistic, hedonistic, and graphic language not available to official spokespersons. As a result, the dismal prospect is that, no matter how much the state strives to counter international terrorism, current emanations of violent extremism will take generations to assuage and will demand more than the efforts of a transitory government in one corner of Europe. It is also predictable that the United Kingdom state will in the meantime continue to

generate new proposals for suppression of activities, some of which will be sensible and some alarmingly counter-productive.

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36

PUBLIC SUPPORT AND (COUNTER) TERRORISM

Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Bart Schuurman

Introduction

This chapter focuses on public support as a key resource that both terrorists and the state forces that oppose them must acquire and maintain if they are to achieve success. The general public, we will argue, is in the case of terrorist campaigns not merely a spectator on the sidelines but an active participant. The public is an actor that needs to be engaged, surprised, shocked and won over in order to bring closer the goals the terrorist group espouses (Boyla 2015; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006). To paraphrase Sluka (1989), terrorists may not need widespread active support, but they cannot survive the active hostility of their popular base. This applies equally to those attempting to counter terrorist activities. Without a degree of support and a larger measure of at least acquiescence, counterterrorism policies are unlikely to succeed, irrespective of whether they reflect a 'soft' or 'hard' approach.

Both violent non-state actors and the authorities tasked with opposing them have long recognized the importance of public support (Silke, 2000). Mao Tse-tung likened guerrillas to fish for whom the people formed the sea. According to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 'in the absence of [popular support], the Islamic mujahid movement would be crushed' (Stohl, 2006). The idea of 'the people' as key to victory in armed conflict has also been emphasized in treatises on how to deal with insurrectionary war (Kitson, 1971; Thompson, 1966). More recently, Smith (2006) has argued that modern warfare has entered a new paradigm of 'war amongst the people'; conflicts in which the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is increasingly difficult to make and which predominantly take place in urban settings rather than battlefields. With regard to military doctrine, the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency field manual FM 3-24 places central importance on the role of the population, heralding a shift from enemy-centric counterinsurgency to a population-centric approach (Petraeus and Amos, 2006).[1]

Despite such broad recognition for the importance of public support in terrorism-related conflicts, the topic has received relatively little academic attention (Boylan, 2015; Malthaner and Waldmann, 2014). This chapter provides an overview of research on the link between public support and (counter) terrorism. It begins with a discussion of how to understand the relationship between public support and (counter) terrorism. This is followed by a look at how such support can be gained as well as the forms it can take. The chapter then expands on how public

support is able to influence the efficacy of (counter) terrorist campaigns and what makes this factor so relevant to understanding success or failure in the fight against terrorism.

Conceptualizing public support for terrorism

In an attempt to understand the constitutive features of war, Carl von Clausewitz identified a now famous 'trinity' of politics, the armed forces and the people (Von Clausewitz, 1993).[2] This trinity has become a source of controversy, with critics arguing that Clausewitz's notion of war is too state-centric to be applicable to contemporary armed conflicts in which non-state actors such as insurgents and terrorists play important roles (Kaldor, 2010). Clausewitz, however, was very much cognizant of different types of warfare, such as the guerrilla campaign waged against Napoleon's troops in Spain, and there is now considerable support for the idea that the trinity can be adapted to study the violence of non-state actors as well (Daase, 2007; Duyvesteyn, 2005). Whether state, terrorist organization or insurgent group, in all cases a distinction can be made between a leadership element, front-line fighters and the people who constitute the active and passive base of support.

In interstate war, the opposing sides can each be described by their separate trinities of people, armed forces and government. Terrorism, however, is a form of warfare characterized by a significant degree of overlap with regard to the 'people' element of the combatants' respective trinities. Outside of a core group of committed supporters and a larger segment of those who provide passive assistance, what Malthaner and Waldmann (2014) have termed the 'radical milieu' from which terrorist groups emerge, both the state and its non-state challengers vie for the support of the same group of people: the uncommitted masses (Duyvesteyn and Fumerton, 2009). In 'irregular' conflicts, the people are not just bystanders or victims but a resource of crucial importance to all combatants.

A distinction can be made both in the types of popular support and the means by which it is acquired (Boylan, 2015; Browne and Silke, 2011; Paul, 2009). First, it can be active or passive. While both governments and non-state actors need to avoid engendering outright hostility, for the latter in particular the degree of active support required depends on the aims being pursued and whether violence is seen as acceptable means. Executing a campaign of terrorist violence does not necessarily require a particularly large number of active supporters. On the other hand, violent non-state actors who seek to wrestle political power and territorial control from the state cannot do without active support from large segments of the population (Le Blanc, 2013).

With regard to *how* popular support can be attained, Boylan (2015) distinguishes between enticement and coercion. In the latter case, terrorists simply demand a population's support through the use of intimidation or outright violence. Enticement can take several forms; terrorists may provoke state forces to overreact in an attempt to garner support from a population or engage in daring and dramatic attacks such as suicide bombings for similar ends (Atran, 2009). Research by Bloom (2004) indicates that in situations where multiple terrorist groups vie for the support of the same population base, these groups may also attempt to 'outbid' their rivals through spectacular attacks or engage in direct violence with their competitors.[3] Finally, groups with sufficient resources may also provide social services (e.g. Hamas, Hezbollah) or even complete social and political alternatives to reigning governments in the areas under their control (e.g. Mao's revolutionary forces, Peru's Shining Path) that, at least initially, can attract considerable supporters. Of the two routes to acquiring popular support, enticement appears to be preferential, as research indicates that ruling by consent is a more sustainable route to political power (Dahl, 1965).

The type of support a terrorist group can count on should be taken into account when designing counterterrorism policies (Boylan, 2015). Support garnered through violence and intimidation may be relatively easier to disrupt than that which is given voluntarily, provided the authorities can guarantee the safety of those who would abandon this forced allegiance. As the recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, providing such guarantees is especially difficult when operating on foreign soil for a (relatively) limited period of time. Furthermore, dealing with active and passive supporters effectively is likely to require approaches specifically tailored to these different groups (Faria and Arce, 2005). The remainder of this chapter will focus on some of the various ways in which states can combat terrorism, using historical examples to illustrate how such measures can influence the distribution of popular support for the government and its non-state challengers.

Counterterrorism and popular support

A state facing a serious and concerted terrorist campaign has several courses of action open to it. First, a general distinction in counterterrorism responses can be made between the war model, adopted, for example, in the campaign against al-Qaeda, and the criminal justice model, followed in many cases of domestic terrorism (Ganor, 2005; Weinberg, 2008). More specifically, five different categories of counterterrorism policies can be distinguished. A state can decide to do nothing; it can attempt to conciliate its opponents, for instance through socioeconomic measures or negotiations; it can expand the legal means available to prosecute terrorism; it can rely on the police and intelligence services to restrict terrorists' ability to operate; or it can utilize outright violence (Miller, 2007).

In practice, there are few examples of states doing nothing after a terrorist attack. The Italian government's initial response to the domestic terrorism that flared up in the late 1960s was decidedly lacklustre, yet this does not appear to have been a consciously chosen strategy but rather the result of an underestimation of the terrorist threat (Meade, 1990). Indeed, more generally there is often too much political pressure for a state to let the use of violence by non-state actors go unanswered (Mueller, 2005). Public support can be gained or strengthened by acting, and when confronted by terrorism, a government's support among its citizens is often best served by being seen to respond forcefully (Malvesti, 2003).

A conciliatory counterterrorism strategy can be a hard sell for governments. For instance, most will claim never to negotiate with terrorists even if in reality many of them do (Toros, 2008). Contacts can range from top-secret, small-scale encounters between security service personnel and terrorists, to conferences at which high-level government officials negotiate directly with terrorist leaders or their representatives. The concessions being negotiated can range from the relatively small, such as an exchange of prisoners, to attempts at long-term conflict resolution. Whether such deals come to fruition is not only dependent on the skill of the negotiators or their ability to build rapport with their enemies. Crucially, both sides are limited in the concessions they can make by the degree to which these will be acceptable to their respective constituents. The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by a right-wing extremist and the suicide attacks carried out by Palestinian terrorist groups illustrate the extreme degrees of opposition that conciliatory policies can engender (Barak, 2005).

When faced with terrorism, politicians and citizens frequently call for broader powers for the police and the criminal justice system. In the early 1980s, the Italian government enacted legal reforms that made it possible for terrorists who surrendered to the authorities, confessed their crimes and provided information on comrades still at large, to receive significantly reduced sentences. These measures were highly controversial, yet the 'penitence laws' were very effec-

tive against the Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*, BR), a left-wing terrorist group that had been responsible for hundreds of attacks since the late 1960s (Weinberg, 2007). However, when similar measures were used by the British authorities against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), their longer-term impact was negligible. The so-called 'supergrass trials' of the early 1980s failed to significantly degrade the PIRA's ability to operate (Kennedy-Pipe, 1997). How can such similar counterterrorism approaches yield such disparate results?

In Italy, the BR's increasingly indiscriminate violence had isolated it from even its most ardent supporters. The organization was also suffering from an increasing number of its members being arrested or killed. To many of those who were left, the penitence laws represented a last and only way out (Hewitt, 1990; Weinberg, 2007). The PIRA, on the other hand, continued to enjoy significant levels of grassroots support and remained a viable organization as a result. In turn, the number of potential informants was lower; those who turned 'supergrass' were often first captured and induced to talk in order to avoid long sentences, rather than people who came forward on their own volition. While certainly not the only factor at play, public support was arguably a crucial determinant of why legal reforms worked in Italy but largely failed in the fight against the PIRA (Hewitt, 1990; Hoffman and Morrison Taw, 1992; Moxon-Browne, 1981).

The use of the police and intelligence services to restrict terrorists' freedom of operation has also been a frequently employed course of action. The state stands to gain when it successfully identifies and apprehends terrorist suspects and rounds up terrorist cells in a lawful and legitimate fashion. For instance, research by Tyler *et al.* (2010) on counterterrorism policing in the United States has demonstrated that Muslim Americans are more likely to lend their cooperation when such policies are perceived as legitimate and fair. Conversely, excessive and abusive powers of the intelligence services can produce a significant backlash. The revelations by Edward Snowden in June 2013, but also the COINTELPRO scandal in the 1970s, demonstrated that these powers need to be carefully used to be effective. Perceived excesses on behalf of its security services or police forces can cost the state dear in public support for its counterterrorist operations.

The use of outright violence to counter terrorism is frequently associated with the deployment of military forces. Again, public support is a crucial variable determining the efficacy of this course of action. The Vietnam War demonstrated that insufficient public support 'at home' can fatally undermine the effective utilization of military means. In the context of a counterterrorist campaign, no less important is the way in which potential supporters of the terrorist group being targeted view the use of military power. Assassinating terrorist leaders ('targeted killing') may have temporary tactical utility, but groups targeted in this fashion have proven remarkably resilient. Dead terrorists can be venerated as martyrs and become rallying points for continued resistance and recruitment. Furthermore, the inevitable collateral damage that accompanies the use of the military instrument can seriously undermine a government's legitimacy, lead to increased support for its violent non-state challengers, engender a desire for revenge and thus keep all sides locked in an escalating spiral of violence (Byman, 2006; Carvin, 2012). As Stohl (2006) argues, the ways in which audiences react to counterterrorism policies can be as important as the short-term benefits provided by the elimination of particular terrorists or terrorist capabilities.

The previous paragraphs suggest that counterterrorism measures' effectiveness is less dependent on the type of measures employed than on their impact on the configuration of public support for both the state and its violent non-state challenger. As various scholars have pointed out, in the cases where terrorists were successful in attaining their stated goals, they enjoyed a significant measure of public support (Charters, 1994; Cronin, 2006; Paul, 2010; Schuurman,

2013; Wood, 2010). A primary consideration for states facing a terrorist challenger would therefore be to design and implement measures intended to maintain as much popular support whilst minimizing that of their opponent (De Mesquita, 2005). However, an important qualification is that most of these findings apply to (nominally) democratic states. Authoritarian regimes may be less affected by the need to maintain popular legitimacy (Byman, 2016). In fact, some scholars have pointed to the Russian intervention in Chechnya as an example of a successful counterterrorism operation that relied exclusively on all-out repression (Mandel, 2015; Zhukov, 2012).

Characteristics of public support and the perception of legitimacy

Public support is often difficult to gauge, particularly in times of crisis or civil conflict. Public support can be measured by looking at opinion polls, sentiments expressed in the media or turn-out in demonstrations or elections. Recruitment potential in the security forces might also provide an indication of support. When terrorists and counterterrorist forces are in competition over the support of the general public, an important precondition for gaining and maintaining such support seems to be the degree to which the political actors are perceived to be *legitimate*. Terrorists need to prove that their claims to legitimacy are strong and credible. They can appeal to the lack of legitimacy of their opponent but may also appeal to particular group-based identities or grievances to substantiate such claims. At least initially, the state is generally at an advantage in this regard, as its authority has frequently been established for decades or centuries, enabling powerful claims to legitimacy based on precedent, tradition or nationhood.

Actions that substantiate these legitimacy claims are equally significant in the struggle for popular support. Here terrorists often run into the limitations of what Neumann and Smith (2007) have called the escalation trap. The continued need to raise the level of violence to garner attention and demonstrate resolve and capability will be curbed by the maximum level of force that the terrorist's intended audience is willing to support for the cause being pursued. Terrorist and counterterrorist forces are prone to miscalculate the type of measures or the degree of violence their respective constituents are willing to stomach. Public support has a qualitative aspect which imposes limitations on the types of violent behaviour those who wish to acquire or maintain this support can engage in (Schuurman, 2013).

On 21 July 1972, 'Bloody Friday', the PIRA detonated 26 bombs in Belfast's city centre, an act of terrorism that was perceived to be so indiscriminate that a public outrage ensued. The temporary lapse in popular support for the PIRA created a window of opportunity for the British forces to launch a large-scale military operation (Bennett, 2010). Similarly, when the Quebecois terrorist group FLQ, fighting for the Canadian province's independence, murdered two politicians in October 1970, they rose to a level of violence that the majority of their supporters were simply not willing to countenance. Support for the group appeared to plummet almost overnight, while the previously embattled Canadian authorities suddenly found themselves empowered by a popular mandate to pursue a more strident counterterrorism approach (Parker, 2007).

Essentially the same sequence of events led to the BR's loss of public support in the late 1970s. A second generation of militants had come to prominence in the middle of that decade who oversaw an expansion of violence both in terms of the number of attacks and those who were targeted. This led to several grievous miscalculations, including the infamous murder of statesman Aldo Moro in 1978 and the killing of communist and trade-union member Guido Rossa in 1979. Thousands of Italians, including those whose political leanings had previously made them sympathetic towards the BR, were outraged and took to the streets to demonstrate against the terrorist organization. The widespread loss of popular support that the BR suffered

as a result made it increasingly vulnerable to the authorities' counterterrorism policies, and it was against this background that the penitence laws described earlier could have their effect (De Graaf, 2011).

Davis *et al.* (2012) and Reed (2013) are some of the authors who show that violence against civilians can undermine popular support for non-state actors. As the examples given above suggest, this conclusion might be amended with the qualification that it is not the use of violence against civilians per se that can produce such a loss of support, but rather that this occurs only when that violence is *perceived to be* excessive or indiscriminate. State forces are by no means exempt from the risk that an excessive use of force will result in a critical loss of popular support. Numerous authors warn that overreaction to a terrorist attack or an insufficiently discriminate use of force to combat terrorism can delegitimize state forces, increase the appeal of the terrorist groups, engender a desire for revenge and thus produce an escalation of conflict-related violence levels (Kalyvas, 2006; Parker, 2007; Silke, 2005).[4] In short, public support for both terrorists and counterterrorist forces can be seen as setting boundaries for the measures that these opposing sides can use, beyond which they risk a loss of legitimacy. These boundaries, however, are liable to expand or contract as the conflict develops.

Responsible for these shifts in the configuration of public support are the interaction between terrorists and counterterrorists and the passage of time. It is clear from the Clausewitzian conception of war that neither side fights in a vacuum but that both face thinking, adaptive opponents who will react to each other's moves while planning their own. This interaction can have a considerable effect on the distribution of public support for the combatants. When one side is perceived to use excessive force or illegitimate means, public support for the other combatant is likely to undergo a qualitative shift towards a position where more violence, or violence of a less discriminate nature, can be used without the risk of losing popular standing. Because these effects are reciprocal, an escalation dynamic is born that can increase conflict-related violence levels (Schuurman, 2013).

In both Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and the decades' old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, negotiations intended to reach a long-term settlement did not occur until significant war-weariness had set in among the combatants.[5] This resembles an argument made by Zartman (2001), which holds that states and violent non-state actors will both prefer unilateral victory to any negotiated settlement. Only when a 'mutually hurting stalemate' sets in and both sides realize that they will not be able to achieve strategic military victory do negotiations become a serious alternative. Whether or not concessions or negotiations will form an effective means for ending terrorism-related conflicts therefore appears to depend to a significant degree on the public's perception of whether a one-sided victory is possible.

Conclusion

Public support is widely understood to be an important resource both for terrorists or insurgents and the governments they oppose. This chapter sought to explore what public support is and how it influences the course of terrorism-related conflicts. Utilizing Clausewitz's trinitarian view of war, public support was conceptualized as a key resource over which state and non-state actors compete. An important difference between interstate 'conventional' war and intrastate 'irregular' war is that whereas the former is characterized by two or more sides with their own populations, the latter is frequently fought among, against and ultimately for the same population. Public support for terrorists and governments can be further conceptualized as consisting of an inner circle of core supporters, a broader group that provides passive assistance and a large 'outer circle' of people whose support is to be gained; either through voluntary enticement or coercive means.

Success for either state or non-state actors in a violent conflict becomes highly unlikely when they are faced with pervasive outright hostility. Yet public support is a resource whose value varies with the goals being pursued and the type of regime or non-state organization pursuing them. Democratic states are likely to be more heavily reliant on public support than non-democratic ones. Groups pursuing a campaign of terrorism are far less reliant on widespread active support than insurgents attempting to gain political power and territorial control. Despite such important variations, it seems clear that public support empowers those who manage to attain it. Crucially, however, public support appears to come with a qualitative dimension that determines whether certain terrorist acts or counterterrorism measures are seen as legitimate.

Public support provides states and terrorists with a mandate to act, providing room for manoeuvre but also setting boundaries to what is seen as the legitimate pursuit of shared goals. When terrorists escalate to a quantity or quality of violence deemed excessive by their (potential) supporters, they risk triggering a (temporary) loss of legitimacy that can empower their government opponents. Vice versa, when states enact controversial counterterrorism measures, and especially when they are perceived as using excessive force, public support could shift in favour of their non-state adversaries; creating opportunities for an escalation of violence and setting in motion events that can prolong the conflict. The perception of legitimacy appears to be a key determinant of (counter) terrorist success.

These findings have ramifications for the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, as they suggest that it is not so much *what* is done that matters, but rather that priority should be ascribed to making sure these actions are *perceived to be legitimate*. Furthermore, the ability of public support to influence (counter) terrorism effectiveness also has implications for *when* certain measures can be effectively employed; conciliatory policies, for instance, may not be effective until a certain measure of war-weariness has set in on all sides. In short, when trying to understand the development of terrorism-related conflicts or when trying to design and implement effective counterterrorism measures, the quality, quantity and distribution of public support among conflict parties should be given due consideration.

In closing, a caveat to be made is that the present chapter has predominantly focused on (nominally) democratic regimes in Europe, North America and the Middle East (Israel). Most Western democratic governments can count on a base-level of popular support that may be considerably reduced or even absent in other parts of the world. How does such a markedly different initial distribution of popular support among the warring parties influence the conflict's development and outcome? Additional research on popular support's influence on terrorism-related conflicts, especially in non-democratic parts of the world, is just one of many promising areas for future research on this important yet relatively little-studied topic.

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Notes

1 Vennesson (2011) challenges the view that the people are important in war. He argues that with the overall decline in armed conflict and the generally restrained nature of violence, the role of 'the people' both in politics and war has entered a downward slope.

2 Please note that Clausewitz's original or primary trinity consisted of reason, passion and chance. For the sake of the argument, we will limit ourselves here to what is formally considered his 'secondary' trinity.

3 When terrorist or insurgent groups compete for popular support, the mechanisms of intimidation and outbidding make the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians more likely (Kalyvas, 2006).

4 For a contrarian view, see Downes (2007) and Byman (2016).
5 This view is not without its critics. See Tonge *et al.* (2011).

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37

TACKLING TERRORIST FUNDRAISING AND FINANCES

Marc Parker

Financial responses to terrorism

Western approaches to counterterrorism clearly attest to the symbiosis between terrorism and money. As a result, counterterrorist financing (CTF) has emerged as a distinct discipline and a specific area of interest. Recent years have seen developments in terrorist financing methodologies, reflecting wider changes in the nature of the threat and in the structure of terrorist organisations. This is evident in the shift from hierarchical configurations to more autonomous and diffuse entities. Attacking finance has therefore evolved to address these developments, and in particular, the challenge of 'low-cost terrorism', with its emphasis on greater financial autonomy and recourse to more discreet sources of funding. In addition, the rise of ISIL, with its access to state assets to fund its organisational and governance mandates, poses further operational challenges and confirms the need for counterterrorist finance interventions to remain sufficiently flexible and dynamic.

At a visceral level, the links between terrorism and finance are easily articulated and understood. With the exception of the United Kingdom and its domestic experience in confronting Irish terrorism, CTF as a discipline had, prior to the events of 9/11, received little consideration. However, following these attacks, the emphasis on CTF assumed a new significance. The emerging narrative was bolstered by a series of assumptions that addressed terrorism in the context of crime. As a result, the prevailing anti-money laundering (AML) template applied in the fight against organised crime would be used to attack the financial architecture and funding processes of terrorist organisations. CTF thus evolved from these principles and would be shaped by those investigative conventions used to address financial crime generally.

Tackling the sources of finance was considered essential in degrading terror group capability, as the costs of financing terrorism ranged from maintaining organisational infrastructure, weapons procurement, recruitment, training, group welfare and transportation. As such, there was a need to better understand the process of raising, storing, concealing and transferring funds for these purposes. The targeting of finances and financial infrastructure played to the public's sense that money was the 'oxygen of terror' and therefore central to any campaign. A new discourse evolved post-9/11 around financial interventions accompanied by new policy initiatives that focused on sanctions, account monitoring and asset controls (Eckert, 2008). CTF emerged as an area in which there was most potential for closer international cooperation. A new consensus

developed around the universal destruction of terrorist networks and CTF, and more latterly 'threat' finance programmes became integral to wider counterterrorism and counterinsurgency interventions (U.S. Presidential Address, 2001).

In the post-9/11 environment, several programmes were established to attack terrorist financing. These typically comprised three distinct yet related pillars (Buckley & Meese, 2004). They included 'macro' interventions: formal government programmes such as asset freezing, sanctions and compliance regimes. This was supplemented further by financial data mining and intelligence collection as a tool for pre-emptive security action, network analysis, targeting money flows and surveillance (Parker & Taylor, 2010). Finally, criminal justice interventions typically completed the CTF template and sought to target the exploitation of criminal enterprises used to fund terrorist groups, including 'micro' financing methodologies such as charities abuse and welfare fraud (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2002).

These initiatives provided the basis for what some commentators observed as an evolving regime of global financial governance (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007). Countering the threat from international terrorism brought a new dimension to multilateral security cooperation, particularly in terms of establishing a common CTF agenda. As a doctrine, CTF is particularly suited to these alliances, given the non-kinetic, technocratic nature of these interventions, and this engagement has been consolidated further with greater sharing of financial intelligence and a commitment for more robust financial controls. Whilst cooperation developed within the structures of a pre-existing military alliance, it was further enhanced through the G8 and the U.S.-E.U. apparatus.

International cooperation around CTF was formalised by establishing a consensus around principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that were effectively institutionalised within a multilateral framework (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008). There is little doubt that Inter-Governmental Organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the European Union and the United Nations have all played a significant role in harnessing international acceptance of the AML/CTF regime (Heng & McDonagh, 2008). There is now a widespread acceptance that analysing and understanding money flows is central to combating the financing of terrorism and that proscribed regulatory action and best practice around risk and compliance protocols is central to effective CTF. As a result, the growth of FATF Style Regional Bodies (FRSBs) to disseminate terrorist finance standards and provide guidance in respect of their implementation has been significant (Financial Action Task Force, 2011). The emphasis conferred on FATF in this new global consensus endorsed the use of its methodologies to counter international criminal finance platforms and urged similar engagement and enhanced multilateral cooperation to combating terrorist financing.

Terrorist financing and organised crime

Since the end of the Cold War, organised crime and terrorism have been considered as part of an emerging spectrum of non-military threats that have challenged the West's conventional understanding of internal and external security paradigms. By addressing CTF and AML collectively, Western governments have reinforced the notion of a nexus between crime and terror and cemented the narrative of addressing terrorist financing through the prism of criminal finance. Whilst acknowledging that terrorism and organised crime are considered distinct phenomena with differing operational drivers, a coordinated response developed around a limited set of common characteristics to enable both to be tackled simultaneously (HM Treasury, 2007). As such, criminal finance and terrorist financing were considered synonymous and interchangeable. The key question emerging from this development was the extent to

which the transfer of prevailing AML conventions and practices were appropriate for terrorist financing.

Whatever the assessment, this alignment was the product of several factors, not least the fact that some terrorist groups had become highly self-sufficient and self-financing through criminal activity. The erosion of territorial borders, the spread of democratisation and access to an ever-expanding global market and the prevailing political and economic conditions had collectively provided the stimulus for this relationship to develop and prosper. In short, the proceeds of crime provided a vehicle for terrorists to diversify financial sources and spread the risk across multiple funding streams. Thus, if the lines of distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups became increasingly blurred and difficulties predominated in determining ideological from criminal motivations, the use of an AML template seemed wholly appropriate for CTF. Crucially, the key to this approach was perhaps the centrality of the 'crime for profit logic' and the extent to which the sources of terrorist financing were derived from acquisitive crime (Warde, 2007).

It is clear that the 'crime-terror nexus' has emerged as an area of interest to policymakers in understanding the contemporary financing of terrorism generally (Makarenko, 2004). The emergence of 'new' forms of terrorism, whether in the shape of diffuse, autonomous or home-grown groups, is increasingly reliant on network and cell-based structures and thus borrows heavily from the prevailing structural configurations of organised crime groups (Neumann, 2009). These networks are largely multi-ethnic, multi-jurisdictional and increasingly willing to forge strategic alliances in pursuit of a common profit goal. The most sophisticated organised crime groups have also borrowed heavily from terrorist methodology, employing military discipline and tradecraft to shore up their own operational practices.

The growing global interconnectivity of organised crime, its ability to transmit funds, share information, exploit and manipulate modern technology and provide endless quantities of black market commodities, has changed the way some terrorist groups conduct their business.

Nowhere are the links between terrorism and organised crime more compelling than in Northern Ireland, where both Republican and Loyalist terrorist groups routinely funded their activities through crime. Whilst historically, the most prominent, the Provisional IRA, sought funding from three core platforms: political donations from the Irish diaspora, legitimate commercial ventures and the exploitation of various criminal enterprises, it was overwhelmingly the latter upon which it was most reliant (Horgan & Taylor, 1999). By the late 1990s, the nature of Irish terrorist financing had undergone significant change, with traditional fundraising activities such as extortion and armed robbery superseded by more complex and sophisticated forms of organised crime, such as tobacco smuggling and counterfeiting (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2002; Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004). This trend has continued with the current generation of Loyalist and Dissident Republican groups who again rely heavily on criminal enterprise as a core funding platform.

The continuing reliance on the proceeds of crime is illustrated by similarities in the funding strategies of Irish terrorist and more recent Afghan insurgent groups. Whilst distinct from the Provisional IRA model in the sense that the Afghan insurgency is not monolithic, this proliferation and factionalisation is best expressed in the variety of methods employed to generate finance. It is widely acknowledged that the Taliban has been financed largely through drug trafficking, with its affiliates, the Haqqani Network in western Pakistan, resorting to kidnapping, extortion and other criminality (Parker, 2014).

Indeed, all of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan are deemed to have benefited from drugs trafficking (Katzmann, 2013). It is, however, difficult to estimate the scale of revenue generation, given the absence of formal banking apparatus beyond the major cities and the overwhelm-

ing reliance on hawala, which dominates the majority of trading underpinning Afghanistan's economy (Collins & Ashraf, 2010). Aside from a strong reliance on drug trafficking, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and other affiliated groups have resorted to various criminal enterprises, with ISAF Military commanders noting a clear 'blurring of the line' between the Taliban and criminal groups (Collins & Ashraf, 2010, p.6). Kidnapping in particular emerged as a significant source of finance, particularly for Taliban factions domiciled in Pakistan. Smuggling also provides further echoes of Irish terrorist financing. Whilst Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan are economically deprived, this region possesses a wealth of natural resources, most notably exotic woods, marble and emerald mines, all of which have been exploited by militants. Indeed, approximately $100 million of timber was stripped from the Swat Valley when the area was ceded to the Pakistani Taliban (Collins & Ashraf, 2010, p.7). It was through this process of 'Talibanisation' that smugglers protected illegal businesses at the expense of the state and in turn further contributed to resourcing the insurgency.

In the context of acquisitive crime alone, there is some debate on the efficacy of AML measures to impact the acquisition and movement of terrorist funds generally (Levi, 2007). However, crucially, the characteristics of terrorist financing mean that the risks are often more difficult to discern and implementation strategies more challenging, due to the relatively low value of transactions involved in terrorist financing or the fact that funds often originate from legitimate sources. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that without the necessary guidance on terrorist finance typologies, or in the absence of specific intelligence, the ability of financial institutions to identify terrorist financing is significantly more challenging than is the case for money laundering or other forms of suspicious activity (Financial Action Task Force, 2007).

Whilst it is logical that curbing terrorist financing will restrict the scale and impact of terrorist action, the immediate financial requirements of some of the most recent Jihadist terror cells are now so modest that law enforcement may be relatively powerless to intervene. The democratisation of violence, the emergence and emphasis on networks and the exploitation of technology have all contributed to a reduction in the cost of financing terror generally. Increasingly, the volume of monies required to fund terrorist operations is smaller, and such amounts can easily evade the formal banking system. Whereas the bulk of funding streams have historically been focused on maintaining organisational infrastructure, this has become less significant in recent years, as a host of domestic attacks throughout Europe now confirm (Klausen, 2009).

It would be a mistake to simply focus on the organisational and operational costs alone in constructing effective counter strategies to terrorist financing. Thus, where funds have been acquired through the exploitation of various criminal enterprises, an AML template is clearly relevant. The application of lessons from the control of transnational organised crime to the control of financing terror is a particularly difficult task, and compounded more so given the asymmetric nature of recent threats from home-grown Jihadist terrorism and the funding models employed.

Yet perhaps the real value of using a money laundering template to attack terrorist financing has been in developing a mindset around the study and investigation of financial crime generally. It is the integration of financial investigation into counterterrorism strategy which is perhaps the real success. Money is now understood as a form of intelligence (Suskind, 2006). The emphasis accorded to mining financial data for intelligence purposes is now central to Western counterterrorism strategy (Amoore & de Goede, 2008). Whether by accident or design, the AML regime has made a significant contribution to CTF procedures. The harmonisation of CTF with AML made infinite sense in the aftermath of 9/11. The emphasis which some terrorist groups placed on criminal enterprise required an approach tailored overwhelmingly to combating acquisitive crime. Recent changes, however, in the 'financial organisation' of terrorism and

the changing funding models of increasingly autonomous attack cells and their emphasis on non-criminal funding streams, may ultimately determine whether new approaches to CTF are required in the future.

Financial intelligence

New threats and challenges inevitably require new responses. As such, greater emphasis has been placed on emerging digital technologies and risk-based calculative models as key assets to counterterrorism. Not surprisingly, the value of financial data and the 'follow the money' doctrine has gathered momentum in recent years. Disciples of this approach advocate enhanced regulation of the formal and informal financial sector and greater emphasis on 'due diligence' and 'know your customer' regimes (Financial Action Task Force, 2007). They champion data collection and data mining, financial surveillance and greater intelligence analysis, sharing and cooperation. As such, there is now a greater focus on financial intelligence gathering and analysis and its application to combat terrorist financing.

Financial intelligence adds value in several areas and has emerged as a key asset for CTF practitioners. It provides corroboration material for more sensitive forms of intelligence and is a minimally intrusive form of investigation. The data is relatively unambiguous and thus easily understood and processed. Its key strength, however, is in exposing target vulnerability. It is anticipated that the reliance on financial intelligence will evolve in tandem with the emphasis on 'Big Data' generally (Parker, 2014). It is precisely the pattern and trend analysis derived from Big Data that currently shapes our understanding of behaviours, preferences and intentions, and this will be central in identifying future threats and keeping communities safe.

There is a growing realisation that financial data and third-party information can assist in the development of financial profiles and typologies that are central to the fight against international terrorism. The ubiquity of the database has revolutionised surveillance potential. Strategic partnerships between state agencies and the private sector have strengthened in recent years, and increasing emphasis is placed on the utility of 'dataveillance' (Amoore & de Goede, 2005). The notion that 'money trails don't lie' and that financial data can reveal blueprints to the architecture of terrorist organisations has emerged as a key narrative. As such, the collection of financial intelligence and financial surveillance by law enforcement and intelligence services is now a core feature of contemporary security practice (Parker & Taylor, 2010).

As the volume of raw data about our lives continues to grow exponentially, so too does the need to mitigate potential intrusions on privacy and consent. CTF operational practice has encouraged the use of financial intelligence collection as a natural consequence of the changing financial and technological landscape. From a financial crime and terrorist finance perspective, opportunities have migrated from the substantive physical to the 'cyber' environment as law enforcement now contends with e-banking and e-commerce abuses.

Questions have recently arisen around the pursuit of financial and other personal data and the pace of development around its acquisition and sharing. These have typically focused on the collection methodologies and implications of exploiting digital technology and using private information for the purposes of governance and national security (Vlcek, 2007). Thus, any future consideration of the operational value of financial intelligence to assist CTF interventions is inevitably bound up with concerns regarding the impact which these collection technologies may pose for liberal governance and the balance in the social contract between the citizen and the state.

Future CTF challenges

CTF as a discipline will continue to evolve in response to external developments. Western CTF efforts will in future focus increasingly on two principal yet distinct challenges, the threat from domestic jihadist terrorism and the external ISIL phenomenon. There is little doubt that recent CTF programmes have challenged the ability of terrorist organisations to operate unmolested and that Al-Qaeda has latterly encountered significant problems in raising funds and sustaining itself (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008). This may account in part for the shift in recent years towards greater financial autonomy by affiliated or inspired jihadist groups. There is little doubt that the persistent targeting of couriers, facilitators and fundraisers degraded Al-Qaeda's main methodologies to generate and move funds.

Not surprisingly, a new paradigm for terrorism has evolved that includes different actors and outcomes from previous manifestations (Hoffman, 2006). The emerging threat from this 'new terrorism' is routinely characterised by different motives and lethality (Zimmerman & Wenger, 2003; Lynch & Ryder, 2012). This has resulted in significant changes to the aims, methods and structure of terrorist groups and challenges conventional notions of terrorism and its overwhelmingly monolithic, hierarchical organisational form (Sageman, 2007). The global nature of jihadist terrorism confirms how the nation-state has yielded its centrality to supranational, global entities and how terrorism has in turn morphed to embrace these changes (Shahar, 2008). These new manifestations are essentially borderless as the world has become more interconnected, and this has made it easier for these groups to communicate, plan and organise funding. Indeed, recent terror attacks and conspiracies in the United States and Europe have confirmed a propensity towards these new organisational structures. Whilst the most dramatic structural changes indicate a shift to looser affiliated or inspired groups and networks, it is the accompanying shift to greater independence, financial self-sufficiency and economy that are of most interest to CTF practitioners.

However one sees the doctrinal debate on the distinctions or otherwise of this 'new terrorism', there is little doubt that significant change has occurred in the structural composition of terrorist groups in recent years. It is structural composition that ultimately determines the choices, range and scope of CTF interventions. Prior to the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, the template for jihadist terrorism was conceived in terms of the 9/11 attacks. As such, the principal threat was foreign, with strong organisational and operational links to a host organisation domiciled overseas. From a Western perspective, however, the events of 7/7 saw a shift in conception as the threat changed from external to domestic, and in the context of terrorist funding from 'donor recipient' to one exhibiting greater financial independence and autonomy.

Aside from developing a greater understanding of the circumstances which give rise to group formation, it is the extent to which these groups have been resourced independently which is of most interest. A range of high-profile terrorist attacks in recent years in both North America and Europe highlight the nature of the threat facing Western governments today, with affiliates and inspired groups or lone actors now emerging as the key protagonists. Keeping pace with the fluid and dynamic nature of how terror cells fund themselves is one of the main challenges for Western law enforcement and intelligence services.

Following the events of 9/11, the overwhelming threat narrative emphasised Al-Qaeda's commitment to a centralised global terrorist strategy. It was primarily the dominance and simplicity of this narrative that shaped the public policy response on CTF, with its emphasis on macro interventions such as asset freezing, sanctions and enhanced regulation and compliance. However, this commitment to a single threat narrative failed to adequately explain the emerging spectrum of terrorist attacks directed against the West (Croft & Moore, 2010). Indeed, recent

terrorist trials in the United Kingdom have highlighted the variety of domestic threats which the authorities now face, with key distinctions emerging between groups established through direct physical contact and those spawned from virtual and web-based interactions (Nicholl & Johnstone, 2009). It is, however, with regard to a further category, those groups which form independently of external direction and sanction and specifically those which require no external financial support that most concern CTF practitioners (Parker, 2014).

Given that recent terror attacks have been characterised by relatively small-scale funding requirements, the key question emerging is the extent to which money remains critical to terrorist group capability. CTF strategy must therefore respond to the polymorphic threat from jihadist groups if is to remain an effective intervention option in the wider quest to counter terrorism. CTF operational strategy must acknowledge changes in the economy of terror and focus increasingly on the new discreet ways of financing terrorism. This shift towards greater operational independence and financial autonomy is clearly one of the most significant developments to have emerged in recent years. Moreover, the scale of monies now required for attack planning is so modest that CTF investigations can no longer rely on financial indicators to identify such plots without specific intelligence or further grounds for suspicion.

Clearly the challenges posed by jihadist groups transcend counterterrorist financing programmes, as Western governments seek to confront a broad spectrum of domestic threats, whether indigenous nationals, resident non-nationals or migrants. Whilst acknowledging the trend towards legitimate independent financing may ultimately prevent the opportunity for effective interventions at the conspiracy phase, the operational impact from CTF in this context may in the future be confined to financial intelligence dividends derived from post-incident evaluations, rather than proactive tactical interventions to disrupt attacks. These threats represent a watershed for CTF practice. As such, wider counterterrorism strategy should acknowledge the trend towards legitimate self-financing models and look for other indicators from typology analysis to identify potential conspiracies. CTF as a discipline should therefore supplement this approach by targeting low-level acquisitive crime as a more credible and risk-averse source of funding for autonomous homegrown groups and contemplate greater use of micro interventions to combat jihadist financing.

In tandem with the threat from jihadist groups, the ISIL phenomenon highlights a new type of terrorist organisation with unique security challenges and unique sources of funding that are crucial to its activities (Financial Action Task Force, 2015). It is overwhelmingly reliant on capital illicitly generated by the territory it occupies and has funded its position by looting banks, exploiting oil reserves and robbing economic assets. A recent FATF report identified a number of significant and emerging terrorist finance risks including kidnap for ransom, non-profit organisation donors and extortion activities that have all contributed to financing the organisation. Global efforts to combat these activities are largely focused on resource deprivation and preventing ISIL from abusing economic and financial sectors as well as accessing international financial markets (Financial Action Task Force, 2015).

It is acknowledged that traditional CTF measures have their limitations when applied to some elements of the current ISIL funding model. On the one hand, ISIL needs to seize additional territory in order to exploit resources to sustain its vision of social order and civil society. This accounts for the emphasis in targeting state assets, antiquities, and resourcing through leveraging utilities and taxing local communities. Increasingly, however, ISIL is drawing material support from 'grass root' contributors rather than donor networks. Funding is typically sought from foreign fighters, and further resources are increasingly transferred through discreet wire transfers and cash couriers. Crucially, new terrorist financing challenges have emerged with returning foreign fighters, and greater visibility is required to develop the necessary granularity to construct effective countermeasures.

As IS financing continues to evolve, new funding typologies will doubtless emerge, and CTF must retain its flexibility in addressing these threats. Western CTF efforts have moved beyond their early incarnation, that of attacking the finances of Irish terrorist groups using AML as the operational bedrock, to embracing new digital collection methodologies in the quest to fully exploit financial intelligence for pre-emptive security action. CTF is now a collective action phenomenon, requiring high levels of cooperation amongst different agencies and enhanced partnership working within both public and private institutions at national and international levels. Despite recent changes in the 'economy of terror', terrorism and terrorist organisations remain deeply reliant on finance (Napoleoni, 2007). Indeed, CTF as a discipline is predicated on the centrality of finance in the terrorism equation. Assuming that '*Threat = Capability × Intent*', it is obvious that money will continue to be an 'enabler' to capability. Crucially however, CTF efforts comprise merely one element of the counterterrorism compendium and will require further supporting countermeasures to inhibit the operational efforts of terrorist groups.

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38

DETERRING AND PREVENTING TERRORISM

Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak and Henda Y. Hsu

Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on deterring and preventing terrorism. Al-Qaeda committed one of the most spectacular acts of terrorism in history when it attacked four targets, including the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Although the study of terrorism had not been ignored until then, these attacks led to increased scholarly focus on terrorism. Governments across the globe and private foundations increased their funding of research to better understand terrorism and political violence.

Silke's (2008) study on research published within five years following the September 11 attacks found that terrorism scholarship had expanded dramatically. Indeed, 90% of the total body of research on terrorism has been published since the 9/11 attacks. For example, while 150 books on terrorism were published in 2000, nearly 2,000 were published in 2002. Silke concludes that a terrorism book is published every six hours (p. 28). He also documents that the number of peer-reviewed journals and multidisciplinary collaborative efforts have greatly increased. Many of these studies have engaged the aetiology of terrorism and the structure of terrorist organizations, but a growing number of works have focused on counterterrorism efforts. Since Silke's important study, scholarly attention to this area has continued to move rapidly ahead.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the growing academic literature on deterring and preventing terrorist attacks. Governments have pursued a number of counterterrorism strategies to deter and or prevent future terrorist attacks. One example includes passing legislation to increase punishments and the costs of committing terrorism. These legislative strategies seem to rely upon deterrence principles, as their goal is to make offenders (and or the organizations/movements they are part of) weigh the costs of receiving these punishments and thereby cause them to decide to not commit terrorist acts. In addition, governments have developed strategies to make it more difficult for terrorists to launch attacks. Recently, in fact, situational crime prevention (SCP), a criminology approach that seeks to manipulate the environment by reducing opportunities that allow crime to occur, has increasingly been applied to terrorism contexts. Only some SCP strategies are based upon deterrence principles, and many of its techniques make it impossible for terrorists to attack regardless of offenders' cost-benefit analyses. Finally, we discuss other policing strategies, in addition to SCP, that have been used to prevent terrorism.

Deterring terrorist attacks

There is a long tradition in criminology that argues that the criminal law should be used to deter criminal behaviour (Freilich, 2015). Beccaria (1764), whose classic, *On Crimes and Punishments*, helped create the discipline of criminology and criminal justice (Bierne, 1991; Newman, 1997), assumed that people have "agency," the ability to control their behaviours and make rational choices. He maintained that individuals evaluate situations and consider the benefits and costs of potential behaviours before committing them. Most people choose to commit acts that will benefit them the most. Since individuals rationally seek to avoid pain and maximize pleasure, a punishment system that provides costs (i.e., painful punishments) for law violations will result in most persons obeying the law. The mechanism used to achieve this conformity is fear. Beccaria maintained that individuals will control themselves and obey laws when they calculate that the potential costs or punishments of offending outweigh any possible benefits. In sum, Beccaria (1764) maintained governments could deter crime by using individuals' fear of punishments to keep them obedient.

Deterrence is achieved by making sure the implementation of punishment is certain, severe, and swift and then publicized to the general public. Beccaria (1764) argued that punishments that were more certain (i.e., the perpetrator's apprehension is more likely), swift (little time passed between apprehension of the offender and the punishment's implementation), and importantly, severe (the magnitude of the punishment was high), and that were then publicized to the public, led to higher costs. Following Beccaria's argument, then, many assume that terrorists will be less likely to commit attacks when the potential costs for doing so are too high.

Others argue, however, that harsh penalties and/or policies might actually have the opposite of their intended effect and lead to increased terrorist attacks due to a backlash effect. LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009: 4–5; see also McCauley, 2006) explain that government policies that "outrage participants or energize a base of potential supporters… may increase the likelihood of further terrorist strikes." Reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) argues that offenders will defy laws, policies, and actions that seek to eliminate their freedom and control their behaviour. Sprinzak (1995) and Kaplan (1995) argue that harsh measures could result in an "us vs. them" outlook by both law enforcement and extremists that results in increased terrorist offending. Criminology's labelling theory similarly assumes that in many circumstances, increased punishment will have the unintended effect of increasing criminal behaviour.

Research has not consistently supported deterrence claims and has produced mixed results. Both Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez (2015), and LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), who examined the impact of the Spanish government's responses to the ETA and the British government's strategies in Northern Ireland respectively, found little support for deterrence arguments. Similarly, Dugan and Chenoweth's (2012) investigation of the consequences of repressive and conciliatory responses by Israel to Palestinian terrorism did not support deterrence arguments. They found, in fact, that conciliatory responses were usually related to decreases in terror, depending on the tactical period. Bejan and Parkin's (2015) analyses of these data, however, produced opposite results. They found that conciliatory responses by Israel had no effect, while their repressive actions resulted in a significant reduction in Palestinian terrorist attacks.

A number of studies have evaluated the effectiveness of specific statutes that were passed to deter terrorist behaviour by increasing the costs (i.e., severity of punishment) for committing these attacks. Here too, though, research has been mixed as findings vary by the statute and terrorist movements involved. Pridemore and Freilich (2007) examined the impact of laws protecting abortion staff and clinics on anti-abortion crime in the United States. During a wave of anti-abortion violence in the early 1990s, several states enacted legislation protecting abortion

clinics, staff, and patients. Pridemore and Freilich investigated whether states that passed these laws had fewer anti-abortion crimes (i.e., a deterrent effect), or more of these crimes (i.e., backlash effect) than states that did not pass such statutes. Interestingly, they found no deterrent effect. More recently, though, Carson's (2014) innovative study that investigated the impact of four specific legislative sentencing acts aimed at the extremist environmental rights movement in the United States found a deterrent effect. Certain statutes reduced the hazard of future attacks by these extremists. She cautions though that the findings were legislative and outcome-specific.

We next discuss situational crime prevention and terrorism.

Situational crime prevention (SCP) and terrorism

History/background of SCP

SCP is a practical, policy-oriented approach whose goal is to reduce crime/terrorism in the future (Clarke, 1980). It is unconcerned with esoteric matters or grand initiatives to transform society (Freilich & Newman, 2015; Tilley, 2004). This is why SCP, at least in the field of criminology, is uniquely concerned with *how* offenders and terrorists successfully commit their crimes and attacks. Understanding how the offender carries out the crime can be used to craft interventions to prevent offending. The rest of criminology and most terrorism scholars are focused on *why* perpetrators offend or the grievances or root causes motivating the terrorists to strike, what Clarke (2004) and others refer to as the dispositional bias.

SCP calls for examining specific crime types (or problems) or terrorist attacks to identify the situational characteristics that allow the perpetrator to successfully complete the crime. A corollary of this point is that SCP parts ways from Beccaria's deterrence arguments summarized above. SCP sees the criminal law as too removed from potential crime scenes to influence situational decisions. Instead, SCP is focused on the event. Its detailed situational analysis advocates use of the "script" method (Cornish, 1994) to identify possible intervention points to remove the identified opportunities. Cornish and Clarke (2002: 47) explain that "crime [scripts]… involve such chains of decisions and actions, separable into interdependent stages, involving the attainment of sub-goals that serve the overall goals of the crime." Once the opportunities and possible intervention points are identified, the next step is to devise strategies to prevent the crime.

There are currently five general strategies encompassing 25 techniques to reduce crime. The techniques include both "hard" and "soft" interventions. Hard interventions include making it impossible or more difficult for the crime to be committed and alert potential perpetrators that they are likely to be apprehended if they transgress. "Soft" interventions reduce situational prompts/cues that increase a person's motivation to commit a crime during specific types of events (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Wortley, 2008). Many of these strategies *are not* based upon deterrence principles and seek to prevent future offending regardless of the offenders' thought processes (Freilich, 2015; Freilich & Newman, 2015).

SCP's application to terrorism

Clarke and Newman (2006) have taken issue with the "dispositional" bias of terrorism research (Freilich & Newman, 2009a). They have encouraged scholars to interview terrorism experts, and terrorists themselves "not to gain intelligence on terrorist organizations, but to help find ways to make terrorist actions more difficult, risky and less rewarding" (233). Clarke and Newman contend that, like regular offending, terrorist decision-making and behaviours are largely governed by environmental opportunities and constraints in relation to their capabilities and resources.

In other words, terrorists do not operate on the basis of unlimited choices. Terrorists' options are structured or bounded by key situational considerations such as proximity to the target, accessibility of weapons, or familiarity of the immediate terrain when carrying out terrorist attacks.

The SCP approach to preventing terrorism begins by analysing the opportunity structure for terrorism, or the social, technical, and physical features of society that affords terrorists the opportunities to perpetrate particular kinds of attacks. Clarke and Newman (2006) have classified four types of terrorist opportunities as being central to understanding how terrorist attacks are accomplished. They are targets, weapons, tools, and facilitation conditions.

While there are an unlimited number of potential targets for terrorists to choose from, not all targets invite the same opportunity for an attack. As such, the attractiveness and vulnerability of a target can be assessed based on terrorists' objectives and situational considerations. To do this, Clarke and Newman (2006) delineate the appeal of a target according to whether it is exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near, and easy (summarized as EVIL DONE). Terrorist target selection is conditioned by a combination of these factors, with more vulnerable targets possessing a greater number of these attributes. Importantly, as illustrated in Box 38.1, EVIL DONE provides a practical target rating system for both researchers and practitioners that can be applied to specific targets in local communities to aid officials in prioritizing targets for protection, designing security measures, and allocating resources (Boba, 2009; Newman & Clarke, 2008).

Box 38.1 EVIL DONE target rating system

Exposed – visible, exposed target that attracts attention and scrutiny is more likely to be attacked than hidden ones. Scoring a target's exposure takes into account both the physical shape of the target and the local environment in which the target is located (e.g. urban versus rural).

Vital – targets that are crucial to society's daily functioning, commonly regarded as infrastructure. The type of infrastructure and its purpose are the two main factors to consider when rating how critical the target is to a community.

Iconic – well-known symbols of a country's identity and strength. When evaluating the iconic value of a target, it is important to determine how various terrorist groups view the symbolic nature of different targets (e.g. military facilities, abortion clinics).

Legitimate – targets that are perceived as appropriate to attack and will bring positive reactions from sympathizers. The identities of the individuals that occupy the target should be noted. For example, military or government personnel are typically regarded as legitimate targets, whereas children are the least legitimate types.

Destructible – targets that can be seriously damaged or completely destroyed. Every target is destructible in some way, but some are easier than others and require less effort and risk. Targets that are destructible by conventional weapons or contain materials that augment their destructibility are given higher ratings of destructibility.

Occupied – evaluates the level at which a target houses people. To emphasize their commitment to violence or the threat of violence, terrorists tend to be attracted to targets where many people can be potentially killed or injured. The density and frequency of people occupying a target are important variables to consider when calculating the risk for an attack.

Near – targets that are close to the home base of terrorist operations. This is perhaps the most pivotal characteristic that informs the terrorists' target choice. This point draws on a body of criminological research that shows that most criminals select targets close to their home or areas where their routine activities take them (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981; Clarke & Felson, 1993). Illustrating the salience of proximity in a terrorism context, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) found that, despite strong anti-U.S. ideology, anti-U.S. foreign terrorist groups seldom attacked U.S. targets (almost never on U.S. soil), but operated largely at home against local targets due to the many challenges that foreign attackers encounter in an unfamiliar environment.

Easy – targets that are not well-protected, with poor security, typically "soft" targets. Thus, targets that are easily accessible and designed without security in mind are easy targets for terrorists.

Like targets, SCP researchers argue that terrorists' choice of weapons is also guided by their intrinsic features. In particular, weapons that are easily obtainable provide terrorists greater opportunities to successfully reach their particular targets and carry out their attacks. For example, readily accessible weapons facilitate training for terrorists to become familiar and proficient with their delivery, concealment, and use (Clarke & Newman, 2006). Most terrorists do not have access to sophisticated weaponry, and thus 88% of terrorist attacks have relied on readily available firearms and explosives. While the deployment of unconventional weapons (such as chemical, biological, or radiological types) by terrorists often generate great concern to policymakers and the general public, they are exceedingly rare, only accounting for about 0.24% of terrorist attacks (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015).

To ensure their plans are effectively executed, terrorists will need appropriate tools and conditions that facilitate their operations. Tools are tangible products that terrorists use in the course of carrying out an attack and are generally everyday products such as vehicles, cell phones or other means of communication, and personal documents. Certain places, regions, or countries have facilitating conditions, or societal features and systems that provide opportunities for terrorists to exploit. For example, a lax banking system or an accessible arms market makes it easier for terrorists to conduct their operations (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Legault & Hendrickson, 2009). Taken together, the control and regulation of tools and facilitating conditions presents important intervention points for authorities, since it is against this backdrop that most terrorists plan and prepare for their specific attacks. Researchers studying the preparatory activities of terrorists suggest that examining their antecedent behaviours (e.g. procurement of false identification, laundering money, and obtaining weapons or explosive materials) provides insight into patterns of conduct that can assist authorities in early interdiction and prevention of terrorist attacks (Cothren *et al.*, 2008; Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006).

Substitution/displacement effect

While SCP has been effectively applied to reduce many forms of crime (Guerette, 2009), the utility of this approach to preventing terrorism has been challenged by criticisms that situational interventions are passive, piece-meal campaigns that often result in terrorists shifting their attacks elsewhere, known as the so-called substitution effect (Enders & Sandler, 2004; Sandler, Tschirhart, & Cauley, 1983). Enders and Sandler (1993) found that in the aftermath of increased airport security and embassy fortifications, terrorists substituted into other modes of attack (e.g. hostage-taking, assassinations) to continue their hostilities. This is especially concerning

given that more vulnerable locations and populations are now possibly at an increased risk of being victimized as terrorists substitute softer targets for those that are well-protected (Enders & Sandler, 2000).

On the other hand, criminologists point out that the idea that SCP endeavours will simply engender other modes of offending, referred to as displacement, is collectively absent in the crime research literature (Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2014). The accumulated research evidence on SCP shows that displacement only occurs in a minority of instances and, more importantly, a spread of crime reduction benefits beyond the anticipated reach of situational interventions, or "diffusion of benefits," is just as likely to occur as displacement (Guerette & Bowers, 2009).

Like crime, SCP researchers assert that the substitution effect is also not a foregone conclusion of situational prevention efforts. Clarke and Newman (2006) note that most terrorist groups may not be sufficiently knowledgeable about various forms of attack or familiar with alternative opportunities. This is perhaps due to the short longevity of most terrorist organizations. Developing the capability to successfully carry out multiple forms of attack requires quite an amount of time, but over 70% of terrorist organizations end their operations within the first year (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015; Young & Dugan, 2014). Hsu and Apel (2015) recently found that, despite significant decreases in incidents of aviation terrorism following the introduction of airport metal detectors, almost all of the ensuing displacement to other modes of attacks were reserved for the most long-lasting terrorist organizations. Concomitantly, Hsu and Apel (2015) reported a diffusion of benefits to a variety of non-aviation attack and target types subsequent to enhanced airport security. In all, SCP scholars argue that terrorism is a contextual phenomenon where opportunities embodied in particular places condition terrorist decision-making and activities in relation to their operational capacity (Freilich & Newman, 2009b). It follows then that the increased risk and effort, or reduced rewards, involved in carrying out an attack elsewhere, against another target, or in a different manner, may not be feasible or judged worthwhile by most terrorists (Clarke & Newman, 2006).

Other policing strategies

Although the actions of other individuals and private sector organizations are often critical to responding to terrorism, law enforcement continues to hold the general responsibility for keeping people safe. The police have to overcome many challenges to successfully foil terrorism plots. For example, in the United States, policing is delivered through a loosely coupled system of agencies representing local, county, state, national, and international interests. Such a fragmented system often results in gaps in service delivery, overlapping responsibilities and duplication of effort, and conflicts over jurisdiction.

Although the 9/11 attacks did not initiate the call for better information-sharing and coordination of services, they enhanced the urgency to take action. The 9/11 Commission report highlighted multiple information-sharing failures and missed opportunities to prevent the attacks. The RAND Corporation has conducted two national surveys related to domestic preparedness and intelligence (Riley & Hoffman, 1995; Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005). Their 1995 survey focused on preparedness issues for state and local law enforcement and found weak intelligence and strategic assessment capabilities and poor information-sharing between federal and state law enforcement officials. Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, RAND conducted a second survey and several case studies to examine local and state intelligence efforts. This study found that state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have played an increasingly important role in responding to and preventing terrorism.

Critical to deterring and preventing terrorism is gathering actionable intelligence to guide investigation and response strategies. The changes in the intelligence practices for state, local, and tribal agencies have been particularly pronounced. Since the 1960s, many law enforcement agencies had eliminated their intelligence units in reaction to a proliferation of civil rights lawsuits. While some restructuring of local law enforcement capacities began in the 1980s, largely as a result of the global drug trade, this was limited to major cities. After the September 11 attacks, law enforcement agencies had to build an intelligence capacity from the ground up at a time when the threats they faced had changed dramatically. In fact, every law enforcement agency, regardless of size, has had to build an intelligence capacity to "understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing," and "must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies" (Carter, 2004: 1). The development of this capacity has expanded the intelligence function in law enforcement agencies and institutionalized intelligence units. These changes have also resulted in a significant need for providing intelligence training to all levels of law enforcement and for coordinating globally with other agencies.

Policymakers and scholars have concluded that law enforcement strategies need to be influenced by an intelligence-led policing philosophy (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). Critical to this approach is gathering intelligence and information that can be strategically accessed and used to make informed response decisions. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States is the lead agency in terrorism investigations, policymakers and scholarship highlight the important contributions of local law enforcement agencies (Davis *et al.*, 2004). Terrorism is a local event, and thus local agencies are uniquely positioned to contribute important intelligence due to their knowledge of individuals, groups, and organizations operating in their communities. Terrorism scholarship examining the behaviours and patterns of terrorists operating on U.S. soil also finds that there are opportunities for law enforcement agencies to enhance the amount, quality, and reliability of intelligence.

Brent Smith and colleagues' American Terrorism Study is one of the most important domestic terrorism data collection efforts to date. This project, conducted in cooperation with the FBI's Terrorist Research and Analytical Centre, includes persons indicted federally as a result of an investigation under the FBI's Counterterrorism Program. These researchers were provided lists of persons indicted, and then travelled to federal courthouses to collect data from trial transcripts and docket information. These data highlight that right-wing groups usually operate in rural areas, while left-wing groups often operate in urban areas. Smith and colleagues found that terrorists are much more likely to engage in planning activities and to commit preparatory crimes compared to traditional criminals. Importantly, the patterns of preparatory conduct vary by ideology (Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006). For example, they found that right-wing terrorist groups are more mobile than international terrorists, and they tend to commit crimes farther from their home. Smith and colleagues concluded that this may either be evidence that far-right groups have broader support networks which allow them to freely move around the country, or it could reflect that they reside in rural locations (p. 46). It was found that left-wing and international terrorist groups committed more preparatory crimes than right-wing and single-issue terrorist groups and were more likely to separate their acts from their targets (pp. 36, 52). This research shows the great potential of strengthening intelligence capabilities and enhancing the information sharing among agencies in different geographic locations and in other branches/jurisdictions of government.

Other important changes have also occurred. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction concluded that the intelligence commu-

nity has initiated over 100 initiatives to respond to concerns about information sharing (p. 430). The creation of the Global Intelligence Working Group and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan have led to more effective intelligence sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. In addition, the large increase in the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the creation of State Fusion Centres has enhanced the sharing of information among federal, state, and local law enforcement (Masse, O'Neill, & Rollins, 2007). Finally, law enforcement agencies have adopted and/or refined their intelligence efforts and have attempted to more strategically link information to action.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of research related to deterring and preventing terrorism. It highlighted how policies and law increasing punishment might deter terrorists from attempting violent criminal acts, that other conciliatory approaches might also be effective, and that the specific statute and context play an important role. We also showed that deterrence strategies might produce unintended consequence by increasing rather than reducing such behaviours. The chapter also highlighted efforts to deploy SCP strategies to respond to terrorism, discussing how understanding situational characteristics and hardening potential targets could effectively thwart terrorism without displacing it. Finally, the chapter discussed post-9/11 intelligence efforts to overcome organizational obstacles to sharing information as well as strategies to transfer local information to the proper authorities to effectively use it to prevent terrorism.

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39

PRISONS AND DETENTION

Reflections on the Northern Ireland experience

Jacqueline Bates-Gaston

Introduction

> Our understanding of terrorists and extremists in prison is extremely limited. Given the scale of writing and research on terrorism over recent decades – the absolutely overwhelming flood of books and publications in the wake of 9/11 – it is surprising to then see how little has focused on prison issues.
>
> *(Silke, 2014)*

Some of the dearth of research into prisons stems from the difficulties in obtaining open-source data to inform practice and policy in prisons, which are of themselves very closed environments. Understandably, governments are sometimes reluctant to give access for research or to share information which might potentially impact on security issues. The management of these groups of high-risk prisoners has been dynamic and challenging, and there has been a lack of applied research, organisational strategy or consistency in addressing the issues. In the context of Northern Ireland, government also had to take a wider, longer-term political view of the emerging peace process (Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, 2004).

There is little doubt that the longer terrorist groups are active, the more likely it is that they will become better informed and knowledgeable about how to resist their imprisonment wherever they are contained. There has always been sharing of knowledge and tactics between groups such as the IRA and ETA, the PLO and FARC (Warnes and Hannah, 2008). In an otherwise mundane existence, group resistance gives a sense of purpose which individual and ordinary prisoners lack. The world now has many large terrorist groups, in, for example, Indonesian (Osman, 2014) and Israeli prisons (Yehoshua, 2014), and what works to attract new recruits or to reduce future violence in one jurisdiction may not work in another because of factors like culture, values, ideology, religion, democracy and human rights. However, there is some research evidence into risk assessment which is based on extensive literature reviews (Dean, 2014; Pressman and Flockton, 2014) which indicates that, overall, those involved in terrorist crimes appear to share common characteristics and behaviours which make them more alike than different.

More recently there has been improved overall transparency in the difficulties and challenges in managing terrorist prisoners in Northern Ireland. These are recorded in the deliberations and

work of bodies like the House of Commons Select Committees on Northern Ireland Affairs (HCSC on NI Affairs), the Criminal Justice Inspectorate (CJINI), the Prisoner Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) and the devolved Committee for Justice (CJNI). From a Western perspective, we can learn from past experiences what has not worked in managing terrorist prisoners using information from public enquiries and reports into the critical events which have led to tragic circumstances.

This chapter seeks to analyse these documents to inform our understanding of the complicated processes and strategies employed, mainly by the IRA but also by the Loyalists, in undermining security and safety, and in establishing control of space and authority within prisons. It also reflects briefly on how prison management can use this experience to inform policies in the future. Given the evidence, it suggests initiatives for improving the processes and systems. It briefly comments on recruitment and disengagement and on the support needs of staff who are required to work in these emotionally challenging situations.

Background to the Northern Ireland "Troubles"

The historic conflict between Ireland and England can be traced back over 800 years, to the Norman invasion of 1170. The more recent terrorist violence in Ireland, known as the "Troubles," began in 1916 with the Easter Rising, which eventually led to the civil war and the partition of Ireland in 1922 into a 26-county independent Republic, and a six-county Province which remained British. This partition was, and is, the focus of the continuing conflict.

The broad objective of Irish Republicans is the achievement of a socialist, 32-county, united Ireland and to protect their community. Republicans perceive the enemy as "the British" and its representatives, including army personnel, police officers and prison staff. The broad objective of Ulster's Loyalists is to maintain the political six counties' (Northern Ireland) links to the United Kingdom and to protect their community. Loyalists see their enemy as the IRA and anyone else who seeks to break the political link with the United Kingdom. The motivations of the two main organisations are very different because their enemies are different. The Loyalists did not contest or subvert the authority of the State, unlike the IRA (McEvoy, 2001).

In Ireland, the perpetrators on both sides are usually described as "paramilitaries" which are comprised of two main organisations with over 10 splinter groups or factions on both sides, which have developed over time. The terms radicalisation, counter radicalism and de-radicalisation have not typically been used in the context of Northern Ireland: "No one talked about the IRA being radicalised, or Shining Path, or ETA or the Red Army Faction" (Silke, 2014).

During this period of community strife, which spilled over into prisons, both paramilitary factions killed innocent civilians as well as "the other" groups, with 80% of all the 3,600 reported deaths attributed to the paramilitaries. Of these deaths, 56% were perpetrated by Republicans and 24% by Loyalists. Both sides demonstrated sectarian motivations in their crimes, which were acted out via shootings (36,000) and 16,000 explosions (CAIN, 2012). This sectarianism within extremism can also be seen between Sunni and Shia (Taylor, 2015) and in other conflicts and is an important factor when considering desistance.

The history of the Northern Ireland Prison Service has been impacted by various Republican campaigns for a United Ireland by violent means which resulted in many of those involved being held in prison with support being actively demonstrated by followers in the community. It is estimated that around 15,000 Republicans and 12,000 Loyalists were imprisoned in the current and ongoing campaign, which began in the mid-1960s (Conflict Transformation Papers, 2003). New IRA dissident groups are maintaining the "armed struggle," including Continuity IRA, the Real IRA and Óglaigh na hÉireann, who have not joined the peace process. These groups

continue with violent terrorist outrages, including the murder of prison officers, attacks on the security forces and the police, and are also involved in a significant number of paramilitary "punishment" beatings and shootings in nationalist areas with further loss of life.

Prison management issues 1966–1998

The current terrorist campaign in Ireland has lasted for over 50 years. As Northern Ireland is a small jurisdiction, its prison population was around 600 until internment was introduced in 1971 because of serious civil unrest. The number of convicted prisoners rose to almost 3,000 by 1979. "A prison system which was built to house just 600 prisoners managed by 292 staff in 1969 was forced to accommodate 2,687 prisoners by 1975 managed by 2,184 staff" (NIPS 1997: 8 in McEvoy, 2001) with only one Young Offender's Centre and two newly constructed prisons consisting of H Blocks at HMP Maze and Magilligan and the old Belfast prison to cope with the rising prisoner population. By 2000, it had been estimated that 20,000 to 32,000 people had been incarcerated for politically-related offences (McEvoy, 2001). This was a very high turnover for an area with a total population of less than 1.6 million. This also meant that many families were affected by imprisonment, and the community played a significant part in how those convicted of terrorist-related crimes were managed and perceived.

The small prison estate limited the options for dispersal of those prisoners with challenging behaviours, unless the wider UK prison estate was to be utilised. The Spanish government had, with some success in security terms, dispersed ETA prisoners across Spain away from the Basque area and even as far as the Canary Islands to help in the management of prisons (Torres Soriano, 2014). This was not considered a viable option in Northern Ireland, as it was thought that the IRA would use a dispersal policy to garner international condemnation for publicity purposes.

The impact of internment and special category status (SCS)

Following the 1916 Easter Rising, the British government had interned hundreds of suspected anti-state personnel in disused army camps in Wales and England. Although it had many disadvantages, the government decided to re-introduce internment in Northern Ireland to try to limit the violence. Over 2,000 people suspected of subversive activities were interned between 1971 and 1976. Internees and those convicted of terrorist activities were held in Nissan huts at Long Kesh and were housed in separated Republican and Loyalist compounds (McEvoy, 2001).

Under pressure from IRA hunger strikers in Belfast Prison, Special Category Status (SCS) was granted in 1972 to those convicted of terrorist crimes. These prisoners, like internees, had the right to free association under a military-style command structure, could wear their own clothes and did not have to work, unlike "ordinary" criminals (Murray, 2014). In a review of the process, Lord Gardiner (House of Lords, 1975) explained the origins and implications of SCS: "In practice this has meant that any convicted criminal sentenced to more than nine months' imprisonment who claims political motivation and who is acceptable to a compound leader at the Maze or Magilligan Prisons is accorded special status." Following the Gardiner Report in 1975, it was suggested that special category status had been a "serious mistake" and that those convicted of scheduled offences by Diplock Courts under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 were to be held in the newly constructed, purpose-built conventional cells in the H Blocks in the Maze prison, which opened in 1976, rather than in the Long Kesh compounds with their special regimes.

Many prisoners joined these organisations because conditions were significantly better and the regimes were more attractive. Also, they were more likely to feel safer if they were housed with people from their own community. As in other countries like Israel, which hold large

groups of terrorists in condensed accommodation, new members would go on to learn more about the political struggle, which reinforced their identity and commitment to the group (Gardiner, 1975; Yehoshua, 2014).

Internment in large camps with free association, the granting of SCS along with separation from "ordinary" criminals and then further self-segregation into factions had a profound and long-lasting impact on the balance of power, on maintaining control and on the future management of paramilitary groups in prisons in Northern Ireland. The majority of the many protests over the years were orchestrated by both sides to resist criminalization and regain SCS. Internment gave the paramilitary leaderships increased power to control their groups, to publicise their grievances to the world and to attract new recruits and provided opportunities to indoctrinate and educate inmates to cope with their imprisonment and for the future. Not only did SCS give additional freedom, self-determination and concessions to the paramilitaries, it also gave them a personal justification and a public perception of respectability and legitimacy for their crimes.

The built environment for paramilitaries in Northern Ireland

Following the ending of internment in 1976, those convicted of terrorist-related offences (TROs) were sent to the newly constructed, purpose-built, high security Maze Prison. Ultimately, the prison contained eight H-shaped blocks of ground-floor, typical-sized cells. Each H Block had one hundred cells, with four separate wings with 20 cells in each wing. The high perimeter wall and lookout towers were manned by the army, while inside was managed by prison officers. The government intended that those convicted of terrorist-related offences would thereafter be held in integrated (Republican and Loyalist) accommodation.

HMP Magilligan also had three H Blocks, which were built around 1977 and had the same design as Maze, and the management's intention was integration of the paramilitaries with other offenders.

Paramilitary accommodation models in the Northern Ireland Prison Service

> All prison services that deal with terrorists need to decide how to contain, distribute or disperse these high risk prisoners around their systems. This requires consideration about whether they should all be held in one place (concentration): whether they should be separated from the general prison population (separation): and if they should be isolated from each other (isolation).
>
> *(Neumann, 2010)*

Neumann's comparative research examined radicalisation and de-radicalisation in 15 countries in the context of those imprisoned for terrorist-related crimes. The review suggested that "prisons are 'places of vulnerability', which produce 'identity seekers', 'protection seekers', and 'rebels' in greater numbers than other environments. They produce near-perfect conditions in which radical, religiously framed ideologies can flourish."

In Northern Ireland, the policy of separation of paramilitaries from ordinary prisoners and from each other had and has mainly been dictated by the paramilitaries themselves despite the efforts of various government policies. Both Republicans and Loyalists have conducted long and violent campaigns to get separation from ordinary prisoners and segregation from each other by faction (Morrison, 2014). These campaigns have included several hunger strikes, in which participants died, dirty protests, blanket protests, riots and the killing of 32 prison officers between 1994 and 2016.

Over time, various accommodation management models and approaches have been tried in Northern Ireland prisons with convicted and remand paramilitary prisoners. These have included:

- integration of paramilitaries with ordinary prisoners,
- integration with other paramilitaries only,
- concentration and separation by main group (Republican or Loyalist),
- concentration with separation and segregation by individual factions like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and including smaller groups like the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and the Red Hand Commando (RHC).
- Frequent movement. The Hennessey Report (1984) had recommended "one way in which the authorities may still be able to keep the initiative is by adopting such strategies as the rotation of individuals and groups on a random but not infrequent basis before they can create trouble." Therefore, influential leaders were moved around the H Blocks to curtail the possibility of escape planning and protests. These individuals were called Red Book prisoners and were deemed "top risk." They were rotated frequently around the Maze and had additional restrictions on movement and compassionate home leave. The system was discontinued in the early 2000s when it was realised that it was counterproductive. "In effect, leadership responsibilities were shared more broadly so that greater numbers of prisoners acquired the necessary skills and experience" (McEvoy, 2001).

The only regimes that have not been challenged by the paramilitaries are concentration with separation and segregation.

Critical events and campaigns for separation, self-segregation, power and control 1971–1998

Hunger strikes, riots and dirty protests

After the end of the 1981 hunger strike in the Maze, Republicans were moved into integrated accommodation with Loyalists, who were then outnumbered two to one. Consequently, the Loyalists began a protest demanding separation from Republicans. They wrecked their cells and some began a "dirty" protest (a particularly difficult protest to manage – which included smearing their cells with their excreta) which had been used in the past by Republicans to exert pressure on the authorities. The Loyalist protesters were moved onto separate wings and had their privileges removed and, ironically, achieved for all in the Maze prison the separation that the Republicans had fought for so long. The then Chief Inspector of Prisons, Sir David Ramsbotham (1998) commented, "This 'de facto' segregation was an important milestone in the history of the Maze as it permitted the development of more clearly defined segregated prisoner communities. Both Loyalist and Republican prisoners could now begin to challenge the authority of staff without the distraction of a power struggle between factions." The Loyalists then continued their protests for separation at Magilligan prison.

Explosives

The ways in which accommodation was organised and managed in Northern Ireland prisons was central to the inquiry led by Lord Colville (1992). This inquiry followed the explosion

of a bomb planted by the Provisional IRA in Belfast Prison in November 1991. The bomb killed two Loyalist prisoners on remand and injured many more staff and prisoners. The bombing demonstrated that both models of enforced integration and self-separation which existed at that time had limitations which jeopardised safety and security (Hansard, 4 March 1992). Basically, the Republican and Loyalist prisoners colluded to create self-selected activities and movement so that, when they were offered, they ensured that they were only out of cell with their own group.

The central conclusion of Lord Colville's report was "strongly against further segregation within the prison system" (Hansard, 4 March 1992). In accepting the report, the then Secretary of State [SOS] for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, said:

> Lord Colville brings out very clearly the increased risks posed to security by segregation. He (Lord Colville) says: "All the lessons from history suggest that segregation facilitates escapes, and escapes will give freedom to paramilitary fanatics, of both factions, who will kill and maim outside prison. Moreover, I am also satisfied that segregation would make it more difficult to offer constructive regimes for inmates, as it already has in the Maze. It would constrain the flexible and effective use of the available accommodation. The opportunity which segregation would provide the paramilitaries to reinforce their cohesiveness within the prison would have an adverse effect on the morale and self-esteem of staff."

However, in the same debate, the MP for Upper Bann reminded the SOS that "there is a de facto separation in A wing" (Belfast Prison). The SOS responded that "the Government introduced new unlock arrangements to reduce the possibility of confrontation between the factions. Those involved the staff making an assumption about which faction will accept the offer of exercise or evening association. Those sensible and pragmatic arrangements fall far short of segregation…" The SOS was being candid in how the paramilitaries had managed their own separation. In response to another question, the SOS stated, "the prisoners to whom Lord Colville spoke drew no distinction between separation and segregation." While Lord Colville was indicating that the prisoners were being "reasonable" in not asking for enhanced conditions beyond separation, his point reflects the subtle bargaining potential of the paramilitaries to push the boundaries and challenge the balance of power in every situation.

Concessions and riots

In 1993, a Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) working party recommended that abutting wings in the Maze should be amalgamated, which, as Ramsbotham (1998) pointed out in his report, only ratified what was already happening. However, this meant that in riot situations, staff had to contend with 100 prisoners rather than 50 at a time. Paramilitaries were also pushing for whole Block association, with all four wings being opened for free association.

In 1994, after a ruthless campaign of rioting and attacks on prison staff within prison and in the community, separation was also granted to all paramilitary remand prisoners. The campaign culminated when Loyalist prisoners in Belfast prison rioted and destroyed their accommodation, thus ensuring that all remand and suspected terrorist prisoners were moved to the Maze H blocks. Belfast Prison and the Long Kesh compounds, which had held internees and convicted terrorists, were subsequently closed. Not only were the two main factions (Republican and Loyalist) in Maze granted separated landings and often their own H Blocks, but all factions (around 10) were also allowed to segregate into their own wings. This created a complicated mix

of pressures and needs of the prisoners, which became demands. Instead of dealing with two main organisations, the authorities had to deal with a complex mix of interests.

In 1994, Maze prisoners also successfully negotiated a 24-hour unlock in the wings, having been granted late-night viewing of the football world cup television coverage. This subsequently became a permanent feature. In return, the prisoners' leaders agreed that staff would be "allowed" to carry out daily security checks in all parts of the wings. Not surprisingly, this agreed "reciprocal" arrangement did not materialise (Bates-Gaston, 2003).

Escapes, prisoner deaths and tunnels

Serious concerns were raised about how the Northern Ireland Prison security situation could have become so vulnerable through a range of events and reports: The escape of IRA prisoners from Belfast prison in 1982; the Hennessey Report (1984) into the escape from the Maze of 38 IRA prisoners; the Narey Report into the escape of IRA prisoner Liam Averill after a children's party at the Maze (April 1998); and the Ramsbotham Inspection report (November 1998) into conditions and security at the Maze, including the shooting death of Billy Wright, the leader of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) by the INLA; the death of a remand prisoner David Keyes, in the LVF wing; and, the discovery of an IRA tunnel leading from an H Block to near the perimeter wall all occurred in 1997.

Other UK experiences

In the mid-1990s, the management of very small groups of IRA terrorist prisoners in high security units in England was reported to be no better. These failings led to the publication of the findings of the Woodcock (1994) and Learmont (1995) inquiries into the IRA escapes from Whitemoor and Parkhurst prisons where staff were seriously injured. The security had been breached in a similar manner to that in the Maze, and staff had found it extremely difficult to resist the psychological tactics and pressures that had been developed and honed by the IRA in Northern Ireland.

The consequences of separation and segregation

The Hennessy (1984), Colville (1992), Narey (1998) and Ramsbotham (1998) reports span a period of 14 years and demonstrate that the behaviours that had developed in the Maze prison in the mid-1970s (with concerted resistance via riots, threats, assaults, escapes, hunger strikes and the deaths of many prisoners and staff) had become significantly worse over time. The seriousness of the breeches indicated that separation of large numbers of paramilitaries by faction increased the pressures on staff while decreasing potential conflict between factions on the wings. Separation also increased the power and cohesion of the various factions, decreased security, reduced staff resilience and impacted on their safety, mental health and wellbeing over time.

These reports and inquiries drew attention to the huge challenges in the management of very cohesive, organised, ruthless, violent terrorist prisoners in various gaols in the United Kingdom. The wide range of serious breaches in security indicated that management policies, procedures and implementation processes were not working. It also indicated that the concept of a "critical mass" is not just about numbers of prisoners, although it can be important. Critically, it is more about how the group, large or small, is managed by staff.

There is currently a small population of convicted Islamic Extremists (IEs) in England and Wales, less than 200 (Pickering, 2014). However, the numbers in prisons identifying themselves

as Muslim are growing, with 5,502 in 2002 rising to 7,246 in 2005 and on to 12,225 in 2014 (Acheson, 2016). The Acheson review highlights that 14.4% of the prison population are Muslim, compared to 7.7% of the general UK population. In this situation, there is potential for recruitment or radicalisation of vulnerable individuals in mixed or integrated accommodation, although it may also lower the potential for security breaches. Security and safety were able to be compromised by small groups of IRA prisoners in high-security units in England, like Whitemoor Prison, where staff were not from the same small community, where fear and threats were less tangible and where the number of terrorists were considerably smaller. How much more likely is it that serious breaches could happen in the United Kingdom or Western Europe, where numbers are becoming much greater?

It is reported that the behaviours of some jihadi extremists held in UK prisons are showing developments in prison resistance very similar to that demonstrated by the IRA (Acheson, 2016). There is evidence that extremist prisoners in different parts of the world are becoming more cohesive and tactically sophisticated, as they did in Northern Ireland. For example, the use of hunger strikes in Israel and the murder of prison staff in Spain, which are designed to exert pressure for control and agreement to specific demands (Torres Soriano, 2014).

New beginnings? Accommodation and management after 1998

Policy of integration

As part of the peace agreement, 453 convicted paramilitaries were granted early release. Those relatively few remaining paramilitaries who were accommodated in the Maze and who had not accepted a ceasefire and the peace agreement were not released early under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. They were transferred to HMP Maghaberry in September 2000. After the closure of HMP Belfast in 1996 and the Maze in 2000, HMP Maghaberry, which opened in 1986, became the only prison in Northern Ireland holding male paramilitary prisoners. As it had done when Maze was operational, Maghaberry continued to accommodate such prisoners (some convicted of terrorist offences and "conforming" or ex-paramilitaries who had chosen not to be housed in the Maze, and some who had chosen to leave the Maze, usually with agreement of their organisation) on an integrated basis with other prisoners.

Following their extensive and challenging experiences, the Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) believed that the integrated approach made prisons safer for prisoners and for staff. However, complaints about integration arose in 2001, following two assaults by Loyalists on high-profile dissident Republican prisoners. By 2003 these protests "had escalated into a multi-faceted campaign with roof top protests on overcrowding, a dirty protest by the dissident republicans and threats about a hunger strike from the latter for separation from the Loyalists" (HCSC on NI Affairs, 2003/4). The protests received external support within both communities. The argument put forward was that enforced integration of paramilitaries with each other and with "ordinary" prisoners was putting individuals' safety at risk. Consequently, the Government commissioned a review of the accommodation arrangements at Maghaberry, particularly in regards to safety (HCSC on NI Affairs, 2003).

The Steele Report (2003) revealed that the revised management policy of integration with other factions and "ordinary" prisoners, which was put in place following the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (1998), was proving problematic. The Steele Review was published and accepted by Government in September 2003 and recommended that "paramilitary prisoners

from the different communities should be separated (although not segregated) in the interests of safety." The HCSC on NI Affairs reviewed the arrangements in the light of concerns around creating another Maze situation where control had been taken by the paramilitaries and landings became no-go areas for staff.

The HCSC on NI Affairs (2004) recorded that websites of groups like the Irish Freedom Committee at that time had been campaigning in favour of separation and the restoration of "political status." They also noted that following the early release of most of the paramilitary prisoners, "ordinary" prisoners had been in the overall majority for the first time. "Over time a number of the individuals who had been released under the Agreement, and their associates, were arrested, convicted of new offences and returned to prison. As a 'critical mass' of both Republican and Loyalist prisoners built up, so their confidence increased in their ability to wage an effective campaign to achieve segregation." The Steele Review Panel recorded that there were rumours of a hunger strike, although the Minister declared that such a threat was not a factor in the decision to agree to separation. The HCSC on NI Affairs (2004) also noted that it was important to remember that the future of the peace process was at a fragile stage. The Committee stated that "the separation of paramilitary prisoners at HMP Maghaberry was demanded by dissidents for political reasons and acceded to by the Government for (other) political reasons … Nonetheless we have to record our belief that the decision taken, as we see it, contrary to the balance of the facts and arguments presented to us, was a dangerous one, most especially for the public servants who will have to implement it and live with its consequences for a very long time."

The HCSC on NI Affairs also made the point that "the Government must accept full responsibility for the implementation of separation, and the additional demands it will place on the resources of the Northern Ireland Prison Service." The HCSC on NI Affairs also remarked, "On no account should any individual be able simply to claim affiliation for himself or others. Once the new arrangements are fully operational, if an individual claims affiliation for himself he should be placed in the main prison, rather than in a separated cellblock, until his claim is either verified or rejected." The prisoners signed a compact (to agree to conditions) which was revised in 2006, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) were to give a view on the authenticity of terrorist crimes for new volunteers to the separated factions.

By 2015, there were still two accommodation blocks at HMP Maghaberry dedicated to Republican and Loyalist prisoners in separated conditions, with the Dissident Republicans having self-segregated into three factions across their two landings. The numbers are currently small, at around 60 inmates overall between Republican and Loyalist groups (HMIP and CJINI, 2015).

The HCSC on NI Affairs (2003) had also drawn attention to the negative impact the separated prisoners campaign had had on "ordinary" prisoners' rehabilitation and regime, as resources had been diverted to the protests. They observed that the paramilitary prisoners had been allocated the best and most modern accommodation to ensure safety for prisoners and staff. Regarding staff support, they were assured by government "that staff would receive the initial training package before working in separated areas… On the question of continuing psychological support, we welcome the provision of regular group 'debriefing' sessions for staff in the separated wings, but we believe that officers must be able to have individual meetings as and when they need them… That the Prison Service, through its Occupational Support Unit has now extended counselling availability to include an out of hours' emergency counselling helpline." These appeared to be reasonable and practical recommendations to support staff.

Prison inspections

However, in May 2015, the Criminal Justice Inspectorate Northern Ireland and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons carried out a joint unannounced inspection of Maghaberry Prison. The report was highly critical, and they described the situation as "a prison that was in crisis" (Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland, 2015). "The demands of the separated units were undermining the work of the whole prison… Staff absence was high which led to frequent and unpredictable disruption to the daily regime for many. This situation had a negative impact on relationships between prisoners and staff and staff morale within prison was described as 'low' at the time of the inspection" with some "staff members subject to credible threats" especially in light of the death of another officer who suffered injuries from an explosion from a bomb detonated under his car in March 2016 (Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland, 2016).

It was clear that the recommendations of the HCSC on NI Affairs in 2003/4 had not been implemented at the time. This lack of support was reinforced by the HMIP and CJINI follow-up to the May 2015 Inspection by a second inspection in January 2016. This noted that:

> It was positive that staff working in Roe House (Republicans) were *now* being better supported… Support for officers working on separated units had improved with the *introduction* of group and individual supervision sessions through the individual personal development scheme facilitated by trained staff. A staff rotation system had also *been introduced* to help ensure that officers did not work excessively long hours in the units or risk becoming conditioned.
>
> *(Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland, 2016)*

The follow-up joint CJINI and HMCI Inspection in January 2016 also noted that staff in the Separated Units:

> received little training to deal with the pressure associated with working in that environment. We were concerned that managing the separated units, in their current form, required a disproportionate amount of the prison's resources to the detriment of the majority of prisoners housed elsewhere… The problems and tensions between prisoners and staff in Roe House were still evident and were still having an impact across the prison on staff perceptions of prisoners in general.
>
> *(Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland, 2016)*

It is remarkable that despite the considerable experience of managing these groups of high-risk prisoners, that the authorities were struggling to implement measures to enhance security and safety with very small groups. It is disappointing that the recommendations in the HCSC on NI Affairs (2003/2004) on the need for robust staff support had been ignored and that absenteeism had significantly increased. This had a detrimental impact on the whole prison system and on rehabilitation and regimes for ordinary prisoners.

The complaints process

The situation in separated landings was exacerbated by the dissident Republicans tying up the time and energy of managers with complaints to the prison and to the Ombudsman. The January

2016 joint CJINI and HMIP Inspection recorded that "about one third of prisoners held in the house (16) generated over 100 complaints each. The majority of Roe House complaints were drafted in the same handwriting and differed from most of the signatures and many were at the second stage of the complaints process. These complaints were a continued and co-ordinated effort to overwhelm the complaints process."

Between April 2015 and March 2016, separated Republican prisoners held on Roe 4 made 1,593 identical complaints and routinely refused to accept responses at Stage 1 and 2 of the NIPS Internal Complaints Process, so that they were escalated to the Ombudsman's office. The Ombudsman reported that these comprised of 78% of the total prison population in Northern Ireland, and they were mainly about controlled movement, full-body searching and refusal of permission for a small number of other prisoners to join them on Roe 4. The Ombudsman also reported that an additional 1,836 complaints from Roe House were received into his office, but had not yet been registered at year end. These tactics had also been used previously in the Maze and had proved successful in wearing down the system over time and in detracting resources from essential services and rehabilitation interventions in the main population.

The Acheson Report, August 2016

The recent government review into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice led by Ian Acheson (2016) found evidence that "Islamist Extremism (IE) was a growing problem within prisons, that a central comprehensive and coordinated strategy is required to monitor and counter it." The review also recommended a more coordinated and rehearsed response to violent incidents and greater coordination with the police. Additionally, the authors recommended that the present system of dispersal across prisons of those sentenced under the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) and IE prisoners should be reviewed and consideration given to containment of "a small subset of extremists within this group who present a particular and enduring risk to national security through subversive behaviour, beliefs and activities, to be removed from the general prison population and held in specialist units and given effective de-radicalisation interventions" in dedicated specialist units.

The report expressed concern that the significant increase in conviction rates following anti-terrorism legislation has meant that "more of these offenders are held outside the High Security Estate and some are proceeding through the offender management system towards release into the community." They noted that "Other prisoners – both Muslim and non-Muslim – serving sentences for crimes unrelated to terrorism are nevertheless vulnerable to radicalisation by Islamist Extremists." The review suggested that the numbers of prisoners guilty of offences relating to terrorism and extremism are likely to increase, "in part due to the reported numbers of Britons (800) who have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight. Others have also travelled to Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen. Some of these may enter the criminal justice system."

The authors gave examples of the threats already posed by Islamist Extremists, including: the development of gang cultures; threats against staff and other prisoners; charismatic prisoners exerting a controlling and radicalising influence on other prisoners; pressure on staff to not supervise collective worship; attempts to engineer segregation by landing, by wing, or even by prison; attempts to prevent staff searches; availability of extremist literature in prison libraries; intimidation of prison imams; exploitation of staff fears of being labelled racist; and abuse of prisoners' legal correspondence. The illegal use of mobile telephone technology by these prisoners was also raised as a concern. The review team visited and reflected on practices in other jurisdictions like Spain, the Netherlands and France and found that there were common themes which they thought had particular relevance to UK prison needs, including: isolation of IE prisoners;

significant deployment of surveillance; the importance of the built environment; staff training to not only manage risk but also to foster rehabilitation; and the primacy police involvement in resolving prison-based counter-terrorism incidents.

Many of the observations made in the Acheson Review mirror the previous experiences of prisons in Northern Ireland and offer some guidance on potential ways forward. As the Review recommendations are implemented, they can be evaluated over time and action taken to improve conditions to enhance security and safety of both staff and prisoners. There are capacity and cultural differences between the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland prisons and the IEs in England and Wales. Both Loyalist and Republican prisoners have consistently refused to engage in work or any form of risk assessment, "rehabilitation or interventions." When released on Licence, they have successfully resisted supervision by the Probation Board or the Police Service Northern Ireland (CJINI response to NI Justice Committee, 2012), unlike in England and Wales where these prisoners are managed by the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) (Pickering, 2014).

However, surprisingly, in 2010, one small group of Loyalists agreed to take part in a restorative justice programme which provided an opportunity for Loyalists to engage in discussion and debate about the future of "Loyalism" (Campbell and Chapman, 2013). Although there were few participants, in a follow-up evaluation, the Loyalist prisoners reported that they had benefitted from the course through challenging their long-held beliefs while encouraging them to reflect on themselves, their communities, their victims, their families and their futures. This might be a positive sign for the future.

Looking at the evidence, it becomes clear that one accommodation model does not address all needs due to many factors, including culture, geographical size, as well as community, social and political interests. Security, safety, recruitment, engagement and disengagement all interact and respond in different ways to management style and accommodation provision. The actions that increase security may well alienate or inhibit disengagement or rehabilitation opportunities, and a balance has to be found between the needs for high security and the offering of opportunities for individuals to disengage from extremist activities (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2014).

A recent Fresh Start Panel report on the Disbandment of Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland (Alderdice, McBurney and McWilliams, 2016) highlighted the difficulties of disengagement in a small community like Northern Ireland, where pressures are brought to bear on families and the community. The review team found that paramilitary groups have significant influence over their own communities and especially young people in disadvantaged areas, some of whom may be recruited in prison. They found that leaving the organisation is difficult "as some paramilitary groups insist on a substantial sum of money as an exit fee." They noted that the separated regime in Maghaberry can serve to cement leadership positions and links between members of paramilitary groups and to draw individuals further into the activities of the group. This illustrates how the context for recruitment and disengagement is all important.

Conclusions

Overall, the evidence suggests that accommodation can have positive as well as negative impacts on prisoners and the system. Security and safety can be enhanced by strong, consistent, supportive and visible leadership with open communication between staff and management with a "no blame culture" in the reporting of problems. Prisoners and staff need to have clear direction and expectations of policies and of what is expected, and then staff must be supported in delivery at the highest levels of management. Various reports have indicated the need for robust, responsive staff support systems, which include specialist training, counselling and frequent debriefing ser-

vices on a regular basis. Reviews of critical events have also recommended frequent rotation of landing staff and rotation of selected lower-risk prisoners. It is recognized that the built environment is important for safety and security with small, open-plan units, well-lit landings which include remote unlock capacity and sophisticated surveillance technology. There is a need for higher prisoner-staff ratio than currently exists on regular landings at present with the use of bodycams (cameras) for staff working with IEs or paramilitaries which record live incidents to increase transparency and accountability for both staff and prisoners. Research at the University of Cambridge (Ariel *et al.*, 2016) found that the use of such cameras influences the behaviour of police officers and the public, and have reduced complaints against the police by more than 90%. The study suggests that the "observer effect" of the cameras reduces the likelihood of conflict. In order to promote a healthier environment, there is a need for monitoring of active attempts at conditioning of staff and to provide appropriate responses with support.

Disengagement can be encouraged by confident staff who are well-trained and are positive role models. Consideration should be given to an initial reception/induction screening period for new intakes who are claiming affiliation with a group. This would include separate assessment facilities to ascertain the level of terrorist commitment though multidisciplinary information sharing and engagement with specially-trained staff. This period would provide a prisoner with opportunities for reflection, disengagement and identification of needs to assist reintegration on release. The use of "time out" facilities which are away from mainstream separated prisoners to allow an individual time for reflection, discussion and opportunities for disengagement could be helpful, as would the rotation of lower-risk IEs or paramilitary prisoners to discourage the natural dynamics of group bonding. Opportunities for debates and discussion groups with knowledgeable experts on the history and genesis of the conflict on all sides could assist some in considering their imprisonment and commitment. In the past, home leave for those assessed as suitable and for lower-risk prisoners was found to promote desistance.

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TERRORIST DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALIZATION

Kurt Braddock

Abu Ibrahim, who had recently converted to Islam and joined the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), had second thoughts about his decision to join the group's fight. "Some of the policies, such as the beheadings of non-combatants … those things I didn't agree with." In an interview with CBS's Clarissa Ward (2015), Ibrahim explained how he initially sought out ISIS as an opportunity to live under strict Sharia law. As part of the group, he bore witness to many of the group's atrocities; he witnessed crucifixions, public stoning, and the other strict forms of Islamic law enforcement at the hands of the Hisbah, ISIS's religious police. Ibrahim conceded, "It's harsh, it's real, but it's the Sharia" (Tasch, 2015).

Despite his initial acceptance of the group's methods, Ibrahim grew dissatisfied. He began to question the group's policies, including the beheadings of Western journalists and other non-combatants. Describing them as "innocent," Ibrahim disagreed with the public executions. Moreover, Ibrahim grew disenchanted with the group and his role within it. He missed his family, he was bored, and he found his experiences with ISIS to be quite different than his expectations. Though Ibrahim had traveled to the Middle East to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, he claimed, "I wasn't doing what I had initially come for" (Ward, 2015). Despite incredible danger, Abu Ibrahim left ISIS. If his judgments are correct, he is not the first to do so, nor will he be the last. Ibrahim described some of his former comrades as disillusioned, even scared.

Stories like those of Abu Ibrahim went understudied within the terrorism literature for some time. In spite of a more recent focus on that which has become known as "de-radicalization" among many terrorism researchers (see later in this chapter and other chapters in this volume), there remain a wide range of issues that are misunderstood related to how individuals leave terrorism.

One of the key problems associated with the study of desistance from terrorism relates to our inability to understand and delineate the reasons how and why different individuals leave terrorism behind. Abu Ibrahim left ISIS due to his disillusionment with the group's practices and the draw of his past personal life; but there exist a variety of other personal, political, organizational, or social reasons why individuals abandon terrorism in different contexts. Further confusing the issue is the ongoing focus on de-radicalization initiatives and their evaluation (e.g., El-Said, 2015; Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Striegher, 2013). Though the study of these initiatives has been useful in illuminating how different countries treat terrorist offenders after they are caught

(and sometimes released), they have provided little insight into our understanding of how or why individuals initially desist from terrorism. Finally, and perhaps most problematically, some researchers and media personnel continue to use the terms "de-radicalization" and "disengagement" interchangeably to describe desistance from terrorism.

Of course, no single chapter can address every issue related to the study of de-radicalization and disengagement, so I will not attempt to do so here. Instead, with this chapter, I seek only to provide a synopsis of some of the most prominent topics related to these issues in two key ways. First, I will offer a definition for disengagement and offer some of the reasons that it occurs at the individual and organizational levels. Following this, I will define de-radicalization and discuss several of its drivers. Although the concepts of disengagement and de-radicalization are closely (and necessarily) associated, confusion about their meaning and the degree to which they are used interchangeably demands their conceptual distinction. So, I will provide a brief synopsis of how these two concepts differ and the implications of distinguishing them conceptually. Because other chapters in this volume address how practitioners have promoted disengagement and de-radicalization from terrorism in risk-reduction initiatives that exist in a number of countries (see Chapters 51 and 52 for example), I will not describe these initiatives here. However, to close the chapter, I will provide references to guide the motivated reader to readings that expand upon these initiatives and other issues concerning disengagement and de-radicalization.

As a first step, let us consider the concept of disengagement and some of its drivers.

Disengagement from terrorism

Disengagement is a process through which an individual who is involved with terrorism experiences a change in the role or function they serve whereby they participate in less violent activity (perhaps stopping altogether; Horgan, 2009a, p. 152). The most obvious form of disengagement from terrorist activity is an individual's decision to leave a terrorist organization and stop engaging in violent behavior on the organization's behalf. Although this form of disengagement does occur, it is important to note that disengagement does not necessarily require an individual's complete departure of the group of which he is a part. It is possible for an individual to disengage from terrorism while still supporting the terrorist group via other means.

Many evaluations of terrorist disengagement have focused on the end of violent activity at the individual level. However, there have been a number of instances in which an individual disengaged from terrorism not of his/her own volition, but because of changes that have occurred at the organizational level. In these cases, changes to the terrorist group's support, leadership, or strategic direction have forced individual terrorists to stop partaking in violent behavior.

Given the different precursors and outcomes respectively associated with disengagement at the individual and organizational levels, it is critical for any discussion of disengagement to address both types. The following section describes drivers of individual-level disengagement, and provides illustrative examples for each.

Individual-level drivers

Exhaustion

Engaging in terrorist activity is, by its very nature, a stressful endeavor. It requires its practitioners to largely abandon their former lives and dedicate their energy to not only carry out attacks, but also to avoid being captured. The constant pressure associated with engaging in terrorism can take a cumulative toll that can become so great as to motivate a terrorist to either abandon

violence as a practice (and perhaps move into a less stressful role with the organization), or leave the group entirely.

In an analysis of the factors promoting the disengagement of members of the Italian Red Brigades, Della Porta (2009) found fatigue and burn-out to be common themes in former members' life histories. Several former terrorists recounted the immense amount of time and energy they dedicated to the group's cause, and for some, the relief that came with their capture. One former member described a daily routine in which he/she would need to wake up at 5 a.m. to perform a reconnaissance mission, remain busy in other group activities throughout the day, and sleep again only around 1 a.m. the following morning. This individual admitted that upon his/her capture, one of his/her first thoughts was "thank goodness, more sleep" (Della Porta, 2009, p. 81).

This degree of exhaustion can weaken the resolve of even the most dedicated fighters, prompting them to put down their weapons for the sake of more peaceful activities. These individuals may not abandon their radical beliefs, but instead support their causes via means that do not require them to exert such physical and mental energy.

Changes in personal priorities and preferences

Most individuals who engage in terrorism have a personal life that extends beyond the boundaries of the groups of which they are a part. These individuals have friends, families, jobs, and other things that are personally important to them. Although terrorist organizations often attempt to isolate their members such that these personal interests do not impinge on the individual's capacity to function in support of the organizations, personal priorities can nonetheless loom large while an individual is engaged. Eventually, these other priorities can become sufficiently important that the terrorist decides to end his/her engagement in violent activity and spend more time tending to interests unrelated to the terrorist organization.

For example, in his analysis of disengagement processes among racist, neo-Nazi, or other right-wing violent extremists, Bjørgo (2009) found that many individuals decided to leave their groups upon reflecting on how violent behavior takes away from other personal prospects. He also found that many former militants felt they were getting too old to engage in violent behavior. As they aged, they no longer felt the need for excitement that violent activity gave them in their younger years. Extreme right-wingers were also cognizant of the fact that their engagement in violent activity would disqualify them from certain career prospects they wished to pursue.

Though age-based preference changes and diminished job prospects were key disengagement factors, Bjørgo (2009) argued that the establishment of a family is one of the strongest motivators for an individual to leave the terrorist groups of which they were a part. Getting a significant other or having children "involve[s] establishing new bonds of loyalty and setting different priorities" (p. 40). For groups in which complete loyalty and attention are required of the individual, this creates a conflict in which that individual must ultimately choose between the group and his/her new personal affiliations. This often leads the individual to disengage from terrorism to focus on other, more personally relevant matters.

Changing roles

Although active terrorists generate the most attention (both from academics and the popular press), the process by which an individual disengages from active terrorist activity highlights the importance of other roles within the group. Terrorist groups require personnel

to undertake a variety of functions; recruitment, fundraising, and logistic support are three examples of non-violent jobs that members of a terrorist group may perform. Individuals often shift from violent to non-violent roles within terrorist organizations. Though the individual has not left the terrorist organization outright in these cases, he/she has disengaged from violent activity.

Interviews performed by Horgan (2009a, 2009b) have revealed that role changes within a terrorist organization can occur for a number of different reasons beyond the individual's control. For instance, organizational staff shortages in support roles or temporary ceasefires may force a terrorist organization's leadership to recall engaged fighters and assign them to non-violent roles within the group. Individuals may also be forced out of violent roles within a terrorist organization as a form of reprimand or as a means for the group's leadership to maintain surveillance on that individual. Horgan (2009a) cited an instance in which a former Provisional Irish Republican Army operations commander was removed from his post as punishment for sanctioning an operation that brought unwanted public pressure on the IRA.

Active terrorists can also voluntarily stop engaging in violence to move to a non-violent role within the organization. For example, in Horgan's (2009b) interview with "Alan," a former member of the Ulster Volunteer Force, the interviewee described how he became unconvinced that violence would achieve the group's goals. After being arrested and being exposed to other Loyalists in prison, Alan came to run a community support group to assist former prisoners re-integrate into their communities. Alan disengaged from terrorism because of doubts associated with the efficacy of violence as a tactic, but he nonetheless seemed to maintain that his former use of that tactic was legitimate. This example illustrates how an individual can abandon violence of his/her own volition, but nonetheless remain adherent to the ideology that supports that violence.

Arrest/imprisonment

One obvious way in which an individual may be forced to stop engaging in terrorist behavior is through his/her removal from the battlefield at the hands of security forces. Terrorist activity is illegal by nature, and active terrorists run the constant risk of being apprehended, imprisoned, or killed by law enforcement personnel. When apprehended or imprisoned, the individual is (obviously) unable to engage in terrorist behavior. However, as with the other forms of disengagement outlined in this section, neither capture nor imprisonment (in and of themselves) are likely to dispossess an individual of the ideology that guided his/her former behavior.

Consider, for example, the scores of incarcerated white supremacists who maintain their beliefs through membership in ideologically based gangs in prison (e.g., Goldman, 2014). These individuals are effectively disengaged; they are unable to participate in violent extremist behavior due to their imprisonment. However, their incarceration does not temper their dedication to the white supremacist beliefs that advocate the behavior in which they engaged before they were jailed. Worse, imprisonment can exacerbate an individual's ideological extremism under certain conditions (Cilluffo, Cardash, and Whitehead, 2007; Goldman, 2014; Neumann, 2010). For example, individuals who are uncertain about their futures are likely to seek out cohesive groups in prison that provide them with a sense of structure (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, and Moffitt, 2007) thus making them prime targets for continued radicalization by extremist groups. Although incarceration removes the threat for violence a terrorist poses, it may have no influence on their beliefs or attitudes in relation to the ideology that guided their behavior.

Organizational-level drivers

As evidenced by the number of examples cited in the previous section, there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that individuals stop engaging in terrorism a function of their own decision-making. However, it is often the case that an individual does not *choose* to stop engaging in terrorist activity, but is instead *forced* to stop engaging in terrorist activity as a result of changes to the organization of which he/she is a part or the environment in which the organization operates. This section will outline some of these organizational-level drivers of disengagement from terrorism.

Achievement of strategic objectives

Terrorist groups are motivated by some political, religious, or ideological goals. In the vast majority of cases, these goals go unfulfilled; terrorist groups tend to dissolve or be stamped out by security forces long before they achieve any large-scale strategic victory (Rapoport, 1992). However, there have been cases in which terrorist groups have achieved their strategic objectives, and as a result, end their violent campaigns.

One notable example of such a group was the African National Congress (ANC). Created in 1912 and ultimately led by Nelson Mandela, the ANC employed terrorism against the South African apartheid regime beginning in the 1960s. The ANC performed its final terrorist act in 1989 as apartheid ended in South Africa, the ANC transitioned into a legitimate political organization, and Mandela was elected the first post-apartheid president of South Africa. This type of transition was not uncommon. The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which had performed a number of bombings in public locations, ultimately came to govern Namibia (p. 59; see also "Transition to legitimate government" below).

In some of the first research on the end of terrorist movements, Laqueur (1977) argued that terrorist organizations that achieve their strategic objectives are typically one of three types: groups with narrow, clearly defined goals; groups with powerful external protectors; and groups that challenged imperial powers with weakening influence. Regardless of the type of group of which an individual is a part, the achievement of strategic objectives by that group will leave that individual without an enemy to fight.

Arrest/killing of top leaders

The degree to which the decapitation of a terrorist organization's leadership influences the organization's subsequent activity is contingent on a large number of factors. Cronin (2009) argued that the efficacy of decapitation for stopping an organization's terrorist activity is a function of the group's structure, culture (i.e., whether it is built on a cult of personality), and the presence of a successor. Through an empirical analysis of dozens of decapitation incidents, Jordan (2009) found that groups that are larger, older, or are motivated by religion are likely to survive decapitation. Although the nature of some groups renders them more resilient to decapitation than others, there are cases in which the removal of a group's top leaders has caused the group to dissolve, leading its members to lay down their weapons.

For instance, the Shining Path was a Marxist movement that executed many peasant leaders in Peru in the 1980s and the 1990s. The group's leader, Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman, recruited a number of followers and led them to a series of attacks. By removing or killing those that dissented against his policies and tactics, Guzman developed an obedient following of impressionable young fighters. Guzman's charismatic persona, coupled with his repression

of dissent within the Shining Path, made him a centrally powerful figure in the movement. In September of 1992, however, Guzman was captured and subsequently imprisoned. His capture decimated the Shining Path; the group's activity declined significantly throughout the 1990s, and the group was essentially destroyed in 1999 when Guzman's successor (Oscar Ramirez Duran) was also arrested.

In another example, Shoko Asahara founded Aum Shinrikyo in 1987. Drawing a collection of international followers, Asahara claimed that the world would be coming to an end as a result of an American attack against Japan. As the head of the apocalyptic cult, Asahara convinced his followers that they must undertake operations to prepare for the impending U.S. attack. In 1995, two months after Aum Shinrikyo released sarin in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people, Asahara was arrested and sentenced to death. This led to a rapid decline in membership and support of Aum Shinrikyo. At the time of the subway attack, Aum Shinrikyo boasted 45,000 members in multiple countries. By the mid-2000s, the group's membership had fallen to less than 1,000.

As evidenced by these examples, the demise of some extremist groups can be traced to the removal of their leaders. When this happens to a group, the individuals that comprise its membership tend to stop fighting or move into other domains in which their skills can be put to use (e.g., organized crime). Regardless, when a group dissolves as a function of its decapitation, its fighters disengage from terrorism, as there is no terrorist action left to undertake.

Destruction of the group

In most cases, terrorist groups fail to achieve their strategic objectives. In an early analysis of terrorism's effectiveness, Rapoport (1992) found that 90% of terrorist groups fail to survive more than a year beyond their founding, and of those that do, more than half do not exist for more than a decade. These figures indicate that at least 19 of 20 terrorist groups fail to achieve their goals or sustain their activities geared toward doing so. Although Held (2008) claimed that terrorism may be slightly effective in some cases (for examples, see the sections entitled "Achievement of strategic objectives" and "Transition to legitimate government" in this chapter), the vast majority are destroyed by security forces or dissolve from within (Cronin, 2006).

Although some scholars have warned against the use of armed conflict as an exclusive means of combatting asymmetric violence like terrorism (e.g., Roberts, 2005), there are some cases in which intervention (for conflicts abroad) or repression (for domestic terrorists) has resulted in the destruction of the target terrorist group. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged in attacks against Sri Lankan government forces, performed suicide bombings against the Sri Lankan population, and killed members of the Tamil community that did not abide by their ideology (Devotta, 2016). Between 2006 and 2009, however, Sri Lankan security forces defeated the LTTE in a number of key places around the country. In May of 2009, the group's key leaders conceded defeat. Following the group's destruction, most of the group's membership (nearly 12,000 fighters) surrendered to the Sri Lankan military (Sriyananda, 2011). Still, some members continued to adhere to the LTTE's cause, attempting to revive the group among the Tamil diaspora scattered throughout the world (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2016).

As evidenced by the case of the LTTE and other groups (e.g., Shining Path, Narodnaya Volya), government and military force can promote terrorist disengagement through the destruction of the groups of which terrorists are a part. However, disengagement resulting from military intervention or repression does not necessarily promote the abandonment of a group's ideology on the part of the individual fighter. These individuals may stop fighting in the short term, only to attempt to re-engage at a later time or in another place (Kramer, 2005).

Transition to legitimate government

Although some terrorist groups' activities are motivated by religious (e.g., ISIS) or ideological (e.g., Army of God, Animal Liberation Front) goals that are largely unrelated to politics, terrorist organizations interested in altering political landscapes may be affected by their inclusion in a legitimate political process. Negotiations between the government and the terrorist organizations can serve to pacify the latter, convincing them that armed conflict is no longer needed, and a political solution to their grievances can be attained. In some cases, these negotiations have led to the terrorist organization's formal representation in the government.

The most widely known example of this process involved the negotiations between the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the British and Irish governments. These negotiations led to the signing of the Belfast Agreement by the IRA, effectively ending their decades-long war of attrition against British rule in Ireland. As a result of that agreement, the IRA decommissioned its weapons and committed to democratic means for resolving political disagreements with the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the political wing of the IRA, Sinn Féin, was integrated into both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament. As of 2016, the IRA's transition to legitimate governance has been widely accepted.

Despite large-scale acceptance of the solution to the Troubles offered by the Belfast Agreement, there were many within the Irish republican movement that refused to accept the political "concessions" made by the PIRA. In the time since the signing of the Agreement, the group has split into multiple dissident groups that have continued their armed campaign within the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (see Morrison, 2015). In essence, members of the PIRA who were dissatisfied with their being forced to disengage from violent activity broke off from the group, forming their own violent groups (e.g., the Real Irish Republican Army, the Continuity IRA, Óglaigh na hÉireann), with which they re-engaged in violence. The example of the PIRA and its violent splinter groups demonstrates that organizational decisions that promote disengagement—even decisions that can be construed as strategic successes—may not uncouple fighters from the ideologies that drive their behavior.

Note that neither the individual- nor the organizational-level drivers for disengagement *affect* or are *affected by* a change in the terrorist's adherence to an ideology that advocates political violence. It is altogether possible for an individual to end their engagement in violent activity, but nonetheless maintain beliefs that advocate the use of violence for a political ideal. The abandonment of such a belief system represents a different process altogether—one often referred to as de-radicalization.

De-radicalization

Even more so than disengagement, the term "de-radicalization" has been the subject of heated debate among terrorism scholars. As a testament to the complex nature of de-radicalization, there exist a wide array of definitions for the term, each with its own emphasis. A review of all of these definitions and their implications is beyond the scope of this modest chapter, but in most cases, they refer to the weakening or loss of beliefs and attitudes that support the use of terrorism. For the purposes of this chapter, however, de-radicalization can be thought of as what Horgan (2014, p. 141) called "psychological disengagement." This refers to a process whereby an individual experiences a change in beliefs or attitudes about the significance of his/her continued involvement with a terrorist group or active engagement in terrorist activity. Whereas initial desistance from terrorist activity represents disengagement, de-radicalization is a form of secondary desistance—changes in personal identity that prompt a reconsideration and/or reori-

entation of beliefs, attitudes, and values that are necessary for participation in terrorist activity (see Gadd, 2003; LaFree and Miller, 2008; Maruna and Farrall, 2004).

Like disengagement from terrorism, there are multiple reasons why an individual may experience de-radicalization at any point in his/her involvement with a terrorist group. Although there has been a significant amount of work on the numerous initiatives geared toward promoting de-radicalization, research on the factors that actually promote de-radicalization are far less understood. I will not repeat analyses or evaluations of these de-radicalization initiatives in this chapter, given that other chapters in this volume accomplish this task quite well. Instead, I will outline some factors that may promote de-radicalization among violent extremists. The terrorism literature has identified an array of factors that promote de-radicalization, but here, I will discuss the three most prominent: disillusionment with the realities of involvement with a terrorist group; disagreement with other members over how the group carries out operations; and disagreements about strategy, policy, or ideology.

Disillusionment with the realities of involvement

Terrorist recruitment propaganda can be particularly adept at depicting involvement in terrorist activity as an exciting, romantic endeavor. ISIS is a useful example; the group's propaganda portrays Iraq and Syria as potential paradises to which foreign fighters can travel to engage in glorious combat. However, as the example presented at the outset of this chapter illustrates, the realities associated with involvement with a terrorist group often fall far short of the individual fighter's expectations. This can lead to immediate disappointment and disillusionment with the group, its members, and the cause that it claims to support.

Horgan (2009b) argued that the discrepancy between an individual's expectations about his/her involvement in terrorism and the realities of that involvement are a critical contributor to psychological disengagement. Interviews with and autobiographies of former members of terrorist groups (e.g., the Provisional IRA [Collins and McGovern, 1997], the Italian Red Brigades [Peci, 1983], and al-Qaeda [Nasiri, 2008]) are rife with accounts that illustrate how individuals become disillusioned with their terrorist activity upon witnessing the behavior of those they believed to be principled, noble fighters. In Patricio Peci's account of his first encounter with a leader in the Italian Red Brigades, he described how the commander picked at his toenails with a breadknife during dinner (Peci, 1983, p. 11). In his autobiography detailing his time with the Provisional IRA, Eamon Collins had a similar experience that had an impact on his "romantic image of the IRA soldier" (Collins and McGovern, 1997, p. 103). Collins reported how after a successful bombing, one of his comrades stole money from a hotel. He recalled feeling as though his fellow IRA's behavior "took the shine off the operation," reducing the IRA to common criminals rather than principled fighters for a free Ireland.

Although disillusionment and disappointment in multiple facets of involvement with a terrorist group is a common theme in terrorist accounts of leaving terrorism behind, the discrepancy between one's expectations and the reality of engagement is one of the more ubiquitous. It is a powerful disincentive to engage in terrorist activity when the image of glorious combat is shattered by the mundane (and sometimes offensive) nature of day-to-day activities.

Disagreement over tactics

According to nearly every definition, terrorism involves violent activity against civilian targets. It seems natural to assume that individuals would be mentally prepared to engage in these tactics

upon getting involved with a terrorist group. However, there is some evidence to suggest that terrorists may come to disagree with their groups' tactical decisions, thus prompting them to re-evaluate their dedication to the group and the ideology that guides its behavior.

One of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon relates to Mohammed Nasir bin Abbas. Bin Abbas left the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah after the 2002 bombing of a Bali bar that killed over 200 people (Horgan, 2009b, p. 33). Another high-profile case was when Sheikh Salman Fahd al-Oudah (who had once been a strong supporter of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda) publicly renounced al-Qaeda and its tactics. Al-Oudah appeared on a Middle Eastern television station to publicly challenge bin Laden on the group's tactics and the number of people that have been killed for the group's ideology (Bergen and Cruickshank, 2008).

In another example, Horgan (2009b) interviewed a former member of the Provisional IRA who described his gradual movement away from the group. Although "Michael" had been experiencing doubts about his involvement with the IRA for some time, the murder of a pregnant policewoman served as the final catalyst to undo his commitment to the group. This event was particularly pronounced in Michael's mind as "a step too far" (p. 94) when one of his comrades joked that the IRA would get "two for the price of one." Although Michael had been able to abide violent tactics against the Royal Ulster Constabulary, this "step too far" proved devastating to him and his commitment to the IRA. He resigned from the group shortly thereafter and eventually become an informer against his former group.

Strategic, political, or ideological differences

Similar to differences associated with near-term tactical decisions, some terrorists have reported leaving their respective organizations because they disagreed (at least in part) with the organization's strategic direction or developed an aversion to the ideology to which they had originally been drawn. The causes of these differences are widely variable, and are not mutually exclusive from the disagreements over tactical decisions.

In another interview, Horgan (2009b) described a conversation with "Doug," who had spent a substantial amount of time in prison for a Loyalist group in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). By all accounts, Doug was a steadfast Loyalist in his time with the group. However, after a visit in prison from the Secretary of State in Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, Doug came to believe in the peace process put forth by the Good Friday Agreement. Doug angrily described how he had suffered for the Loyalist cause in the fight against the IRA, but wished his compatriots would "give peace a chance for God's sake" (p. 112). As a result of his sponsorship of the peace process, Doug came to believe that his former comrades in UDA leadership roles were jealous of his involvement and took steps to discredit him. In essence, Doug felt that his enthusiasm for a shift in organizational strategy led to his split from the UDA.

As "Doug's" case illustrates, shifts in beliefs about the direction of an individual's organization can occur suddenly and have a strong effect on that individual's position in the group. Although Doug believes his movement away from terrorism (and the other strategies employed by the UDA) were prompted by jealousy on the part of his former comrades, there are instances in which individuals come to question their group's ideology simply by being exposed to the behaviors that the ideology promotes. The case of Abu Ibrahim outlined in the introduction to this chapter, for example, describes a man who quickly became disillusioned with ISIS's strategies (Ward, 2015). Regardless of their respective impetuses, it is clear that misgivings about a group's strategic direction or ideology is a key driver of de-radicalization.

Disengagement and de-radicalization: comprehension through distinction

As evidenced by the citations referenced in the preceding sections, some of the clearest and most convincing research geared toward distinguishing disengagement from de-radicalization has been performed by Horgan and various colleagues (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Horgan, 2005; Horgan, 2009a, Horgan, 2014; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). This work has revealed four key themes that help to differentiate disengagement and de-radicalization while illustrating how the two are intimately related.

Research on disengagement and de-radicalization has produced evidence to show individual trajectories out of terrorism are as varied as the pathways into it. Some individuals grow disillusioned with the ideology guiding their terrorist behavior, thereby prompting them to abandon violence as a tactic. Others are forcibly disengaged from terrorism (e.g., through capture or organizational change) and come to abandon the ideology to which they had clung. Stated plainly, *there is evidence of terrorists de-radicalizing before disengaging, as well as disengaging before de-radicalizing*.

Less obvious, but just as critical for understanding why terrorism ends, are cases in which disengagement and de-radicalization do not co-occur. It is possible for an individual to disengage from terrorism without de-radicalizing. Research on individual drivers of disengagement shows that terrorists often lay down their weapons for reasons entirely unrelated to their adherence to the ideology that guides their behavior. Interviews with former terrorists have revealed that changes in one's personal circumstances or preferences can prompt them to abandon political violence while maintaining beliefs and attitudes that promote it. Given this, it is important to recognize that *individual drivers of disengagement from terrorism do not necessarily induce changes in beliefs or attitudes that promote the use of terrorism*.

Empirical work on the end of terrorism at the organizational level has produced similar findings. When a terrorist organization collectively ends its engagement in terrorist activities (whether forcibly or voluntarily), there are rarely mechanisms in place to help individual terrorists abandon the beliefs and attitudes that drove their support for the organization. Although terrorist "de-radicalization programs" have become more common around the world (see Ashour, 2009; Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Horgan and Braddock, 2010), only a small proportion of those who engaged in violent activity go through these programs. Moreover, the efficacy of these programs remains in doubt; even those individuals that undergo what these programs often call "de-radicalization" may not abandon their ideology. Taken together, this means that many individuals who are forced to halt their terrorist activity due to changes in their organization's strategic direction or capacity to continue operations may not experience a change in beliefs or attitudes related to the use of violence. As a result, *organizational drivers of disengagement from terrorism do not necessarily induce changes in beliefs or attitudes that promote the use of terrorism*.

Just as it is possible for an individual to disengage from terrorism without de-radicalizing, it is possible for an individual to de-radicalize without disengaging from terrorism. Individual terrorists may become disillusioned with the ideology that originally guided their behavior for any number of reasons (see above), but may find themselves unable to leave their respective groups. For example, the use of child soldiers in terrorist organizations is well documented (e.g., Bloom, Horgan, and Winter, 2016; Capone, 2016; Joyce, Lynch, and Veale, 2015). These children are often exploited and indoctrinated with terrorist ideologies without the capacity to leave the group without outside assistance. Other (adult) terrorists may no longer believe in their group's purported cause(s) and wish to leave, but fail to do so out of fear of reprisal by the group. As these and other examples illustrate, *changes in an individual's beliefs and attitudes such*

that they no longer support a terrorist ideology does not necessarily facilitate that individual's capacity to abandon terrorist activity.

These four axioms indicate that the continued conflation of the terms "disengagement" and "de-radicalization" is a detriment to our understanding of each process. Researchers and analysts that wish to promote these outcomes would do well to recognize that the factors that drive the disengagement and de-radicalization processes *may* encourage both, but this is not a foregone conclusion. Continued scholarship into each process as they occur both individually and in concert would be useful for the development of strategic interventions intended to (a) induce individuals to abandon terrorist activity, (b) uncouple individuals from their terrorist ideologies, or ideally (c) both.

Further reading

I opened this chapter conceding that no single manuscript could capture every nuance of terrorist disengagement and de-radicalization. Any singular attempt to do so is likely to overlook key factors that relate to these processes. For the sake of conceptual clarity—which remains evasive despite years of research on disengagement and de-radicalization—I chose to focus on distinguishing the two processes in terms of the factors that drive them and demonstrate that the processes are *not* synonymous.

However, there are other areas of interest related to disengagement and de-radicalization that would be useful for the motivated reader to seek out. In addition to the other chapter(s) in this volume that supplement this one, I would recommend several important readings in multiple areas of interest.

First, my focus on definitions and drivers of disengagement and de-radicalization has left me little room to discuss an area of research that has generated great interest from academics and practitioners alike—de-radicalization initiatives. Any reader interested in these programs would benefit from reading Part II of Bjørgo and Horgan's (2009) volume on disengagement and de-radicalization. Seven chapters in that volume respectively detail initiatives in Scandinavia, Colombia, Yemen, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and other locations. In a similar edited volume, Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin (2011) have collected a number of papers concerning de-radicalization efforts in other contexts (though there is some overlap with Bjørgo and Horgan's [2009] book). Although there has been substantial research on individual efforts at de-radicalization, there is a marked lack of work concerning what constitutes "success" in these initiatives (Horgan, 2009b). Horgan and Braddock (2010), however, made a first attempt at proposing a framework for evaluating what they called "risk-reduction initiatives." Readers interested in the practical application and evaluation of de-radicalization efforts would be wise to read this paper.

Second, the academic literature on disengagement and de-radicalization is useful insofar as it accurately reflects how individual terrorists undergo these processes. Though not academic in nature, autobiographies of former terrorists offer insight into their experiences leaving terrorism that most academic work cannot provide. These autobiographies are widely available; there have been scores written by former terrorists and extremists in the last twenty years. Some notable examples include *The Informer* (O'Callaghan, 1999), *Killing Rage* (Collins and McGovern, 1998), *Romantic Violence: Memoirs of an American Skinhead* (Picciolini, 2015), *Agent Storm: My Life inside al-Qaeda and the CIA* (Storm, Cruickshank, and Lister, 2015), and *The Blood of Lambs* (Saleem and Vincent, 2009). Although these comprise only a small fraction of the total number of autobiographies of former terrorists available to readers, they represent a good starting point.

Finally, the emergence of ISIS and its sophisticated online propaganda has brought issues related to Internet-based radicalization to the fore. As researchers have sought to mitigate the

effects of online messages geared toward radicalizing potential followers, some authors have studied how the processes of de-radicalization and disengagement can be promoted online (e.g., Ashour, 2011). Other research has explored the efficacy of online attempts at countering violent extremism (CVE) which, unlike de-radicalization or disengagement, seeks to stop radicalization before it starts (e.g., Braddock and Horgan, 2016; Davies, Neudecker, Oullet, Bouchard, and Ducol, 2016). Although CVE and de-radicalization are slightly different in focus, these readings will help the reader understand how each can be used to reduce the number of individuals that adhere to an ideology that advocates the use of terrorism.

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41
TARGETED KILLINGS
Perpetual war for perpetual peace?

Rory Finegan

Introduction

The killing of Osama bin Laden by American Special Forces in May 2011 was heralded as an event of massive symbolic importance. Within the US, news of the killing led to impromptu street celebrations and "pushed approval ratings for President Obama up six points" (Silke, 2012: 173). Some argued that the death of bin Laden did not mean the end of the threat from al-Qaeda, but bin Laden's death did, however, reignite the debate over whether the Targeted Killing (TK) of suspected terrorists is an effective strategy to follow. There followed the subsequent TK of American-born Anwar al-Awlaki, who was head of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, on September 30, 2011 by an American drone (Hepworth, 2014: 1); and the TK of two British jihadists in Syria by the RAF, again utilising the modus of a drone and representing the first time that the UK had directed a TK against its own citizens when Britain was not at war (Dominiczak *et al.,* 2015). These instances of TKs have once again focused attention on this oft-debated and highly controversial issue and put into context one of the tools that has been used in the "Global War on Terror" (GWOT), namely that of TKs or pre-emptive action.

Doing so is important for two principal reasons. First, the increasing prevalence of TKs in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency suggests that a tactical evaluation is long overdue (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Duyvesteyn, 2008; Plaw, 2008). Secondly, such an analysis offers one way to investigate how the logic of "deterrence by punishment" (Wilner, 2010) might be applied to counter-terrorism.

Counter-terrorism policy and strategy

Terrorism is usually calibrated; it is intended to elicit certain public reactions, to include shock, horror, submissiveness, a change of opinion, or action on a particular issue, from the release of prisoners to the creation of a new national homeland. "So too must counter-terrorism policy and strategy, be calibrated and integrated" (Harmon, 2008: 235). Duyvesteyn (2008) believes that "the use of the military instrument complies with the logic of terrorism; provoke the opponent into overreacting" (p. 343). Those who favour stronger action against terrorism sometimes argue that terrorism is war (Harmon, 2000). The application of military force after a significant terrorist attack is understandable in light of the acute threat to security. There is according to

Sir Michael Howard a clear and "thunderous political imperative: something must be done" (Howard, 2002: 90). This would indicate that "terrorism can be effective in its operational aim of provocation" (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 343). Indeed, Parker (2015) argues that this is a core tactic of terrorism, namely, "the provocation of states into an overreaction to the threat posed," and "that terrorist groups have been remarkably open and consistently candid about their intentions" in this regard (p. 38).

Gauging success

Policymakers therefore are often confounded by the problem of how to gauge whether or not they are winning their war against terrorism; as Howard (2000: 7) has stated, "we cannot be at war with an abstract noun." In spite of the popularity of the declaration of war, to declare war on what is, after all a tactic "does not appear to make a great deal of sense … the problem with a declaration of war is that warfare conjures notions of victory and defeat" (Richardson, 2006: 216). Stemming from this, a key issue therefore is how to analyse the utility of TKs as an effective implement within the toolbox of counter-terrorism measures.

Setting the scene

In order to explore the complexities of the issue, two clearly defined strands need to be explored. First, the definition of TKs, the language it is couched in and how it is changing. Second, the evolution of its operational use and correspondingly, what is seen as a TK.

Melzer (2008: 36) suggests five definitional elements:

> TKs involve the use of lethal force; are designed to target specifically identifiable individuals (as opposed to collective random punishment); are carried out with the deliberate attempt to kill the individual in question; are used against individuals not in the physical custody of the targeting actor (distinguishing it from judicial or extrajudicial execution); and are carried out by states.

As Melzer (2008) has noted, the common element in all these contexts is that lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator.

Alston (2010: 3), in his capacity as UN Special *Rapporteur* on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, defines a TK as "the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States[1] or their agents, acting under colour of law, or by an organised armed group in conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator". David (2007) provides a useful discussion point in his definition that TK is the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit government approval. Plaw (2008) sees the most immediately striking feature of David's definition as the fact that killing is authorised simply by the expedient of government approval.

TKs can thus take place in a variety of contexts and may be committed by governments and their agents in times of peace as well as armed conflict.

Legality and morality of TKs

Despite the frequency with which it is invoked, TKs is not a term defined under international law (Alston, 2010: 4). Nor does it fit into any particular legal framework. A broad divergence of

opinion exists in the literature on the legality of TK of terrorists (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Plaw, 2008; Duyvesteyn, 2008; Williams, 2010). Other writers argue that TKs are often confused with assassination – the killing of an individual for political reasons; they contend that politically motivated assassinations can and should be distinguished from the legitimate use of force directed against specific enemy combatants, and that TKs are the latter: force directed against enemy combatants in hostile overseas environments (Casale and Patterson, 2005). That the topic of TKs can generate such divergent opinions from informed commentators reveals that the issue is arguably a new paradigm with which international law has yet to come to terms (Cullen, 2008).

Hepworth (2014) has noted that moral and ethical questions are difficult to answer due to their inherently individualistic and cultural nature. Martin van Creveld (1989) has starkly stated that when you fight terrorism, you become a terrorist; equally, Duyvesteyn (2008) posits that states using TKs as an instrument enter a moral slippery slope that plays into the hands of their opponents. A recurring theme in those that oppose the policy of TKs is the ethical dimension of collateral damage in assassination policies: "if terrorism is condemned because it kills the innocent, how can one justify counter terrorism tactics that kills them too" (Byman, 2005: 101).

A riposte to this argument is with a 'lesser-of-evils' approach (Ignatieff, 2004), which argues that wider military operations utilising traditional means of air and artillery support are "less discriminatory than even the broadest TK technique" (Hepworth, 2014). Richardson (2015) nonetheless believes that "*highly* discriminate use of force works, indiscriminate doesn't." Williams (2010) in relation to the use of drones in Pakistan and its tribal borderlands with Afghanistan, quotes a blogger[2] that "to sit at a console 7,000 miles away with life and death control over people whose land you've never walked on is too much power for any human being. It makes killing virtual and is a virtual licence to kill" (p. 881).

Hafez and Hatfield (2006) acknowledge that many of the claims proffered by proponents of TKs and their detractors are normative ones. They argue that the debate on the effectiveness of targeted assassinations is an empirical one that can be evaluated through the use of statistical methods. Plaw (2008) however notes that even on this controversial issue not all is disagreement, and that there exists some important moral reference points concerning targeting agreed by both proponents and detractors of the policy, namely that among even some of the strongest defenders of targeting, preventive arrest is, where possible, preferable to targeting. Frankel (2011) takes up this theme of not only the normative but practical benefit of a captured terrorist who can be immediately interrogated, as this may lead to 'follow-on raids." Bowden (2012) has referred to this as the 'targeting engine' whereby such garnered intelligence would be acted on exceptionally quickly to beat the insurgent information and dissemination cycle and launch a new raid or even multiple raids, thereby constantly keeping the insurgent movement on the back foot. But Cockburn (2014) takes issue with this concept of a vaunted intelligence machine predicated on multiple agencies with a vast array of technological equipment and databases at their disposal. He sees the seductiveness of screen-based warfare in this era of computer gaming as being both intriguing and disturbingly familiar themes to emerge. The drones' vaunted intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cameras – the 'unblinking eye' of the American war effort are what sceptics have compared to watching Google Earth through a straw. Such issues again bring to the fore the kernel issue of how to both measure and quantify the success or otherwise of TKs.

Measuring the effectiveness of TKs

Assessing the impact of TKs on insurgencies is as difficult as it is important. Theoretically, there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of repressive measures in general on the

strategies and tactical repertoire of insurgent groups. The key pillars that evolve around the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006), often referred to as the Repression/Protest Nexus (Araj, 2008), focus on whether TKs act as a deterrent or disruptor against terrorist attacks and whether they cause a retaliatory or backlash effect in the form of increased terrorist attacks following a TK. Does repression by regimes either escalate or de-escalate dissent by opposition groups? The social movement literature or Social Movement Theory (SMT) examines the relationship between protest and repression (Araj, 2008; Opp and Roehl, 1990) and has been developed to analyse social movements, often defined as a collection of informal networks which mobilise around conflictual issues (della Porta and Diani, 1999). Gunning (2009) notes that organisations that SMT terrorism scholars study are not only typically part of a broader social movement but are affected by similar opportunities and constraints, and profoundly shaped by their interactions with these broader movements and their detractors. Some studies have found that repression decreases protest whereas others have found a positive effect of repression on protest. Davenport and Mueller (2005) concluded that when confronted by harsh state repression, dissidents have been found to either run away or fight harder according to the political–economic context. Araj (2008) contends that most students of social movements who study protests in countries under foreign control or occupation have found that harsh state repression typically has a strong *positive* effect on protest.

Deterrence and disruption

Several scholars have argued that deterrence against terrorists cannot work and therefore this tactic/posture is a heavily debated aspect in the counter-terrorism literature. The main argument is that terrorists do not have a centre of gravity that can be attacked: "an adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred" (Whiteneck, 2005: 187). Even if deterrence is arguably successful, it can promote a substitution/displacement effect[3] and often 'displaces' the attack to other venues or countries where targets are relatively softer. There exists strong empirical evidence for this substitution effect of terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 2004). Duyvesteyn (2008) also believes that the use of the military instrument leads to substitution and that the seemingly successful actions of counter-terrorism today create problems for the future. Additionally, substitution occurs not only locally, as in the case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but between regions, types of attacks and sometimes even between groups. Pre-emption is seen as a logical corollary of deterrence; pre-emption is the quintessential proactive policy, in which terrorists and their assets are attacked to curb subsequent terrorist campaigns (Arce and Sandler, 2005). Pre-emption itself can possess a deterrent effect (Sederberg, 1990), while Luft (2003) argues that TK works well as a mechanism of pre-emption, and that what he refers to as the 'silent multitude' who go about their daily lives are testament to the success of a TK policy. But Duyvesteyn (2008) argues that there is a fundamental problem with measuring and proving that pre-emption can work as an effective instrument to counter terrorism, because proving it works relies on counter-factuals – in effect, proving something that did not happen. There is therefore a fundamental problem with measuring and proving that pre-emption can work as an effective instrument to counter terrorism, which in turn morphs into a deterrent effect.

As regards disruption, the argument suggests that "terrorism is a 'production line' of activity – from scouting targets to preparing bombers – if coordinated acts of violence are to take place" (Wilner, 2010: 312). By removing particular individuals that fill critical positions within organisations and forcing others to seek refuge, a group's ability to coordinate acts of violence is considerably disrupted. In essence, defenders of targeting argue that in confronting terrorism, the best form of defence is offence, in that they pursue terrorist organisations back to their bases

of operations and seek to disrupt, damage and even destroy such organisations. As David (2007: 118) contends, if these people are eliminated, the ability to mount attacks is degraded; the reasons for the decline in Israeli deaths from suicide bombers "have much to do with the success of TKs in eliminating, discouraging and disrupting terrorist operations." Another clear benefit of TKs is keeping would-be bombers on the run. The 'taking out' of the leadership of terrorist organisations is also a military measure that is suggested as effective by several experts (Harmon, 2008; Art and Richardson, 2007; Cronin, 2008; Hanle, 1989). Indeed, Hanle (1989: 216) argues that the terrorist leadership present the "centre of gravity" in the counter-terrorism struggle. Both Harmon (2008) and Cronin (2008) also point out the examples of the arrest of the leadership of *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

Retaliation and backlash

The idea that targeting terrorists perpetuates and even intensifies a cycle of violence is certainly a popular refrain amongst its critics – particularly in relation to the Israeli case (Amnesty International, 2001: 1). Duyvesteyn (2008: 328) contends the following concerning the effectiveness of the use of force: "there are few indications that it contributes to lessening terrorism. Rather the opposite is the case; the use of force makes things worse, in that it 'complies' with the aim of terrorist organisations to provoke the state into overreacting." This means in effect that the use of the military instrument, including TKs, complies with terrorist logic and is effective in its operational aim of provocation (2008: 343). But Hafez and Hatfield (2006) notably do not concur with this. Again, they reiterate that "Targeted Assassinations' [TKs] do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long run" (2008: 359). "Constant elimination of their leaders leaves terrorist organisations in a state of confusion and disarray" (Luft, 2003; cited by Duyvesteyn, 2008: 338). In effect, these authors argue that the cumulative effect is favourable for suppressing terrorist activity. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) emphasise that a reduction in one violent tactic does not necessarily translate into an overall reduction in the rate of violence. In conclusion, they contend that because of the substitution effect the killing of key commanders can be mitigated by militants through the use of adaptation, *unless* TKs are combined with other strategies such as arrests, capture and interdiction of *materiál*. Therefore the combined effect of this multiple strategy deprives terror cells of the ability to reconstitute and hence diminish their future effectiveness due to diminishing capacity.

Historical usage of the policy

In a post 9/11 universe TKs have become one of the primary modes of operation and the relevance of examining historical models of TK implementation is correspondingly both highly topical and relevant to inform the way we think about the contemporary use of TKs. This chapter now segues into an examination of the evolution of the operational use of this tactic within an historical context thereby offering, not just a chronology, but a background and selected history of the development of TKs based on three micro-case studies on its use in South Africa, Spain and Israel. This section closes with a consideration of how this history has changed radically since 9/11 and a very particular 'versioning' of TKs that has been utilised since by the United States.

South Africa

In 1974, the National Government of South Africa under Balthazar Vorster initiated a policy of hunting and killing members of the African National Congress (ANC)[4] who were opponents

of the regime and living abroad (Plaw, 2008: 4). Initially this TK policy was restricted to opponents based abroad, but as resistance to the regime continued and even escalated in the early 1980s, the government of P.W. Botha covertly extended the targeting programme to opponents of the regime at home. It was then allowed in effect to become the basis of a "total counter-revolutionary strategy" against all opponents of the regime (Plaw, 2008: 5).

The programme was only brought to a halt in 1990 following "exposure in the press and a crackdown by the new government" (O'Brien, 2001: 128-37). Plaw (2008: 5) contends that for all its successes in terrorizing the enemies of the South African State, "ultimately the strategy must be accounted a costly failure," as not only did it fail to protect the apartheid regime from revolutionary change, "but it did great damage to the image of South Africa and contributed significantly to its international isolation."

Spain: ETA and the GAL

In the mid-1980s the Spanish government organised a secret elite security force – the *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* (GAL). The GAL was intended to combat Basque separatist terrorist, by pursuing perpetrators back to their home bases in Basque areas of France and disrupting their activities. Woodworth (2002: 412) argues that if one of the aims of GAL was to force ETA to consider its own dissolution, it was a "total failure."

Whitfield (2014) supports this view that Spain's counter-terrorist strategy, ranging from state-run death squads and a persistent culture of police torture to a blatantly politicised judicial assault on all manifestations of radical Basque nationalism; in turn nourished the Basque narrative of oppression. Perkoski (2010) analysed ETA violence over two periods: the first running from 1983 to 1987, the second from 1988 to 1992. He found that killing ETA members had no impact on ETA violence in the initial period; the killings neither increased nor decreased the overall level of violence in the conflict. He did find a difference however, in the second period. The killing of ETA members in this period did produce a short-term decrease in ETA attacks. This lasted no more than one month. This would suggest that TKs may work, but Perkoski then found there was a *rebound* effect: in the second month after the killing, ETA attacks *increased* significantly. In contrast Perkoski found that arresting ETA members as opposed to shooting them dead was correlated with a significant reduction in violence. Ultimately Whitfield (2014: 60) believes that "the saga of GAL had other consequences too. GAL attacks created a whole new pantheon of ETA martyrs, bolstered its recruitment…and undermined the legitimacy of Spain's democracy."

Israel and Wrath of God

The Israeli case is of particular note as the state of Israel has certainly been employing the tactic since the 1950s and arguably earlier, if the period pre the formation of the state of Israel is to be considered. Additionally, they continue to use TKs in the occupied territories on an ongoing basis, the tempo of its use the only discernible variation.

The Israeli response to the Munich massacre of 1972 saw the establishment of the 'X' Committee, which systematically killed the Palestinian militants associated with the Black September group responsible.

Stahl (2010: 111) argues that the Israeli Defence Forces' (IDF) seizure of, *inter alia*, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June 1967 led to a "multitude of transformations in Israeli counter-terrorism stratagems and tactics." The 1980s saw repeated attempts to kill Palestinian leaders that have morphed into the present policy. This most contested of all evolving Israeli strategies to

counter the threat of militant Islamist terrorism, whether employed in the Disputed Territories (DT) or internationally, is *Sikul Meh'mu'kad (SIKUM)*, literally *focused foiling* or *thwarting*.

Cockburn (2015: 116) however argues that for many years the preferred Hebrew term for TKs had been *Hisul Memukad*, meaning *targeted extermination*. But in November 2011, "Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein decreed that the term 'wrongs' Israel and mandated substitution of the phrase *Sikul Meh'mu'kad* (Cockburn, 2015: 116)."

Use of TKs since 9/11 by the US

The tactic of TKs is currently most closely associated with the United States response to the attacks of 9/11. Since 9/11, the United States has consistently conducted TK operations against terrorist personnel. Cockburn (2015: 116) believes that the Israeli use of the policy has heavily influenced the US since 9/11, pointing to how in 2005 Avi Dicter (retiring head of Israel's internal Security Service, *Shabak*) contended that "foreign delegations come here on a weekly basis to learn from us, not just the Americans. It has become the *sexiest* trend in counterterrorism." Dicter further argued in interview that "the state of Israel has turned targeted prevention [TKs] into an art form" (Cockburn, 2015: 117). Alston (2010: 3) has noted that such policies [TKs] "have been justified both as a legitimate response to 'terrorist' threats and as a necessary response to the challenges of 'asymmetric warfare'."

PlayStation War

In think tanks, on university campuses and in the higher echelons of government, the reliance on unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or drones to search out and kill perceived enemies has prompted 'heated debate' (Marlowe, 2010). Marlowe contrasts how it remains the case that the method of using drone strikes "in the US … are presented as efficient, precise and costless," while conversely "in the Middle East and Pakistan they are perceived as cruel and cowardly." Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-born US citizen who tried to detonate a home-made car bomb on Times Square, told a friend he was angered by the drone strikes in Pakistan (Marlowe, 2010).

Regarding the use of drones, employed increasingly by the CIA to target suspected terrorists, a UN report suggested that there "is a risk of developing a 'PlayStation' mentality to killing" (Alston, 2010). Secondly, we may ask the question does drone technology, along with its multi-billion-dollar suites of surveillance and processing add-ons, and its growing thousands of support personnel, "do what it says on the tin?" (O'Loughlin, 2015). Equally O'Loughlin, author of *Toploader*, a black comedy about drones, questions where is the warrior code, the moral hazard for those who attack with impunity from thousands of kilometres away. According to Cockburn (2014) the reason 'drone warfare' is so popular is that it makes little adverse impression on domestic opinion – no one is campaigning to "bring our drones home."

The collateral damage debate

Williams (2010: 872) notes that "not all the victims have, however, been terrorists. Hundreds of Pakistani civilians have been killed as 'collateral damage' in the aerial strikes and this has led to a backlash of anti-Americanism in Pakistan." Alston (2010: 7) has noted that reports of civilian casualties in Pakistan "range from approximately twenty (according to anonymous US Government officials quoted in the media) to many hundreds." Etzioni (2010: 11) believes that "critics pay little attention to the fact that the use of drones is subject to close oversight," and that figures that portray high civilian collateral damage "are based not on research, which

of course is very difficult to carry out under the circumstances, but on reports in the media." Additionally "the media is using the media to confirm what the media reports." In contrast, US Intelligence officials estimate that between Obama entering office and March 2010, drones killed between 400 and 500 militants and about twenty civilians, putting the civilian death rate at "5% or lower" (p. 14).[5] Williams (2010: 877) posits that "on average the drones killed approximately nine people per strike in 2008 and twelve per strike in 2009." Wilner (2010: 307) suggests that TKs in Afghanistan have "degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the group's success rate, influenced *their* selection of targets, and weakened morale." He also argues that his findings "speak to the efficacy of TKs in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and to their value as both counter-capability and counter-motivation operations." Silke (2012: 179) has noted that as Wilner does not present data on the causalities caused by these attacks before or after, "it is difficult to judge to what extent the quality was affected." Richardson (2015) believes that currently there remains insufficiently robust empirical evidence to rigorously interrogate how successful or not TKs carried out by drones actually are, while Klaidman (2012) notes that both the US military and CIA utilise different methodologies in selecting targets. In the latter case the CIA engages in a controversial tactic known as 'signature strikes', targeting groups of military-age males whose identities are *not* known but who bear certain characteristics or 'signatures' associated with terrorism.

There can be no doubt that the killings, "especially of innocent Pakistani women and children, have caused tremendous outrage among average Pakistanis who already are pre-disposed to anti-Americanism" (Williams, 2010: 880). Fears that the collateral damage will radicalize Pakistanis have been repeatedly expressed by observers: "Every one of these dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased" (Kilcullen, 2009). Cockburn (2014) believes that each TK carried out by drones "did not reduce attacks and save American lives. It increased them. Each killing has prompted mayhem."

Zero Dark Thirty

Peter Bergen, author of *Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden – From 9/11 to Abbotabad,* reported in April 2012 that "at least 1,400 lives have been lost in 250 drone strikes in Pakistan since 2009. Bush launched a drone strike every forty three days; Obama, one every four days" (Bergen, 2012; cited by Marlowe, 2012). Extrapolating this, Byman (2013: 32) notes that "Bush oversaw fewer than fifty drone strikes during his tenure; Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last few years." Marlowe (2012) also notes that "linguistically, Obama reduced George W. Bush's global 'war on terror' to a more focused 'war on al-Qaeda'."[6] These issues of when and how this war will finally draw to a close were one of the defining *motifs* of Kathryn Bigelow's film *Zero Dark Thirty* (Colombia Pictures, 2012). Interestingly this debate is most keenly focused on those spearheading the US TK programme. Klaidman (2012) notes that "the military is increasingly acknowledging the limits of lethal operations in the war on terror," and increasingly the emphasis is on "nonlethal approaches to achieving the military's strategic goals." A Special Operations commander is quoted "that ultimately we're not going to be able to kill or capture our way out of this fight." Klaidman argues what he calls the 'mestasasizing' nature of the threat, which provides the most rational argument for tempering TKs and their associated drone strikes. Or, as one military planner noted, "how long can we continue to chase offshoots of offshoots around the world" (Klaidman, 2012). The debate within academia has not abated on this controversial issue. Byman (2013: 32) argues that "the drones have done their job remarkably well [and] have devastated al-Qaeda and associated anti-American military groups,"

whereas Cronin (2013: 44) counter-argues that the problem for Washington is that its "drone program has taken on a life of its own, to the point where tactics are driving strategy rather than the other way around."

"Dozens of top Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders have been killed" (Williams, 2010: 887), which may have disrupted future terrorist plots against the US mainland. This must be weighed against the fact that the drone strikes have led to a backlash against America in Pakistan. Many average Pakistanis see the drones "as a humiliating insult to their sovereignty and worry about innocent civilians dying as 'collateral damage'" (Williams, 2010: 887). Williams has concluded "that for all their "lightning rods for anti-Americanism among non-Pashtun Pakistanis, the drone strikes are the best 'worst option' for dealing with a hard to reach enemy" (Williams, 2010: 887).

Conclusion

As it approaches its second decade, the 'War on Terror' has produced outcomes that are fundamentally different from those that were expected. Rapid regime change in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been followed by protracted wars involving heavy military and civilian casualties in which TKs are both a significant and ongoing component. This high-tempo use of TKs against insurgent groups has substantial implications for the future. One key emerging theme is that TKs initiated against a committed, resolute, dispersed and ideologically driven insurgency may contain it, but not eradicate or defeat it. TKs allow a degree of time and space that may be used to bring a multitude of other security enablers to bear, allied to a comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying socio-political and economic causes of the conflict. This has to be balanced by the legacy that TKs create in any society, the bitterness it engenders and the difficulty in re-establishing relationships between conflicting parties as part of any eventual peace process. This is a protracted process; there can be no quick fixes.

Meanwhile the use of drones by the US to carry out TKs against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Pakistan border region along with a sustained campaign against ISIS within their self-proclaimed caliphate continues unabated amid intense scrutiny of the CIAs covert drone programme. Amnesty International, in conjunction with Human Rights Watch, has demanded that American officials be held responsible for "illegal killings carried out by drones and call for greater transparency over its [US] secret programme" (Crilly, 2013). Amnesty rejected a "global war doctrine" that allows the US to attack al-Qaeda anywhere in the world (Boone, 2013). Bowden (2013) notes that while drone strikes are a far cry from the atomic vaporising of entire cities, "the horror of war does not diminish when it is reduced in scale." More recently, in a major policy speech, President Obama defended the use of drone strikes as a 'just war' against militants but "waged proportionally, in last resort and in self-defence."Yet critically he acknowledged that the US was at "a cross-roads" in its fight against militants and that "a perpetual war" involving drone strikes and Special Forces would prove "self-defeating and alter our country in troubling ways" (Carswell, 2013). Drone warfare appears to be here to stay, and it is "likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the US" (Byman, 2013: 32).

The implementation of a policy of TKs, whether carried out by Special Forces operatives on the ground or via drones from the air, should not be undertaken lightly in any conflict. What this essay highlights however is that it may be a particularly redundant undertaking without the imposition of a wide range of other measures, particularly if attempted in a conflict that spans a large geographical area, such as the current attempt to contain ISIL (ISIS).

The fact that the US remains arguably the world's only superpower is irrelevant in the world of al-Qaeda and ISIS and the new asymmetric warfare that has come to the fore,

where TKs have become a key tactical instrument in the arsenal that is now employed against these insurgent groups. Equally, for policymakers it is self-defeating to talk of the terrorists in terms as if they were vermin. What they commit is anathema to us, but at the same time when viewed in a cold abstract light they are intelligent, well organised and dedicated. For policymakers to set as an ambition the forcible defeat and eradication of a politically and religiously motivated terrorism is to condemn us to continuing frustration and disappointment, in a constantly evolving and mutating war against an enemy that is dispersed, hidden and driven by an ideology that transcends borders. This has implications on the need to have more solid evidence to base counter-terrorism policies and, accordingly, how to calibrate long-term targeting policies, as well as to examine how effective are other instruments linked to a reduction in terrorism, and the combination and/or sequence in which such instruments are employed. It therefore remains the case for both researchers and policymakers that the challenge remains unchanged, which is to find out what works and, more importantly, under which conditions.

Notes

1 This chapter focuses only on killings by States and their agents because, as yet, no non-State actors have sought to justify specific 'targeted killings'.
2 See *Drone Debate, Are Remotely Controlled Weapons Ethical. A*vailable at http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2009/12/drone_debate_are_remotely_cont.html
3 E.g. from skyjacking to kidnapping. Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) found that the success of metal detectors in airports led to significant displacement into other terrorist activities, such as kidnapping. In the Israeli–Palestinian case, the thwarting of suicide attacks has led to the substitution of mortar and rocket attacks by Palestinian militants.
4 ANC: African National Congress; black liberation movement, founded in 1912, banned in 1960, unbanned on 2 Feb 1990. Oldest surviving political organisation in South Africa, now has majority in Parliament.
5 The matrix used by the US when a strike is authorised has the following elements. Intelligence from various sources is combined. A scoring system is used that allocates low scores to high value targets. The higher the score the matrix generates, the higher the rank of those who must approve the strike. Etzioni (2010) suggests that the higher the total score, the less likely the target will be approved. Reviews are conducted after the fact to check the validity of the information of which the matrix draws. The approval of the nation in which the strike takes place is "often sought" (Etzioni, 2010: 13). Klaidman (2012) suggests that Obama's terrorism adviser John Brennan was working on a project called 'the playbook', a highly classified initiative to codify and institutionalise the standards and procedures for TKs.
6 In fact, the official redefinition was from GWOT to "Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)" (*The Guardian*, 25 March 2009).

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42

ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERTERRORISM

Lyndsey Harris and Rachel Monaghan

The detention of 'suspected' terrorists without trial and the use of drone strikes by nation states against citizens 'suspected' of engaging in terrorism abroad highlights the ongoing complexities of counterterrorism in terms of ethics and human rights. Paul Wilkinson argued that in a liberal state the criminal justice system is best placed both morally and logically to deal with terrorism. However, states have resorted to military means and emergency powers to counter the threat posed by terrorism. Focusing largely on the experiences of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), this chapter examines a range of methods used by states to counter terrorism and subsequently considers the ethical and human rights dilemmas faced by those charged with countering terrorism. In doing so, the chapter considers our understanding of ethics, including a discussion of two categories of normative ethical theory: namely consequentialism and deontology. The chapter also provides a wider exploration of the concept of human rights before assessing some British and American counterterrorism efforts involving the use of force and the use of law through the lens of ethics and human rights.

Introduction

The release in 2015 of Shaker Aamer, the last British resident held at the US military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, following 13 years of captivity for being a 'suspected' terrorist and the targeted assassination of two British members of the so-called Islamic State (Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin) in Raqqa, Syria by a Royal Air Force (RAF) drone strike serve to highlight the continued complexities of counterterrorism in terms of ethics and human rights. Aamer's detention along with an estimated 780 detainees without trial by the US government following the 9/11 al-Qaeda terror attacks on New York and Washington, and their subsequent treatment therein (e.g. initial denial of protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions and allegations of torture and mistreatment) coupled with the emergence of extra-judicial killings of citizens 'suspected' of being terrorists abroad by guided missiles, demonstrates the "acute moral risks associated with counterterrorism" (Sorrell, 2011: 2).

According to Wilkinson (2008: 85), "the criminal justice system is morally and logically the correct institution in a liberal state to take prime responsibility for dealing with terrorism." Yet, we have witnessed military means and emergency powers being justified by states as legitimate tools to counter the threat of and acts of terror. Counterterrorism operations and policies

have been constructed on the understanding that the act of terrorism is a more serious type of crime. Primarily focusing on the experiences of the UK and the US, this chapter aims to examine some of the methods chosen by states to counter terrorism and considers the ethical and human rights dilemmas facing those responsible for countering terrorism. The chapter first considers what we understand by ethics and human rights and will examine two categories of normative ethical theory, namely consequentialism and deontology. It will also explore the concept of human rights before looking at a number of examples of British and American counterterrorism efforts involving the use of force and the use of law through the lens of ethics and human rights.

Understanding ethics

Ethics, or moral philosophy as it is alternatively known, involves the systematising, defending, and recommending of concepts of right and wrong behaviour. Reding *et al*. (2014: 5) define the field of ethics "as the systematic reflection of existential questions relating to the 'good life', moral obligations and 'just' society". Within the field, philosophers typically divide ethical theories into three main strands, namely metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Within the first strand, metaethics explores the source of our ethical principles and their meaning. The second strand, normative ethics, is concerned with the content of moral judgements and seeks to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. The third strand, applied ethics, as Kagan (1998: 3) explains, "attempts to apply the general principles of normative ethics to particular difficult or complex cases." Such cases include war, animal rights and capital punishment to name but three. While much has been written with respect to ethical theory, for the purposes of this chapter only normative ethics will be discussed and in particular the theories of consequentialism and deontology as these "two broad classes of ethical theory … have shaped most people's understanding of ethics" (LaFollette, 2007: 8).

Consequentialism represents a family of theories, which are bound by a central idea "that the moral assessment of actions, motives, or rules is, at bottom, a matter of how much good such things produce, or how much bad they allow us to avoid" (Shafer-Landau, 2013: 413). Accordingly consequentialists contend that we are morally obliged to behave in ways that produce the best consequences. Thus, an act is morally right if the outcome or consequences of that act are more favourable than unfavourable (Carlson, 1995; Vallentyne, 2007). Within act consequentialism, utilitarianism is probably the best-known theory. For advocates such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) an act is morally right if the consequences of the act are more favourable (in terms of pleasure and/or happiness) than unfavourable (understood as pain and/or suffering) to the greatest number of people. According to act utilitarianism, specific acts such as torture and killing would be morally permissible if the acts' consequences were more beneficial than detrimental to the majority; this will be discussed on more detail later in the chapter (Burnor and Raley, 2011; Stewart, 2009). To counter this moral difficulty, other consequentialist theorists such as John Stuart Mill (1806–73) proposed a revised version of utilitarianism, namely rule utilitarianism, in which an act is morally right if it conforms to a behavioural code or rule and the consequences of adopting that rule are more favourable than unfavourable to everyone (Stewart, 2009; Vallentyne, 2007). The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) aptly summarises the distinction between the two approaches:

> The key difference between act and rule utilitarianism is that act utilitarians apply the utilitarian principle directly to the evaluation of individual actions while rule utilitarians apply the utilitarian principle directly to the evaluation of rules and then evaluate

> individual actions by seeing if they obey or disobey those rules whose acceptance will produce the most utility.

In contrast to consequentialism which we have seen concerns itself with the outcome or the consequences of moral behaviour, deontological theories concern themselves with the action and motive regardless of the consequences and thus are often described as duty theories (LaFollette, 2007; Stewart, 2009). Like consequentialism, deontology represents a family of theories. Probably the most influential theorist is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). For Kant, the overarching principle of all morality is the categorical imperative. This imperative involves two formulations, the formula of universal law and the formula of ends. The first formula acts as the benchmark or standard for adjudging, which acts are right and which are wrong: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, cited in McNaughton and Rawling, 2007: 35). Subsequently, the categorical imperative can be viewed as a universalisability test, in that acts that pass become moral laws and those that fail are considered morally wrong and taboo (Stewart, 2009). The second formula according to Kant holds that we should "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (Kant, cited in McNaughton and Rawling, 2007: 35). Thus, certain acts such as lying and cheating are always wrong; again, we will return to this idea later.

As with most theories, problems can be identified with respect to both consequentialism and deontology. Of particular interest is the already noted objection to act utilitarianism on the basis of moral permissiveness. Additionally, it can result in the violation of a person's rights or the commission of serious injustices if the majority benefits (for a more detailed discussion see Burnor and Raley, 2011). Rule utilitarianism also has its share of criticisms, again of interest to us are those surrounding the problem of relativism with respect to the existence of different behavioural codes or rules in different countries and the permitting of injustice (for a more detailed discussion see Stewart, 2009).

With an understanding of ethics considered albeit briefly and the two main categories of normative ethical theory explored, the discussion now turns to human rights.

Understanding human rights

Whilst human rights have evolved into a complex and broadly defined concept, for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to know that human rights are rights inherent to all people regardless of their nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, race, religion, language, or other status (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016). As Halstead (2014: 2) notes, "Western ideas of human rights are overwhelmingly based on the idea of universalism." Thus they are available everywhere; they are inalienable and cannot be taken away (except in specific situations – this will be discussed later); they are interdependent and indivisible, meaning states cannot select which rights to honour and not honour; and they are equal and non-discriminatory (OHCHR, 2016a).

Human rights include citizenship rights – these are concerned with basic constitutional issues and are frequently categorised into legal, civil and political rights (Open University, 2016). Examples of legal rights would include the right to a fair trial, equal treatment under the law and due process. Civil rights would incorporate the right to freedom of expression, free association and free movement, whereas political rights involve the right to vote, a secret ballot and free elections. Additionally, we can speak of social, cultural and economic rights, including the right to participate in culture, the right to food, and the right to work and receive an education.

Human rights are protected and upheld by international and national laws and treaties (often referred to as international human rights law), the most notable of which is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1948 and constitutes the foundation of the current international system of protection for human rights. The UDHR contains 30 articles that establish the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all people. It commits governments to uphold the fundamental rights of each person and provides a vision for human dignity that transcends political boundaries and authority (Amnesty International, 2016). Accordingly, all states have ratified at least one of the 10 core human rights instruments (nine treaties and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) identified by the UN, and 80% of states have ratified four or more (OHCHR, 2016a).

Other international human rights laws relevant to this chapter would include the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Geneva Conventions, and the European Convention on Human Rights. The CAT requires states to take effective measures to prevent torture in any territory under their jurisdiction, and prohibits them from transporting people to any country where there is reason to believe they will be tortured. Torture is defined in the Convention (Article 1) as:

> any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
>
> *(OHCHR, 2016b)*

Additionally, Article 2 clearly prohibits the justification of torture on the groups of "exceptional circumstances" such as war, the threat of war, domestic political instability or any other public emergency.

The Geneva Conventions comprise a series of treaties that outline what is and what is not legal in terms of civilians and combatants in wartime. It involves four Geneva Conventions (last revised in 1949), which are complimented by three further Protocols (two from 1977 and one from 2005). The Conventions cover the protections afforded to sick and wounded military personnel on land and at sea, the treatment of prisoners of war and the protections afforded to civilians, including those in occupied territory (Internal Committee of the Red Cross, 2016).

Found in all four Conventions is Common Article 3. This article establishes fundamental rules covering non-international armed conflicts under which no derogation, that is to say a relaxation or exemption from the rule, is permitted. It includes, for example, the human treatment of all persons in enemy hands and specifically prohibits torture and cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment (Internal Committee of the Red Cross, 2016).

The European Convention on Human Rights is an international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. It was drafted in 1950 by the then newly formed Council of Europe and was adopted in 1953. It contains 16 rights which mirror many of those contained in the UNDHR, such as the right to life, freedom of expression, the prohibition of torture and no punishment without law. The Convention also permits signatory states to derogate from certain rights in time of "war or other public emergency threatening the life

of the nation". The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 to implement the Convention, meaning any person who feels that their rights have been violated by the state can take a case to the Court. Judgments that find violations are binding on the states concerned (Gani, 2014). Moreover, the UK government has incorporated the ECHR into the Human Rights Act 1998. As previously noted, while human rights are inalienable and some are considered absolute rights, such as the right to protection from torture, others are considered limited and qualified. For example, we have the right to liberty, but this may be limited under specific circumstances such as lawful arrest or detention. Likewise, our right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion may be qualified, meaning that a balance between the individual's rights and those of the state or community will be sought (Ministry of Justice, 2006).

With an understanding of both ethics and human rights considered, the discussion now examines some of the counterterrorism methods adopted by the UK and US with respect to the ethical and human rights dilemmas they pose.

Counterterrorism involving the use of force

A state has a number of options it can employ to counter the threat of terrorism. One of these options is the use of force. The justification for the use of force by states is often considered in light of the just war tradition: *jus ad bellum* (just cause to engage in war) and *jus in bellum* (just in war). Although Clark (1988: 31) contends that it is not possible to speak of a single doctrine of just war, it is he believes possible to view the just war tradition as "a set of recurrent issues and themes in the discussion of warfare and [it] reflects a general philosophical orientation towards the subject". Moreover, Bellamy (2008) argues that the just war tradition is deeply embedded in the way Westerners think about the legitimacy of going to war; he argues that it provides a common language to evaluate competing moral claims of war and that the just war tradition comes close to agreed international standards of behaviour. Thus, a number of conditions need to be met for waging war. War should only be resorted to for a just cause or intention (e.g. in self-defence, for restitution or retribution), its declaration must be made by a proper authority (e.g. legitimate authority), it must be a measure of last resort and there should be a reasonable hope of success (Algar-Faria, 2015; Clark, 1988; Walzer, 1977; and Westhusing, 2003).

The second element of the just war tradition (*jus in bello*) is concerned with the conduct of war once it has been embarked upon and centres on the ideas of proportionality and discrimination. Thus, it aims to limit the effects of armed conflict by protecting persons who are not participating in hostilities (discrimination), and by restricting and regulating the means and methods of warfare available to combatants (proportionality). This element is often referred to as international humanitarian law.

In light of the conditions required for a just war to be undertaken, Boyle (2007) considers whether they can be applied to a state's military response to terrorism. In terms of proper authority, he argues that "those responsible for the welfare of the community are duty-bound to respond" (Boyle, 2007: 711); however, this legitimacy has limitations in that states are expected to respect treaties and international law and seek appropriate international approval for unilateral actions. Thus, the US and its allies' response to 9/11 in the invasion of Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), while not mandated by the UN, was widely regarded to be a legitimate form of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter in that the Taliban government was considered an accomplice to the events of 9/11 and, hence, a justifiable target for action (for more on the legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan see Smith and Thorp, 2010). In contrast, the invasion and occupation of Iraq (commonly referred to as the Iraq War) in 2003 by the US and its allies including the UK is still contested in terms of its legitimacy (Bowcott, 2004).

Indeed, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, when asked if the invasion was illegal, responded by saying "Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal" (BBC, 2004).

With respect to the condition of a just cause, Boyle (2007: 711) suggests that "the justice of military defence against terrorism arises from the wrongfulness of the terrorist actions". Additionally, military measures taken to punish terrorists for their attacks or aimed at preventing terrorism in the sense of pre-emptive strikes do not constitute a just cause. However, Walzer (1977) argues that preventative strikes are justifiable if three conditions exist, namely an obvious intent to injure, a degree of active preparation and a risk to a state's territorial integrity or political independence if no action was taken.

The issue of pre-emptive strikes as a counterterrorism measure also raises ethical and human rights questions in relation to *jus in bello*, in that specific individuals identified as terrorists are targeted and killed, often through the use of drones. The use of drones can be viewed as a prime example of the consequentialist, namely act utilitarian ethical framework guiding UK and US military counterterrorism operations in that their use, it is argued, causes fewer civilian casualties and less destruction than say air strikes or carpet bombing (Ahmad, 2014). It is also argued that their use minimises the risk to soldiers; however, as Crawford (2015: 40) points out, "if they reduce risk to combatants but hurt civilians directly, or indirectly as a consequence of increased militancy in reaction to drone strikes, then the utilitarian case for drone strikes is weakened." Some drone strikes do result in civilian deaths; for example, the human rights group Reprieve's data suggests that as a result of 47 men being targeted by US drone strikes, 1,147 people were killed (Ackerman, 2014).

The UK's use of drones in the targeted killing of so-called Islamic State members Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin and a similar US drone strike which targeted Mohamed Amwasi (Jihadi John) in Syria raise dilemmas with respect to citizens' human rights. All three were British citizens yet were assassinated rather than arrested and tried for terrorist activity. The British government in justifying its drone strike said it had acted in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, in that it had "clear evidence" that terrorist attacks were being planned on the UK (BBC, 2015).

An obvious critique of the application of the just war tradition to the problem of terrorism and states' subsequent counterterrorism efforts is that it was originally developed with wars and the threat of wars between sovereign nations in mind. Additionally, Forst (2009) identifies another problem with respect to the principles of discrimination and proportionality in that the tradition does not fully distinguish between strategic and tactical aspects of conflicts. He notes: "we have yet to establish how external powers can adapt just war principles to deal with such problems. The just response to terrorism is not always effective in achieving peace and order, and the effective response is often unjust" (Forst, 2009: 267).

Duffy (2005: 333) contends that the arrest and incarceration of 'suspected' terrorists since 9/11 has led to "widespread allegations – and considerable evidence – of torture and other mistreatment". Under the Third Geneva Convention, the coercive interrogation of prisoners of war is strictly prohibited; as a way to avoid this, the US under President Bush reclassified such detainees as unlawful 'enemy combatants'. In doing so the detainees were not afforded any of the protections enjoyed by soldiers and civilians captured in war (Algar-Faria, 2015). Whilst the use of torture is explicitly prohibited in all human rights instruments, in terms of ethics the debate in often framed within the context of the ticking time bomb scenario. Such a scenario envisages a situation in which a terrorist with knowledge of an impending terrorist attack is apprehended; the question is how far the authorities should go in order to extract that information (for a more detailed consideration of this scenario see Wisnewski and Emerick, 2009).

For utilitarians, the consequences of an action are the most important consideration, so if the cost of torturing one terrorist is outweighed by the benefits accrued to a greater population, then torture would be ethically permissible. But as Ignatieff (2004) points out, once torture is accepted as legitimate in certain hypothetical contexts it soon provides the basis for routinely torturing people. In contrast, deontologists "would walk away from the situation without hesitation owing to the categorical imperative of never treating a rational being as a means to an end" (Algar-Faria, 2015: 24).

Counterterrorism involving the use of law

Another option that states can employ to counter the threat of terrorism involves the use of law, namely the creation of anti-terrorist legislation and/or derogation from existing legal commitments. The creation of anti-terrorist legislation frequently follows specific terrorist attacks and they are often argued for on the grounds of necessity. As de Londras (2011: 8) notes:

> domestic law-making processes tend not to cope particularly well in times of crisis. Panic, fear and populist impulses can conspire to create an atmosphere where the imperative turns towards combating a risk, and where the risk is presented and/or conceived as being particularly grave or dangerous.

In the UK, for example, prior to the Terrorism Act 2000, anti-terrorist legislation had existed albeit on regularly renewed temporary provisions. The first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act 1974 was passed by Parliament just eight days after the Birmingham pub bombings by the Provisional IRA, which saw 21 people killed and 184 injured. In introducing the bill, the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins warned the House of Commons that "the powers … are Draconian. In combination they are unprecedented in peacetime. I believe these are fully justified to meet the clear and present danger" (cited in Walker, 1992: 31). The Act gave the police and the security services wide-ranging powers of arrest and detention to counter terrorism extending from Northern Ireland, including the detention of persons suspected of terrorism for up to seven days. Additionally, the Act included exclusion orders designed to prevent people under suspicion of terrorist activity from entering Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) from either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. However, the legislation did not apply to UK citizens who had been living for the last 20 years or born and ordinarily resident in Great Britain. As Doody (2012: 80) explains, a total of 448 people received exclusion orders and "the fact that the majority of these people were Irish ensured the creation of fear amongst the Irish community that it could be applied to anyone at any time". The Act also, it is argued, created a suspect community whereby Irish people living in England, Scotland and Wales or travelling between Ireland and Great Britain were deemed 'suspect'. Hillyard (1993: 258) argued that "this community is treated in law and in police practices very differently from the rest of the population".

Following 9/11, the US introduced the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, more commonly known as the PATRIOT Act. This act was designed to deter and punish terrorist acts in the US and around the world and to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. Moreover, it gave far-reaching surveillance powers to national security agencies to intercept electronic communications and to request without court approval that telecommunication companies hand over information. The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures" (cited in Fabbrini, 2015: 90) and thus criticism of the PATRIOT Act has primarily been around the right to privacy and the extent of the federal government's surveillance powers. Data available from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) with respect to the administrative subpoenas (national security letters) issued by FBI agents to gather information such as phone, bank, computer and credit history records for national security purposes record that nearly 193,000 were issued between 2003 and 2006. This led to one terror-related conviction; a conviction they argue would have been secured without the use of the PATRIOT Act (ACLU, 2015).

Examples of derogation would include the detention without trial of individuals suspected of engagement in terrorist-related activities. In Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975 nearly 2,000 people, the majority of whom were Catholic, were held without trial; this policy was more commonly known as internment. The British government had informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its derogation from the ECHR, namely with respect to the right to liberty and security (McCleery, 2015). In the aftermath of 9/11, the UK passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which contained measures to permit the indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of being international terrorists (McGoldrick, 2008). A derogation was made with respect to the provisions of the UK's Human Rights Act, which encompasses the ECHR. However, a case was brought to the House of Lords (prior to 2009, it was the highest Court of Appeal in the UK) on behalf of a number of foreign national detainees in Belmarsh prison. The Lords ruled that the detention of foreign nationals was incompatible with Article 14, namely the prohibition of discrimination. The Belmarsh detainees were being discriminated against on the basis of their nationality and no such detention without trial provisions applied to British nationals suspected of being terrorists.

Conclusion

As has been shown in this chapter the methods adopted by states in their efforts to counter terrorism are fraught with ethical and human rights dilemmas. Much of the UK's and US's counterterrorism responses abroad post 9/11 have involved the use of force and as such appear to be justified by utilitarian ethics. Pre-emptive strikes involving the use of drones against members of the so-called Islamic State are argued to be 'just' and undertaken in self-defence to prevent terrorist atrocities at home, yet they violate a number of human rights, including the right to life, a fair trial and due process. The treatment of captured 'suspected' terrorists, their detention without trial and their experiences of enhanced interrogation techniques and torture again justified by utilitarian ethics contravene the right to due process and freedom from torture. As Ignatieff (2004: viii) points out, "when democracies fight terrorism, they are defending the proposition that their political life should be free of violence. But defeating terror requires violence. It may also require coercion, deception, secrecy, and violation of rights." Thus, it is no surprise to find human rights dilemmas arising out of the measures taken at home by states through both the introduction of anti-terrorism legislation and derogation from existing human rights commitments. The right to liberty, privacy and non-discrimination have all been discussed with respect to British and American counterterrorism laws. States have a duty to protect their citizens as they go about their daily business, but in doing so they need to consider the ethical and human rights consequences associated with their operations and policies: "the counter-terrorist must be sure today's solution is not the seed of tomorrow's insoluble problem" (Irwin, 2004: 100).

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Part II: case studies

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ARGENTINA
A case study in Dirty War

Itai Sneh

Introduction

How significant is the causal connection between the abuses inherent in repression and torture and the subsequent demise of such regimes? Do repression and torture diminish and curtail confrontations, or actually incite and facilitate more bloodshed? Do repression and torture work as a functional policy to strengthen regimes, or generate more popular support for adversaries, and thereby help the opposition recruit more activists? Does torture elicit reliable information for counter-terrorism, or trigger false confessions? Does torture actually deter future perpetrators or is this practice self-destructive for the perpetrators? While moral answers seem intuitively self-explanatory, historical and recent evidence from Argentina demonstrates the futility and hugely negative consequences of repression and torture. This chapter focuses on the Argentinian experience of the use of "Dirty War" and repression to crush internal threats and dissent.

The Argentine Dirty War, 1976–1983, was characterized by repression and torture (Finchelstein, 2017). As such, this era weakened the fabric of Argentine history, curtailed economic growth, and proved counterproductive and self-destructive rather than an effective and successful counter-terrorism policy. This chapter will show that while its infamy is justified, the Dirty War marked yet another period in the troubled Argentine history of state-sponsored violence and lack of respect for human rights, rather than a completely new phenomenon. Thus, the Dirty War was different only by degree, but not by kind. It was merely the most widely known period of atrocities, neither the first, nor the last. Indeed, tragically, there have been numerous violations and exhibitions of repression and torture since1983.

By definition, tyrannical regimes and authoritarian states continuously execute wide-scale repression and torture to maintain and expand their powers. Such sovereigns perpetrate torture, often mortal, of individual members of collectives who may pose threats, real, perceived, or imagined. Repeated victims include civil society organizations, independent parties, liberal groups, and progressive thinkers. Reasons for punishment include adversarial ideology, oppositional politics, different religion, and competing economic interest groups. Moral debates and practical controversies concern repression and the accompanying routine application of torture. Repression and torture are often—justifiably—viewed by dissidents as a means to the end of demonstrating the monopoly of formal authority, as enabling the politics of fear, and as tool of exclusion rather than as legitimate or necessary security instruments. Harsh regimes are not

empathetic, nor do they express moral concerns about their actions. Perpetrating rulers, however, do deeply care about the practical results of their misdeeds. Regime behaviour is affected by consequences from adverse operational results and negative public image at home and abroad.

Historically, many dictatorships have systematically violated the civil liberties of hundreds of millions of individuals. Deeds by official representatives and semi-official agents are often complemented by the even less accountable paramilitary groups that these regimes created, funded, supported, or turned a blind eye to their activities. Offenses of fundamental human rights can rise to the level of crimes against humanity. Wrongdoings include murders of opponents and extrajudicial disappearances leading to killing, rapes, torture, and indefinite detentions, alongside attacks on the families and communities of targeted people. The Argentinian Dirty War encompassed all this.

A brief history of repression in Latin America

Repression and torture in Latin America goes back to the 16th century with the harsh practices of the arch-conservative Iberian Spanish conquistadors, and their Portuguese (and to a different degree also the French, and subsequently immigrants from Italy and even Germany) contemporaries, all with the blessing of the Catholic Church. The prevailing norms were derived, in part, from the legacy of the contemporary Spanish Inquisition. Priests endowed with clerical and political power in a monarchic theocracy repressed and tortured any opposition or heresy, real or imagined. There was little protection to those considered dissenters or deviants. Authority and procedures derived from the corpus of Civil Law, too, played a role in establishing patterns of repression and torture. Civil Law is rooted primarily in Roman and Canon laws, expanded in medieval times by wide practice in the Holy Roman Empire. While laws were relatively simple, and all people were considered equal in front of God, strong kings proclaimed comprehensive codes on public and private matters in which what is not expressly allowed is forbidden. Officials, troops, and clergy strictly enforced harsh standards without any separation of powers guided by a rarely independent judiciary.

These coercive empires and their greedy agents, by design and by consequences, annihilated native civilizations by subjugating most people, killing many others, taking away their lands, extracting resources, importing slaves to substitute the original inhabitants, and persecuting those migrants like the crypto-Jews who escaped to the Americas from repression and torture at home. Many Spanish officials, soldiers, and privateers came to the Americas aspiring to a speedy accumulation of fortune, then a return home to live lavishly on what were often misbegotten riches. Thus, repression and torture were prevalent in the resulting rush to exploit and plunder. This pattern irreparably ruined indigenous communities. Replacement and reconstruction by early European migrants and long-term settlers significantly lacked in scope, quality, and in durability. Regrettably, patterns that emerged in the 16th century visibly prevailed into late modern times.

From the 17th century, the British and the Dutch empires, too, eradicated indigenous populations by similar practices, including the importing of slaves and the sending of Protestant missionaries to their North American colonies. There was, however, a major difference between the early patterns of the Iberians in Latin America and how the more successful British and the Dutch handled themselves in North America. Following the Reformation, sometimes imbued with ideas of humanism, Northwest European migrants, often Protestant, subsequently increasingly secular, arrived as organized ideological and religious groups with a political agenda of liberties and tolerance. These rights were initially primarily limited to their own members. Their intention was to strike viable roots in the New World, maintain fertile lands, and establish

commercial infrastructure to their descendants. To facilitate these long-term goals, these settlers established communities with relative and increasing transparent rules, managed by representative governments accountable to its citizens.

These Northwest European migrants typically aimed to duplicate the principles of the foundational English "great Charter," the 1215 *Magna Carta*. Its contents demanded consultation and consent from white males who owned property to the manner in which they were ruled. Clause 36 protected from arbitrariness the foundation for the right of *habeas corpus*, which required a cause for detention and limited its duration without due process, resulting in an appearance in an impartial court leading to a fair trial. Significantly, Clause 39 of the *Magna Carta* prohibited torture. In addition, the British, who in the 17th century took over from the Dutch most of their North American possession, abided by Common Law jurisprudence. By contrast to the Civil Law, in Common law what is not allowed *is* permissible. Combined with characteristics such as local powers expressed by jury trials, individualism, and respect for precedents, Common Law was more adversarial to repression, and less susceptible to the long-term practice of torture.

While imperfect and exclusionary, such frameworks included robust safeguards for vulnerable individuals and groups against empire or corporate-sponsored violations of civic liberties, especially repression and torture. Legal standards were less intrusive. Emerging norms gradually provided for an independent judiciary that protected free public discourse. Northern societies incrementally curtailed repression and torture. Instead, they gradually embraced emancipation for slaves and rights for women, children, migrants, and ethnic minorities in Canada and in the United States. That frame of mind also facilitated a more entrepreneurial economy and innovative society.

By contrast, Latin America in the post–World War II era offers several acute case studies for the horrendous results for human rights when the rule of law does not exist. The misdeeds of military regimes during the 1948–1989 Cold War demonstrated the ominous political consequences for offenders who claim to pursue an agenda of law and order, but in reality extinguish civic liberties, including basic principles such as due process. Perhaps most infamous—and instructive as to the long-term futility of repression and torture as organizing principles for viable, successful, and popular governance—were the patterns that repeatedly obtained in Argentina, culminating with the Dirty War of the late 1970s.

Historical background in Argentina

Following its discovery by Europeans early in the 16th century, Argentina was affluent thanks to its ample natural resources. That promise attracted the flow of colonizing white farmers and labourers to the riches of the Pampas. Its society, however, duplicated the repressive patterns and human rights violations inherent in the feudalism of mainland Spain and in the offensive patterns of Spanish colonialism. Particularly harmful were the Spanish subjugation and forcible assimilation of indigenous populations and native cultures, characterized by strict hierarchy, intolerance, discrimination, lack of respect to pluralism and individual rights coupled with strong collaboration with Catholic institutions.

After Argentine independence from Spain amid intense domestic struggle in the 1810s, prospects of cheap lands and lucrative jobs attracted ambitious and competent fortune seekers from Europe (Lewis, 2014). Many immigrants, mostly Catholic, came to Argentina from Spain, Italy, and Germany. Mismanagement by short-sighted corporations, and corrupt politicians, who focused on merely extracting wealth for themselves and for well-connected elites rather than developing sophisticated infrastructures and building professional skills, depleted an inherent prosperity. Conservative church control further stifled free expression, stunted enterprise,

and curtailed innovation among white settlers and indigenous people alike. State-sponsored repression and torture were prevalent.

From the late 19th century into the 1920s, advocates waged serious attempts to reform and modernize the political system in order to advance the cause of deliberative democracy and civic engagements. The Radical Civic Union, led by Prime Minister Hipolito Yrigoyen (1852–1933), spearheaded an effort to modernize Argentine politics. His attempts triggered a 1930 military coup that deposed Yrigoyen, and interrupted three generations of civilian rule (Brennan & Pianetto, 2016). Afterwards, until the 1983, culminating with the 1976–1983 Dirty War, a noxious mix of military and civilian governments resulted in further political and economic instability as autocracy and intolerance often prevailed over rights and growth.

Perón

The most prominent exemplar of that troubling pattern was Juan Domingo Perón (1895–1974), a senior military officer (Turner & Miguens, 1983). He was a descendant of Italian immigrants. In the 1930s, he admired Mussolini's fascist regime. Similar regimes obtained in Spain and Germany. In 1941, at the height of the success of Axis powers Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II against democratic countries such as the British, Perón led a group that executed a military coup.

Perón enforced a fascist dictatorship and ruled Argentina with an isolationist and protectionist iron fist. As a *caudillo* (Spanish for an authoritarian military/political leader, a repeated historical pattern in Latin America), Perón relied primarily on coercion against opponents by the army and the police, and on consistent support from the well-organized trade unions. Thus, Perón advanced state corporatism and business monopolies and imposed customs on imports. Combined, these measures prevented modernization of the economy: cronyism protected inept administrators and failing factories, focused on extracting industries such as mining, rewarded inefficient farmers, exacted revenge against opponents, and tolerated rampant corruption by loyalists. Such self-destructive policies worsened economic conditions and harmed social cohesion. This overwhelming sense of national decline damaged Perón's popularity. It also undermined his political credibility and the viability of his policies.

Perón did not change his political course, nor did he introduce reforms. Instead, he increased repression, including the repeated harassment, detention, and torture of political and ideological opponents. This pattern radicalized many initially peaceful dissidents such as future guerrilla fighter Che Guevara (1928–1967). In 1955, democratically minded military officers executed a coup. They promised a republican government of the people, by the people, for the people. The new regime forced Perón into exile. This *junta*, however, often followed similar policies. Failing to deliver progress, this regime, too, became repressive, and increasingly applied torture against its own opponents.

By 1973, the fledgling military regime allowed Perón to return home permanently. He was democratically elected to the presidency that October. Ailing Perón insisted that his wife since 1961, Isabelle Martinez de Perón (b.1931) would become his Vice President. Juan Perón died on July 1, 1974. His party then chose his widow as the successor. While Argentina was a patriarchic society, many ordinary and poor Argentines admired Juan Perón's populist first wife, Evita Perón (1919–1952). Those Perónistas hoped that Isabelle Perón would be similar. She tried to secure her position by espousing an agenda of unity and social justice, complemented by a strong emphasis on law and order.

Isabelle Perón, however, was considerably less popular and powerful in comparison to the charismatic, almost mythical Evita. Isabelle Perón, moreover, lacked her own mandate, did not

gain support from the indispensable trade unions, and her government, too, was corrupt and incompetent. Thus, she failed to secure viable political support. To consolidate her own rule, and hoping to crush the rising opposition, Isabelle Perón practically authorized *desaparecidos* (forced disappearances) of activists by signing decrees that allowed the armed forces to define "subversives" and to take any necessary actions against them. Most importantly, Isabelle Perón designated José López Rega (1919–1989), previously the Minister of Social Welfare, as her personal secretary. Shortly afterwards, López founded the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance. This was a paramilitary militia that assaulted approximately 1,500 people after Perón appointed López to be Comisario General (Chief) of Police (Andersen, 2009).

This high level of repression and torture proved enough to undermine Isabelle Perón's legitimacy as a leader at home and abroad, but was insufficient for some leaders in the right wing. They feared grassroots ideologies such as Liberation Theology. Its principles blended Christian religious teachings well embedded among many Catholics with demands for social justice norms such as equality and workers' rights. Socialists and Communists in many neighbouring Latin America countries such as Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba called for violent revolutions to realize this ambitious agenda.

In this context, leading Argentine generals viewed Isabelle Perón as incompetent in facing left-wing opposition, and as misusing the legacy of her deceased husband. Thus, on March 24, 1976, General Jorge Rafael Videla (1925–2013) staged a military coup. Leading this *junta* until 1981, he launched what was officially called Proceso de Reorganización (Process of National Reorganization). This campaign escalated the already extra-legal operations of the ousted Isabelle Perón administration (Méndez and Wentworth, 2011). The differences were of degree *and* of kind. Compounding years of pre-existing violent practices, the state not only suspended political organizations, but used torture against tens of thousands of suspected members of the political and ideological opponents.

The "Dirty War"

This national purge is commonly known as the "Dirty War" because the regime called its comprehensive actions *limpieza*, a social and political "cleansing" of a wide array of "dirty," "dangerous" "subversives," often young people. Enemies included leftist-guerrillas, Communists, Marxists, Socialists, progressives, and liberals, union leaders, professors, journalists, writers, artists, professionals, students, and those considered as supporting any of the above, sometimes even those judged potential, neutral, or "indifferent." Indeed, the vast majority of victims of torture and murder were peaceful dissidents, primarily non-violent idealists (Pion-Berlin & Lopez, 1991).

During the course of this Dirty War, the *junta* murdered approximately 30,000 "counter-revolutionaries," first "disappearing" many of these activists into hundreds of detention camps (Anderson, 1993). Crimes included kidnappings, torture, and brutal abuse of family members such as spouses, children, and siblings in front of each other, including sexual assaults. The *junta* also took away small children and babies during the captivity of their parents. Pregnant women were often held until they gave birth. New mothers were usually secretly murdered, as were the fathers. The regime awarded hundreds of babies for adoption to friends of the regime, with the apparent blessing of some Catholic priests who approved of the resulting Christian upbringing. The beneficiaries were often childless families from the military or other *junta* supporters, sometimes for the financial gain of army officers. Most of these now-adults are unaware of their true origins.

Powerful and right-wing members of the Catholic establishment collaborated with the regime (Morello, 2015). That was particularly correct with regard to followers of Opus Dei,

an elite ultra-conservative group that often considered a social justice agenda as Communist propaganda. Lower-level priests and nuns who lived and worked with the poor, by contrast, were more likely to oppose the Dirty War, even passively. Hundreds of clergy suffered abuse during the Dirty War. Then Assistant Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Jorge Mario Bergoglio (b. 1936), the future Pope Francis I, remained publicly silent. Bergoglio, already a prominent Jesuit, espoused an insular theology of pious sacramentalism that tried to distance Catholicism from politics and detach believers from Liberation Theology. Although Jesuits are celebrated for their moral independence and universal mission, Bergoglio remained quiet while fellow clergy were among those whom the state arrested, tortured, and murdered, and some priests approved of taking away children from their original, often murdered families (Scheper-Hughes, 2013). By contrast, in El Salvador, Jesuit Archbishop Oscar Romero chose to act politically against similar repression and torture. He was murdered in 1980.

This suppression of civil society and democratic institutions and subjugation of religious groups damaged Argentina. It caused a considerable brain-drain of competent professionals. They largely migrated to democratic and free states, especially in North America and in Europe. For example, around 40 percent of Argentine physicians left their homeland during the Dirty War. Jews, based mostly in Buenos Aires, were disproportionately highly educated, professional, and left-leaning. They faced severe manifestations of anti-semitism. Jews were targeted for detention and torture well beyond their political significance (Finchelstein, 2017). Many Jews fled abroad, especially to Israel, deepening the adverse economic consequences for Argentina. The most famous political prisoner during the Dirty War, Jacobo Timerman (1923–1999), a prominent newspaper editor, was also a Jew. His subsequent memoir of the horrors, especially the torture that he endured, *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number*, is the most potent book on the era. In stark contrast, Alfredo Astiz (b. 1951), called the "Blond Angel of Death," was arguably the most infamous perpetrator of repression and torture. Astiz committed horrific crimes at the Navy Petty Officers School of Mechanics, known as ESMA, where it has been estimated some 5,000 people were held and tortured during the Dirty War (Di Paolantonio, 2008). Few of these captives survived

International dimensions

With the clandestine Operation Condor, Argentina also waged the Dirty War abroad (McSherry, 2012). This campaign coordinated terror, kidnappings, disappearances, and assassinations of loosely defined "subversives" in collaboration with fellow repressive dictatorships and secret services from Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Indeed, such contemporary regimes frequently relied on torture to crush dissidents, many of whom were youthful and peaceful. The most prominent example was Chile. On September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet led a right-wing coup that deposed Communist president Salvador Allende. Pinochet led a four-member military *junta* and governed for 17 years. They murdered about 3,000 people, including 1,100 who were forcibly disappeared. Other countries included Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Amilivia, 2016). Their *juntas* applied torture widely against left-wing dissidents, peaceful and violent alike. The resulting torture and repression were utterly incapable of creating or generating earnest compliance, or of mobilizing popular support for the military dictatorships. In addition, semi-military, state-sanctioned militias tortured and killed opponents, many of them of indigenous populations in the rural areas, and intimidated the urban poor.

In the context of the ongoing Cold War, Henry Kissinger, first as National Security Adviser then as Secretary of State in the Republican administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald

Ford, was the eminent U.S. policy-maker in the 1970s. As a part of his realpolitik approach to confronting the Soviet bloc, he prioritized the practical concern to defend pro-American regimes over protecting human rights, in private and in public (Schmidli, 2011). Kissinger provided at least a tacit support to repression and torture by the *junta*. Fearful of any subversive organizations, Kissinger continued collaboration with anti-Communist governments who violated human rights policies and interventions that began by the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s. The consequences of what was correctly perceived in Latin America as a U.S. endorsement of repression, torture, and undemocratic regimes that overstated values of civil liberties and social justice reverberated well beyond Argentina into countries such as Chile and Brazil. In addition, the U.S. army trained numerous officers from the region in the School of the Americas. Its curriculum included instruction on how to maximize the efficacy of interrogations and tactics allegedly included torture (McCoy, 2005).

In partial contrast, U.S. policy temporarily changed when Jimmy Carter became president in 1977. He promised to position human rights at the core of his approach to international relations (Schmitz & Walker, 2004). An internal interagency foreign policy team chaired by Warren Christopher, thus commonly known as "The Christopher Group," wanted the United States to "seek a rapid end to patterns of gross governmental violations of the person." As a result of Carter's intentions, these specific and meaningful policy deliberations under the leadership of Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, the Carter administration imposed commercial sanctions on Argentina and limited military cooperation and sales. As a result of the United States abstaining or voting against loan proposals in multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, and the suspension of direct aid to Argentina, Argentina's economic malaise worsened. An example was the U.S. vote against 18 out of 20 loans for Argentina, which amounted to a limited censure given the scope of human rights abuses. Consistent intervention by the Carter administration helped save thousands of prisoners from death or from long detention.

That relatively positive legacy helped make Jimmy Carter a relatively welcomed American leader in his long life following the end of his presidency in 1981. Later, however, especially after late 1978, U.S. policy-makers, especially the powerful and hawkish National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, focused on helping a traditional ally like Argentina against perceived left-wing threats. Thus, American efforts to help the fate of affected individuals or to promote political reforms dwindled.

When Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, the Dirty War was abating, partially because most people targeted had already been detained or had fled abroad. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger wanted to collaborate with Argentina. As a result, the U.S. offered little criticism of the repression and torture perpetrated by the *junta*.

Impact of the Dirty War

During the Dirty War, wide-scale repression, torture, and disappearances were coupled with corruption, ineptness, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Combined, the consequences of these misdeeds severely weakened the legitimacy of the military regime. A particularly damaging presence to the regime were the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, parents of disappeared young men and women (Bouvard, 2002). This ubiquitous and vocal advocacy group sat and held vigil outside the presidential palace, showing their commitment to find the fate of their sons and daughters, whose photos they often displayed.

In 1978, Argentina hosted the soccer World Cup, the most popular sport in the country and the region. A lot of pride and legitimacy were at stake, as it was a diversion from the oppressive

political life. The national team won the prestigious title for the first time in history, significantly eclipsing Brazil, its traditional arch-rival. The regime secured this victory, in part, by bribing Peru to lose a game to assure Argentina's advancement to the final stages.

Nevertheless, even this misbegotten trophy failed to gain the regime a long-standing popularity. In 1982, *junta* leaders thought that a speedy victory over the British by invading the largely defenceless Falkland [Malvinas] islands would provide a popular diversion and erase their diminished public credibility (Arquilla & Rasmussen, 2001). Linkage politics, however, interfered. The weakness caused by the prevalence of repression and torture could not overcome an illusion that the army is functional, and ready for any action. As the army's legitimacy deteriorated due to mismanagement and economic malaise, however, its popularity declined due to the lack of cohesion, and internal conflicts that led to repeated palace coups. The severe domestic problems affected poor army performance. Military life was repressive to many who were drafted in mandatory conscription. Soldiers suffered corporate punishment even for minor infractions, which amounted to torture. These measures demoralized troops. The organizational pathologies of the Argentine military in contrast to the more cohesive, better equipped and trained, and thus more dependable British army were a major factor for a stinging defeat, hastening the *junta*'s demise. This turn of events emulated the differing pattern of earlier colonization between the Spanish and the British: planning, prioritizing, clear lines of communications, investment in long-term viability, and professional execution of reasonable goals.

The Falkland defeat caused a wide-scale surge of popular resistance in Argentina. It could not be crushed with additional repression and torture, as there were no realistic foes left to be scapegoated for the obvious malaise. The *junta* had to abdicate its power. As a face-saving mechanism, and in accordance with U.S. pressure to allow more freedom, the army agreed to hold democratic elections in the summer of 1983.

A progressive politician from the rejuvenated Radical Civic Union, Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín won the presidency and took office in 1983. His personal credentials and political gravitas were enhanced by his public opposition to the Dirty War. Indeed, he filed several times writs of *habeas corpus* to try and secure the freedom of forcibly disappeared victims. As a president, Alfonsín revoked the regime's self-amnesty and established the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons concerning the repression and crimes such as torture perpetrated during the Dirty War. Its investigations led to several trials. Violent and legal resistance by the army, however, halted Alfonsín's attempts. Trials resumed decades later. In 2010, an Argentine court sentenced former General Videla for 50 years in jail. He died three years later. In 2011, Alfredo Astiz was among 12 officials sentenced to life in prison (Davis, 2013), while in 2016, a different court convicted conspirators in Operation Condor.

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44
CANADA

Stéphane Leman-Langlois

Introduction

The recent history of terrorism in Canada shows three clearly defined cycles with different actors, different goals and different tactics. Throughout, however, the overarching feature of Canadian political violence is its rarity and, with few exceptions, its low intensity. Despite this, various counterterrorism agencies in Canada, and in particular the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), have seen their legal powers and budgets significantly increased. This chapter will start by reviewing three historical cycles of political violence in Canada. It will then provide an overview of counterterrorism structures and activities, with special attention given to the interactions between political violence and its policing.

Terrorism and political violence in Canada, 1960–2015

The Terrorism and Counterterrorism Research Group (TCRG; Leman-Langlois and Brodeur, 2009) has gathered a database of some 350 acts of political violence for the 1973–2015 period. Most of those are low-level attacks directed against property: fewer than 20%, or 70 acts in the database involved violence, 35 with loss of life. It is important to underline that those numbers are not evenly distributed over the historical period, with the 1980s being, by far, the most active. Our statistics show that political violence in Canada clusters around three historical periods that roughly correspond to three types of terrorism. It begins in the 1960s with the then widespread revolutionary discourse against capitalism, imperialism and colonial domination. The second cycle begins 20 years later, in the extremely active 1980s, with the multiplication of demand-oriented acts of political violence. Finally, starting in 1999 with the infamous "Millennium Bomber," a new form of globally inspired but locally active ("glocal") terrorism has taken shape.

First cycle: revolutionary war

Like most Western countries, Canada had its episode of anti-establishment, "revolutionary" terrorism in the 1960s. The *Front de libération du Québec* (Quebec Liberation Front, FLQ) was

one of the many products of a growing discourse of Francophone disenfranchisement within Anglophone Canada.

Because French Canadians are mostly concentrated in the province of Quebec, a minority of *Québecois* have always seen it as their "nation," in a traditionally Westphalian understanding, where a statistically dominant cultural group occupies a recognizable space. In that view Quebec only falls short of being a fully legitimate nation-state because it lacks unfettered sovereign power over its territory. This incomplete sovereignty and the presence of a superseding federal state with disputed powers was understood as a form of oppression, while the fact that most of the rest of Canada (not to mention the US neighbour) was English speaking was seen as a looming de-facto or deliberate assimilation of Quebeckers and the short-term disappearance of French culture from North America. At the time there were 4 million Francophones in Quebec (on a total population of 5 million) and the rest of Canada counted some 13 million mostly Anglophone citizens (the proportion is now 8 to 28 million; Statistics Canada, 2015). This discourse of oppression could be illustrated by two historical narratives, the first being the British *conquest* of "New France" in 1760 (followed by the imposition of British rule) and the second, the quashed rebellion of 1837 in Quebec (Ontario had a similar rebellion, almost at the same time, also against the British administration).

Beginning in the 1960s, galvanised by the successes of national independence movements in the colonial world, multiple non-violent groups started openly advocating for the separation of Quebec from Canada, mostly based on the oppression and on the assimilation discourses. The first groups with large numbers of members were the *Front de libération populaire* (FLP) and the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (RIN), the latter eventually becoming an official (albeit short-lived) political party.

By the mid-1960s some separatist groups began to steer away from the historic and linguistic conflict account and adopted a new, trendier, socialist "popular liberation" track. Widely distributed commentary magazines and papers like *Révolution québécoise*, *Parti pris* and *Québec libre* promoted the new socialist–separatist agenda as a class struggle against the oppression of the working poor. It so happened that the financial, industrial and political elites were mostly Anglophones and the working poor Francophones, but that was now presented as a Canadian coincidence, while the true root of the problem was imperialist capitalism. Lesser-known underground publications such as *La masse* (*Sledgehammer*), *Victoire*, *Mobilisation* and *Pouvoir ouvrier* (Worker Power) offered variations on the theme. FLQ ideologue Pierre Vallières published several pamphlets, as well as the bestselling *Nègres blancs d'Amérique* (Vallières, 1967), where he interpreted the historical oppression of the Francophone minority in Canada as a class struggle (published in 1967, and later in English as *White Niggers of America*. At the time Valières was introduced as "Canada's Malcom X" in the New York Review of Books; New York Times, 1998). In the 1980s Vallières became one of the main sources of conspiracy theories about the FLQ, arguing that its activities were directed from the federal government and the US CIA in order to discredit the independence movement.

As part of the separatist discourse shifted away from the traditional distinction between Francophones and Anglophones and was replaced by an economic and political conflict between the proletariat, the bourgeoisie and "Anglo-American imperialists," independence was no longer a final goal of the struggle but simply a means towards the establishment of a socialist utopia (Fournier, 1982). As was the trend with leftist intellectuals in France and Quebec, many in the movement saw the USSR as a model of social, scientific and technical progress and the US as the centre of world capitalist oppression. However, this anti-capitalist shift was not shared by all and cracks began to appear within the movement.

Meanwhile, mainstream politics in Quebec had also begun to revolve around the idea of a nation within a nation, a French Quebec that must either be "equal or separate" (the slogan

of one of the leading political parties). Traditional parties such as the Liberals and the *Union Nationale* had begun insisting on the need for constitutional reform, following a trend set by newer and more radical formations who simply demanded separation from Canada. One of these formations was the freshly founded *Parti Québécois*, which later formed the government and unsuccessfully offered independence to Quebeckers in two referendums in 1980 and 1995 (and whose programme today continues to revolve around the same strategy).

It is significant that none of these groups and parties advocated for radical social or economic transformations, with the most significant economic change being the nationalisation of electrical production and distribution by the Liberal Party in 1963 under the slogan "maîtres chez nous," "masters in our own house." This may explain, in part, why some underground movements adopted a more radical, revolutionary discourse as a way to legitimise their continued existence within a changing political and cultural environment that had largely adopted its culturalist–nationalist discourse (and as a way to recruit new members, since its numbers were dwindling in favour of the legitimate parties; Fournier, 1982: 120). For instance, by the end of 1965 the underground, semi-official publication of the FLQ, *La cognée* ("The Axe," personal collection of the author), started to justify the FLQ and its violent actions as the sparks that would ignite a popular revolution towards socialism in an independent Quebec. *La cognée* was explicitly produced as the propaganda arm of the FLQ, publishing bi-monthly its ideology and suggestions as to how the public should be "educated" (offering its comments on current events or, for instance, running a months-long series detailing its version of the history of Quebec), as well as advice on forming combat cells, concocting home-made grenades, derailing trains and the like.

From 1962 to 1973 the violent underground movement gave rise to multiple groups and acronyms, some dissolving quickly after mass arrests and others more durable but with low membership and few activities. The best known is the FLQ, who started its robbing and bombing campaign in 1963 (Comeau, Cooper and Vallières, 1990). Early on, the FLQ had adopted as its emblem a famous drawing of a "Patriot" from the 1837 Rebellion, carrying his long rifle and going to war against the British. After stealing hundreds of automatic weapons and large quantities of dynamite the FLQ detonated bombs against government symbols such as mailboxes and military installations, railroads and official buildings, but also in various private enterprises with striking workers or other labour-related conflicts (Crelinsten, 1993). In terms of tactics the FLQ is nearly indistinguishable from other revolutionary terror groups from the era – the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigades or the Basque separatists – albeit at a somewhat less intense, less violent level.

That would change in October of 1970. The story of the FLQ ends with its most spectacular attacks: on 5 October 1970 a group of seven *felquistes* abducted British commercial attaché James Richard Cross from his home in Montreal; five days later a second group of four, surprised by the kidnapping and disappointed that the first group (whom they had no contact with) had accepted to reduce its demands, pushed Quebec Labour minister Pierre Laporte into their car from the street in front of his home. Though Cross was to be released later in December, the body of Laporte was recovered from the boot of an abandoned car just six days after his kidnapping, on the evening of 16 October, in the middle of negotiations with the government. The circumstances of his death remain unclear. In his memoirs, kidnapper Francis Simard (1982: 68) says that "a decision was taken" to kill the hostage because the Canadian Forces had been activated in Ottawa (on 12 October) and in Montreal (at the behest of the Quebec government, on 15 October). On the very day of Laporte's killing the federal government had also declared a state of "apprehended insurrection" through the War Measures Act. Under the circumstances, Simard says, further negotiations were deemed impossible by the group. He does not say how it was done or who actually killed Laporte.

Both sets of kidnappers had made demands for the release of "political prisoners" (other members of the FLQ that had been arrested by police in previous years and months), as well as the rehiring of a group of 450 laid-off employees of a Montreal Canada Post trucking contractor (which had become an important labour crisis at the time). Public sympathy, which had been relatively high, not the least because of the support of well-respected artists, vanished almost instantly in the fall of 1970 (Laurendeau, 1990). The FLQ survived another three years, but mostly as what Brodeur (1981) called a "police colony" because of the number of infiltrated informers.

In short, the FLQ disappeared because its radicalised discourse was not sufficient to recruit new members among the populations sympathetic to the independence movement, who preferred to participate in legitimate politics where their option was now being discussed, and its radicalised strategy cut it from the popular and cultural elite moral caution and support it had enjoyed.

Second cycle: demands, claims and condemnations

After a relative lull after the October crisis, the 1980s were a very active decade. In fact, other than the 1967–1970 FLQ period, statistically the 1980s are to date the most active period in political violence in Canada, both in terms of the number of attacks and of the variety of the causes. In Figure 44.1 events are categorised according to seriousness. The lower curve represents acts with violence against persons and property destruction valued over 10,000 CAD (n=109), a more "intense" definition of terrorism, while the higher curve illustrates all acts of property destruction, threat of violence and other "nuisances" (n=240). In this graph the 1979–1989 period holds 50% of the number of acts of serious violence for 1973–2014 (and 65% of the nuisances). Note that in order to fully grasp these numbers one has to take into account that the Canadian population grew by 27% during the period (26 million in 1981 to 33 million in 2011).

If we were to define terrorism more strictly, where indiscriminate killing takes place against civilians, the number of instances for the four decades is five, four of which occurred in the 1980s.

The most murderous attack of this cycle is of course the 1985 Air India disaster. In June 1984 Prime Minister Indira Ghandi had quashed the Sikh rebels who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, the most holy site of Sikhism. "Operation Blue Star" killed

Figure 44.1 Chronology of serious and nuisance political violence events in Canada, 1973–2014 (n = 349).

hundreds of Sikh militants (the actual number is unknown) and heavily damaged the temple. In the aftermath some local and expatriated Sikhs vowed revenge, and in October Ghandi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, in turn triggering thousands of revenge killings against Sikhs in India.

The actual attack was conducted with some $3,000 in funds provided by a local businessman. Two suitcase bombs were placed on board aircraft bound for India in Vancouver. The first one, placed on Canadian Pacific flight 003, reached Tokyo Narita airport in the morning of 23 June. It exploded during luggage transfer to the Air India aircraft, killing two handlers. The second was placed on Canadian Pacific flight 301 to Toronto, for transfer to AI 181/182 to Montreal, London and Bombay. It exploded a few minutes before reaching the shores of Ireland, bringing down the Boeing 747 with 329 persons on board, mostly Montrealers of Indian decent (Canada, 2010: 637).

The attackers were part of Babbar Khalsa, an extremist organisation that openly demanded a separate "Khalistan" (Land of the pure) for Sikhs in the Punjab and, after 1984, revenge against India in no uncertain terms: in the words of one of its Canadian leaders, "I give you my most solemn assurance, until we kill fifty thousand Hindus, we will not rest" (Bolan, 2005: 46).

The decade would see many more examples of political violence stemming from foreign conflicts. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and its affiliate Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) attacked multiple Turkish targets, in Ottawa in particular, to support its separatist agenda and to force the government of Turkey to admit having committed genocide against its Armenian population at the beginning of the 20th century. Armenian extremists were active in most of the Western hemisphere during the 1980s. In Canada they assassinated the Turkish military attaché and wounded the commercial counsellor in two separate attacks in 1982. In 1985 they raided the embassy and took hostages inside. Other groups, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), were extremely active in financing and recruitment but did not engage in violence in Canada other that a few instances of intimidation and extortion.

In the early 1980s the Canadian constitutional crisis reached a new high. The Parti Québécois, first elected in 1976, held a general plebiscite on the independence of Quebec in 1980, which the federation won by a 60% majority. During the campaign the federal government had promised to review the constitution, which it first proceeded to "repatriate" from Britain immediately after the plebiscite. Most provinces, including Quebec, were opposed to the repatriation because the new constitution would enshrine a separation of powers that has been decided by the federal government alone. What is more, Quebec was especially concerned with the new "language rights" that would be set in the accompanying new "Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Between 1980 and 1982, when the new constitution finally came into power, multiple low-intensity explosions, fire-bombings and other attacks against property were committed by all sides of the debate.

Also at the beginning of the 1980s, Canada had its extreme-left terror episode in the form of "Direct Action," also referred to as the "Squamish five" case, from the city where the group was arrested in 1982. Other than subsistence thieving, the group had started its crime spree with unsuccessful firebomb attacks against a mining company and Environment ministry offices as protests against environmental degradation and interference with the local aboriginals' traditional way of life. Months later the group set its sights on BC Hydro's installations in pristine areas of Vancouver Island. After having stolen dynamite, the group placed a large bomb near new power transformers on the island in May 1982, causing heavy damage. Months later the group would conduct their best-known attack, partly destroying electronics manufacturer Litton Systems in Toronto, Ontario. In its communique Direct Action explained that Litton had

been targeted because of its participation in the US "cruise missile" defence system (Hansen, 2001: 477-486). Over 250kg of dynamite were loaded onto a stolen delivery van and parked near the structure, with multiple signs warning of explosives. A warning phone call was also made minutes before the explosion, but the faulty home-made timer triggered the explosion early, wounding ten employees who had not had sufficient time to evacuate. In the following weeks the group also attacked video clubs offering pornographic movies. After a few months of investigation the RCMP managed to follow a lead to a post box where another radical group with links to Direct Action received its mail. Following its users, the police eventually identified most of Direct Action and, in the morning of 20 January 1983, the five were arrested as they travelled to their favourite target practice spot in the woods near Squamish, British Columbia. In its very short life Direct Action managed to embrace most of the controversial issues of the 1980s: the environment, aboriginal rights, world peace and armament, and pornography as a means of the oppression of women.

Third cycle: glocalisation

In 1999, Ahmed Ressam tried to cross the Canada-USA border in Washington State with a home-made bomb hidden in a rented Chrysler (a map to LAX was later found at his Montreal apartment). Ressam's circle of contacts in Montreal, the "Montreal Cell", as it became known, revolved around Fateh Kamel, a veteran from Afghanistan and Bosnia with links to a radical group of bank robbers in France (the *Gang de Roubaix*) and, through them, to the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) in Algeria. Kamel operated a store front in Montreal but ran a false papers business for other veterans and travelling jihadists. He had been wounded in Bosnia but his activities there are not known. Arrested during one of his multiple trips abroad, he was tried in France for his links to the Roubaix gang but not for personally taking part in violence of any form. His only conviction in Canada is for a stolen handbag. So though he probably acted as a broker between various networks and cliques his role in terrorist violence was not operational.

Ressam, who landed in Canada in 1994 with a false French passport, immediately claimed asylum but never followed up with that process, missing the first hearing. Instead he made a career for himself robbing tourists and reselling their papers to Kamel. Probably under the latter's advice, in 1995 Ressam forged a new identity for himself, with matching passport. In 1998 he travelled to Afghanistan as "Benni Antoine Noris" and learnt bomb making at the infamous Khalden, Deronta and Toronta camps, where he stayed almost a year. What happened to Ressam between 1995 and 1998 is a matter of conjecture, but it ended with his being recruited by a loose network of veterans and jihadists remotely connected to the bin Laden network. Recordings made by police at his Montreal apartment show that he and his group of mostly Algerian friends were constantly discussing geopolitics and jihad. Eventually, one of the older members of the group made contact between Ressam (and one of his friends) and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. There, Ressam received money and instructions from Abu Zubaida, an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Khalden camp. Upon returning to Canada Ressam proceeded, with some accomplices, to build a bomb in Vancouver to be taken to LAX for the coming millennium celebrations.

Though Ressam's LAX plot was in essence classical international terrorism, I have included it in this section because of his radicalisation in Canada. The next major Canadian case, that of the "Toronto 18," is an almost pure form of "glocal" terrorism. In June 2006 Canadian authorities arrested 18 individuals in suburban Toronto for their participation in various terrorism-linked activities. By the time of their arrest members of the group had already splintered in two camps. One, the "Scarborough" group, favoured a military-type assault with light weapons, possibly

including storming the Parliament of Canada and beheading the Prime Minister, according to their recorded conversations. That group envisioned recruiting hundreds of jihadists, arming them and conducting simultaneous attacks in every large Canadian city (Speckhard and Shaikh, 2014). That group's planning did not go beyond the procurement of a handgun in the US and a hunting rifle in a local gun shop. No member of the group knew how to use either (Speckhard and Shaikh, 2014).

The second group, comprised of four young men, the "Mississauga" group, seemed more serious and went as far as to purchase (police-supplied, simulated) ammonium nitrate fertilizer in order to build truck bombs. The idea was to detonate at least three bombs in Toronto on 11 September 2006, both as a reminder of the al-Qaeda cause and as punishment for Canada's involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

Other cases of glocal terrorism in Canada include that of Said Namouh, who from a small Quebec village was actively publishing material and managing the website of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF); Mohammad Khawaja, Ottawa resident who built a remote detonator for British bombers; Omar Bulfred and Azim Ibragimov, who firebombed a Jewish school to protest against Israel; Aswo Peshdari and Ahmed Misbahuddin, who plotted to blow up the Parliament, also in retaliation for the Canadian presence in Afghanistan. In that category we could also include a few "plots" that involved individuals at various degrees of mental indisposition, like the Korody-Nuttal couple, whose ability to prepare their pressure-cooker bombs was severely reduced by their life-long drug habit (and who needed much help from the police to get anything done at all), the so-called "Via Rail" plot where the two involved had no real clue as to how they would "cut" a railway bridge and cause a derailment (and where one plotter scared the other away with his vociferous but unintelligible religious diatribes). Finally, two successful attacks show that mental problems do not necessarily result in failure: Michael Zehaf-Bibeau stormed the Parliament after having shot a soldier in October 2014, two days after Martin Couture-Rouleau had run over and killed another soldier. The two entirely separate events, both meant as a reaction to the departure of CF-18 fighter jets as part of Canada's participation in the war in Iraq, were carried out by individuals with extremely severe personal problems. It should be noted that dozens of Canadians have also left for Syria, Iraq and Somalia to join the armed conflicts there. However, I will not discuss these cases as their exact nature is either unverifiable or does not fit conventional definitions of terrorism.

One of the studies TCRG has led in the last few years aims at mapping extreme-right groups. Since their recent increase is mostly a reaction to what is perceived as a Muslim threat from inside Canada, where the concepts of "tipping point" (a population threshold where the increasing Muslim population comes to dominate the politics of a nation) and "Islamisation" are foundational, they are mostly *local* in nature. However, analysis of their discourse shows that they make very intense use of what they deem to be examples of Muslim crimes committed elsewhere in the world in order to feed their xenophobic, racist worldview. For the moment extreme-right networks in Canada are mostly effective at the level of communication. Violence remains disorganised and individualised, with no wider strategy or organisation. One example is that of Justin Bourque, who killed three RCMP officers during a 30-hour rampage in 2014 in order to "start a rebellion against an oppressive, corrupt government that he believed was squelching the freedom of most Canadians" (National Post, 2014). Bourque's attack was by far the most murderous act of anti-state terrorism in recent history. At the other end of the spectrum, the extreme left has not been on the political violence radar since the 1980s, other than occasional property violence protests during international events such as the 2000 Third Summit of the Americas.

In short, the nature of glocal terrorism in Canada has two components. The first one is that it is *unpredictable*: anyone can become a terrorist. There is no profile, no overarching cause and no homogenous political project. There are only fleeting, opportunistic, loosely organised groupings with few actual ties, often triggered by the contingencies of the media news cycle. The sole fact that many attackers above were Muslims does not inform us on the religiousness of their motives. The second one is that it is *incompetent*: most attacks are extremely simple, rapidly organised (within minutes in some cases) and, if they ever reach this final point, crudely executed.

From a policing point of view, then, the current cycle of political violence in Canada offers unique, unprecedented challenges. Though it will sometimes be possible to infiltrate groups such as the Toronto 18, who had no fewer than three police operatives in their midst, in general this will be impossible because of the extremely narrow structure of the group and the short time frame between what one might call "radicalisation" and actual violence. In the next section we discuss the evolution of CT policing in Canada.

Counterterrorism in Canada: a scandal-driven evolution

The end of the RCMP Security Service era

The official response to the FLQ episode forced profound changes in national security policing. In what might be deemed the first phase of the police response to the FLQ crisis, the RCMP managed to produce adequate strategic intelligence about the movement. Newly declassified reports show that though much was made of communist block influence (either from Cuba or the Kremlin), RCMP analysts were not duped. By 1969 they also understood that the overall threat of violence was low and coming from a relatively small number of extremists (Whitaker, Kealey and Parnaby, 2012). Though a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation documentary had shown two self-proclaimed FLQ members training in Algeria, RCMP analysts also rightly dismissed the inflated idea that the FLQ was part of an international network. Finally, in April 1970 the RCMP had warned the federal government that political kidnappings were going to be the FLQ's next tactic (Whitaker *et al.*, 2012).

In terms of tactical intelligence and policing the state also scored some spectacular successes in the fight against the FLQ: amid repeated mass arrests of members, the foiling of the planned kidnapping of the US general consul in Montreal in the spring of 1970 stands out. After renting a cottage where they would keep their hostage, six cell members prepared their demands in advance (which closely matched those produced of the subsequent kidnappings of Cross and Laporte; Fournier, 1982: 270). In June 1960 a university student called police about a professor who might have been part of a $58,000 heist committed at the University of Montreal in May and attributed to the FLQ. Police followed the lead to the cottage and its dwellers. The conclusion of the investigation was less than stellar, however: in the cottage they found the address of a farm where other members of the FLQ were hiding, which they raided too quickly and failed to arrest Francis Simard, co-conspirator in the later Laporte kidnapping, who was sought by police but escaped by simply giving a false name. Of course, the tracking down and freeing of British Consul James Cross is also a huge success on the part of the RCMP: while looking for one of the kidnappers' wives, officers found an apartment she had rented with others and managed to trace the moving company to an FLQ sympathiser who eventually met the Cross kidnappers, who in turn led police to the apartment where the hostage was kept (Fournier, 1982: 365).

That said, one must wonder how the provincial *Sûreté du Québec* (SQ) or the Montreal police could fail to ensure even a minimum of security or at least issue a warning to Quebec officials

that the FLQ was changing tactics. That the acting prime minister and minister of labour of Quebec (the PM had been on official business in the US in the previous days) could be taken while playing football in the street is puzzling. Only after that second kidnapping was the army called in and detailed to VIP security. One part of the problem was the classic lack of cooperation between police forces, combined in this case with the no less classic gap between strategic intelligence and tactical intervention (Leman-Langlois and Lemieux, 2007).

The federal, provincial and municipal governments, in their haste to react to the October crisis, also committed several fundamental blunders. Resorting to the military stands out because of the symbolism but had few tangible social or political effects. Two far more ill-advised strategies should be underlined. First, responding to demands from the Mayor of Montreal (and the city's *Section anti-terroriste*) and the Quebec Premier, the federal government declared a state of "apprehended insurrection" under the 1914 War Measures Act, which gave police a panoply of emergency powers, such as the temporary admissibility of guilt by association, the presumption of guilt and the suspension of habeas corpus in legal proceedings. Armed with those new powers, provincial and municipal police forces quickly arrested and detained over 500 persons with links (some documented, many simply imagined) with the FLQ or with anti-government protests, including artists, labour leaders and political figures, as well as many cases of mistaken identity.

Newly declassified documents reveal that the federal government resorted to the provisions of the War Measures Act without consultation with the RCMP, who at the time were the reference in counterterrorism, and far better equipped to police terrorism than the Montreal Police and the provincial SQ (cases in point: the SQ raided the home of the Quebec Secretary of State, in a posh area of Montreal, mistaking him for a suspect with the same name; Tetley, 2007: 98. As for the Montreal Police, it decided early after the Cross kidnapping to investigate *every* tip given by the public, some 1,500 per day, with none proving useful; Brodeur, 1980: 86). The strategy in fact *hampered* RCMP progress by multiplying false leads and diverting staff towards mass arrests (Whitaker *et al.*, 2012: 286). However, it is worth noting that at the time neither the presence of some 8,000 soldiers patrolling the streets nor the suspension of legal rights and protections met with much resistance within the public: polls showed that 86% of French Quebeckers supported both tactics (Laurendeau, 1990: 330; Tetley, 2007: 103). In short, it may have been politically expedient. At another level, though the invocation of an "apprehended insurrection" revealed itself as a mistake from the policing point of view, its possible political objective may have been to scare the Quebec voters away from independence movements. In that the success was only temporary however, with the Parti Québécois winning the 1976 provincial election.

Second, beginning at the end of the 1960s the RCMP was directed at policing not only separatist terrorists, but also *separatists*, including the official *Parti Québécois*. In 1967 the RCMP Security Service had already been instructed to "spy on Quebec as if it were a foreign nation" (quoted in Fournier, 1982: 314). But it was the post-1970 campaign of dirty tricks that led to its demise. Starting in 1971, the RCMP specifically began to engage in "special operations" against "separatists/terrorists," which would lead to spying on official political parties (especially the Parti Québécois, who by 1972 had over 100,000 members), false flag operations, the kidnapping of suspected FLQ members (Quebec, 1981: 340–347) and the maintenance of some 40,000 dossiers on persons and groups. These operations would come to an abrupt halt in July 1974, when a bombing commissioned by organized crime blew up in the hands of an RCMP constable under contract with the mob (Fournier, 1982: 468). For months the RCMP attempted to attribute the failed bombing to the FLQ, who had not been active for almost two years. During his second trial in 1976 the constable would finally reveal he "had done far worse for the force" (Dion, 1979: 74), triggering the worst scandal in RCMP history.

The CSIS era

The subsequent McDonald (Canada, 1979) and Keable (Quebec, 1981) commissions of inquiry would reveal a culture of near complete lawlessness within the RCMP Security Service, which at the time was operating in anti-Soviet paranoia and outside of any form of review mechanism. The solution recommended by the Commission was the creation of a separate, civilian entity, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), in 1984. Interestingly, a previous official inquiry into the RCMP Security Service, the McKenzie Commission, had also recommended civilianisation in 1969, months before the events listed above. Ironically, McKenzie had argued that the image of the RCMP should not suffer from the dirty tricks needed to protect effectively the security of the nation. At the time the RCMP had fought tooth and nail against the civilianisation of its SS (Whitaker *et al.*, 2012: 239).

The "CSIS era" of counterterrorism begins with the most spectacular failure in Canadian high policing: despite having identified and listened in on conversations between Sikh extremists, and followed some in the woods where they tested a bomb, and all the while being warned by Indian intelligence that Sikhs expatriates were preparing acts of violence (India was heavily involved in spying on the Sikh community in Canada at the time; Cléroux, 1993: 425-6), CSIS failed to engage in any preventive action including, as dictated by its act, informing the RCMP that a major crime was being prepared. In fact, it was found later that, all the while, the service was routinely erasing recordings made of Sikh extremist meetings and phone calls. The RCMP, who remained the only federal policing agency in Canada, fared no better. On 1 June 1985, three weeks before the attack, the Air India intelligence service had notified RCMP that an attack on their planes were imminent (at the time Air India only had two flights from Canada per week). The RCMP offered no response, in fact convening all of its canine bomb detection squads to a training meeting on the day of the attack (again, the only day in the week with Air India flights). It also failed to share any and all information with CSIS (Canada, 2010). Furthermore, the Canadian Security Establishment (CSE), the SIGINT and cryptology agency of Canada also had intercepts that announced an attack on flight 182, but did not share them with either CSIS or the RCMP (Canada, 2010).

The main problem was that, early on, CSIS understood its function as wholly separate from that of policing: gathering *intelligence* and not *proof*. Under that profound misconception the transmission of intelligence towards a traditional policing agency would a) not be admissible in court; b) unduly reveal intelligence collection strategy; c) might corrupt evidence gathered by RCMP if defence lawyers argued that it stemmed from information gathered in violation of Charter rights (note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was also relatively new, enacted in 1982, and few courts had yet ruled on it). It is that strict interpretation of the rules that led CSIS to destroy its recordings even before they had been translated. This early in its existence, CSIS was still mostly concerned with avoiding the scandals that had led to its creation, which were understood as stemming from the combination of policing and intelligence work which, it had been concluded, could only be countered by air-tight compartmentalisation. This extreme interpretation hampered cooperation between the agencies for many years, but has fortunately been abandoned since.

The official Air India Commission of Inquiry, formed in 2006 after two key plotters were acquitted, credits Japanese police with the few investigative successes: from the crime scene in Narita it managed to produce enough evidence to identify the only person who would ever be convicted for the attack, the bomb maker, an auto mechanic from Vancouver. In other words, the Commission found that not only had security agencies in Canada failed in what seemed the relatively easy prevention of the attack, they also revealed themselves to be incompetent in the

following investigation, wasting millions of dollars towards a very weak, and ultimately failed, criminal case against some of the remaining accomplices (the leader, who had fled to India, was tortured to death by police there).

If the infancy of CSIS is often invoked in order to explain some of its early failures, by 1999 the problems were still not entirely ironed out. The service would take another crucial hit to its public image with the Ahmed Ressam debacle. The aforementioned "millennium bomber" was under CSIS surveillance after a French *judge d'instruction* (investigating judge) found communications between the dismantled Roubaix gang and the "Montreal cell" in early 1996. Surveillance equipment was installed in the Montreal cell's apartment on Malicorne Street, in Montreal. After months of jihad talk and no concrete action, it seems that it was concluded that the group posed no real threat. When Ressam left for Afghanistan in 1998, CSIS recorded the goodbyes but apparently thought little of the event. The following year, the French investigating team actually travelled to Montreal in October 1999 with the RCMP and Montreal police to interview Ressam (a request filed with RCMP in April; Bell, 2004), who was presumed to stay at an apartment rented by one of his old friends. Ressam managed to escape through an unwatched back door. The next time he would see the authorities, it would be the US Customs and Border Protection agents. Much remains unknown but CSIS was accused of refusing to cooperate with the French, the US investigators and, once again, with RCMP investigators, who at some point even considered obtaining a warrant to search CSIS offices.

The post-9/11 era

This situation changed drastically after the September 2001 attacks in New York. First, the Criminal Code was amended to allow for much more latitude in criminal investigations related to terrorism, especially with the inclusion of new offences related to financing, supporting, training and travelling to join with terrorist groups. This would mean that CSIS could or had to mobilise the RCMP much earlier, when a "pre-terrorist" offence was taking place. Further, after a successful experiment with organised crime investigations, new collaborative task forces, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETS), were formed in high-population areas of Canada in order to conduct joint terrorism investigations with RCMP, CSIS and relevant provincial and municipal police forces. In the post-9/11 panic, the INSETS started on the wrong track with the communication to the US FBI of unfounded suspicions about Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who would then suffer extraordinary rendition to his native Syria in 2002. After his ordeal Arar sued the Canadian government and obtained a 10.5 million CAD settlement. In a subsequent inquiry commission (Canada, 2006), it was revealed that CSIS agents had travelled to Syria to take advantage of the torture conditions of the detainee in order to conduct their own interrogations.

But in June 2006 the INSETS approach was credited with the arrest of the Toronto 18, who had been under joint surveillance and investigation for months. Following the arrest of Internet jihadist Younes Tsouli in mid-October 2005 in London, some of his affiliates in Toronto had come under the attention of CSIS, who dispatched an infiltration agent in late November (Speckhard and Shaik, 2014). Contrary to old custom, however, CSIS had already notified RCMP who, also contrary to custom, had accepted to contribute to the ongoing investigation instead of taking it over. As it turns out, infiltration was very easy: on the first meeting the targets started talking jihad right away with the infiltrator (Speckhard and Shaik, 2014). The investigation also included intercepting communications and Wi-Fi signals but most of the evidence would come from the infiltrated agents.

This is definitely the era of communication technologies. It should be noted, however, that though the Internet and new technologies as a whole are continually designated as a boon for terrorists and other criminals and a new hurdle for police, recent experience in Canada shows the opposite, with almost every investigation starting with communications, links or interactions on the web. At this point the web is in fact the Achilles' heel of terrorists. Easy to use, insecure, popular applications and devices continue to be routinely used, instead of the chimeras that are the "dark web," encryption or the truly absurd notion that terrorists might communicate by firing weapons to write messages on walls in PlayStation games.

Yet in the post-9/11-era Canada, like many of its allies, has invested heavily in high-tech SIGINT interception and metadata analysis. The CSE, under much scrutiny since the Snowden revelations about the workings of the Five Eyes partnership, has seen its budget multiplied, but with few results. The driving concept, in contradiction with every successful investigation above – which shows that good policing begins with a target – continues to be that terrorists are hay shafts in haystacks that have to be thoroughly searched and monitored.

Conclusion

The current buzzword in terrorism and counterterrorism in Canada, as elsewhere, is "radicalisation." Radicalisation is treated as an actual, measured object and oftentimes as a *cause* of violence, which is tautological at best. The Observatoire sur la radicalisation et l'extrémisme violent, which I co-direct, is gathering a database of 100 Canadian jihadis who are remarkably similar, in their involvement with violence, to the members of the extreme right studied by TCRG. One thing we fail to observe in both populations, however, is a thing which might correspond to "radicalisation." Many join first, some for thrills, and learn the politics later. Yet radicalisation continues to be held out as the key to what is presented as the enigma of political violence in an otherwise peaceful polity. The stories above show that there is no enigma. There are unfathomable contingencies, but for the most part the politically violent are products of their social environment and their rationales, strategies, successes and failures vary with the flow of history. They are not military masterminds and experts in asymmetric warfare. They are not criminal geniuses, far from that. They are mostly young men navigating the contingencies of a rapidly changing, globalised world with few certainties and fewer universal moral standards. They may seem to have radical solutions to the problems they perceive but those solutions are not fundamentally out of step with the permanent war that Western countries have engaged in for decades.

Policing the problem of political violence, then, should be about more than finding and watching terrorists plot an attack or arresting, at the airport terminal, a few youths who have decided to take part in a foreign conflict. We need to go upstream to a point well before policing, with prevention that addresses social, economic and demographic problems related to the inclusion of ethnic, religious and other minorities into the political process – a process that must of course be organised in a way that projects an image of fairness and honesty. We need to stop presenting local violence problems caused by cultural, economic and political problems as attacks from the outside best solved with missiles. We need to stop glorifying violent criminal outfits like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State by grossly overstating their dangerousness and power. But more importantly, we need to equip schoolchildren with the mental tools necessary to grasp the complexities of the world they live in and to be critical when faced with ready-to-think, simplistic, Manichean and violent worldviews.

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CHINA
People's war on terror

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China's main terrorist threat is closely associated with the Uyghur issue. Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs populate the north-western region of China, known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Xinjiang came under the Chinese control by the 18th century and in 1949 was integrated into the People's Republic of China (PRC). The newly founded Chinese state attempted to assimilate ethnic minorities in order to ensure its territorial integrity. The Uyghurs, however, perceived the Han presence as an invasion, and the Xinjiang population has persistently challenged the legitimacy of China's Communist Party (CCP). Since the 1940s the region has been a stage to numerous protests, rebellions, and uprisings. Some of these events have been peaceful, while others turned violent. Furthermore, over the years Uyghur separatists have resorted to the tactic of terrorism, which has manifested itself in an increased number of terrorist attacks in the past decade.

The government's main responses to instability in Xinjiang have focused on repression backed by the presence of security forces (Odgaard and Nielsen, 2014). Beijing makes little distinction between Uyghur separatism and terrorism, treating the entire ethnic movement as a terrorist threat. The Chinese government has alienated much of the Uyghur population by ignoring regional separatist grievances and persecuting Uyghur oppositional leaders. For instance, the government has called Rebiya Kadeer, an exiled Uyghur separatist and head of the World Uyghur Congress, "an ironclad separatist colluding with terrorists and Islamic extremists" (Ford, 2009). The oppositional World Uyghur Congress itself was labelled a terrorist group on China's 2003 list of terrorist entities (China Daily, 2003b). In 2014 Ilham Tohti, a prominent Uyghur scholar critical of China's Xinjiang policies, was sentenced to life in prison on terrorism-related charges, as he was found to have "encouraged his fellow Uighurs to use violence" (*Economist*, 2014).

A combination of military crackdowns, security raids, and arrests of oppositional leaders stepped up in China's strike hard campaign and the global war on terror produced temporary results: the relative quiet of the 2000s made it seem that Beijing had secured victory over restive Xinjiang. However, as China set out to prepare for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it became apparent that Uyghur terrorism was not defeated. Moreover, the threat transformed and became more radical and more dangerous: the number of terrorist attacks has been progressively on the rise, terrorism today is no longer confined to Xinjiang but has spread to other regions of China, and terrorist acts today are more indiscriminate and involve higher numbers of civilian victims

than when they first started in the 1990s. Thus, terrorist attacks attributed to Uyghur separatists in the almost ten years between 1995 and 2008 claimed 160 lives (START, 2015). In comparison, the same number of people died in just several attacks in 2014: the Urumqi railway attack claimed 79 lives, the Urumqi market bombing 31, and the Luntai attack 50 (Julienne, Rudolf and Buckow, 2015).

China's counterterrorist approach has failed to reduce the threat of terrorism. Furthermore, Beijing's controversial policies have marginalized Uyghur separatists, and factions of Uyghur militants have firmly embraced terrorism. This chapter traces the evolution of the Uyghur issue and China's response to it. It proceeds by examining the emergence of the terrorist threat in relation to Uyghur separatism. The chapter concludes with the analysis of China's counterterrorist policies.

Ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and China's response

In 1949 Xinjiang became an integral part of the newly founded Chinese state (Bovingdon, 2010). Since then, Beijing has officially advanced Uyghur self-determination rights. Numerous legal documents have outlined a large degree of autonomy for Xinjiang, and have guaranteed protections for ethnic rights and freedoms. In 1955 Xinjiang received a status of an autonomous region of China. In 1984 China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law further consolidated the right of ethnic minorities to administer their local affairs. However, in reality Xinjiang's autonomy has been closely monitored from Beijing. To ensure complete integration of the region into the PRC, the government has adopted a combination of social and economic policies targeted at ethnic assimilation and co-optation of the Uyghurs.

To reduce the threat of separatism, Beijing has advanced an agenda of assimilating the Uyghur population. The state has actively encouraged and supported Han migration into the region, which has over time turned the Uyghurs into a minority in their land (Clarke, 2008). Thus, according to the 1964 census, Xinjiang's population was 54 percent Uyghur and 33 percent Han (Toops, 2004, p. 246). Today, the Uyghur population accounts for only about 45 percent, compared to 40 percent of Han Chinese (BBC News, 2014). To further marginalize ethnic concerns, Beijing criminalized secessionism in the 1982 Constitution. The Uyghurs lost their ability to organize around the ethnic issue through the 1989 Law on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations.

As part of the assimilation efforts Beijing has imposed numerous restrictions on Islamic religious practices. According to the PRC Constitution and the White Paper on the Freedom of Religious Belief, Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of religion. However, the state has significantly interfered with religious practice. During China's Cultural Revolution Xinjiang saw the destruction of mosques and persecution of Islamic clergy. In response to the rising ethnic protests in 1996, Beijing issued secret Document 7 that further legitimized the Party control over religious activities. Since then the government has conducted a campaign against religious extremists that included a publication of the 2004 Regulations on Religious Affairs – a document that provided legal framework for the state control over religion. The Regulations have empowered the Chinese authorities "to detain and arrest religious believers, close religious sites, and impose restrictions on the movements, contacts, visits, and correspondence of religious personnel" (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

In addition to assimilation efforts, Beijing has tried to co-opt ethnic minorities through economic development. In Xinjiang the Chinese government has launched numerous economic programs that allowed Beijing to proudly declare that its efforts brought "an era of rapid economic and social progress [to Xinjiang] and enhanced comprehensive strength, with the local

residents enjoying the most tangible benefits" (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2009). In reality, however, many of the economic incentives and development projects have benefited Han migrants rather than local Uyghurs. As one Uyghur representative put it, the Hans "occupy the most important jobs and vacancies, and local Uyghurs cannot find jobs even if they have achieved a high level of education" (Radio Free Asia, 2014a). This way, state-supported economic initiatives have further deepened the divide between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang.

State suppression of ethnic grievances, curbs on Islamic practices, and the lack of economic opportunities have significantly marginalized the Uyghurs in their own land. As a result, contrary to Beijing's declarations, the integration of Xinjiang into the PRC has not always been peaceful (Mackerras, 2001; Millward, 2007; Wayne, 2008). The history of modern Uyghur resistance to Han domination goes back to the Chinese Civil War, when Uyghur nationalism manifested itself in the proclamations of the First and Second East Turkistan Republics. Since then, ethnic protests and riots have persistently challenged China's advance in the region. In 1990 a significant largescale uprising against the government's policies in Xinjiang engulfed the Baren Township (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 123). After the turbulent 1990s, the 2000s saw a relative respite in ethnic unrest. In 2009, however, an incident at a toy factory in Urumqi sparked a contemporary wave of violence. In 2013 ethnic bloodshed swept through Kashgar, Lukqun and Hotan. Despite Beijing's pacification efforts, ethnic violence has only escalated.

China's primary response to ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang has been hard-line suppression. Since the 1940s the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been deployed in the region against ethnic riots (Dillon, 2004). The police have also been involved in armed responses. For instance, in May 2014 police in Aksu prefecture opened fire at women protesting against restrictions on Islamic dress (Radio Free Asia, 2014b). The government has justified such responses as necessary against the "three evil forces – violent terrorists, religious extremists and 'splittists'" (Pan, 2002 a). Furthermore, since September 11 Beijing has argued it is fighting terrorism in Xinjiang, effectively blurring distinctions between ethnic separatism and terrorism. The government proceeded to retroactively portray earlier ethnic uprisings such as the 1990, 1996, and 1997 riots as acts of terrorism (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2001).

While many ethnic protests in Xinjiang indeed break out in violence, such violence is distinct from terrorism. In fact, Uyghur terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon that started in February 1991, when the first bombing was registered in Xinjiang. As the government clamped down on Uyghur activists after the Baren protests, Uyghur separatists turned underground and introduced terrorism as a tactic. Before September 11, the Chinese government acknowledged the ethnic roots of such violence. After September 11, Beijing's strategy changed as it started treating Uyghur separatism as equivalent to terrorism: major ethnic uprisings today are reported as terrorist attacks, and the military response to ethnic riots is justified as part of the war on terror. Yet such anti-separatist policies combined with Beijing's counterterrorism have not secured victory over Uyghur militancy. Instead, factions of Uyghur separatists have become more violent, and Uyghur terrorism has only become more dangerous.

Uyghur terrorism

Terrorism in Xinjiang emerged in close association with ethnic separatism. Terrorist attacks first started in 1991 and mainly targeted government installations and members of security services. Historically, waves of terrorist attacks have generally coincided with waves of ethnic protests in Xinjiang (Pokalova, 2013). In recent years, however, patterns in Uyghur terrorism have started shifting. In response to China's war on terror, Uyghur militants have become more

indiscriminate, and terrorist attacks have spread from Xinjiang to other parts of China. Uyghur groups have developed partnerships with foreign organizations, and today China's threat of terrorism is no longer confined to Xinjiang.

Much confusion surrounds Uyghur terrorism. The most widely known Uyghur organization implicated in terrorism is the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), designated in 2003 as a terrorist organization by the Chinese authorities. In the climate of controlled political opposition, this designation remains largely undisputed. However, due to the lack of information on the group produced by sources other than the Chinese government, the details about the group remain vague. Many terrorist attacks recorded by the Chinese government remain unclaimed, and often attacks attributed to the ETIM are disputed.

Uyghur militants, in turn, avoid the ETIM label: it seems the group the government calls the ETIM uses the name Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). As group leader Abdul Haq Turkistani explained:

> Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) is a group established as a continuation of the East Turkistan Jihad Movement (ETJM) in the year of 1989 under the unique leadership of Ziyauddin Yusuf. In the year 1997, it appeared outside Eastern Turkistan under the leadership of Hahsan Mahsum and was re-organised in a more disciplined way. In 2000, following a decision by the council delegation, the name Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) was changed into Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and it is currently continuing its activities under that name.
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> *(Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2014)*

This way, the TIP traces its roots to the anti-Chinese resistance movement that goes back to the 1940s (Reed and Raschke, 2010).

Little is known about the TIP under the leadership of Hasan Mahsum, who consolidated militant Uyghur groups into a more coherent organizational structure. Mahsum defended his violent methods against the Chinese state as self-defence. "Any rational human being has the duty to fight against invaders to protect his homeland," he explained (Eckholm, 2002). According to Mahsum, he was defending Uyghur ethno-nationalist separatist aspirations that had little to do with global jihadi networks. In a rare media interview Mahsum denied organizational links with either the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. "Involvement by some Uyghur individuals with the Taliban doesn't mean that the East Turkestan Islamic Party has relations with the Taliban," Mahsum stated (Radio Free Asia, 2002). "The East Turkestan Islamic Party hasn't received any financial assistance from Osama Bin Laden or his Al-Qaeda organization. We don't have any kind of organizational links with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban," he added.

The tightening security environment that followed the 1990 Baren uprising and subsequent riots highly restricted the functioning of the TIP in Xinjiang. As a result, the group was forced to explore operational bases outside China, primarily in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan (Potter, 2013; Reed and Raschke, 2010). After September 11, as China embarked on the war on terror, the presence of security forces and their frequent sweep operations further pushed Uyghur militants outside China. At the same time, as Operation Enduring Freedom proceeded in Afghanistan, Mahsum was forced to relocate his bases to Pakistan. Few TIP activities were registered in the 2000s and Hasan Mahsum himself was killed in 2003 at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (China Daily, 2003a).

Even though Mahsum operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, little evidence exists to suggest that an Uyghur–Al-Qaeda alliance formed under his leadership. The situation started changing as Abdul Haq Turkistani (Memetiming Memeti) assumed the TIP leadership. As Al-Qaeda

members fled to Pakistan from Afghanistan, their interactions with TIP members increased. Abdul Haq became an influential figure among the Al-Qaeda ranks as he served as a mediator between the Al-Qaeda and Taliban groups in Pakistan (Roggio, 2010). In 2005 he was allegedly appointed a member of Al-Qaeda's Shura Council (Gunaratna, Acharya, and Pengxin, 2010). Such connections suggested that Abdul Haq's TIP started relying on Al-Qaeda to remain viable outside China.

At the same time, Abdul Haq's terrorist activities remained focused on China. He raised funds to grow capabilities to strike against Chinese targets both inside China and abroad (US Department of Treasury, 2009). In 2005 he issued a video urging "all the Xinjiang Muslims" to wage jihad against China (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008b). In 2008 Abdul Haq made the TIP known to the rest of the world as he used the Beijing Olympics as an opportunity to draw international attention to the Uyghur issue. He appeared in a video issuing a warning stating that his forces were prepared to "give the Chinese government the deadliest strike by the simplest means" in order to "turn the year 2008 into China's year of condolence" (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008b). Abdul Haq's promise was not just a threat: terrorist attacks in China spiked in 2008.

Preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games were disrupted by a string of bus bombings in Yunnan and Shanghai. The TIP claimed responsibility for these attacks. In a video called "Our Blessed Jihad in Yunnan" a TIP Commander called Seyfullah issued a warning to China and urged the rest of the world to boycott the Olympics. Seyfullah announced:

> Our aim is to target the most critical points related to the Olympics. We will try to attack Chinese central cities severely using the tactics that have never been employed. We warn China and the international community for the last time that those spectators, athletes, particularly the Muslims, who are planning to attend the Olympics, please change your intention from going to China. Please do not stand together with the faithless people. The Turkistan Islamic Party volunteers will conduct violent military actions against individuals, departments, venues, and activities that are related to the Olympics in China.
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> *(CBS News, 2008)*

The warning materialized in a number of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in August 2008. Around the same time, security services in Dubai disrupted a terrorist plot targeting a shopping mall selling Chinese goods (Pantucci, 2010). In this plot, two ethnic Uyghurs attempted to "draw the world's attention towards the Turkestani Muslims' cause in China" (Hassan, 2010). This way, the threat of Uyghur terrorism extended beyond Chinese borders.

Despite additional security measures introduced around the Olympics, relations between militant Uyghurs and Al-Qaeda continued to grow stronger. In 2009 Al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi issued a statement on behalf of the Uyghurs. He blamed the Chinese forces for massacring Uyghurs and urged Muslims to defend themselves against China, promising that the "state of atheism [was] heading to its fall" (Wong, 2010). Since then, ethnic Uyghurs have been implicated in Al-Qaeda related plots. For instance, in July 2010 several Uyghurs were arrested in Norway and Germany on charges of plotting an Al-Qaeda-orchestrated bombing (Wong, 2010). The growing association between the TIP and Al-Qaeda was also demonstrated by the appointment in 2011 of the new TIP leader Abdul Shakoor Turkistani as an Al-Qaeda chief of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan (Right Vision News, 2013). Abdul Shakoor replaced Abdul Haq Turkistani, who was allegedly killed in a drone attack in Pakistan in 2010.

Under the leadership of Abdul Shakoor Turkistani the TIP became particularly active and the number of terrorist attacks started increasing once again. Justifying violence, Abdul Shakoor explained: "My brothers, without fighting the Chinese and with only talking they will not leave our land. The land they took over by using guns can only be taken back with guns" (Zenn, 2011). Abdul Shakoor Turkistani was reportedly killed in Pakistan in 2012, but terrorism did not subside after his death. On the contrary, 2013 saw one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks claimed by the TIP (Kaiman, 2013). This time a vehicle crashed into a bridge at China's symbolic Tiananmen Square, killing at least five people and injuring many more. As the new TIP leader Abdullah Mansour explained, the Uyghur militant wing was not ready to surrender. "China is not only our enemy, but it is the enemy of all Muslims … We have plans for many attacks in China," he stated (Mehsud and Golovnina, 2014). Terrorist attacks in 2014 and 2015 continued with increased frequency.

Despite the changes in terrorist tactics and the growing connections between the TIP and Al-Qaeda, the TIP rhetoric has retained much of its ethno-nationalist separatist agenda against the Chinese state. Most TIP videos and statements justify terrorist attacks as a method against Han domination in Xinjiang. Even though the TIP has adopted some of Al-Qaeda language on jihad, the group's messaging is not explicit on the role of the global Caliphate advanced by Al-Qaeda, or targeting states other than China. Even after the Uyghur leadership reportedly became involved in the Al-Qaeda command, the TIP emphasized the liberation of Xinjiang as its primary goal. In 2011 the TIP video entitled a "Letter to the Chinese People" once again laid out claims for Xinjiang independence, citing such long-standing Uyghur grievances as state-supported Han migration, China's anti-Uyghur family planning policies, and economic exploitation of the region (Pantucci, 2011). Thus, even though TIP terrorist attacks have become more frequent and more widespread, they seem to still have the same objective behind them – Uyghur political independence from China.

At the same time, the TIP today presents a much bigger and more radicalized threat to the Chinese state than at the time of its founding. Through interactions with other underground organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan the TIP formed strategic partnerships that have allowed it to remain viable outside China. The Chinese authorities, however, have less access to the group's network outside its borders and have to rely on international partners in counter-terrorist efforts. China's counterterrorism, which has focused on suppressing ethnic grievances and pushing Uyghur militants out of Xinjiang, has failed to eradicate the terrorist threat but has instead forced the TIP to transform and adapt to changing environments. The next section turns to the analysis of China's counterterrorist policies.

China's counterterrorism

China's counterterrorist approach was greatly influenced by September 11. Before September 11, Beijing made few attempts to describe violence in restive Xinjiang as terrorism. The separatist nature of violence was acknowledged by Xinjiang leadership. Uyghur violence was commonly referred to as "criminal activities," and Xinjiang party leader Wang Lequan called Uyghurs as "ethnic separatists in Xinjiang" who were "vicious thugs" (Manthorpe, 1997). Violence in Xinjiang was perceived as an outcome of Uyghur separatism, and few had heard about the ETIM before September 11.

After September 11, however, the Chinese government announced that it was facing an onslaught from international terrorist elements supported by global Islamist jihadist forces in Xinjiang. In just over a month after September 11 the Chinese government issued a report in which it connected over 40 "Eastern Turkistan" organizations to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban

(Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2001). The report established the ETIM as "a major component of the terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden," thus tying it to the perpetrators of September 11.

Having linked the Uyghur issue with global terrorism, the Chinese authorities proceeded to address the separatist struggle in Xinjiang through the war on terror paradigm. As Rebiya Kadeer explained, the Uyghur Islamic identity has facilitated China's rhetoric connecting Uyghur separatism to global jihadism (US Congress, 2009). As the World Uyghur Congress (2011) reported, in the eyes of the Uyghurs, the attacks of September 11 "gave China a reason to justify getting tough on the ethnic minority." Alleged Uyghur–Al-Qaeda connections have legitimized China's hardline responses and Beijing has been able to relegate Uyghur ethnic grievances as a secondary matter.

As an immediate response to September 11, the Chinese authorities launched a strike hard, high-pressure campaign. In Xinjiang the campaign manifested itself in a series of crackdowns, accompanied by increased political repression. To assist the PLA in carrying out enhanced security operations, in 2002 the Chinese government established a classified branch of the People's Armed Police (PAP) – Snow Wolf Commando Unit, later renamed Snow Leopard Commando Unit. This group, along with the Falcon Commando Unit, has emerged as China's elite counterterrorist forces. Waves of arrests, arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trials, and other abuses followed (Amnesty International, 2002). Such measures put much pressure on militant Uyghurs pushing them to flee China for safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, China's war on terror approach further alienated the Uyghur population. As one local observed, "Since September 11, the situation has gotten worse … The police are everywhere, and they pay Uighurs to spy in every neighbourhood and every mosque … Sometimes, people just disappear" (Pan, 2002a).

While increasing domestic pressure in Xinjiang, China attempted to legitimize its hardline approach internationally as part of the global war on terror. According to Chinese sources, Uyghur terrorists presented an international threat as they reportedly had already "fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Uzbekistan" (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2001). China expressed strong support for international cooperation against terrorism in its 2002 White Paper on National Defence, and the newly established Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) became China's primary venue for coordinating international efforts against the threats of terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism (Cheng, 2015).

China's attempts to portray the Uyghur issue as a matter of international terrorism proved to be rather successful. In 2002 the ETIM was added to the UN list of Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. The same year the US designated the ETIM a terrorist organization under the US Executive Order 13224. Despite the vague nature of the Uyghur threat to the US interests, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage justified the designation, explaining that the ETIM "committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was hurt" (Pan, 2002b). The designation was supported by the fact that the US captured 22 Uyghurs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and detained them at Guantanamo Bay. However, due to the lack of evidence connecting these individuals to either Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, all 22 have been since released.

China's post–September 11 counterterrorist efforts seemed to have produced desired results. Levels of violence in Xinjiang in the early 2000s decreased significantly compared to the previous decade. However, the Chinese government only achieved tactical superiority in the short term. In the long term, Xinjiang crackdowns contributed to further radicalization of Uyghur terrorists. In 2008, as Beijing embarked on preparations for the Olympic Games, terrorist attacks

returned with increased frequency. Despite heightened security measures, terrorist acts spread from Xinjiang to other parts of the country and became more indiscriminate.

In preparations for the Olympics, Beijing assembled a counterterrorist force comprised of almost "100,000 commandos, police and army troops" (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008a). The forces trained in a series of "Great Wall" counterterrorist drills at the national level. Dozens of sweep operations targeted alleged ETIM hideouts. As a result of these, the authorities claimed a 12.6 percent drop in crime rates in Urumqi alone (Chan, 2008). To clamp down on religious extremism, in February 2008 the government adopted a document entitled "Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities." Subsequently, raids followed on alleged "illegal religious schools" and "jihad training centers" (Chan, 2008).

Nevertheless, such measures failed to prevent terrorist attacks in China in 2008. Furthermore, restrictions in Xinjiang did not stop the rise of ethnic riots in Urumqi in 2009. According to Beijing, the riots were "organized by the three forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism at home and abroad" (Coonan, 2009). Remaining true to its war on terror stance, the government has continued to overlook the ethnic grievances feeding into outbreaks of violence in Xinjiang, and has focused on terrorism instead. Following the Tiananmen Square terrorist attacks of 2013 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying named the ETIM "China's most direct and realistic security threat" (US Official News, 2015).

As the Chinese government failed to secure victory over Uyghur terrorism, it embarked on the deliberation of new comprehensive counterterrorist legislation. To date, the Criminal Law of the PRC remains China's primary legal tool in dealing with terrorism. A number of amendments were introduced to the Criminal Law pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, but no single counterterrorist law has come into effect in China. Facing a growing terrorist threat, in October 2011 China's National People's Congress (NPC) passed a Decision on Issues Related to Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Work. Further legislative work led to the NPC unveiling the first draft of a new counterterrorist law in November 2014.

The 2014 draft immediately sparked controversy. Fearing the law would legitimize the ongoing crackdowns and human rights violations, the Human Rights Watch (2015) called the draft "a recipe for abuses." The US administration expressed concerns over digital surveillance provisions outlined in the draft. President Obama cautioned that the law would require foreign companies working in China "to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all users of their services" (Denyer, 2015). Taking some of these concerns into consideration the NPC revised some of the draft's provisions, including the definition of terrorism, but the third hearing and the vote on the bill have been put on hold. Instead, on July 1, 2015 China passed a sweeping National Security Law, and on July 6 unveiled a draft of a Cybersecurity Law.

Conclusion

China's "people's war on terror" has relied on draconian measures against both Uyghur separatists and terrorists. Arming itself with new legislative justifications, the Chinese government has proceeded to carry out crackdowns against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. In this fight, forced assimilation attempts, discriminatory economic programs, and religious suppression have continued to alienate the Uyghurs. China's counterterrorist measures in turn have facilitated the radicalization of Uyghur terrorist factions. Terrorist attacks have persisted unabated. Prior to the war on terror the vast majority of terrorist acts in China were confined to the territory of Xinjiang. Since China's start of the strike hard, high-pressure campaign, terrorist attacks have spread to other parts of China, reaching its very Tiananmen Square. Attacks have become more

indiscriminate, causing large numbers of civilian casualties. Suicide bombings have become common.

Through indiscriminate anti-separatist and counterterrorist responses China forced many of Xinjiang militants to relocate to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such pressure, however, failed to eradicate the terrorist threat. Instead, it compelled the Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party to seek partnerships abroad. This way, in the 2000s the TIP grew closer to Al-Qaeda. And even though the TIP has remained true to its anti-China aspirations, this partnership has radicalized the group as it has assimilated some of Al-Qaeda rhetoric and operational expertise.

Today, the danger of further radicalization of Uyghur militants persists, as a Turkistani Battalion has surfaced in Syria. In July 2014 the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, listed China among other countries infringing on the rights of Muslims (Olesen, 2014). Today, according to Beijing's estimates, around 300 ETIM "extremists" are fighting alongside the Islamic State (US Official News, 2015). This trend indicates the danger of the TIP firmly partnering with the Islamic State, repeating how it partnered with Al-Qaeda in the 2000s. Just as Al-Qaeda's influence radicalized the TIP a decade ago, its partnership with the Islamic State would make the threat of terrorism for China ever more dangerous.

Note

1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

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46
FRANCE

Frank Foley

For a decade and a half between 1997 and 2012, as America was hit by 9/11 and Britain and Spain suffered major bombings, France avoided any jihadist attacks on its soil and developed a reputation as Europe's 'counterterrorist powerhouse' (Gerecht and Schmitt 2007). British, U.S. and other government delegations visited Paris in the years after 2001 to learn from how the French were combating jihadist networks. They found that France's intelligence capability and knowledge of terrorist networks were extensive and its police forces were robust in their counterterrorist operations, while hundreds of suspects were being imprisoned under the country's anti-terrorism legislation. Scholars such as Robert Leiken (2012, 111–13, 266, 294) also claimed that the French state's strict approach to integrating minorities had reduced its radicalisation problem to a minimum. All in all, France's uncompromising response seemed to offer a model of successful counterterrorism.

Since 2012, however, France's strong reputation has taken a number of knocks. From a situation where no terrorist attacks were taking place, France suffered four significant jihadist assaults in less than four years. This reversal of fortune was not due to any major change in the state's approach to counterterrorism. Rather, the key perceived strengths of the French response – its legal framework, intelligence work and operational response to terrorism – also presented some potential or actual weaknesses, which some analysts had long pointed out, but which only became more apparent after 2012.

This chapter analyses the main elements of the French case in four steps.[1] It begins with a brief overview of the evolution of terrorism and counterterrorism in France in recent decades. Among European countries, France is one of the states with the most extensive experience of terrorism. Yet it has not been the target of a long-term campaign of frequent, fully realised terrorist attacks on home soil, such as those experienced by Britain (with the IRA) and Spain (with ETA). Instead, France has sustained infrequent but intense waves of terrorist attacks, notably in 1986, 1995 and 2015.

The second section examines France's legal framework for terrorism cases and its approach to investigating political violence. French officials believe that it was a mistake on the part of the United States to set up extraordinary procedures and military trials for terrorism suspects after 9/11 (Foley 2013a, 208). Their preference is to bring terrorists to justice in civilian courts, yet their judicial procedures, terrorism offences and non-jury trials still enable them to make a flexible and draconian legal response to terrorism.

The French legal response goes hand in hand with its counterterrorist operations, which are examined in the third section of the chapter. France has made an active military response to terrorism abroad, while its operations at home against suspected terrorists and 'radicals' have been wide-ranging and have long kept jihadist networks under considerable pressure. Yet if France has been successful in disrupting terrorist networks and securing countless terrorism-related convictions, some analysts have asked if the hard-hitting nature of its legal and operational response to terrorism has also proved counterproductive in fuelling disaffection among Muslims against the French state and possibly contributing towards support for jihadist terrorism.

The fourth section of the chapter considers the organisation of French counterterrorism, with a particular focus on intelligence and law enforcement. France has succeeded in forging close links between intelligence agencies and judicial actors, which has considerable benefits for counterterrorism. Yet there have often been deficiencies in coordination between its police, intelligence and security agencies' responses to terrorism. This – along with problems in intelligence analysis – has contributed to France's failure to prevent terrorist attacks and has led the government to make organisational reforms of intelligence and counterterrorism. In sum, apart from providing a notable example of the challenges facing contemporary intelligence agencies, France is also an interesting test case for broader debates on whether a draconian response to terrorism is likely to be effective or counterproductive for reducing the threat.

Terrorist threats and state responses

In recent decades, France has been a target for a wide variety of terrorist organisations, from leftist militants to Corsican, Basque and Breton separatists and a number of groups stemming from North Africa and the Middle East. The French state has made a variety of diplomatic and repressive responses to these threats, with a particular emphasis on judicial, law enforcement and intelligence tools.

In 1979, the leftist *Action Directe* began attacking symbols of capitalism and government, killing around 13 people before intelligence and police operations brought them under control by 1987 (Cettina 2003, 71). France also responded to Corsican militancy with law enforcement tools, as well as negotiations with local leaders and a failed attempt to introduce greater regional autonomy in 2003. While these efforts helped to reduce terrorism in Corsica, there was an increase in the number of killings carried out by mafia-like organisations on the island (De la Calle 2015).

During the 1980s, several Middle Eastern groups mounted terrorist campaigns on French soil. Palestinian splinter groups unhappy with France's support for Yasser Arafat carried out a number of attacks on Jewish targets in the country in the early 1980s. In 1982, as part of a dispute between Syria and Iraq, Syrian security forces exploded a bomb in Paris outside the offices of a pro-Iraqi newspaper. Another Syrian-linked bombing, carried out by Armenian terrorists, killed eight people in Paris Orly airport in July 1983 (Cettina 2003, 73). France sought to prevent the spiralling of such campaigns by being as neutral as possible with regard to the political issues that motivated transnational terrorism. Applying what Shapiro and Suzan (2003, 69–70) have called the 'sanctuary doctrine', during the 1980s the authorities did not interfere with transnational terrorist groups on their soil that did not attack France or French interests directly. The government also sanctioned negotiations and deals behind the scenes with Armenian and Palestinian terrorist groups.

In 1986, a series of terrorist attacks across France caused 11 deaths and more than 220 injuries. Most of the attacks were carried out by the previously unknown 'Committee for Solidarity with Near Eastern Political Prisoners' and Hezbollah. This terrorism had an Islamist dimension,

therefore, but it had nothing to do with the Algerian- and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorism that would later threaten France in the 1990s. This seemed to be more a case of traditional state-sponsored terrorism. A defector told French officials that these terrorist attacks were sponsored by Iran, Syria and Libya, each of which had particular grievances against France at that time. According to a report in *Le Monde*, the government sent officials to Damascus in September 1986 to conclude a deal whereby Syria would cease support for terrorism in France and provide intelligence in return for French arms, economic aid and diplomatic support. A similar deal was apparently struck with the Iranian regime the following summer (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 74). Although the government denied that such deals took place, France did withdraw considerably from Lebanese affairs (pleasing to Syria) and scaled back its support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. As Michel Wieviorka has argued, this was 'a policy of diplomatic activities … guided by the will of terrorist states' (quoted in Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 74). After 1986, France remained largely free of transnational terrorist attacks on its home soil for the next eight years.

While France was prepared to negotiate with terrorists and their state sponsors, it also made an operational response to their attacks in the form of intelligence and police investigations at home and occasional military action abroad by its foreign intelligence service – the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* – which is a defence institution. The DGSE carried out a car bombing in Damascus in 1981, an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the Iranian Embassy in Beirut in 1983, and a failed raid on a terrorist camp in Lebanon in 1986 (Porch 1995). That same year, however, as France faced a wave of terrorist attacks at home, the government decided that 'sanctuary', diplomacy and ineffectual military operations could no longer be the main elements of its response to such threats. From 1986, France underwent significant reforms of its judicial response to terrorism, which had knock-on effects on the police and intelligence services (see below). The role of diplomacy receded and the judicial, police and intelligence arms of the state began to play the central role in the country's response to terrorism.

From the early 1990s, jihadist groups fought the Algerian regime and also posed a threat to France, making it the first Western country to experience this form of terrorism on home soil. In Algeria's bloody civil war, *Le Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) took the lead in fighting the military-backed government in power there. While the GIA's main focus was on Algeria, it also viewed France as 'the mother of all sinners' among Western powers because of its colonial exploitation of Algeria and support for the country's military regime (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 79; Harmon 2000). Al-Qaeda, who opposed France's support for the regimes not only in Algeria but also in Tunisia and Morocco, provided some funding and training for the GIA. In the period from July to October 1995, the GIA and its sympathisers carried out seven terrorist attacks in Paris and Lyons, killing 10 people and wounding over 150. Another attack, suspected of being linked to Algeria, was carried out in December 1996, killing 4 and injuring 80 people.

Over the next decade, a GIA splinter group, the *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédiction et le Combat* (GSPC) was the main Algerian-linked threat to France. Other, more transnational, forms of jihadist terrorism also posed a threat, motivated by the idea of a global jihad against Western powers. Chief among these was Al-Qaeda, which had an additional reason to focus on France after 9/11 when the French military was deployed to support the American-led invasion of Afghanistan. Jihadist militants killed 11 French engineers working for the Pakistani navy in May 2002 and bombed the French oil tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden in October of that year. Increasingly linked to Al-Qaeda, the GSPC formally pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and renamed itself Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007. Yet the majority of jihadist plots foiled by the French security services on home soil throughout this period were planned by lower-level individuals or small groupings, including numerous home-grown terrorists (Foley 2013a, 35–7).

The services' long record of foiling such plots began to unravel in March 2012 when the Al-Qaeda-inspired gunman, Mohamed Merah, mounted a series of attacks, shooting dead three off-duty French soldiers at different locations and killing three children and a rabbi at a Jewish school (Borredon and Cazi 2012). Grim though it was, this violence was only the prelude to a more significant wave of terrorism in 2015. On 7 January, two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, shot dead 12 people and injured 11 others at the Paris offices of the satirical magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*. Claiming to avenge satirical depictions of the Prophet Muhammed, one of the brothers had apparently trained with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, while both had been active in long-standing Al-Qaeda networks in France. The brothers had been in contact with Amedy Coulibaly, who followed up their attack by killing a policewoman and four people at a Jewish supermarket in the following two days. Though he had been a part of the same long-standing Al-Qaeda-linked networks as the Kouachi brothers, Coulibaly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) before carrying out his attacks (Meichtry *et al.*, 2015). Further attacks by jihadist-inspired individuals followed in subsequent months, notably a murder by beheading in June and an attempted gun attack on a French *Thalys* train in August.

On 13 November 2015, a series of suicide bombings and mass shootings were carried out at the Stade de France, at cafés and restaurants and at the Bataclan music venue in Paris, killing 130 people and injuring 368. At least eight men perpetrated the attacks, including several who had previously fought with ISIL in Syria. The group was allegedly coordinated by a Belgian national, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was killed by police five days later in a prolonged fire fight in a Paris apartment during which two other terrorist suspects were also killed (BBC 2015). ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement that criticised France's air strikes on its territory in Syria and Iraq, and what it called the 'war against Islam in France' (Fisher 2015). Though several countries faced a significant threat, by the end of 2015 France appeared to be a leading Western target for terrorist attacks by ISIL and its sympathisers.

As in 1986 and 1995, France was once again confronting a wave of terrorist attacks, though this time with a much larger death toll and, at the time of writing, the possibility that it could develop into an extended period of regular attacks. The following sections will show how France's approach to counterterrorism has been formed by decisions made following these waves of violence. Yet, more fundamentally, the state's response has been shaped by a consensus in French society concerning the importance of domestic security. Interpreting their history as one in which the security and stability of the country has repeatedly been threatened, the predominant view in France has long been that the security of the Republic supersedes other considerations, including the civil liberties of individuals (Foley 2013a, 56–64).

Legal framework and terrorism investigations

Whereas the police tend to direct law enforcement investigations into terrorism in common law jurisdictions, France's civil law, inquisitorial system gives prosecutors and investigating magistrates (*juges d'instructions*) the power to direct the French police's investigations into terrorism. Terrorist crimes were traditionally handled by local investigators in different cities throughout France, but following the wave of attacks in 1986, this system was reformed. In a context of major public outcry, the government's main response was to pass anti-terrorist legislation in September 1986, which centralised all investigations and judicial proceedings related to terrorism (Shapiro 2007, 138). The legislation created a section of public prosecutors and a section of investigating magistrates within the Trial Court of Paris, who specialised in and dealt only with terrorism cases. While French law enforcement agencies can work by themselves on surveillance, infiltration and the gathering of evidence, they usually need the authorisation of a prosecutor

or investigating magistrate in order to arrest a suspect. For many years, law enforcement relied in particular on investigating magistrates since they had the most extensive powers to authorise court-admissible intercepts such as telephone taps and the interception of emails.[2] In this context, French prosecutors tended to refer the vast majority of terrorism cases to investigating magistrates (Foley 2013a, 105).

When an investigating magistrate is given a case, it is their prerogative to decide which law enforcement agency will be tasked for the judicial investigation. The magistrate then directs the investigations of this agency and decides which suspects will be arrested. Tasked with carrying out an impartial 'search for the truth', investigating magistrates have a duty to look for both incriminating and exculpating evidence in respect of suspects. In practice, however, there has been a tension between this claim to neutrality and the close working relationships that investigating magistrates have enjoyed with prosecutors, police and intelligence agencies (Hodgson 2005). While investigating magistrates have statutory independence from government, during the 1990s and after 9/11, key magistrates voluntarily allied themselves with the state and its security agencies in the fight against terrorism. Though this raised questions for civil liberties (see below), it allowed the Paris-based group of specialised magistrates to become internationallyrenowned experts in the investigation of jihadist networks and contributed to increasing public confidence in France's ability to counter terrorism from the late 1990s.

As Shapiro and Suzan (2003) have argued, this led to a 'de-politicisation' of counterterrorism in France for about a decade at least. Whereas politicians tended to be associated with the appeasement of terrorism in the 1980s, the investigating magistrates gained public reputations as implacable and effective opponents of terrorism in the 1990s. As the BBC wrote about one of the more prominent anti-terrorist magistrates, Jean-Louis Bruguière, 'for the overwhelming majority of French people and politicians, Mr Bruguière is a hero' (Astier 2003). Taking ownership of the issue from politicians, investigating magistrates assumed a central position in France's response to terrorism.

In addition to centralising the investigation of terrorism, the 1986 legislation also mandated that all terrorism trials would take place in two divisions of the Trial Court of Paris. Those charged with terrorist offences punishable by a maximum of 10 or (since 2006) 15 years in prison are sent before the *Tribunal Correctionnel*. Terrorist offences that carry more than 15 years in prison are judged before a *Cour d'Assises*, which is dedicated to terrorism cases. Instead of a popular jury, a bench of three judges who are specialised in adjudicating on terrorism cases and a jury of nine other professional judges consider the evidence and decide on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This is derogation from ordinary French judicial procedure, since the *Cour d'Assises* normally tasks nine lay jurors with deciding the guilt or innocence of defendants. The decision to abolish popular juries in terrorism cases was taken against the background of some cases where the terrorist group, *Action Directe*, had threatened jurors (Foley 2013a, 193).

While French legislation contains a variety of terrorism offences, investigating magistrates and prosecutors have overwhelmingly relied on one which states that it is an offence to participate in an 'association' formed with a view to carrying out acts of terrorism. Although a pre-existing criminal 'association' law was used de facto in terrorism cases during the 1980s and early 1990s, the terrorism 'association' offence was formally created in legislation introduced by the government following the wave of GIA-linked terrorist attacks in 1995. In the following 10 years, 403 (out of a total of 592) terrorism-related convictions in France were secured using the 'association' law. It has been used so extensively because it is a broadly defined law, which offers considerable flexibility to the authorities. To be convicted of participation in a terrorist association, minor actions such as providing lodgings or giving one's passport to terrorists can suffice

without any further evidence showing that the suspect had knowledge of, or intended to assist, the terrorist activity concerned (Foley 2013a, 202–3).

For this and other terrorist offences, the investigating magistrate plays a key role from start to finish. The same magistrate can direct an investigation, charge the suspects and prepare a detailed case file for the public prosecutor, which is then presented before the trial court. In the trial proper, considerable weight is attached to the report of the investigating magistrate, who shares the same status – *magistrat* – as the trial judges who decide on the guilt or innocence of defendants. Unsurprisingly, the acquittal rate in terrorism trials is extremely low. Indeed, some experts have pointed to cases where they believed that the conclusions of anti-terrorist investigating magistrates were accepted uncritically by trial judges (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 85; Foley 2013a, 197). Given some anti-terrorist magistrates' close relationships with police and intelligence services, this has raised questions about the extent to which the French legal response to terrorism respects civil liberties and ensures an appropriate separation of executive and judicial power. However, French society has largely tended to support the state in making a draconian legal response to terrorism over and above any concerns about civil liberties.

Operational responses to terrorism and 'radicalism'

The wide degree of latitude afforded by French society to the state on counterterrorism issues has also allowed the police and intelligence agencies to launch sweeping operations against suspected terrorists and 'radicals'. When the jihadist terrorist threat emerged in the 1990s, France's security agencies with the approval of investigating magistrates arrested large numbers of people from Muslim communities on suspicion of links to terrorism. In November 1994, for example, 93 people were arrested in a single day. In June 1995, 131 people were rounded up in one day (Shapiro and Suzan 2003). A later operation against an Iranian group in June 2003 saw 164 people arrested in one day as part of a terrorism investigation. French security officials admitted to Foley (2013a, 294–6) that they often knew little about the people they were arresting in their largest operations during the 1990s. Several of these operations were indiscriminate with little basis in intelligence. Yet as the intelligence picture of the French security agencies improved from the late 1990s, their arrest operations became more selective and discriminating on the whole.

Following the unprecedented attacks of 13 November 2015, however, the French authorities demonstrated once again their ability to carry out mass arrests. The government declared a state of emergency, which allowed them to search houses without warrants and, crucially, impose house arrests. In the first week after the attacks, police conducted 793 raids and detained 90 suspects. A further 164 people were placed under house arrest (Groll 2015). By the end of the month, over 200 people had been detained and 330 were under house arrest.

France's security forces have a great deal of experience in responding to active terrorist crises. In December 1994, the GIA hijacked a flight from Algiers to Paris and killed three passengers, intending to later crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower or blow it up low over central Paris. However, an elite firearms unit of the French military tricked the hijackers into landing the plane at Marseilles airport before storming the plane, killing the four GIA operatives on board and rescuing the remaining passengers alive (Gregory 2003, 131). Another unit pursued Khaled Kelkal, a suspected perpetrator of some of the 1995 terrorist attacks, to hills near Lyon and killed him following an exchange of gunfire. In more recent years, elite units of the French police have engaged in stand-offs and have killed determined gunmen such as Mohamed Merah in 2012 and some of the perpetrators of the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in the Paris region.

Yet France's response has gone far beyond terrorist suspects to include a broader campaign against both violent and non-violent extremism. The government has deported many 'radical Islamists' (129 between 2001 and 2010 alone) to North African and Middle Eastern countries despite the risk in some cases that the deportees would be tortured. While some of these radicals were supporting or inciting violence, others were deported simply for expressing virulent anti-Western opinions or adhering to 'radical' forms of Islam (Human Rights Watch 2007). Indeed, France launched an explicit 'fight against radical Islam', in which the authorities conducted administrative checks and other disruptive raids on hundreds of businesses and premises. Though presented as a measure designed to disrupt the 'support base' of jihadist terrorism, the broad focus of the campaign – on 'radical Islam' – gives the authorities the flexibility to operate on a large scale in Muslim communities (Foley 2013a, 289).

Beyond the home front, France has also been active internationally in its counterterrorist operations and intelligence work. When the United States was attacked on 9/11, France's security agencies stood out among Western countries as leading experts on jihadist terrorism. With several years of experience investigating jihadist networks, the French services had developed intelligence on Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists of interest to France who had spread across the world, from the United States and Canada to the UK to Afghanistan (Foley 2013a, 285–8). France was a prominent member of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan from late 2001 and later led its own military intervention against jihadist militants in Mali in 2013–14. French intelligence, military and special forces also tracked and conducted operations against jihadist militants in several other North Africa and Sahelian countries in collaboration with local security forces (Marret 2010).

From 2011, in common with other Western European countries, France sought to monitor and intervene against the increasing number of its citizens going to Syria to fight for jihadist groups, notably ISIL, and was well aware that some of them could return to carry out attacks on French soil. France was a prominent contributor to the US-led coalition's air strikes on ISIL territory from September 2014. Following the terrorist attacks of November 2015, President Francois Hollande (2015) declared that France was 'at war … a war against jihadist terrorism'. France stepped up its air strikes on ISIL in Syria and Iraq, and used diplomatic means to try to persuade the US, UK, Russia and others to intensify their respective air campaigns against ISIL (Doherty 2015).

With its active operational stance, intelligence expertise and draconian legal framework, France has long held an international reputation as a forceful and sophisticated practitioner of counterterrorism. Still, even as it was being praised in many quarters, some analysts pointed to weaknesses in the French response, one of which concerned the organisation of security agencies and intelligence work.

The organisation of French counterterrorism

A wide range of agencies play important roles in France's intelligence and law enforcement response to terrorism. While deficiencies in their coordination and intelligence work have come under increasing public scrutiny with the terrorist attacks of 2012 and 2015, these difficulties have a long history. One of the earliest responses of the French government to such problems was to establish a unit in 1984 – the *Unité de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste* (UCLAT) – which was designed to facilitate regular exchanges and information sharing among the numerous intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in counterterrorism. While Shaun Gregory (2003), Kevin O'Brien (2005) and others have claimed that UCLAT plays a central role in France's response to terrorism, Foley (2013a, 92–100) shows that these authors have exaggerated the unit's importance. Rather than using this formal inter-agency forum,

France's security agencies have long relied on informal routines and interpersonal relationships when coordinating their responses to terrorism (Foley 2009). Though these informal links have worked well in some cases, they have also had a tendency to break down. During the wave of GIA-linked attacks on France in 1995, the government was concerned about the tensions between some of France's security agencies, noting their reluctance in some cases to share information across agency boundaries. President Jacques Chirac even made a public statement in which he criticised what he called the 'traditional quarrels of the chapel' and called for an effort to 'break down the frontiers and reinforce the cohesion of the ensemble' (Cettina 2001, 134).

Notwithstanding occasional political attention such as this, the agencies continued to have a mixed record in coordinating their counterterrorism work. On the plus side, France pioneered a form of judicial intelligence cooperation that became the envy of interior ministries in other liberal democracies. One of its principal domestic intelligence agencies, the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST), also had a competence to carry out law enforcement inquiries in the areas of national security and terrorism. From about 1998, investigating magistrates began to allocate almost all law enforcement investigations of jihadist terrorism to the DST. This direct link between the DST and magistrates enabled the introduction of sensitive intelligence material into terrorism trials in way that strengthened the French authorities' ability to successfully prosecute and imprison suspected jihadists (Shapiro and Suzan 2003; Foley 2013a).

However, this success caused problems elsewhere. In its alliance with certain investigating magistrates, the DST had usurped the traditional investigative role of the police in respect to an increasingly important type of terrorism. After 9/11, officers of the *Police Judiciaire*'s anti-terrorist division became increasingly frustrated at their effective exclusion from jihadist cases. As one officer put it, there was 'a type of "war," *entre guillemets*' between the police and the DST over the issue. Asked if the two services did terrorism investigations together, he said: "No, no, no … it is very separated'" (quoted in Foley 2013a, 125–6). The DST was reformed and renamed the *Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur* (DCRI) in 2008, but there was no indication of any improvement in its relationship with the *Police Judiciaire* on terrorism cases.

The lack of cooperation between the two agencies may have played a role in their inability to prevent the third and final gun attack of Mohamed Merah in March 2012. When he made his second attack on 15 March – killing two off-duty French soldiers – a full day passed without any contact between the DCRI and the *Police Judiciaire*'s anti-terrorist division. While contact was then established, it was not until the night of 17 March that the police shared a list of relevant IP addresses so that the DCRI could check them against their own files (including their file on Merah). Thirty-six hours passed without a breakthrough in identifying the suspect, enabling Merah to carry out his third and most deadly attack on the Jewish school. This atrocity changed the hitherto slow cooperation and cross-checking of information between the DCRI and the police, leading them to the IP address of Merah's mother, which made them focus on Merah himself as a suspect just hours after his third attack – too late, alas, to prevent it (Foley 2013b).

If weak inter-agency coordination was partly to blame for the failure to neutralise Merah, another key aspect of the case was the deficiencies in intelligence analysis that it revealed. Long before March 2012, Merah was on the radar on the intelligence services, which had identified his 'Islamist profile' and 'potential for radicalism' and had interviewed him about his trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Desprats and Leonnet 2012). Yet while the DCRI had a great deal of information about Merah and a number of opportunities to probe his suspicious behaviour further, it did not perform an accurate analysis of his trajectory and thus decided to halt its surveillance of him just months before he carried out his attacks. Echoing the views of many, *Le Monde* called it 'the incredible failure of the secret services' (Borredon and Cazi 2012).

While counterterrorism had been depoliticised during the late 1990s and much of the 2000s, it was firmly back in the French political arena by 2012 if not before. The creation of the DCRI in 2008 was strongly associated with the then President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the DCRI's failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of March 2012 also occurred during his period in power. However, elections and a change of government took place within three months of the attacks, meaning that the official inquiry into the episode was completed after Sarkozy's political opponents had assumed office. In this context, the government of President Francois Hollande made public an official interior ministry/police inspectorate report in late 2012, which made serious criticisms of the DCRI's handling of Merah. It was unusual for this type of report to be made public, since they are normally for internal use only within the French government, and it set the scene for further organisational change (Desprats and Leonnet 2012; Borredon 2012).

With the DCRI facing criticism from all sides, the government decided to reform and rename it the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure* (DGSI) – meaning that the agency was upgraded to a higher rank in the organisational hierarchy and placed directly under the authority of the Interior Minister. Created in May 2014, the DGSI also saw an increase in its budget and personnel, including a plan to recruit more intelligence analysts, linguists and IT specialists and strengthen its analytical capability (Borredon 2013; Le Parisien 2014). Yet these relatively modest organisational changes did not signal an end to the doubts surrounding France's domestic security agencies.

Following the terrorist attacks of January 2015, questions were raised once again about intelligence collection and analysis on the case since the agencies had long known about the perpetrators' extensive involvement in jihadist networks and had tracked them for some years before halting this surveillance in 2013–14 (Erlanger and Yardley 2015). After the attacks, the government announced a significant expansion in which 2,680 new posts would be created in the area of counterterrorism over the following three years, 1,100 of which would be in those units of the intelligence services dedicated to tracking terrorist networks (Parti Socialiste 2015). Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks, it emerged once again that some of the perpetrators had been known to the authorities. Government officials admitted that there had been intelligence failures both internally, among the French services, and externally, in the inadequate cross-border cooperation between security agencies in Europe that the case revealed (Gauthier-Villars 2015). President Hollande (2015) announced that 5,000 additional police posts would be created to 'fight … terrorism' and increase the 'general security' of France, along with a substantial increase in the numbers of magistrates dedicated to investigating terrorism. Yet it remained to be seen if the French government's decisions during 2015 to invest in counterterrorism would help to improve its now faltering ability to prevent jihadist attacks on home soil.

Conclusion

Mass arrests, hundreds of terrorist-related convictions, deportations and widespread raids against both violent and non-violent radicals led to a certain muting of public support for jihadist terrorism in France by the early 2000s. While prominent extremists such as Abu Hamza were being tolerated in neighbouring Britain, in France radicals were being driven underground, while many left France for neighbouring European countries as a result of the pressure put on them by the French authorities (Foley 2013a, 300–1). Over more than two decades, France's draconian legal and operational toolbox has had the direct effect of significantly disrupting terrorist networks and those who support the use of violence. Equally significant, however, is the broader potential impacts of these policies.

It is a complicated endeavour to assess whether France's legal and operational responses to terrorism have contributed to the alienation of some sections of its Arab and Muslim communities. We also need further research on whether counterterrorism figures significantly among the factors that fuel political protest and violence by Muslims in France. According to research by Koopmans *et al*. (2005, 168–73, 17–78), France's assertive republican philosophy of assimilation provides a 'harsh political context' that has driven French Muslims generally into subdued and 'defensive' forms of political protest. This is 'not a pacified' position, however, and French Muslims could under certain circumstances become more 'assertive', the authors argue. Future research should explore whether similar dynamics may be found among the tiny proportion of Muslims in France that support violence. If aggressive action by the state drove jihadist terrorism onto the defensive in France for many years, did it also have counterproductive effects by helping to fuel the radicalisation and violence that has risen to particular prominence since 2012?

Experts such as Jeremy Shapiro (2010, 280) and the International Crisis Group (2006, i–ii, 2, 21–2) have long argued that invasive counterterrorism measures and tough tactics by the general police in the *banlieues* fuel disaffection among Muslims against the French state and may contribute towards support for jihadist terrorism. Indeed, France's response to the terrorist attacks of 2012 and 2015 included sweeping counterterrorist operations and the conviction and imprisonment of many people who made comments sympathetic to the attacks, raising questions about freedom of speech (Chrisafis 2015). One cannot exclude the possibility that these and other counterterrorism measures, in combination with factors such as the rise of ISIL, contributed to higher levels of support for and radicalisation into jihadist terrorism in France. Whatever the precise combination of causes, it was in any case undeniable after 2012 that, similar to some other Western European countries, France faced an increasing problem of radicalisation (Ouest France, 2015). It was only a few years since scholars such as Robert Leiken (2012) had been prepared to claim that France's strict approach to integrating minorities had reduced its extremism problem to a minimum. Always a questionable assertion, the growth in radicalisation and jihadist violence in France from 2012 made this optimistic claim untenable.

As its previously strong reputation suffered a number of blows, France was now confronted with some key questions about the effectiveness of its response to terrorism. Much of the public debate concerned the problems in French intelligence analysis and in the coordination of security agencies. Yet, as just outlined, other more fundamental questions also loomed concerning the benefits and costs of France's legal and operational responses to terrorism. Further research on these aspects of the French case can provide an important contribution to broader debates on whether a draconian response is effective or counterproductive for reducing the threat of terrorism.

Notes

1 This chapter draws in part on research carried out for my book, *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past* (Cambridge University Press, 2013); I would like to thank Cambridge for their permission to draw on the book here.

2 A law passed in mid-2015, however, gave police and intelligence agencies new powers to carry out intercepts without needing the authorisation of a magistrate.

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47
GREAT BRITAIN
Terrorism and counter-terrorism since 1968

Steve Hewitt

Since 1968 and the start of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, terrorism and counter-terrorism have grown in significance and importance within the domestic sphere of Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales). A threat that was a secondary concern in 1968 compared to the dominant menace of the Cold War has become in the present the major preoccupation of the British domestic security state. Understanding why this change has occurred and in what form involves four key groups of actors: the terrorists, the counter-terrorists, the politicians, and the courts. The first on this list represent proactivity, whereas the remainder tend to react to acts of terrorism of varying seriousness with the courts, in turn, being doubly reactive in that they react against the reaction of politicians and security forces to the actions of the terrorists. A key development across the time span to be covered is that, particularly since 9/11, the British security state has tried to shift from solely being reactive to becoming increasingly proactive although, arguably, that is still in reaction to a changing terrorism template.

The significance of this piece, besides its relation to an important safety and security question that has dominated public discourse on and off for decades across the Western world, is that it examines several key themes evident in the nearly 50 years of this modern security environment. More clearly, it chronicles the rise of terrorism and the transformation of the British domestic security landscape dominated by the Cold War to an era centred on counter-terrorism. The British example is also a model of counter-terrorism that, although security based, has broadened its approach to terrorism in a controversial effort to prevent it from happening in the first place. Although this approach is perceived as a break with past counter-terrorism practice, it is not so different in spirit from more traditional security work, which had as a priority to counter perceived far-left subversion within British society for much of the Cold War (Glees, 1987).

British counter-terrorism has evolved in response to the changing nature of terrorism. The dominant threat from the 1960s to the 1990s arose, of course, from an ethno-nationalist terrorist movement in the form of Irish Republicanism through principally the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (English, 2003). Not surprisingly, in the centres of UK power, this threat was viewed as a domestic issue, in contrast to modern Islamist terrorism, which is frequently interpreted through an international terrorism prism. In reality, however, neither was completely domestic nor foreign. Irish Republicanism, although clearly rooted in centuries of British exploitation of Ireland and anti-Catholic discrimination in the past and present, equally had strands that reflected wider international currents, including decolonization movements

that gripped major parts of the world (Rapoport, 2004). Furthermore, it received considerable foreign assistance from diaspora communities in the United States and from the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi (English, 2003). In turn, Islamist violence in the post-9/11 era is frequently associated with international terrorism and yet perpetrators have often been British citizens with a variety of motivations, both global and local, including anger over the foreign policy of the United Kingdom and the West more generally, the appeals of religious radicals with an extremist interpretation of Islam, and a sense of grievance and alienation fuelled by Islamophobia. A better model for understanding the interplay of terrorism in Britain between the local and the global is 'glocalisation' (Wellman, 2002). Similarly, although the argument has been made by practitioners that Irish Republicanism and Islamist violence are completely different (Clarke, 2007), history suggests that there are some similarities. Certainly, the IRA never used suicide terrorism as occurred on 7 July 2005 on the London transportation system, but it did carry out indiscriminate attacks against civilians in the same way that Islamists have. And both have targeted the British military, as in the case of the Islamist murder of soldier Lee Rigby and other plots and through numerous Irish Republican attacks (News.bbc.co.uk, 2009).

In turn, the model of counter-terrorism on display domestically in Great Britain consistently across the nearly half century is what Ronald Crelinsten refers to as the 'criminal justice model' (Crelinsten, 2009, 52). This consists of treating terrorism as a crime and, at least domestically, using the tools of the criminal justice system to combat it (Crelinsten, 2009). This developed in contrast to Northern Ireland, where both a criminal justice and a war model of counter-terrorism operated during the Troubles, and elsewhere in the world, where in some locations a war model would be employed against suspected Islamist terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11. The significance of the criminal justice approach to counter-terrorism by definition is that the police will have an important role to play. It also encourages a crucial role for domestic intelligence; in Great Britain this has been in the form of the Security Service (MI5), a Cold War security institution although its actual birth predated the start of that global struggle (Andrew, 2009). The dominant police force would be the Metropolitan Police, a reflection of the predominance of London and its status as a global city and as a centre for terrorist attacks over several decades.

The modern period of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom witnessed the evolution of terrorism with the flourishing of Irish Republicanism from the 1970s to the 1990s only to be surpassed in the new century by Islamist-generated violence. Along the way, other types of terrorism, including far right, far left, Middle-Eastern motivated, state-sponsored, and outright state terrorism have taken place, but with one notable exception the chief threats have been posed by Islamism and Irish Republicanism. Collectively, these various types of terrorism caused 447 fatalities within Great Britain between 1970 and 2014 (see Table 47.1). Of that total, 270 deaths, or nearly 60 per cent, came in one incident of state terrorism: the 1988 downing by a Libyan intelligence agent over Lockerbie, Scotland of Pan-Am flight 103 on its way from London to New York.

Irish Republicanism, the dominant terrorist threat in Great Britain until the end of the 20th century, caused nearly a quarter of the total deaths. With the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in 1968, as in previous decades it was not long before the conflict would spread across the Irish Sea to Great Britain (English, 2003). Attacks in Great Britain would spark greater publicity for the terrorists while placing additional pressure on the British government (English, 2003). In 1972, an Official Irish Republican Army bomb killed seven people at a military base at Aldershot in England. A series of bombings by Irish Republican groups over the next two years, mainly in London, ensued.

But it was an attack in the United Kingdom's second largest city, Birmingham, which more than any single incident ushered in the new counter-terrorism era while offering a preview for

Table 47.1 Deaths in England, Scotland, and Wales from terrorism, 1970–2017**

Motivation	*Number of Deaths*	*Percentage**
State terrorism	270	54
Irish Republicanism	113	23
Islamist	89	18
Middle Eastern	16	3
Far right	5	1
Ethno-nationalist	2	.4
Far left	1	.2
Total	496	

Source: Global Terrorism Database, START, general media coverage.

* Due to rounding, the percentages do not add up to 100%.
** Figures do not include the deaths of attackers.

the post 9/11 British counter-terrorism environment. On 21 November 1974, Irish Republican bombs exploded in two pubs in the centre of that city, killing 21 people and injuring nearly 200; a third bomb failed to detonate. The unprecedented loss of life coming in the aftermath of an October pub bombing in Guildford, in which five people died, triggered a furious reaction from British politicians. These two attacks and the response they engendered put incredible pressure on the police and the justice system to find the perpetrators and eventually led to men being wrongly accused and convicted of the bombings and imprisoned for years before eventually being released in admitted miscarriages of justice (Donohue, 2001).

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Labour government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson introduced the *Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974* as a temporary emergency measure; it was quickly passed, receiving royal assent eight days after the Birmingham bombings (Legislation.gov.uk, 1974). The legislation, which had to be renewed each year and which was amended at various points over subsequent decades, offered a clear preview of new powers that would become associated with the 9/11 era in Britain. Organizations were officially 'proscribed' by the British state and individuals who publicly supported banned organizations, including through their attire, faced a fine or imprisonment (Donohue, 2001). The Home Secretary received the power to exclude from the United Kingdom those he or she suspected of having some connection to terrorism. The most controversial aspect of the new law, however, allowed the police to detain a terrorism suspect for up to seven days while a decision was made whether or not to bring charges. This legislation and the approach it represented would dominate the legal framework of counter-terrorism for the rest of the century until it was replaced by the *Terrorism Act 2000* but its spirit would live on in the new act and other future terrorism-related legislation.

Enforcing the new terrorism powers within Great Britain were two main agencies, the police, mainly in the form of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB), originally established as the Irish Special Branch in 1883, and MI5 (Porter, 1991). A confusing system of responsibilities would bedevil British counter-terrorism until 1992. Since its birth, the MPSB had enjoyed chief responsibility for tackling the threat of Irish Republicanism in England, Scotland, and Wales, with MI5 playing a secondary role, whereas the Security Service was the lead agency for all other types of terrorism in Britain including Loyalist violence (Andrew, 2009).

Even with the growing threat of terrorism connected to Northern Ireland, counter-terrorism remained a lower priority for MI5; until 1984 the Security Service subsumed efforts against political violence within counter-subversion as terrorism for a time during the Cold

War was viewed as 'the violent side of subversion' (Andrew, 2009, Locations 13328–13333). In the 1970s, fewer than 10 per cent of the Security Service's resources were devoted to counter-terrorism as compared to 52 per cent dedicated to counter-espionage and 28 per cent assigned to counter-subversion (Andrew, 2009). By 1994, according to the then Director-General of the Security Service, Stella Rimington, countering terrorism received 75 per cent of her agency's time (Rimington, 2016). Those numbers would only continue to grow over the years, whereby in 2010 over 90 per cent of the budget was now directed to counter-terrorism (Foley, 2013).

Despite counter-terrorism's low position in the security pecking order, the post-1968 period represented, Stella Rimington later recognized, the start of a fundamental shift in security priorities:

> The emergence of a serious threat of terrorism on our own doorsteps, and the almost simultaneous development of what was to become so-called 'international' terrorism, marked the start of a significant shift of resources away from the traditional Cold War targets. With that came what was eventually to be a huge change in the way we worked and in the whole culture of the Service.
>
> *(Rimington, 2011, Locations 1825–1833)*

In that sense the 1980s into the early 1990s represented a more significant turning point, sped along by the dissipation of the Cold War, for the British security state's appreciation of the seriousness of the threat of terrorism. Prior to this period and essentially from 1917, the British state viewed the Soviet Union and communism as the chief domestic security menace. This danger came through subversion, espionage, and, of course, the potential for nuclear war (Wilford, 2003). Although the 1980s began the same way, by the end of the decade an unprecedented thawing of relations through the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev had occurred and the Berlin Wall had been reduced to rubble. Terrorism remained as a menace, however. The seizure of the Iranian Embassy and 26 hostages in 1980 by members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan, an event ultimately ended by the Special Air Service, reinforced the potential for London to be the target of international terrorism, as had occasional attacks over the previous decade (YouTube, 2010). On 21 December 1988, the single worst terrorist attack in British history, the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on its way from London to New York, took place. Two hundred and seventy people from 21 countries, including 11 on the ground, perished in an act of state terrorism carried out, a Scottish court would later decide, by a Libyan intelligence agent at the behest of the Gaddafi regime (BBC News, 2011).

But it was Irish Republicanism, principally the Provisional IRA, which bedevilled the British state through the 1980s and 1990s. Reflecting the personality of its leader, the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took a tough line against the IRA and, in response, she became a central target. This led to an unprecedented effort in 1984 to decapitate the British government through a time bomb planted at the Grand Hotel in Brighton where the Conservative Party would be holding its annual conference. It exploded in the early hours of 12 October, killing five people and injuring 31 others, although Thatcher escaped unscathed. In admitting its responsibility for the attack, the IRA pointed out, in a now infamous quote, the difficulty in trying to prevent terrorism: 'Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always' (Taylor, 2001, 265).

The back and forth between the two sides continued into the 1990s with Thatcher's successor, John Major. The IRA carried out an even more spectacular assault against the British government than the Brighton bombing in 1992 when it launched a mortar that exploded in the garden at the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street while Major and his cabinet met.

This was one of a series of attacks, particularly in London, designed to have a dramatic impact on British life in a desire to force the Major government to the negotiating table because the IRA leadership recognized it could not win a protracted conflict. Already back channel conversations were underway. The new attacks, designed to damage the British economy, included the 1996 bombings of the Docklands business district of London and the centre of Manchester and a sophisticated plot to destroy six sub-power stations around London, depriving millions of people of electricity for months (Bennetto, 1997). Eventually, however, peace would prevail through a negotiated settlement that became known as the Good Friday Agreement and which was ratified through popular votes in the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland.

In broad terms, a dominant ethno-nationalist terrorist threat was replaced by a dominant religiously motivated international one, but the picture was more complicated than that. Already other types of terrorism had emerged in Great Britain. Lockerbie exemplified state terrorism but this type of violence also occurred through other attacks such as the bombing of the offices of the African National Congress by South African intelligence agents in March 1982. Middle Eastern terrorism in addition to the Iranian embassy hostage-taking included attacks on Israeli targets, the most serious of which was the shooting of the Israeli ambassador to the UK in an attempted assassination in June 1982 (Andrew, 2009).

Nor was Great Britain exempt from violence on the part of political extremists on both ends of the political continuum. In 1970 and 1971, in an era of far-left terrorism in parts of Western Europe and in the United States, several bombings against economic and political targets, particularly the Ford Motor Company, were carried out by a group calling itself the Angry Brigade (Townshend, 2002; Andrew, 2009). No lives were lost in these attacks in contrast to the far-right and lone actor style terrorism of David Copeland, who set off three explosives packed with nails against those he despised, specifically pubs associated with multiculturalism and gays and lesbians. Three people died in the attacks and over 100 were injured before Copeland was caught (Hall and Hopkins, 2000). Other far-right acts of terrorism would occur, including the murder of a British Asian man in Birmingham in 2012 by a racist Ukrainian, Pavlo Lapshyn, who subsequently set off bombs by mosques in the West Midlands that fortunately failed to injure anyone (Dodd, 2013). There was an unfortunate tendency in Great Britain on the part of the media, politicians, and even the police to react to far-right terrorism differently from acts of violence by Muslim extremists. For instance, an attempt to murder a British Asian dentist by an individual shouting white power slogans and vowing vengeance for the killing of a British soldier, Lee Rigby, was not treated as an act of terrorism (Moore, 2015).

Part of the reason for that double standard was because in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the arrival of peace in Northern Ireland, the top threat to domestic security that emerged, in the eyes of the political elite, their security agencies, and the British media, involved violent extremism associated with Islam. Fears of this form of violence were certainly not groundless even if the actual risk to British lives from terrorism was relatively low in relation to ordinary activities such as travelling in an automobile in the UK, where there is a one in 20,000 chance in a year and a one in 240 chance over a lifetime of dying (Medicine.ox.ac.uk, 2016). But car accidents did not carry the same societal impact as an act of political violence. The threat of terrorism, and more specifically the background of the small number involved in the threat, intersected with wider concerns in relation to immigration and multiculturalism, heightening alarm and concern over the activities of a tiny fraction of Britain's diverse Muslim population (Kundani, 2014). Whether British Muslims are viewed as an 'enemy within' or as a 'suspect community' or as a 'securitized community' – and, as a result, are treated using counter-insurgency tactics – has been the subject of considerable debate and discussion (Miller and Sabir, 2012; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Brown, 2010). These debates will only

continue because they touch upon fundamental discourses in 21st-century Britain that stretch beyond violence.

Clearly, there was unhappiness on the part of many British Muslims over a variety of issues, including UK foreign policy and Western foreign policy more generally in places such as the Middle East. Specifically, the invasion of Iraq sparked a strong reaction. The British government was certainly cognizant of the anger and some of its roots. The Home Office and Foreign Office co-sponsored an April 2004 examination of such attitudes, including through opinion polling, in a report entitled 'Young Muslims and Extremism', a draft of which was later leaked to the media. Because it was not meant to be made public, the document did not avoid acknowledging the complex factors, including foreign policy, religious identity, Islamophobia, and immigration, which drew a small number toward violent extremism:

> *Anger:* a perception of 'double standards' in British foreign policy, where democracy is preached but oppression of the 'Ummah' (the one nation of believers) is practised or tolerated e.g. in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya; a consequent sense of helplessness over the situation of Muslims generally; the lack of any real opportunities to vent frustration. The following quote by a young British Muslim leader best demonstrates the link between extremism/terrorism amongst young British Muslims and foreign policy issues. 'What is needed is a debate about the root cause of terrorism, which is our country's foreign policy. As part of a truly globalised community, many young British Muslims carry the burden of struggles elsewhere – Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir.'
>
> *(Quote from Osama Saeed-Muslim Association of Britain, The Observer – 4th April 2004).*

> *Alienation*: the struggle to reconcile a modern Islamic identity with modern secular challenges; a general lack of young Muslim participation in mainstream politics and public life; Islamophobia and ignorance about Islam in British society and the media creating alienation, including among educated professionals; a perception that counter-terrorism powers are targeted at Muslims.

> *Activism*: a proactive desire to forge an alternative Islamic identity to that of parents but often without an underpinning knowledge of Islam, disillusionment with 'sell-out' mainstream Muslim organisations; a desire for simple 'Islamic' solutions; the search for practical goals and a purpose in life, the need to belong: all driving vulnerable youngsters in unpredictable directions.
>
> *(Global Security, 2004)*

By the time of this report and even before the 9/11 attacks, the British government had already recognized the potential threat from so called 'new terrorism'. The fact that the main British counter-terrorism law lacked permanence prompted the government of Tony Blair, following on from a report commissioned by his predecessor, to introduce and pass the *Terrorism Act* in 2000 (Donohue, 2008). Elements of previous legislation were clearly incorporated into the permanent law against terrorism. These included a list of proscribed groups and detention without charge, although continual debate over how long this should be would ensue. The original legislation in 1974 had an initial 48 hours and then up to seven days if needed. This would later increase to 14 days in 2003 under the *Criminal Justice Act* and then to 28 with the *Terrorism Act 2006*. Tony Blair's government even pushed for it to be raised to 90 days, but

despite a clamour in parts of the media for this shift, the measure was defeated in the House of Commons (Liberty-human-rights.org.uk, no date; News.bbc.co.uk, 2005). Blair's successor, Gordon Brown, once more tried to increase the detention period, this time to 42 days, but his government was forced to withdraw the measure when the House of Lords, including a former head of MI5, voted against it (Watt, 2008). Other significant measures in the *Terrorism Act 2000* included Section 44 and the ability of police to randomly stop and search individuals (now greatly curtailed) and Schedule 7, which allowed individuals (numbering in the tens of thousands per year by the 2011–2015 period) entering the country to be stopped and questioned (Anderson, 2015).

The *Terrorism Act 2000* preceded 9/11. In the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in history, there were plots, real, imagined and exaggerated; arrests; convictions; and actual attacks connected to Islamist motivations. The conspiracies involved plans to bomb a London night club and a shopping mall and the kidnap and beheading of a British Muslim soldier. Attacks included a 2007 attempted car bombing outside of a nightclub in London and crashing a car into a terminal at Glasgow's airport, and the 2013 murder of a British soldier, Lee Rigby, in the streets of Woolwich. The most serious violence took place on 7 July 2005 when four British men (three of four were born and raised in the UK and the fourth entered as a child) blew themselves up on the London transportation system using explosives that they had manufactured in a flat in Leeds. The attacks on both the tube system and on a London bus killed 52 and injured hundreds more. In a martyrdom video, the ringleader, Mohammed Siddique Khan, specifically cited Western foreign policy and the complicity of those who voted in governments responsible for such policies as justification for the indiscriminate killing of Londoners (Hoffman, 2014). Although this linkage was widely denied by the Blair government, and the motivations of the bombers extended beyond foreign policy, the invasion of Iraq was an important inspirational force for terrorists, a point even acknowledged by former MI5 Director General Eliza Manningham-Buller in her 2011 Reith Lectures (Manningham-Buller, 2011).

Although the *Terrorism Act 2000* served as the main piece of legislation, various governments did not hesitate to bring in new legislation or reforms to existing legislation, frequently in response to some of the events just described and often almost in an effort to show they were responding even if the police and Security Service did not request extra powers and the additional powers were not used. Thus seven pieces of terrorism-related legislation were introduced in 14 years. The attacks of 9/11 beget the *Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act* in November 2001 which allowed for foreign terrorism suspects to be detained indefinitely without being charged; a 2004 court decision that this was unlawful led to the *Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* which created a system of 'control orders' that could be used to, in effect, put foreign and British terrorism suspects under a system of house arrest. The 7/7 attacks sparked the Blair government to bring in the *Terrorism Act 2006* which included criminalizing the glorification of terrorism and increased the period for detaining a terrorism suspect from 14 days to 28 days. Gordon Brown's government brought in the *Counter-Terrorism Act 2008* which allowed for the post-detention questioning of terrorism suspects and unsuccessfully tried to increase the detention period without charge to 42 days. The *Protection of Freedoms Act 2012*, brought in by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government, would later reduce the detention period back to 14 days. Finally, the new Conservative government of 2015 passed the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015* that focused on the travelling of British citizens to Syria to join violent extremists fighting the Syrian regime of Assad, particularly Islamic State. It promised future legislation to target non-violent extremism which, it argued, contributed to the growth of violent radicalization, so the trend toward additional laws will undoubtedly continue. In relation to arrests, a spike occurred after 9/11 followed by a decline and then an increase to a record

level in the year to September 2015. The crackdown on Britons attempting to travel to Syria caused the increase, including a dramatic growth in the number of women arrested (BBC News, 2015). Whatever the reason for the terrorism-related arrest, less than half would ever be charged with a terrorism offence (White, 2015).

Charged with enforcing the new laws and making arrests were the police in cooperation with the Security Service. The security agencies with domestic responsibility for counter-terrorism lacked diversity and thus were tasked with investigating communities that they themselves had little knowledge or understanding of. Some police forces, such as the Metropolitan Police, attempted to take a more holistic approach through the creation of a 'Muslim Contact Unit', which instead of viewing predominantly Muslim groups and communities solely through the lens of counter-terrorism would attempt to address wider issues, including racism and Islamophobia, that the communities faced, while maintaining a dialogue even with individuals whose views the wider society might find extreme (Lambert, 2013). In an effort to coordinate counter-terrorism across the British state, in 2007 the Blair government created the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), which is based in the Home Office and exercises considerable power over British counter-terrorism policy. In terms of intelligence, new prominence was given to the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) that features participants from all of the main UK intelligence agencies, which the Blair government also established. JTAC also has responsibility for issuing a terrorism threat level ranging from Low, where an attack is unlikely, to Critical, whereby an attack is imminent (Andrew, 2009; Foley, 2013).

Eventually, a restructuring of British domestic counter-terrorism would occur as a result of the impacts of the major attacks of 9/11, the 2004 Madrid train bombing, and the 7 July 2005 bombing. Special Branch units in many locations, including the West Midlands, were changed into Counter-Terrorism Units. The Met in 2006 created a new counter-terrorism unit that amalgamated its Anti-Terrorist Branch and its Special Branch into the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, also known as SO15, and the number of personnel involved more than doubled between 2001 and 2006 (Foley, 2013). The changes for MI5 were possibly the most dramatic. From an agency that at one time performed counter-terrorism as an afterthought during the Cold War, it would now nearly become the *raison d'etre* for its security work. There was now no higher priority although, arguably, it was slow to react to this new reality. In the first half of the 1990s, the Security Service downplayed the threat from international terrorism and then in the late 1990s, with the rise of al-Qaeda, it recognized the danger but saw it as connected to something that might happen abroad as opposed to within Britain (Andrew, 2009). Even after 9/11, it remained hesitant. This began to change over two years later when, in February 2004, the government announced a 50 per cent increase in MI5 employees; and the numbers would grow further, so that by 2011 it employed a total of 4,000 or more than double the figure when 9/11 occurred (Travis and Norton-Taylor, 2004; BBC News, 2007). In that same year, the Security Service began to establish regional offices around the United Kingdom; 8 would eventually be opened (Norton-Taylor, 2004; Gilmore, 2008; Foley, 2013). That shift also would see far greater co-operation and a much better and more integrated working relationship between MI5 and police forces around Great Britain, a trend only sped up by the 7/7 attacks and criticism that it had failed in the lead up to the attacks to share information with relevant police forces (Andrew, 2009; Foley, 2013). As part of the new integrated counter-terrorism role, Britain's main domestic intelligence organization became more adept at gathering intelligence that could later be turned into evidence in court, a far cry from its days as a Cold War spy agency (Foley, 2013).

Arguably, a greater shift in dealing with terrorism in the post 9/11 era was a new effort to be proactive instead of simply reacting to an attack after it had occurred. It represented a

search for a strategy as opposed to just tactics. In addition to investing additional resources into counter-terrorism and introducing a raft of new laws, the British government in 2003 brought in an official counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST, although it was not publicly rolled out until 2006 (Omand, 2010). Four strands exist within this approach: Prepare, Pursue, Protect, and Prevent. By far, it was the final element that generated the most attention, controversy, and outright criticism. As the name suggests, it is a continuing effort to prevent individuals from becoming terrorists in the first place through a variety of means such as counselling, mentoring, and working with vulnerable communities. Youth have been a particular focus of Prevent, leading to the creation of Channel, a programme designed to intercept young people seen as particularly vulnerable to being drawn into violence extremism, be it through the far right, animal/environmental extremism or, the main focus of the programme, Islamism. Critics have argued that Prevent stigmatizes, 'securitizes', and racially profiles Muslims communities while ignoring wider issues that contribute to violent radicalization such as UK foreign policy, Islamophobia, and lack of economic opportunity (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Greer, 2010; Thomas, 2010; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2011; Awan, 2012).

CONTEST and, in particular, the Prevent strand have been tweaked over the years (Foley, 2013). The post-2015 government of David Cameron, for instance, building upon ideas Cameron first enunciated in a speech in Munich in 2011 and exemplified in a 2006 book *Celsius 7/7* by a key Conservative minister, Michael Gove, made it clear that their target in the future would not just be violent extremism but extremism in a broader sense (Gove, 2006; Cameron, 2011). Their argument for this approach is that such legal speech can create the environment from which violent extremism springs. Hence, the educational system, including universities and schools, would find itself legally compelled to monitor perceived extremism (Home Office, 2015).

The problem with the Cameron government's approach, critics have pointed out, is that there was no clear evidence of extremism being a conveyor belt-style pathway to violent extremism. Indeed, MI5's Behavioural Science Unit acknowledged in 2008 in an internal document leaked to the British media, entitled 'Understanding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the UK', that British terrorists 'are a diverse collection of individuals, fitting no single demographic profile, nor do they all follow a typical pathway to violent extremism'. As a result, a single profile of a typical terrorist could not be created (Travis, 2008a). Indeed, the report raised the possibility that efforts by the state to target extremist views held by British Muslims might backfire by helping create the conditions that lead to a drift into violent extremism that such policies were designed to counter by creating an atmosphere of persecution:

> This feeling is heightened by mainstream UK media coverage that perpetuates negative stereotypes of Muslims, by Islamic and non-Islamic media that reports atrocities against Muslims worldwide, and by the extremist groups themselves who spread the message that Muslims are being … persecuted, to the point that the only course of action is to fight back with violence.
>
> *(Travis, 2008b)*

A similar point about the risk of focusing on extremism and was raised by the government's independent terrorism legislation reviewer, David Anderson, in a September 2015 report (Anderson, 2015).

Considering the nature of the historical period since 1968 with economic peaks and valleys, conflict, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that the domestic security landscape, including both terrorism and counter-terrorism, would change dramatically over a relatively short period of time.

In broad terms, terrorism shifted from being a threat posed by a professional group motivated by ethno-nationalist influences to a professional group in the form of al-Qaeda motivated by Islamist and political forces to an increasingly diverse, scattered, less professional, even amateurish, landscape of small groups and lone individuals still motivated by Islamist and political forces but often without any formal connection to a wider movement such as Islamic State. However, the series of lethal attacks in London and Manchester in the opening half of 2017 clearly demonstrated that Islamic State and al-Qaeda-style plots remain a very serious and real threat in the UK. While lone actors and inspired amateurs generally pose far less of a danger because of the scale of what they are capable of achieving, a possible exception being the Manchester Arena attack in which a suicide bomber killed 22 people, such individuals are difficult to counteract because of the lack of visibility and absence of wider connections that might lead to infiltration or appearance 'on the radar'. Preventing a lone individual or small group from attacking someone in the street with a vehicle and knives, as in the case of the murder of Lee Rigby and both the Westminster and London Bridge attacks in 2017, is a near impossibility. The major concern for British security forces then, operating a form of threat triage, is the connecting of this aspirational element with individuals or groups of individuals who do have operational ability, perhaps through being a foreign fighter as has happened in Paris. Conversely, how to deter such desires to inflict pain on Great Britain in the first place remains a conundrum. What British government after government offers, namely an emphasis on values including the religious beliefs of minority groups, can only ever be a partial answer if other factors, such as prejudice and the wider history of UK foreign policy, which might require deeper reflection by the majority, are ignored or downplayed.

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INDIA

Arijit Mazumdar

Introduction

India is no stranger to terrorism. Terrorist acts, including arson, armed attacks, assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking, hijackings, kidnappings, etc., have been a regular occurrence across the country, particularly since the early-1980s. During the past three decades, the country has seen some of the highest number of civilian deaths anywhere in the world.[1] The states of Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab in the north, the seven north-eastern states and a wide swath of territory in the central region of the country have been the worst affected. The central government in India does not distinguish between the terms militancy, insurgency and terrorism, sometimes using them interchangeably. Its Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is the nodal agency dealing with internal security matters. The MHA describes the violent actions of all armed groups active in the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and the north-east and in the east-central and south-central region of India as terrorism (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a).

Terrorism in India is broadly classified into three types on the basis of the motivations and aspirations of the individuals/groups that engage in violence (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a). Ethno-nationalist terrorism focuses on the creation of an independent or autonomous territory and/or the redressal of political grievances of a particular ethnic or national group. Religious fundamentalist terrorism is motivated by religious influences, where perpetrators use religious scriptures to justify acts of violence. Left-wing terrorism (or ideology-based terrorism) involves the use of extreme-left ideologies to support the use of violence. What is common across these various types of terrorism is the presence of a 'political' motivation behind the acts of violence.

The next section of this chapter provides an overview of terrorism in India, including a description of the various terrorist groups operating within the country. Following this, the chapter presents an overview of the various counter-terrorism strategies employed by India, including the existing anti-terrorism legal framework. The chapter rounds off with a 'successes and failures' section regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism in India.

Terrorism in India

Terrorism in India involves issues like language/ethnicity/religion, nationalism, inter-tribal rivalry, illegal immigration, desire to control local resources and feelings of exploitation and

alienation, which have led to violence and diverse demands by various armed groups (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015b). There are about 40 domestic and foreign groups that are currently designated as terrorist groups and banned by the central government (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015c).

Ethno-nationalist terrorism

Terrorism that has its roots in the Kashmir, Punjab and north-east insurgencies has been classified as ethno-nationalist terrorism. The political status of Jammu & Kashmir became a matter of dispute between India and Pakistan immediately following the Partition of British India in 1947. While the two countries fought two wars over this issue, the situation inside Kashmir remained by and large peaceful until the late 1980s. In 1989, a massive insurgency erupted in the disputed state. The insurgency in Kashmir stemmed from a long process of political mobilization against a backdrop of institutional decay (Ganguly 1996: 80). The proximate cause of the insurgency was the flawed state legislative assembly elections of 1987, which resulted in a victory for the local pro-India Jammu & Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) party in alliance with the Indian National Congress (INC) party, which was ruling at the centre at the time.

Thereafter, Pakistan entered the fray to support secessionist groups like the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) with arms, funds and militant-training camps and helped create other groups that sought to annex Jammu & Kashmir to Pakistan (Schofield 2003). In response, India deployed the Army as well as other central security forces. Large-scale infiltration of Pakistani militants and Kashmiris militants trained in Pakistani camps continued throughout the 1990s. India has accused Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military of aiding and abetting the insurgency in the state. Pakistan has denied these accusations, arguing that it was only providing 'moral and diplomatic support' to Kashmiris struggling against Indian 'occupation' (Embassy of Pakistan in USA 2015). The Army and central security forces have remained stationed in Kashmir since the early-1990s. The major armed groups active in the state today include the HM, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Jihadi al-Islami (HuJI), and Al-Badr. Violence in the state has so far claimed the lives of thousands of people. The insurgency has also resulted in the flight of thousands of Hindus from Kashmir due to threats from terrorist groups. However, there has been a decline in insurgency-related incidents and deaths during the past five years (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2015a).

The state of Punjab was wracked by a violent insurgency from 1978–93, led by Sikh terrorists who sought to create a separate homeland for the Sikh community called Khalistan. The insurgency was the result of a power struggle between the local Akali Dal party and the Indian National Congress (INC) party in the state, with both parties encouraging the rise of extremist religious forces to undermine the other (Marwah 2009: 91). As the rivalry escalated, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a radical Sikh religious cleric, rose to become the leader of the Khalistan movement. Bhindranwale and most of his supporters were killed during Operation Blue Star, launched by the Army in June 1984 to clear the Harminder Sahib Complex (also known as the Golden Temple) in Amritsar, the holiest place of worship for Sikhs, where they were holed up since 1980. Around 500 civilians died in the crossfire and the Complex was heavily damaged in the fighting, resulting in a wave of anger among the Sikh community worldwide. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who ordered Blue Star, was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, which immediately triggered anti-Sikh riots across the country. The riots resulted in the deaths of around 3,000 Sikhs, two-thirds of which were in Delhi.

The major terrorist groups in Punjab were the Babbar Khalsa (BK), Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) and Bhindranwale Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTFK) (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2015b). These groups were alleged to be receiving aid from Pakistan, which had set up training camps within its territory. These groups were also supported by Sikh diaspora communities based in the US, UK and Canada. Sikh terrorists occupied the Harminder Sahib Complex again in 1986 and 1988 but were cleared by security forces both times (Operation Black Thunder-I in 1986 and Operation Black Thunder-II in 1988). These two operations resulted in minimal loss of life and damage to property, unlike Blue Star, and dealt a huge psychological blow to the Sikh terrorists (Fair 2009). By the late-1980s, popular support for the pro-Khalistan groups waned as they indulged in indiscriminate killings and criminal acts. Under K.P.S. Gill, the Punjab Police succeeded in bringing about a dramatic fall in the number of terrorist incidents during the period 1988–92. The insurgency is no longer considered 'active' today.

All the seven states (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura) in India's north-eastern region have been witness to one or more violent insurgencies. The region constitutes about 8% of India's size, with a population of about 40 million (about 3% of the total population of India). It is home to more than 200 ethno-tribal groups and as many languages. Prior to India's independence, the region consisted of Assam province (1873–1947) and the semi-independent princely states of Manipur and Tripura. Both the princely states acceded to India in 1949. Geographical isolation from the rest of India, social and cultural diversity, illegal immigration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh, competing political demands, multiple insurgent groups and the presence of safe havens across the border in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar (Burma) have been responsible for the unending militant violence and instability in the region (Cline 2006: 125).

Historically, the major insurgent groups in the region have been the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) or NSCN (IM) and NSCN (Khaplang) or NSCN (K) in Nagaland; United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) in Assam; United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), People's Revolutionary Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) in Manipur; Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) in Meghalaya; Mizo National Front (MNF) in Mizoram; and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in Tripura (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015b). Their demands range from greater political and financial autonomy within India to complete independence. Arunachal Pradesh alone has not seen any 'home-grown' terrorist movements. The central government has used the Army and central security forces to tackle these groups. Some groups like the NSCN (K), UNLF, PLA and others have entered into an informal alliance designed to put up a joint resistance against the Indian state. Others like the NSCN (IM) and ULFA ('pro-talks' faction), have been engaged in peace talks with the central government. Although some of the groups are active across more than one north-eastern state, none of them have been active outside the north-eastern region. In recent times, however, there has been a significant reduction in the level of violence in many of these states (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2015a).

Religious fundamentalist terrorism

According to the MHA, the nature of terrorist threat in Jammu & Kashmir has changed over the years (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a). Initially, the sepa-

ratists sought to create a secular, independent Jammu & Kashmir. In recent times, the LeT and JeM have spearheaded the insurgency in the state, gradually displacing local groups such as the JKLF and HM. The LeT and JeM are Pakistan-based radical Islamic groups, which desire not just to 'liberate' Kashmiri Muslims but also establish an Islamic state in South Asia (Tankel 2011). Apart from receiving aid from the ISI, both the LeT and JeM raise money in Pakistan through public donations and receive funds from Islamic charities based in the Middle East.

Within Jammu & Kashmir, the LeT and JeM have targeted religious minorities like Hindus and Sikhs and migrant labourers and tourists in addition to security forces. Outside the state, they have been involved in several spectacular and brutal attacks across India. They have taken to suicide terrorism in the form of *fedayeen* attacks, where a small group of terrorists undertake a mission fully aware that they have little chance of returning alive (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a). One such attack alleged to have been carried out by LeT *fedayeen* terrorists was on India's Parliament in December 2001 (which subsequently led India to initiate a military build-up along the border with Pakistan). Another one was the Mumbai attacks in 2008, in which over 200 people were killed. The JeM is alleged to have been involved in the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 from Kathmandu to Delhi and diverting it to Kandahar in December 1999. The hostages were later released in exchange for India handing over three terrorists, including the founder and senior leader of the JeM, Maulana Masood Azhar, to Taliban officials in Kandahar. Both the LeT and JeM are designated as terrorist groups by India as well as by the US, UK, Australia, Canada, UAE and the UN and alleged to have links with Al-Qaeda (Tankel 2011).

India has also accused the ISI of helping forge an alliance between the LeT and its 'home-grown' Islamist terrorist groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) (Gupta 2011). The goal of these groups is to 'liberate' India's Muslims and establish an international caliphate across South Asia. The IM has claimed responsibility for bomb blasts in several Indian cities, including Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Pune. The group has been designated as a terrorist organization by India as well as the US, UK and UAE. The LeT-IM cadres have engaged in indiscriminate killings, targeted India's middle class, attacked specific communities (Gujarati jewellers in Mumbai) and bombed public places (trains, hotels, temples, etc.). The goal is usually to provoke communal clashes between Hindus and Muslims, create fear and panic in the minds of the public, expose the weaknesses of the government and law-enforcement agencies and discourage foreign tourists and investors from coming to India.

Left-wing terrorism

The roots of left-wing terrorism in India may be traced back to the peasant struggles and uprisings during the pre-independence period (Chakrabarthy and Kujur 2010). However, the peasant uprising in the village of Naxalbari in the eastern state of West Bengal in 1967 is considered to be the origin of left-wing extremist movement in India. The uprising was led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) or CPI-ML. The insurgency was brutally suppressed by state and central security forces by the mid-1970s. Although, considerably weakened, the CPI-ML managed to survive as an organization (Ramana 2011).

In the aftermath of the failed insurgency, the left-wing extremist movement in India fractured into more than three dozen groups. These groups, including the CPI-ML, were collectively known as Naxals/Naxalites, the name derived from the village of Naxalbari. The current *avatar* of the CPI-ML is the CPI (Maoist), which is the largest and most powerful left-wing

extremist group today. The Maoists claim that their armed struggle is primarily in response to the forced displacement of tribals from mineral-rich areas and caste-based inequality and discrimination prevalent throughout India. They reject India's parliamentary democracy and advocate the capture of political power through protracted armed struggle, based on guerrilla warfare and mass mobilization (as Mao Zedong had preached).[2] Using this strategy, the Maoists have spread across several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The Maoists have a particularly strong presence in the impoverished, tribal-inhabited, mineral-rich and forest-rich region that spans parts of these states. This region has been deemed as the 'Red Corridor'.

The Maoists have carried out several attacks against the security forces and physical infrastructure (railways, roads, power transmission lines, telecommunications towers, schools, etc.) inside the Red Corridor. They have also built links with legitimate political and social organizations throughout India hoping to reach a wider audience and mould public opinion in their favour. They have established front organizations, which have been known to disseminate propaganda, covertly raise funds for the insurgency and provide legal assistance and shelter to members of the CPI (Maoist) (Nayak 2010).

Despite periodic attacks by the Maoists in remote areas of the country, the number of incidents of violence has come down (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2015a). Historically, the Maoist movement has struggled to transform itself from a rural, peasant-based armed struggle to a mass movement with support in urban areas (Ahuja and Ganguly 2007: 265–266). Nevertheless, left-wing extremist groups have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to endure primarily because the underlying factors that gave rise to them, i.e., social inequality and the exploitation of labourers, peasants, tribals and *Dalits* (Untouchables) have not been properly addressed.

India's counter-terrorism approach

A combination of military, political, developmental and legal measures has been utilized by India in countering terrorism. It should be noted however that these four measures have not been utilized uniformly across the country in every counter-terrorism situation. Additionally, the lack of a unified national counter-terrorism doctrine has long presented administrative and operational challenges for both India's civilian and military leaders.

The military measures include the use of the Army, central security forces and state police forces. The political measures include the initiation of peace talks and creation of special administrative structures for ethno-nationalist communities to address their socio-political and economic grievances. The development measures include the creation of infrastructure and delivery of public services in conflict-affected areas. The legal measures include the use of anti-terrorism laws, specialized central investigative agencies and an integrated intelligence grid to share and collate data from various government agencies.

India has used calibrated military force several times in response to armed groups that have carried out terrorist acts. The primary goal behind using military force was always to contain the intensity of violence and reassert government control over a territory and population. This would ostensibly facilitate the revitalization of the political process (like holding fresh elections) in the violence-affected areas, which in turn would help address the underlying factors that gave rise to the insurgency (Goswami 2009; Rajagopalan 2007). The civilian and military leadership have been united in the belief that using heavy artillery, tanks and offensive air power would be counter-productive. It would not only increase the intensity of violence but also harden the resolve of the insurgent groups, making it difficult for them to compromise and reach a political settlement with the central government.

The Army was deployed for the first time during the Naga insurgency and later during the Mizo, Assam, Punjab and Kashmir insurgencies. The central government has encouraged the Army to create specialized infantry units like the Rashtriya Rifles in Jammu & Kashmir during the 1990s to better respond to terrorist/insurgent threats (Rajagopalan 2004). Nevertheless, recognizing that the Army needed assistance in meeting its growing counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency responsibilities, the central government has increasingly used Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to deal with the armed groups indulging in terrorist acts.

The Assam Rifles is the oldest CPMF in the country. It is responsible for maintaining internal security in the north-eastern region and defending the India–Myanmar border. India has also used its six CAPFs, viz. Border Security Force (BSF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and National Security Guard (NSG) to respond to internal security threats (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a; Misra 1986). All the six CAPFs are under the administrative and operational control of the MHA.

The BSF, CRPF and ITBP are the primary organizations engaged in counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir and left-wing extremism-affected states. The NSG is a specialized counter-terrorism force used for engaging heavily armed terrorists, anti-hijacking operations, bomb disposal and hostage rescue missions. The NSG was involved in both Operation Black Thunder-I & II in Punjab. The Army, CPMFs and CAPFs assist the state police forces in maintaining internal security across the country, whenever requested to do so by the respective state governments or deemed necessary by the central government. The central government has implemented a scheme for reimbursement of Security Related Expenditures (SREs) of the states seriously affected by terrorism/insurgency to assist them (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a). In a few cases like Punjab, the state police forces have successfully led counter-terrorism operations demonstrating that local law-enforcement agencies may be best suited to tackle terrorism affecting their area.

The central government has also undertaken measures designed to reach a political settlement with some of the armed groups that have engaged in terrorist acts, including the initiation of peace talks and the establishment of new administrative structures likes states and locally elected autonomous territorial councils in order to politically and financially empower specific ethno-nationalist communities/groups.[3] It has demonstrated its willingness to consider any proposal short of independence. After a two-decade-long armed conflict, the MNF signed the Mizo Accord in 1986 renouncing their demand for an independent state. In return, the central government created a new state of Mizoram. The central government has also signed Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements with the main 'pro-talks' factions of the ULFA, NDFB, NLFT, and Manipur-based Kuki insurgent groups (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015b). Talks are underway to reach a final settlement with these groups.

In addition, the central government has signed Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) agreements with certain groups like the ANVC and DHD, following which these organizations dissolved themselves. In August 2015, it signed a landmark peace accord with the NSCN (IM) after 18 years of negotiations, which outlined the framework for the final settlement of the Naga issue. In the north-east, the central and state governments have worked sporadically with local civil society organizations and actors who have facilitated peace talks with armed groups (Das 2007).

The military and political approach has been combined with a strong focus on development of infrastructure and delivery of public services. This is most commonly observed in the central and state governments' response to left-wing extremism. Programmes involving road construc-

tion, water supply, education, electrification, housing assistance and food distribution have been implemented in the states affected by left-wing extremism (Ramana 2008). These programmes are designed to alleviate poverty and address socio-economic inequality, thereby reducing the appeal of the left-wing extremist groups. Improving governance, revitalizing the political process and implementation of laws designed to protect the interests of local people, especially tribals, have been significant elements of the central government's approach to dealing with Maoist violence across the country (Mazumdar 2013).

In some areas, the Army, CPMFs and CAPFs in conjunction with the state administration have been involved in various civic action projects, i.e., welfare/developmental activities, including the holding of medical camps, building of primary healthcare centres, sanitation drives, sports events, running vocational education centres and undertaking disaster-relief missions (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a). These measures are designed to both assist the local population as well as create goodwill between them and the security forces, i.e., 'winning hearts and minds'. The central government's recent strategy to tackle the Maoists has involved a mix of military and development approaches (Ramana 2011). This strategy has been successful in curbing Maoist violence in various states and resulted in the arrest and killing of several prominent Maoist leaders.

Since the late-1980s, India's parliament has enacted special laws to deal with terrorism. The first such law was known as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act or TADA. This was followed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act or PoTA. These laws have since been repealed, with the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act or UAPA currently being the primary law used by the central government to deal with terrorism. The UAPA incorporates many of the features of TADA and PoTA, including a description of terrorist acts, which involves 'using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances, firearms, poisons, noxious gases or other chemicals, or detaining, threatening, injuring or killing people, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people' (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2008).

It should be noted that the definition of terrorist acts outlined in these Indian laws differ significantly from similar laws in many Western countries in that they do not attribute any political or ideological purpose behind these acts. In addition to the UAPA, India has also utilized the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), National Security Act, Arms Act, Explosives Act and the Indian Penal Code (IPC) provisions to prosecute individuals on terrorism-related charges, depending on the nature of their actions. The AFSPA is currently in force in Jammu & Kashmir and parts of the north-east and has been a powerful tool for the security forces in their counter-terrorism operations. According to the AFSPA, in an area that is proclaimed as 'disturbed', an officer of the armed forces has power to use deadly force, arrest without a warrant, enter and search any premise without a warrant and stop and search any vehicle without a warrant and is granted legal immunity for his/her actions (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2015e).

Finally, India has established the National Investigation Agency (NIA), a federal agency empowered to investigate terrorism-related incidents, individuals and groups across the country without waiting for authorization from respective state governments (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a). The act of parliament that set up the NIA also authorized the establishment of special courts for trial of the cases registered by the NIA. The staff of the NIA is drawn from various security agencies across the country. It was created in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks of 2008 to address the need for a central agency to combat terrorism. The central government is also working towards the establishment of an integrated national intelligence grid or NATGRID, which would connect the databases of all central government-

affiliated security agencies allowing for easier sharing of data and intelligence-related information between them (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015a).

Successes and failures

Some analysts have pointed out that India has arguably the best track record in the world when it comes to tackling terrorism (Rajagopalan 2007). The country has shown remarkable resilience and willingness to absorb the costs associated with terrorism over the past several decades (Fidler and Ganguly 2012). Since independence, successive central governments have been adamant that there could be no compromise regarding the unity and integrity of the country. However, they have been willing to consider political and administrative arrangements short of independence to address the grievances of certain ethno-nationalist groups (Goswami 2015).

In cooperation with the respective state governments, the central government has been able to dramatically reduce levels of violence in many states. In Jammu & Kashmir, insurgency-related violence has been steadily dropping and is at its lowest since the early-1990s. The intensity of violence has also reduced considerably in the Maoist-affected states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha and West Bengal, and modestly in even the worst-affected states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Maharashtra (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2015f). In the north-east, the central government has engaged in peace talks with the 'pro-talks' factions of various insurgent groups and signed ceasefire agreements and peace accords with some groups (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2015b). The central government's surrender-and-rehabilitation policy for the north-east has succeeded in weaning away more than 7,500 members from various armed groups in recent times. Violence has come down substantially in Nagaland and Tripura. The only state in which the security situation has deteriorated in recent times is Manipur, but even here there is some hope for improvement as peace talks between the central government and some of the insurgent groups are currently underway.

Unfortunately, India's strong track record has been somewhat tarnished by allegations of human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, torture, disappearances and killings of innocent civilians, against the security forces during the course of counter-terrorism operations (*The Wall Street Journal* 2015). Special anti-terrorism laws like the AFSPA, which have granted immunity from prosecution to security forces, have been the subject of much criticism both in India and abroad (Human Rights Watch 2007). However, both India's defence ministry and home affairs ministry are opposed to a repeal of the act, arguing that the AFSPA provide legal cover to security forces and should be revoked only when the security situation was conducive for it (*The Tribune* 2015). Laws like TADA and PoTA and the current UAPA have also been criticized for giving wide-ranging powers to law enforcement authorities, which infringe upon the human rights of individuals and generate resentment among the populace. This appears antithetical to the objective of 'winning heart and minds' of the people.

Poor coordination between successive central governments and state governments has complicated the ability of the law enforcement agencies and security forces to counter terrorism-related violence (Fidler and Ganguly 2012). To some extent, the failure to curb left-wing extremism across the various states of the country is the result of differing capacities and motivations of the respective state governments and the lack of a unified centre-state strategy in dealing with the violence. Finally, the inability to curb external support to insurgent and terrorist groups may be considered as a failure on the part of the central government. From their sanctuaries in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar, armed groups have launched several hit-and-run attacks against security forces in the past. Furthermore, China (from the 1960s to the 1980s) and Pakistan have covertly supported armed groups in India as part of their strategic competi-

tion with India (Fidler and Ganguly 2012). India does not follow a policy of 'hot pursuit' across international borders, which limits its capacity to prevent or respond effectively to such attacks.

Conclusion

Perhaps no other country in the world has seen as many different types of active terrorist groups within its territorial boundaries as India. Complex political, economic and social factors have been responsible for the birth of many of these armed groups. The objectives of these groups have included secession, greater political and financial autonomy within India, the creation of an Islamic state and the destruction of parliamentary democracy, among others. However, the Indian state has been able to absorb the pressure exerted by such groups and in many cases has forced them to reconsider the viability of armed struggle. This has significantly brought down the intensity of violence is certain areas, especially the north-east region.

The Indian state has almost always used a combination of political and development measures and calibrated military force in pursuit of a peaceful resolution to each conflict. The use of military force is primarily designed to bring the armed groups to the negotiating table. The ultimate goal is to bring disgruntled elements among its own citizens back into the national mainstream and revitalize the political process in the areas that are affected by violence. Inducing the leaders of the armed groups to surrender/participate in peace talks, utilizing local civil society organizations and individuals to facilitate peace talks with armed groups, holding elections, improving governance and creating new political and administrative structures have been key to resolving many of the long-standing conflicts within India.

Unfortunately, even the limited use of force has resulted in severe hardships for the local population caught between the armed groups and the security forces. The use of draconian laws like the AFSPA has created a serious wedge between the local population and security forces in states like Jammu and Kashmir, and Manipur. This represents one of the biggest failures of India's counter-terrorism approach. It may be argued that the legitimacy of its political system is greatly diminished by its failure to uphold the rule of law and public accountability during counter-terrorism operations. While the capacity of the Indian state to face the challenges posed by armed groups is not in question, more needs to be done to address the human cost of India's counter-terrorism approach.

Notes

1 The South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) provides one of the few reliable estimates of fatalities in terrorist attacks across India since the early 1980s. The SATP is a database maintained by the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), which is a non-profit organization focused on the evaluation and resolution of internal security challenges in South Asia. According to the SATP, the combined number of civilians, terrorists and security forces killed in the worst terrorism-affected states are as follows: Jammu & Kashmir (1988–2014): 43,704; Punjab (1981–2014): 21,631; Assam (1992–2014): 8,114; Maoist insurgency-affected states (2005–15): 6,633; Manipur (1992–2014): 5,963; Tripura (1992–2014): 3,488; Nagaland (1992–2014): 2,462; Meghalaya (1992–2014): 619; and Mizoram (1992–2014): 46. For more details, see South Asia Terrorism Portal (2015a). According to the Global Terrorism Index 2014, published by the independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 404 people were killed and 719 were injured in 624 terrorist incidents in India during 2013. That year, India was ranked as the sixth-worst terrorism-affected country in the world, behind Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. For more details, see Institute for Economics and Peace (2014).

2 See South Asia Terrorism Portal (2015c, 2015d) for CPI (Maoist) strategy and programme outlined in the 'Party Constitution, Central Committee, CPI (Maoist)' and 'Party Program' documents, respectively.

3 See Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (2015), for a detailed description regarding the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which outlines provisions concerning the administration of tribal areas in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.

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IRAQ

Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Iraq, 2003–2011

Michael Clarke

The experience of terrorism and counter-terrorist activities in Iraq after the war of 2003 is a classic example of the way in which both activities exist on their own spectrums of behaviour. The Iraq experience from 2003 to 2011 witnessed single acts of terror, and then terrorism directed within Western societies for the sake of events in Iraq, but also the use of terrorism as part of a guerrilla movement that eventually developed into outright civil war. Iraq suffered under a series of terrorist campaigns in these years that covered the complete spectrum from terrorism to war. There were single terrorist acts of expressivism or personal identity, but increasingly the organised use of terror tactics within a guerrilla force fighting for control of the state.

Counter-terrorism activities, of necessity, followed a similar path along its own spectrum; from policing against criminal acts, to attempts to create social stability and then, quite quickly, to a full-blown counter-insurgency campaign across the entire country. In a state of overt civil war, terrorism was an intrinsic element within the wider struggle. It also represented the apotheosis of most terrorist philosophy which sees it as a driver of political change and then a component of organised war to wrest political control to a group of insurgents.

The conditions prevailing in Iraq once Saddam Hussein was defeated and deposed were such that every element across the terrorist spectrum was employed during the eight years of US-led occupation of the country. The Iraqi case is therefore different from many others where conditions are not permissive of such extremes. But it is also an object lesson in the way terrorism and counter-terrorism tends to operate in extreme conditions.

Iraq in 2003

Despite many attempts within the US Administration to establish, or even imply, an Al-Qaeda presence in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it is now beyond question that no evidence exists of any such link or even of remote influence (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 167). After the 9/11 attacks in 2001 policy-makers in Washington frequently conflated the role of Al-Qaeda in that attack with the longstanding 'problem of Saddam' in world politics. But that was never true. They were always separate issues. On the other hand, the 9/11 attacks had, by common consent, changed the calculus of risk for Western countries regarding the potential of international terrorism. The dread at how much more destructive the attacks might have been on New York and Washington if chemical or radiological elements had been used – the possibility that this particularly nihil-

istic new brand of international terrorism might gain access to weapons of mass destruction – put Saddam's known possession of chemical weapons in a new light. So too, there was a new assessment of the dangers he might pose to the international community in general if he were tempted to make some sort of common cause with Al-Qaeda in the coming years, in the same way that Colonel Gaddafi in Libya had made some common cause with Palestinian and Irish Republican terrorism in the previous two decades (Kampfner, 2003).

These were credible fears for Western governments, but the fact remains that Iraq was not a society in which international terrorism had any roots up to March 2003 when the US-led invasion took place. That changed almost immediately in the spring of 2003 once it became clear that there was no convincing plan in place for post-conflict Iraq. Social disorder and the struggle for power in a recreated Iraqi government provided a highly permissive environment for multiple terrorist campaigns.

That permissive environment began with the military occupation. The US took responsibility as the occupying power for all of Iraq, save for the four southern provinces of Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan and al Muthana which were allocated to the British, subsequently the 'Joint Occupying Power'. For both the US and British military establishments the expectation was that the occupation would last only until the autumn of 2003 (Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 464; Chilcot Summary, 2016: para 594). The US expected to withdraw the first 50,000 troops within ninety days of victory and then 50,000 every month thereafter. The British assumed they would reduce their major commitment of more than 40,000 troops to an unspecified 'medium level' within four months of the *start* of the invasion – an invasion they thought would itself have to be measured in months rather than days and weeks (Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 461; Chilcot Summary, 2016: para 594). 'Baghdad in 120 days' was the war-fighting assumption of the planners (Bailey, Iron and Strachan, 2013: 79). The administration of the country and the arrangements to create a new Iraqi constitution and then a democratic government, it was assumed, would be taken over by the United Nations and other members of the international community. This did not happen. Under United Nations Security Council resolution 1483 in May 2003 the UN undertook a role in the reconstruction of the country, but the US-led administration was to maintain control through the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad and the military, in effect, retained responsibility not just for law and order but also for the political framework that was intended to deliver an effective and democratic post-conflict government.

At this stage, between March and September 2003, the disorder in Baghdad and to a lesser degree in Tiktrit, Ramadi and Mosul could be attributed to extensive looting and some degree of politicised criminality. The failure to crack down on looting in Baghdad immediately after the invasion was later seen as 'releasing a crime wave' which would not subside in the subsequent years (Chilcot Summary, 2016: para 650). 'Stuff happens', said US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 12 April 2003, denying that crime and looting were a significant problem. Widespread criminality, however, directly exacerbated the conditions that created a political insurgency. Iraqi ministries that would have resumed control of the country after the invasion had been ransacked and their records lost. Iraqi communication systems had been hit hard in the bombing and most of the surviving equipment had been looted. The electricity grid became unstable and had been switched off, but then could not be switched on again (Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 467). Two of the three sewage plants in Baghdad had to be rebuilt because of looting. Within the first two months the inability of the CPA to deliver on the basics for a functioning society and its increasing isolation in the 'green zone' of Baghdad rapidly swung the popular mood from joyous liberation from the tyranny of Saddam to sullen resentment at the behaviour of foreign occupiers.

In the British Area of Responsibility around Basra the situation was more relaxed, though the breakdown of essential infrastructure had been just as dramatic. But the British had taken responsibility for the neglected south-east of Iraq that in the Saddam era had produced 60% of the national wealth and received only 5% of its benefits in return. British forces were involved in 'soft hat patrolling' and implementing small-scale reconstruction initiatives similar to those they had used in the Balkans during the 1990s. The four southern provinces were populated overwhelmingly by Shia peoples so the British did not have to contend, as did US forces, with a dispossessed Sunni minority who had been privileged throughout Saddam's regime, or a nascent Kurdish state in the northern provinces around Irbil and Kirkuk. From the beginning, however, the British did have to contend with significant Iranian influence among the Shia communities in the south, particularly in Maysan province. It was a pervasive influence among local tribal leaders, the clerics and within the criminal and smuggling networks that burgeoned immediately after the invasion.

In the face of increasingly sectarian, and hence politicised, criminality, US and British military forces faced two fundamental problems. The first was that it became clear after May 2003 that they would not be able to hand over responsibility for infrastructure failures and economic reconstruction – still less for law and order – to any other organisation. They would be staying for an indefinite future and would face all the frustrations they had previously experienced in the Balkans in the 1990s and which they had been determined to avoid in this bigger and far more challenging case.

Secondly, and notwithstanding this realisation, the numbers that the US and its military allies could devote to security across Iraq were grossly inadequate to the task. In settled and free societies, a ratio of two security personnel per thousand members of the general population is normally regarded as adequate to maintain order. In unsettled societies, that ratio should normally be increased tenfold from a 2:1000 to around 20:1000.[1] In mainland Britain, for example, the 2:1000 ratio is normally maintained. But during the worst years of the emergency in Northern Ireland, the ratio within that province was at least 20:1000 and sometimes more. In the Balkan operations of the 1990s NATO eventually deployed a ratio of 20:1000 security forces to population. Across Iraq as a whole the 20:1000 ratio suggested that a total number of allied troops in excess of 450,000 would be needed – some three times the 150,000 troops that were actually deployed. More specifically, the US 3rd Division, faced with the collapse of order in Baghdad during the summer of 2003, was able to put a maximum of 10,000 troops onto the streets of a city of 5,000,000 inhabitants – a ratio of precisely 2:1000 (Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 469). In Basra, the British could have put perhaps 3,000 troops onto the streets with some reorganisation and a maximum effort, which, in a city of around 2.7 million people, would have offered them a ratio of less than 1:1000. It was never enough, and proliferating criminality rapidly turned into terrorism and then a full-scale insurgency.

Events moved swiftly during the summer of 2003. Paul Bremer was appointed as the chief administrator for Iraq and was determined to follow through on the Pentagon's desire to take a tough line against the Baathists, who had been the ideological backbone of the Saddam regime, and deal decisively with the wave of criminality that had gripped the country. Within the first month of his appointment Bremer dissolved the Iraqi Army, leaving some 300,000 troops with their personal weapons, residual salaries and very few prospects. There was widespread public anger at this, especially among Sunni communities, and US forces in Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah found the public mood running decisively against them.

The first really dramatic terrorist attack occurred on 19 August when the UN Headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad was bombed, within the first week of its operations, killing the head of mission Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 other UN staff. As a result the majority

of the 600 UN staff in Iraq were withdrawn for safety reasons. This attack had a major effect on the future prospects of internationally sanctioned reconstruction in Iraq. And it may have marked the effective debut of Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQ-I), the forerunner of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and latterly of 'Islamic State'. Certainly, the attack was claimed by Abu Musab Zarqawi, who was at the time leading Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which morphed for a while into AQ-I. Neither the US nor Britain were prepared to admit publicly, however, that they were facing a growing guerrilla campaign in Iraq (Chilcot Summary, 2016: para 698). In November plans went ahead for the creation of a transitional Iraqi administration that would guide the country through a new constitution and elections in 2004, and at the turn of the year Saddam Hussein was finally captured by US forces. There was some hope that they would 'turn a corner' in 2004. But in truth, the critical moments had already passed and the spring of 2004 saw a decisive turn from 'criminality' to 'terrorist insurgency' and thence to full-scale civil war.

Iraq from 2004 to 2011

US authorities were hit by two major incidents within a month in spring 2004 that transformed their situation, even as constitutional arrangements for the 'new Iraq' proceeded on schedule. One was the ambush and killing of four US security contractors and the unrest it sparked in Fallujah. The situation in the city deteriorated over the following months and it became a no-go area for US forces. In April the US fought the first of two ferocious battles to regain control of the city; the first was the largest military operation since the invasion itself. The second, later in 2004, was the biggest urban combat the US military had initiated since the 1968 battle for Hua during the Vietnam War. And though US forces prevailed in Fallujah on both occasions, the results were to transform US operations from policing and counter-terrorism to outright counter-insurgency operations (Rogers, 2006). Less than three weeks after the contractors' killing, photos began to emerge from Abu Ghraib prison of the explicit abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US military personnel. It could not have happened at a worse moment and destroyed a great deal of the moral authority the US military and civilian administrators had been trying to assert.

For the British, the effect of these developments was different but just as serious. The sense of political drift and societal collapse that was emanating from Baghdad convinced the Jaish Al Mahdi (JAM), a Shia militia led by the renegade cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, that they could spark a full nationalist uprising among the Shia communities in the south (Fairweather, 2011). It began very precisely on 7 April 2004, in the midst of the first Fallujah crisis, and immediately had the effect of putting stretched British forces onto a new operational footing. In Basra there were more than 70 coordinated attacks on British forces inside two hours, and it was considerably worse in al-Amara where British forces numbers were low (Bailey, Iron and Strachan, 2013: 85). In June British forces came under sustained attacks in Majar al-Kabir in Maysan province and six British military policemen were killed by a mob. Terrorist attacks in the towns and cities of the south steadily increased and became more identified with the militias rather than AQ-I that was seeking to exploit events in the north. This is not to say that there was no Sunni violence in the Basra area during this time. British forces put pressure on the Sunni terrorist cells they knew about and regarded a containable level of Sunni violence as one bomb explosion a week. There was also an AQ-I terrorist attack on Italian Carabinieri forces in Nasiriyah and some characteristic suicide bombing in Basra, but in general, and after some sharp official denials by British authorities, the Shia-based JAM emerged as the main force threatening the achievement of Coalition objectives in the southern provinces of Iraq (Bailey, Iron and Strachan, 2013).

The success of JAM was partly attributable to the fallout from events in Baghdad and the northern provinces, partly to growing discontent at the failing services and economy in Basra

and the southern provinces, partly to the prevalence of criminal networks that were deeply involved with JAM's activities, and not least to Iranian support and connivance in the operations of militia units. Thereafter, dealing with 'the problem of the militias' became the key theme in Britain's military involvement in Iraq, until it was finally ended in May 2011.

In one respect, the situation in Iraq sparked more predictable violence. Attacks within Western societies, in Madrid, London, Berlin and in many attempts against the US homeland, were driven until that time mainly by the inspiration of Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda core organisation operating from South Waziristan along the Pakistan border. Most plots and attacks were answering calls coming from events in South Asia. But the images and accounts coming from Iraq after 2004 began to have a similar effect on would-be terrorists in Western countries. In Britain, in particular, the attempted bombing of the *Tiger Tiger* nightclub in London and then of Glasgow airport in June 2007 were perpetrated by Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed, on grounds that they wanted to retaliate for events against Iraqi people. Though counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are significantly different activities and respond to different sorts of challenge, the reality of jihadist radicalisation in these years was that counter-insurgency in Iraq inspired individual acts of terror against Western societies.

Nevertheless, by the autumn of 2004 the pattern that would dominate the rest of the Iraq campaign was effectively established. The US in the north and the British in the south were facing significantly different challenges and their military and political aims were increasingly different. The US found itself pulled into a three-way counter-insurgency operation in which all three opposition forces wanted something significantly different. There was an oil-rich Kurdish enclave in the north that was amenable to US persuasion and pressure but determined to drive a very hard bargain with any new Iraqi government and working to create an independent state. There was a Shia majority population, closely linked to the Saderist militias operating against the British in the south, who were determined to take control of the government as their natural right after years of Saddam's minority and Sunni-led oppression. And there was a powerful Sunni minority, fearful of reprisals, stiffened by the now largely unemployed officer class of the old Iraqi army, and resentful of the vigorous de-baathification process they had suffered. It was this Sunni segment of the population that gave Mussab al-Zaqawi the 'warm water' in which his terrorist outrages on behalf of his AQ-I could now flourish.

The immediate problem for US forces was that in those years they were not well trained, nor did they have the numbers, for the counter-insurgency operations they now found themselves pulled into. The Pentagon had long since decided that its forces would not engage in any more 'nation-building' after their experiences in Central America, the Balkans and Afghanistan. US forces had the facilities to engage in aggressive counter-terrorism. They had developed sophisticated and extensive intelligence assets in-country by the end of the first year of operations. They had special forces and 'black operations' capabilities to uncover and undermine terrorist cells where they found them. Not least, they could deploy extensive police and investigatory assets in the campaign. The problem for the US was rather that these capabilities were falling behind the trend of events. Counter-terrorism was now less appropriate than a properly organised counter-insurgency response. The second battle of Fallujah in November 2004 was an ad hoc counter-insurgency operation that was, in effect, an outright conventional battle against the Sunni militias that had dominated the city and prevented any Baghdad governance there for almost a year. The bulk of US forces were not trained, or inclined, to engage in all the delicate politico-military balances required by counter-insurgency operations. They wanted to act decisively and made war on the 'bad guys' without sufficient discrimination. The 'terrorists' of 2004 were conflated with the 'militias' of 2005. Both battles in Fallujah failed to achieve the US's wider political objectives and fatally weakened its hold on the loyalties of the Iraqi population as a whole.

During that year the political process in Baghdad went forward but was locked into the green zone – the 'emerald city' as it was now known to journalists – and was increasingly divorced from the realities on the ground (Chandrasekaran, 141). An Iraqi transitional government took power in 2005, there was a referendum on a new constitution and parliamentary elections were successfully held at the end of the year. But the insurgency got worse. The US had no alternative but to put its faith in the emerging Iraqi government. It could hold off Kurdish pressure by engineering much greater 'autonomy' and better shares of Iraq's oil wealth. The US had stumbled upon a political strategy that was just about workable, to hold two of its three warring factions in check and devote itself to dealing with the Sunni insurgency centred on Anbar province and in the key cities of Ramadi, Fallujah and Tikrit.

By that stage the US had realised that its military forces would have to understand and practise counter-insurgency operations in a much more sophisticated way. Certainly, by late 2005 Iraq was drifting from an anti-US insurgency into a full-scale sectarian civil war. The bombing in February 2006 of the Shia holy shrine, the Samarra Al Askari mosque, was a turning point in this process, even though there were no fatalities. The bombing was almost certainly carried out by Zaqawi's AQ-I and it had an effect out of all proportion to the damage to the building. Sectarian conflict increased markedly thereafter.

To their credit, the US Army and Marine Corps re-thought their own doctrine of counter-insurgency during 2005 and 2006, General David H. Petraeus taking the intellectual lead. In December 2006 there was a new doctrine and a determination to make it stick throughout the US forces that would be serving in Iraq (Field Manual FM 3-24, 2006). In January 2007 President Bush announced a 'surge' of 30,000 more US troops to Iraq who would be deployed mainly to Baghdad and Anbar province – the centre of the Sunni insurgency. But now the strategy was based explicitly on generating consent among the local Sunni communities; on getting tribal leaders to oppose the insurgents, and on training Iraqi forces much more intensively to assume responsibility for domestic security. The US was now taking counter-insurgency seriously as an essential military task and linking it – of necessity – to a political strategy that tried to make the best of whatever government emerged from the chaotic and sectarian bargaining taking place among Iraqi leaders, and deferring any decisions on Kurdish independence into the future. There was a nominal role for Kurdish leaders at the heart of the new Iraqi government, but neither side seem to have taken that arrangement very seriously.

In these respects, US strategy for dealing with what had become outright civil war was, by 2007, more coherent than it had been before and more assertive in the way it was being pursued. The key was the so-called 'Sunni awakening' whereby US strategy had helped to empower the Sunni leaders in Anbar once more within their own communities and turned them against the AQ-I extremists who had so quickly mobilised their loyalties. With the Sunni uprising running out of stream, the Shia militias in the Baghdad area could therefore be contained by the power of the new central government.

British policy, facing a different type of challenge in the south, was diverging from this approach. British forces were now more focussed on a withdrawal, as soon as possible. A commitment to deploy significant British forces to Afghanistan had already been confirmed in January 2006 and this would be difficult to sustain unless the Iraq operation was first wound down. The British wanted to move into a 'strategic over-watch' stance as soon as possible by transferring authority for control of their four provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control teams. To do this, the British were more concerned to keep their own Area of Responsibility quiet. This involved doing deals with the JAM that they had been fighting, turning a blind eye to Iranian influence within the area and tolerating a further growth of criminality across the sector. US chiefs were very sceptical about this approach (Chilcot Summary, 2016: para 780). As one British

commander recorded, he was required to produce a range of different effects for the success of his mission, and his lowest priority among them was to pursue counter-terrorism. His highest priority was the protection of his own forces and to do that he had to deal with the problem of the militias (Bailey, Iron and Strachan, 2013).

At exactly the time during 2007 when the US was very proactive and implementing its surge of forces and its 'Sunni awakening', the British were actively trying to draw their forces down and look for accommodation with local Shia militia leaders (Ledwidge, 2011). To an extent, that was working. In the summer of 2007 there was a big reduction in JAM violence against British forces and in September the British headquarters was moved out of Basra Palace to the airport on the outskirts of the city. Basra was handed over to the Provincial Iraqi Control team. It was a high-risk strategy, and though some sort of normality was returning to day to day life in the city, it was also evident to most observers that Basra was becoming an effective centre for the JAM militias and a no-go zone for the central government in Baghdad (Elliott, 2015).

In March 2008 it was clear that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was not prepared to wait for more training for his forces before exerting his control over Basra. In a humiliating fait accompli, for the British he launched his 'Charge of the Knights' offensive, without consultation even with local British commanders, but with US military support, to take Basra back under Baghdad government control. The British could only offer marginal help, and perhaps did not want to offer more. British military chiefs and the new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, were firmly of the opinion that Britain could do no more to improve the situation. So while the US, with its infinitely superior troop numbers and economic support, was setting down the terms on which an interim settlement for the whole of Iraq would now be based, the British were actively extricating themselves from a situation where terrorism and insurgency had set the conditions for the political settlements to follow, rather than the occupying power. In December 2008 the Prime Minister announced plans to withdraw the majority of British troops from the theatre of operations and from 2009 to 2011, residual training functions were gradually wound down until the last naval training team left in May 2011. The US military withdrawal from Iraq was finally completed in December 2011.

Islamic State and the collapse of Iraq

In light of events in 2014, when 'Islamic State' (IS) swept into northern Iraq, threatened Baghdad itself and began to encroach into the Kurdish areas of the north-east, it has been asserted that what the US and the British left behind in 2011 in Iraq was a façade state, ripe for a terrorist takeover. This, however, would be a major overstatement. What the Coalition left behind was a weak state but not an unviable one. It was given a well-equipped and sufficiently well-trained army to cope with most of the foreseeable eventualities. The real weakness of what was left behind was an inbuilt sectarianism flowing from the very centre of the new state. The JAM, which the British had compromised with in the south, became a critical force behind the Baghdad government, able to mobilise large portions of 'the street' at very short notice. The new government of Iraq, of which the US was by then unable to prevent Nuri el-Maliki becoming Prime Minister, was at once bureaucratically incompetent and personality driven by him. Maliki stripped down the officer corps of the forces left for him, to ensure the personal loyalty of Shia officers, and let gross corruption invade every aspect of the new state structure. In 2008 Transparency International had judged that Iraq was the third most corrupt country in the world (Transparency International, 2008). That was partly the responsibility of the US and British administration of the country, which had been unable to prevent so much international

aid being misappropriated at every level. But the Maliki government made corruption much worse by its own incompetence and pervasive venality. The Kurdish areas concentrated on carving out their own de facto autonomy; deterred from declaring themselves an independent state only by their wariness of Turkish reactions to such a move. The Sunni communities were left fearful again that Maliki's government could never represent them fairly.

Thus, when a well-prepared IS offensive developed against Mosul in August 2014 and then swept south towards Ramadi and near to Baghdad, the conditions for its success were well set. The emasculated officer corps of the Iraqi army, drawn from southern Shia groups to serve in the north of the country, abandoned their men and disappeared. Such collapses of military leadership are highly contagious and difficult to reverse in the immediate circumstances. The Sunni communities were again prepared to let IS extremists defend their safety, as they had partly done in the case of AQ-I a decade earlier. IS engaged in uniquely brutal behaviour within the territories they had captured but it was not until they came under pressure, losing territory after the successes of their first year of conquest that IS has been seen to inspire, and in some cases direct, significant jihadist terrorism against targets in the Western world. Otherwise, IS can be seen to use terror tactics, such as massive suicide truck bombs, in Baghdad and Ramadi, Beji and Tikrit – in places where they have lost ground – as a way of trying to turn a flank, to get at the enemy in their own centres of power, in an otherwise conventional ground war for the establishment of a Caliphate. Thus terrorism has come full circle in Iraq, from an expression of outrage and commitment to a cause in 2003, to a driver of insurgency in 2004; then to a tactic of civil war in 2006, then again to an aspect of war-fighting in a conventional IS war for control of extensive territories; and in 2016 once again as an expression of outrage and 'propaganda of the deed' in bomb attacks and personal assassinations in the heartlands of its enemies in Baghdad and the supposed friends of Baghdad in Western countries.

The hard fact is that the occupation of Iraq between 2003 and 2011 left a weakened state in the midst of the Levant (Alaaldin, 2016). The so-called 'Arab Spring' revolutions that began in December 2010 owed nothing to Al-Qaeda, or the Israel–Palestinian conflict, or the Cold War, or the great powers that were involved in the region. They were originally a series of spontaneous revolutions against failed and autocratic governments across the region and each had a dynamic of its own. But when the revolutions reached Syria, in the heart of the Levant, the sectarian genie in that country very quickly escaped from the bottle and a weakened Iraq, run by an extremely poor government, became prey to the contagion of it.

In this respect, the most significant long-term outcome of the events that Iraqi weakness and initial IS victories have created may be the development of a series of 'Sunnistan' communities across a Balkanised Levant. Zarqawi's AQ-I, and then AQAP, had used the rhetorical claim of a new Caliphate to try to unite the Sunni communities behind their particular extremism and in their unending war on the Shia communities around them. Zarqawi had eventually alienated his own support base, not least that of Al-Qaeda core, who called on him to avoid self-defeating barbarism in Iraq. In any case he was killed by US forces in 2006. But since 2014 IS have taken up the same mantle more convincingly than Zarqawi. And though the eventual defeat of IS within the territory it claims to be its new Caliphate is highly likely, the war it has created and the prospects of complete state collapse in Syria make a Balkanised Levant a high possibility, in which Sunni peoples from Lebanon and Jordan to Saudi Arabia and from Yemen in the south to the borders of Turkey in the north, not excluding the mainly Sunni Kurds, will fear for their future in a fragmented region.

Perspectives

Despite the unique circumstances of the Iraqi case, a number of important generalisations, both about terrorism and counter-terrorism, are evident.

One is that terrorism is potentially intrinsic to any political status quo, settled or unsettled, and any state or groups of people can be victims of it (O'Gorman, 2011). There is no limit to the referred guilt that nihilistic terrorists can impose on otherwise guiltless and unconnected people. Western society, no less than the Shia peoples of the world, can be regarded by jihadists, for example, as guilty on account of what they inescapably *are*, rather than anything they *do*.

Nevertheless, in conditions of extreme societal breakdown after a very long dictatorship such as in Iraq (or Libya or Syria or Yemen or Afghanistan), terrorist campaigns are highly likely and should be anticipated by the forces of law and order. Even low-level criminality in such situations may be terroristic, where the stakes are high and the rewards great in situations where government is not functioning at all, even for relatively short periods. The lack of US and British planning for the effects of a short governmental vacuum in Iraq, and the casual way in which US officials, in particular, viewed a crime wave across northern and central Iraq in 2003 still remains astonishing.

Individual acts of terror, no less than deaths caused by the mentally ill, are deeply hurtful and distressing but do not traditionally have a strategic effect, unless or until the authorities overreact to the provocation or prove themselves uniquely incompetent to offer their citizens basic protection. The Iraq experience, however, also provides an object lesson of the ways in which individual terrorist acts can blend into a violent insurgency, a separatist movement or a sectarian hatred if the underlying political conditions exist – or in this case were allowed to develop. And in this case those conditions developed with remarkable speed. By the time the Coalition partners had admitted to themselves, let alone to the outside world, that they had a 'crime wave' on their hands; a local 'insurgency', a full-scale 'civil war', it was already sometime after the real onset of the phenomenon. They were always in reaction mode and did not get ahead of the political agenda except for the brief period of the 'surge' and the 'Sunni awakening' in 2007–8.

Another perspective is that in the modern era 'political terror' – terrorism in the service of a mainstream political demand, such as separatism, an anti-occupier campaign or an attempt to capture the machinery of the state – can be taken over by something altogether more nihilistic in a broken society. Al-Qaeda and IS have world revolutionary aims – in the case of IS also by creating a very tangible new territorial state – but both have sought to pursue their grand aims in relatively nihilistic ways. They believe that violence and death is more than instrumental in the achievement of their aims; it is an object of commitment in itself. Regardless of whether an attack succeeds or not in the eyes of the authorities, the act of violence or the suicide of a terrorist is by definition a victory. There is nothing new in this perspective, but it has never been pursued so broadly by such big terrorist movements before and it found great expression in the sectarian campaigns and the campaigns against occupying troops in Iraq.

Nevertheless, nihilism can also alienate all but its most committed supporters. AQ-I, and latterly IS, both found that the political attractions of their campaign and their claim to defend the Sunni peoples of the Levant from resurgent Shia societies, could be undermined eventually by the human revulsion at their brutality. In this case nihilist terrorism can lose a great deal of its strategic potency. It loses touch with the political base that tolerates it and becomes merely a vicious sideshow, as happened directly to AQ-I.

All of this reinforces the most critical lessons for counter-terrorists and counter-insurgency strategists. What determines the level of likely terrorism in a broken society, the form it will

take, its propensity to be overtaken by something even more extreme, and so on, will depend on the space the volatile political environment allows for such activities. The sheer number of available security forces cannot be left to chance, or compensated by superior technology. Unity of governmental effort is essential, so that a common goal is always evident. For either an indigenous government, or a foreign post-conflict administering power, tight control of the political sphere is the single most necessary condition for success. Only if politicians and governmental administrators, national and local, can deliver on what the security forces promise by their very presence, can progress be made. In Iraq, as the Chilcot report pointed out, a 'circular analysis began to develop' in late 2003 whereby reconstruction was dependent on the provision of better security. But improved security required more public consent among Iraqis that only effective reconstruction activity could provide (Chilcot Summary, 2016: para 685). If government cannot deliver to the population what they expect then neither can the security forces. And this applies to dealing with terrorism as well as to more widespread insurgencies. Broad public consent for what the government intends to do is the necessary pre-condition, in any situation, for policy success.

Finally, the Iraq experience also reinforces the need for the government and the authorities to maintain the moral high ground in dealing with terrorism and insurgency. As Iraq showed, there was scope for some active anti-terrorism (as opposed to counter-terrorism) where suspects were pursued or picked up during special forces night operations, and so on. Maintaining the moral high ground does not make it impossible for the authorities to exercise a muscular security policy in broken societies. Anything less might be taken in many cultures as signs of weakness or lack of resolve. But such policy must exist within a clear and transparent legal framework. It must be pursued unambiguously legally, and a 'transitional government' as existed for some time in Iraq, must be held firmly to internationally recognised legal standards by any intervening power. Too many moral compromises were made during the Iraq years to a cruel and vengeful post-Saddam culture which eventually undermined the moral authority of both the Iraqi government and their liberators from dictatorship. Mistakes and misjudgements by the occupying forces further undermined the essential moral authority they needed to combat terror in all its forms and served, as ever, as a recruiting sergeant for more violent radicals.

Not least, the time necessary for a society to recover from a war or dictatorship, or a society riven by sectarianism, should not be underestimated. On a historical basis, around half of all the international interventions of modern times have been judged successful (Dobbins, 2003). The average duration of foreign involvement in such reconstructions is twelve years. In this case, the intervention was a turbulent eight years. Fourteen years on, Iraq is unlikely to reappear on maps in the future in its 2003 form. The emergence of some type of Kurdish state in the north-east of Iraq, at least, is almost inevitable. The territory that the US-led coalition invaded in 2003 seems likely to remain the arena for both an international air war, a war on the ground for control of the state, and a terrorist-dominated struggle for sectarian advantage between Shia and Sunni peoples for some time to come.

Note

1 'Security personnel' in this context is defined as any forces with a direct and regular role in domestic, day-to-day security. In a settled, free society, with a 2:1000 ratio such personnel will normally be predominantly police and some smaller related forces. In less settled societies, or settled societies in periods of manifest crisis, such personnel are more likely to involve paramilitary, militia or military units as well as regular police forces.

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Can terrorism be curbed?

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Introduction

Can terrorism be defeated or at least curbed? These questions have been consuming the attention of scholars since the beginning of the academic exploration of terrorism (Ganor 2005; Sageman 2014). In this chapter, we will review the Israeli experience over the last seven decades in order to offer some relevant insights regarding the political, strategic and social conditions which can facilitate the defeat or reduction of terrorism. However, before advancing to the analysis of the Israeli case study, we would like briefly to discuss the conceptualization of terrorism and counterterrorism.

Since 9/11, scholars have placed tremendous importance on conceptualizing and theorizing terrorism and as a result have made significant breakthroughs (Silke 2001; Young and Findley 2011). Shortly after it assembled, the START team at the University of Maryland offered a workable conceptualization that laid the foundations for the construction of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Terrorism, according to GTD constitutes an

> intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor. In addition, two of the following three criteria also had to be met. 1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and 3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.
>
> *(LaFree, Dugan and Miller 2014)*

These three elements are recognized by most experts as core characteristics of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006). In addition, most scholars agree that terrorism usually targets civilians or military personnel who are not in a combat situation (non-combatant).

Despite the significant progress in the conceptualization of terrorism, our understanding of counterterrorism seems to be more limited (Crenshaw and LaFree 2017; Crelinsten 2013; Silke 2011; Crenshaw 2010). Traditionally, scholars of counterterrorism focused on the inherent challenges that democracies face when attempting to balance between their commitment to defending human rights and civil liberties on the one hand and allowing their inhabitants

Table 50.1 Counterterrorism models

Approach	*Attributes*
Passive	Defensive measures that aim at fortifying soft targets, deterring attackers, maximizing recovery and minimizing the impact of attacks.
Preventive	Pre-emptive operations that aim at thwarting terrorist operations and destabilizing the groups that perpetrate them.
Reactive	Retaliatory operations that aim at taking a toll from the terrorists and their supporters and deterring them.

to maintain secure and peaceful lives on the other hand (Wilkinson 2011). In their seminal works, Crelinsten and Schmid distinguished between "war," "criminal justice," and the "reconciliatory" models (Crelinsten and Schmid 1992). The "war model" considered terrorism as an act of warfare; the other models leaned towards labelling it as a criminal act. In line with these respective views, the "war model" perceives the military as the leading entity in executing counterterrorism policies. The 'criminal justice model' places the responsibilities on law enforcement agencies. The "reconciliatory model" leaves counterterrorism to politicians and diplomats (Crelinsten 2013).

Hovering in the background is the "defensive model." This approach does not focus on the terrorists, but on their targets. Thus, it centered on hardening soft targets, crisis management and helping those who were affected by terrorism (Perliger, Hasisi, and Pedahzur 2009; Perliger and Pedahzur 2006; Perliger 2012). The modes of response are not mutually exclusive. Most regimes apply one or more of them at the same time. However, in crisis situations, policy makers tend to favour the "war" and "defensive" models (Perliger 2012).

We will leave the question of preserving liberal values aside and focus on the question of effectiveness. We will introduce the three counterterrorism models that Israel has been applying: Defensive; Preventive; and Retaliatory (see Table 50.1), and assess their pros and cons. It is important to remember that these models are not pure, nor are they mutually exclusive. Counterterrorism policies encompass all three of them. However, the relative weight of every model tends to differ from one policy to another.

In the subsequent sections, we will divide the seven decades that have passed since the formation of the State of Israel to the following three main periods: Early years (1949–1964), the Armed Struggle (1965–1980), Enter the Islamists (1981–). In each subsection, we will identify the specific characteristics of the challenge of terrorism at that time and analyze the attributes and outcomes of the measures that were adopted to counter it. Before we proceed to the analysis, however, it is important to contextualize the evolution of the specific terrorist threats that Israel faced.

Setting the stage

The dawn of the 20th century was marked by a rising number of Jews immigrating to Palestine. The Zionist motivations of the immigrants raised concerns among the Arab majority in the country and galvanized the Palestinian national movement (Kimmerling and Migdal 1999).

Gradually, local conflicts over lands and pasture areas assumed ethnic, religious, and national features. In 1920, the leadership of the "Yishuv" (the Jewish community in Palestine) formed a nationwide paramilitary organization (Shapira 1999). The name of the organization, Haganah (in Hebrew, "Defense"), embodied its nature. At the time, Britain had solidified its hold over

Palestine and shortly afterward received a mandate from the League of Nations to rule the territory. The Jewish leadership was determined not to alienate the British rulers, who in 1917 made an unprecedented commitment to the formation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Hence, the Haganah was engaged mostly in defensive operations which focused on protecting Jewish population centers (Slutsky, Avigur, and Rivlin 1978).

The defensive approach was suitable for the relatively calm reality of the 1920s. However, on August 23, 1929, riots erupted in Jerusalem and quickly spread to other parts of Palestine, generating an intense debate among Jewish leaders (Cohen 2015). Activists of the Haganah in Jerusalem demanded a forceful response. They believed that by imitating the tactics of the Palestinians, they would deter them (Hoffman 2015). However, this approach carried with it serious risks, such as the potential for the escalation of the conflict to a point where the fragile collaboration between the Yishuv and the Mandate Authorities would be compromised (Dror 1996).

The disagreement led to the departure of the Jerusalem group that formed Haganah B later evolving into the Etzel (acronym in Hebrew of "National Military Organization," which was also known simply as "The Irgun"). By the early 1930s, the group had carried out its first retaliatory attacks, and in the mid-1940s it became the main Jewish group carrying out campaigns of terrorism against Arab and British targets (Hoffman 2015; Perliger and Weinberg 2003). The events of 1929 also gave rise to a preventive approach. Yitzhak Sadeh, a veteran of the Russian army, approached the leaders of the Haganah and presented them with his concept of prevention (Milstein and Doron, 1994). His idea was to form small mobile units that would subvert Arab attacks either by setting ambushes on the roads that the militants used, or by turning the tables on them and raiding their own bases. While this approach was less provocative than that of Haganah B, the Haganah's leadership was reluctant to assume the risk and chose to stick to its policy of restraint.

Only in the spring of 1936, following the outbreak of the Great Arab Revolt, was the preventive approach eventually exercised. The British Forces in Palestine had no adequate means to simultaneously counter the armed insurgency and protect the Jewish settlements (Rankin 2009). Hence, with the active encouragement of the mandate authorities, the Haganah embraced Sadeh's preventive approach and allowed him to form the first Mobile Units (Markovitzki 1989). Two years later, Charles Orde Wingate, a British officer who supported the Zionist movement, enhanced the counterinsurgency capabilities of Yishuv even further by forming the Special Night Squads (SNS) (Anglim, 2007). Sadeh sent his two most promising protégés, Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan, to serve under Wingate. Once there, they absorbed Wingate's approach and later went on to educate their own soldiers in accordance with it (Cox 2015).

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations sanctioned the Partition Plan for Palestine. A day later, as the British forces commenced their preparations to leave the country, a civil war erupted between the Arab and the Jewish populations (Gelber 2001; Morris 1999). Six months later, following Israel's declaration of independence, the local conflict transcended into a conventional war between Israel and its neighbors.

Early years

By the conclusion of the war in 1949, the newly born Israeli state faced immense security challenges and the second round of war with the Arab armies was looming. Meanwhile, many of the 700,000 Palestinians who had become refugees during the war tried to return to their homes (Morris 1993). Israel, with 620 miles of unprotected land borders, faced both budgetary and manpower constraints that prevented it from either introducing physical barriers or deploying

significant forces to the border areas. Groups of Palestinian insurgents identified this weakness and targeted Israel's border settlements (Pedahzur 2010). As early as 1951, Moshe Dayan, head of IDF's Southern Command, tried to revive the preventive approach by deploying a mobile unit to the Egyptian border. However, shortly afterward, Dayan left the command and the unit dissolved. Meanwhile, the infiltrations from the eastern border with Jordan intensified.

In the spring of 1953, Colonel Mishael Shaham, commander of the Jerusalem Brigade, approached Major Ariel Scheinermann (Sharon), at the time a student at Hebrew University. Shaham believed that retaliatory operations would deter the insurgents and their sponsoring state (Bartal 2011). He asked the young officer to form an ad hoc militia and raid the house of Mustafa Samueli, a formidable infiltrator (Milstein 1985). Though the raid failed, the militia institutionalized (Unit 101). The unit's reprisal attacks did not so much as put a dent in the infiltrations effort and Palestinian violence persisted (Maoz 2007). In fact, its operations led the international community to condemn Israel for targeting civilians (Drory 2012). Nonetheless, domestically Scheinermann and his men were seen as heroes, and by early 1954 they assumed command of Israel's 890 Paratroopers Battalion (Seckbach 2013).

In 1955, Egypt escalated its proxy war against Israel by training and directing the Palestinian militias' (known as "Fedayeen") operations. During this time, the Fedayeen infiltrated Israel's borders and attacked Israeli settlements and vehicles. Faced with this intensifying threat, the Israeli leadership recognized the need for a new counterterrorism doctrine. Moshe Dayan, Chief of the General Staff, who from the onset was not an adherent of exclusive reliance on the retaliatory operations, revived the preventive approach. He formed Sayeret Shaked ("Almond Reconnaissance Company") and deployed it to the southern border. Under the unofficial leadership of Abd el-Majid Hidr (aka Amos Yarkoni), a famous Bedouin scout, Shaked revolutionized the concept of prevention (Milstein and Doron 1994; Eldar 1994). Much like Sadeh's mobile units, Shaked's fighters operated in small teams. They patrolled known Fedayeen routes, relying on a combination of the scouting skills that they learned from Yarkoni, air reconnaissance, and radar technologies. Upon detection of an infiltration, the fighters initiated pursuits that in many cases led to the killing or apprehension of the infiltrators (Eldar, 1994). However, the founding of Shaked did not divert Israel from its reprisals path.

To conclude, the mid-1950s were marked by the simultaneous application of both offensive and preventive doctrines, mostly by using classic measures of the war model, i.e., specialized military units (Pedahzur 2010). The decision of Israel to adopt these forms of the war model were driven by the fact that terrorist attacks were concentrated in border areas, the lack of alternatives (as the Israeli police forces were at their infancy stage) and the fact that Arab Armies were directly supporting and facilitating the terrorist campaigns.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 that brought the offensive approach to a new peak reshaped the regional geostrategic landscape and reduced the intensity of terrorism on Israel's southern borders. However, the challenges did not disappear. Inspired by Franz Fanon's, *The Wretched of the Earth* and the anticolonial movements that emerged around the world, *Fatah—Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastini* ("The Liberation Movement of the Palestinian Nation") formed in 1959. Fatah presented the 'Armed Struggle' as its doctrine and six years later, on January 1, 1965, launched its first attack (Fanon 1965; Sayigh 1997). A cell consisting of four men placed explosive devices on a water pump in the National Water Carrier in the Netofa Valley. As they returned, they encountered an IDF patrol and gunfire was exchanged. Although the explosive device planted by the four men did not explode, the Fatah were quick to release a memorandum claiming the success of the operation. This attempted attack would be a sign of bigger things to come (Chamberlin 2012; Kurz 2005).

The armed struggle

The occupation of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip during the Six-Day War (also known as the "1967 War") brought under Israel's control a significant number of Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war, and escalated the Israeli–Palestinian conflict even further. Taking advantage of the weakness of the Kingdom of Jordan after the war, the Fatah assumed the leadership of the *PLO—Munazzama at-Tahrir al-Filastiniy* (The Palestinian Liberation Organization) and tightened its grip over large parts of its territory, turning the Jordan Valley into its new battlefront with Israel (Drory 2012).

In response, the IDF expanded its preventive apparatus by forming Sayeret Charuv ("Carob Reconnaissance Unit"). The new unit was modeled after Sayeret Shaked, and adapted its modus operandi to the conditions in the Jordan Valley (Erez, 1983). Despite the proven effectiveness of the preventive approach, Israel did not give up on its retaliatory policies. On March 21, 1968, the IDF launched a large-scale reprisal operation against Palestinian strongholds near the villages of Karameh and Safi in Jordan. The operation in Karameh did not yield the results that Israel was hoping for. The battle lasted over ten hours, and the Israeli infantry and armored forces sustained heavy casualties. The success in Karameh emboldened the image of the resistance and encouraged supporters in Gaza to follow suit and form new cells. Ariel Sharon, the head of IDF's Southern Command, responded immediately. He deployed Sayeret Shaked to the Gaza Strip and formed two new clandestine units, Rimon and Zikit (Grenade and Chameleon, respectively) whose operators were disguised as Arabs and operated within Palestinian population centers (Eldar 1994; Maimon 1993, 2005).

By the fall of 1970, tensions between the PLO and the Hashemite Kingdom reached a boiling point as the Palestinian insurgents undermined the stability of King Hussein's regime. In September, the king ordered his army to carry out a massive military operation against the PLO. The event that was labeled by the Palestinians as "Black September" forced the PLO to relocate its bases of operation to Southern Lebanon. The trauma of the experience in September 1970, which crippled the military capabilities of the PLO, forced the organization to adapt both its tactics and targets selection, as well as to expand its area of operations beyond the Middle East (Chamberlin 2012).

The most memorable manifestation of the PLO's new *modus operandi* took place during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. On the morning of September 5, members of Fatah took 11 Israeli athletes hostage after infiltrating the housing quarters of the Israeli male athletes in the Olympic Village. The organization was hoping to exploit the presence of TV crews from all over the world who had arrived in Munich to cover the games in order to further publicize and attract attention to the Palestinian struggle. At the end of a long day of negotiations, the German police attempted to carry out a rescue operation that ultimately led to the death of the athletes (Jenkins 1975; Weimann 2008). Although this incident brought the Palestinian issue to the top of the global agenda, the attack escalated the cycle of violence. The Israeli government, vowing to avenge the death of the athletes, adopted a new method of operation, by implementing for the first time a systematic campaign of targeted killings of various Palestinian leaders. Unlike recent Israeli campaigns of targeted killings, the planning and execution of the operations was mostly under the responsibility of intelligence services (Mossad cells in Europe) and not the military apparatus. The Palestinians responded with counterattacks as well as assassinations of Mossad agents or other Israeli officials (Pedahzur 2010).

By the mid-1970s, the PLO rebuilt its military apparatus in Southern Lebanon. The proximity to the Israeli border provided the organization with opportunities to launch attacks against nearby Israeli towns (Schiff and Ya'ari 1985). The head of the PLO's armed wing, Khalil al-Wazir

(aka Abu-Jihad), structured the fighting units in the form of a regular army, i.e., brigades and battalions. He also devised military insignia, uniforms, and ranks to match the organizational apparatus he had created. By the late 1970s, the PLO's army consisted of three regiments whose role was to fend off the IDF should Israel invade southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, Fatah, as well as other Palestinian groups, formed clandestine units that operated covertly against Israeli targets.

The expansion of the struggle outside the Middle East forced Israel to develop new methods of counterterrorism warfare, as well as to enhance its competency in terms of preventive capabilities. In addition, Israel integrated multiple elements of the defensive model, such as enhancing aviation/airport security, installing of new technology for the detection of border infiltrators, and developing new units to deal with the growing frequency of hostage-taking attacks. The most important of those units was the YAMAM, a distinctive police unit which specializes in rescue operations in hostages' situations. The direct trigger to its formation was a failed rescue operation in 1974. On May 15 of that year PLO members took hostage of more than 100 elementary school students in the town of Maalot in Northern Israel. A rescue attempt by the elite IDF unit "Sayeret Matcal" led to the killing of the kidnappers, but not before 28 hostages were killed as well. Thus, the events convinced the Israeli decision makers that a specialized unit should be formed to deal specifically with such complicated operations.

Eventually, as a result of the continuation of PLO attacks, which peaked with the Coastal Road massacre of 1978, during which a Fatah unit took over an Israeli bus and killed 38 civilians, the IDF launched the Litani Operation. This mission became the prelude to the First Lebanon War of 1982. The Israeli government was determined to devastate the PLO and remove its presence from its northern border. The war, that had given way to nearly two decades of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, weakened the PLO. As a result, the PLO had to relocate once more, this time to Tunisia. Nevertheless, the threats from Israel's northern border persisted (Feldman and Rechnitz-Kijner 1984; Barzilai 1996).

Enter the Islamists

By the early 1980s, new groups emerged both in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories which combined both nationalistic and religious ideological sentiments. Inspired by the Iranian revolution and with the active encouragement of the newly established Revolutionary Guards, a Lebanese Shiite militia named *Hezbollah—al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah fi Lubnan* (Party of God the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon), filled the void that was left by PLO's departure from Lebanon. As Israel focused on the struggle against the PLO and paid less attention to the Shiites, Hezbollah had worked diligently to recruit support among Shiite neighborhoods and villages in Lebanon—rising up right under the noses of the Israeli intelligence community. Concurrently, Sunni revivalism in Saudi Arabia and Egypt inspired a group of Palestinian students to form the *PIJ—Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin* (The Movement of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine) in 1981.

Six years later, *Hamas—Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah* (The Islamic Resistance Movement) emerged on the scene as the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its rapid growth was facilitated by the socio-political reality that took shape in the West Bank during the 1970s and 1980s. For years, Israel considered the Islamic charities in the West Bank and Gaza as moderating forces. Religious preachers were allowed to operate freely and provided the Palestinian population with the social and educational services that it needed. This infrastructure was utilized eventually by the first leader of Hamas, Shaik Hammed Yassin, to mobilize grassroots support for the organization. As support for PIJ and Hamas continued to grow, the PLO leadership in the West Bank was looking for ways to maintain its dominant status (Gleis and

Berti 2012; Jaber 1997; Norton 2014; Levitt 2008; Mishal and Sela 2006); thus it supported and inflamed the mass protests which eventually led to the eruption of the first Intifada (Uprising in Arabic) in 1987.

The Intifada signaled the transition of the Palestinian struggle from outside Israel to the West Bank and Gaza, where local activists led riots and demonstrations and challenged the military forces that maintain the martial law in these areas. The Israeli soldiers, who were not yet trained for counter-guerrilla warfare in the Lebanese context, were now faced with the additional, more complicated, duties of riot control. However, at least at the preventive level, the situation at the Palestinian front was not as dire.

Ehud Barak, the commander of the IDF's Central Command, took note of the rising unrest in the West Bank before the Intifada broke out. Yitzhak Mordechai, the commander of the Southern Command, observed similar trends in Gaza. Within three years, the two commands were operating highly clandestine preventive units named Duvdevan (Cherry) in the West Bank and Shimshon (Samson) in Gaza. More than a reincarnation of Charuv or Shaked, these two units followed in the footsteps of the masqueraders that operated in Gaza in the early 1970s. By the early 1990s, the Police Border Patrol established its own units of masqueraders. In addition, Israel was engaged in several additional measures in order to curb the motivation of militant activists of the Palestinian organizations, including mass administrative arrests, forced curfews, limitation on civilian political activities, and demolition of houses belonging to families of perpetrators of terrorist attacks (mainly affiliated to Hamas and PIJ) (Pedahzur and Perliger 2010).

The creation of new masqueraders' units, as well as the exercise of the above-mentioned additional measures, have proven to be highly effective in identifying and arresting local leaders and other central activists of the Palestinian organizations. Nonetheless, they had limited impact on the level of violence, which subsided just when both sides eventually agreed to engage in direct negotiations in early 1993, in what would become known as the Oslo Peace Process. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords in late 1993, and the subsequent establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the PLO, under the leadership of Fatah, redefined the objectives of PLO's military apparatus which now operated alongside Israel's security forces. Nonetheless, the Fatah's leadership did not forfeit the option for an armed struggle. In 1997, it founded the *Tanzim* (Organization), a network of local groups which aimed to counteract the entrenchment of Islamic forces, as well as pursue operations against Israel if needed (Bloom 2004). Following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, a group of West Bank militias comprised of Fatah and Tanzim activists established *Kataib Shuhada al-Aqsa* (Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Battalions). Affiliated with Yasser Arafat and the Fatah, the Brigades began to operate against Israeli targets. By 2002, they were deploying suicide bombers at a similar rate to Hamas, turning this method of terrorism to one of the driving forces of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Pedahzur 2005). Overall, more than 200 suicide attacks were perpetrated or attempted by the different Palestinian organizations during the Al-Aqsa Intifada (between the years 2000–2005).

In light of increasing public pressure and with no other options left, since 2001 Israel had experimented with a combination of defensive and preventive measures. On the defensive level, public buildings, restaurants, and shopping malls have had to introduce satisfactory defensive measures in order to maintain their licenses (Perliger, Pedahzur, and Zalmanovitch 2005; Perliger and Pedahzur 2006). The protection of open spaces and public transportation presented bigger challenges however. By 2002 the Ministry of Defense had begun to erect a security barrier between Israeli and Palestinian population centers. While the architects of the barrier focused on the security of Israeli citizens and settlers in the West Bank, they did not take into consideration the hardships that this barrier would inflict on innocent Palestinians. Hence, while this defensive measure rendered suicide operations obsolete, it fueled the international campaign

to delegitimize Israel. In terms of preventive measures, the most important one was the reoccupation of several Palestinian cities and refugee camps. In the short run, this was an effective step. Israel had restructured its intelligence network in these areas. In the long run, however, the military campaign undermined the remainders of the peace process that had started a decade earlier. Lastly, Israel engaged in a massive campaign of targeted killings, which initially focused on ticking bombs and operational leaders, and eventually expanded also to include political leaders, a policy which further undermined Israel's legitimacy and the ability to resurrect the peace process (Pedahzur and Perliger 2010).

Can terrorism be curbed?

The Israeli case study provides some important insights not just regarding the factors that may shape the effectiveness of different counterterrorism policies, but also the dynamics and traits which make specific types of terrorism more difficult to counter.

Measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies is complex. The most convenient way to assess it is to measure the consequences of each policy against the expectations of the policy makers who enacted it. Israel has never developed an unambiguous and official doctrine for countering terrorism. This is clearly portrayed by Boaz Ganor, who interviewed policy makers and heads of the security establishment. Each and every one of them, when asked about the goals that should be defined in the struggle against terrorism, had a somewhat different objective in mind and consequently suggested a different course of response (Ganor 2005).

A survey of over seven decades of counterterrorism policies indicates that the hardliners indeed have the upper hand. In the vast majority of cases, Israel's struggle against terrorism fits the "war model." Although this finding is not surprising, the preference for the more military model is not self-evident. The immense intelligence efforts and thwarting operations carried out by Israel have brought about short-term accomplishments. However, a retrospective analysis of the evolution of terrorism committed against Israel demonstrates that the long-term aims of stamping out terrorism or even containing it have not been achieved. Organizations that suffered setbacks did not in fact dissolve; they simply changed form. Terrorist tactics that Israel was able to suppress were replaced often by much more devastating modes of operation. And in general, the international community's support for the Palestinian political demands increased significantly over the last three decades.

How can this be explained? Especially since it is clear that in the struggle against Palestinian terrorism, Israel enjoyed significant advantages in terms of military/operational capabilities and access to financial and other resources, as well as from the support of the international community (at least until the early 2000s). Several components of the conflict seem to undermine the ability of Israel to curb Palestinian terrorism. First, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 provided the Palestinian groups with a base from where they were able to facilitate grassroots support for the struggle and an almost endless reservoir of potential recruits, as well as helping them in the long run (especially as a result of the implications of the Israeli military control of the West Bank and Gaza) to gain international support. Second, despite the fragmentation within the Palestinian political landscape, the ability of the Palestinian population to agree on some core elements of their political vision created enough bottom-up support and consolidation of Palestinian political ethos to sustain the violent struggle. Third, the ongoing support (although it fluctuated over the years) of the Arab League and some Arab countries helped the Palestinians to preserve their access to safe havens and other important resources. Fourth, the Israeli focus on identifying tactical solutions to new challenges, rather than investing in identifying a strategic solution, eventually contributed to the endurance of the Palestinian struggle.

A recent example is the over-focus of Israel following the 2016 Gaza war on finding a tactical solution to the use of tunnels by Hamas in order to infiltrate into Israel, rather than focusing on strategic steps that can hopefully prevent future escalations in Gaza. Fifth, the Israeli tendency to undermine alternative, more peaceful solutions to the conflict made it more difficult to nurture Palestinian actors who would be willing to engage in non-violent solutions to the conflict. What does all of this actually tell us more generally about our ability to curb terrorism?

Concluding remarks—generalizing from the Israeli case

The Israeli case study confirms that even when the asymmetry between the actors is significant, curbing terrorism is especially challenging under specific circumstances. When terrorism is perpetrated in the name of clear and identifiable political objectives, which can effectively rally the relevant population, the state may find it difficult to undermine the mobilization of political support by the terrorist groups. This is especially true as the struggle itself facilitates a dynamic which enhances the national solidarity of the "rebelling" community (as with the Palestinian case). In addition, it seems to confirm the importance of supportive external state actors and relevant diaspora. The ongoing support from various state actors, combined with support from the Palestinian diaspora, allowed the various Palestinian groups to overcome various setbacks, even some that seemed to be extremely detrimental to the Palestinian cause (see the 1982 Lebanon war). Lastly, the usage of the war model, especially domestically and against the specific ethnic/national collective which is concentrated in specific geographical space, in many cases facilitates an array of counterproductive consequences, which seems to exacerbate rather than calm a contentious situation. Thus, a review of the Israel experience uncovers multiple cases in which the easy trigger on the military response worked to the strategic (and tactical) advantage of the Palestinian groups, rather than benefiting Israel's security interests. It reflects the need to combine the war model with other counterterrorism mechanisms, and its utility under very specific conditions.

To conclude, several elements seem to further complicate the challenges Israel is facing in terms of combating and preventing terrorism. These include the growing involvement of global Jihadi groups in the Palestinian struggles (and their contribution to escalation in the violence), the growing international support for the Palestinian demands, the lack of political consensus within Israel regarding the preferred solution for the conflict (and specifically the continued control of the West Bank), and the growing military competence of the Palestinian groups.

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51

ITALY

The process of disengaging the Italian left-wing armed groups from political violence

Lorenzo Bosi and Donatella Della Porta

Italian left-wing armed groups started to emerge from 1969 on and usually lasted for a few years: Gruppi d'Azione Partigiana (GAP) 1969–72; Brigate Rosse (BR) 1970-88; Nuclei Armati Proletari (NAP) 1974-76; the Comitati Comunisti Rivoluzionari (CoCoRi) 1975-78; Prima Linea (PL) 1976-83; Unita' Comuniste Combattenti (UCC) 1976-77; Formazione Comuniste Combattenti (FCC) 1977-79; Reparti Comunisti Armati (RCA) and Movimento Comunista Rivoluzionario (MCR) 1979-81; Guerriglia Rossa 1979-80; Brigata XXVIII marzo 1980.[1] The BR and, to a lesser extent, Prima Linea represented indeed an exception rather than the rule in terms of their capacity to survive. The immediate reasons behind the defeats of the Italian left-wing armed groups were that their militants were killed, imprisoned or forced to quit while no new recruits were available to join anymore. The abandonment of political violence by their militants proceeded, however, through an often complex process of disengagement.

We look at this process by drawing especially upon studies on contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) suggesting that the disengagement process was, above all, constituted by the concatenation of four mechanisms: societal de-escalation – when social-conflicts pacify and mobilization decreases in scale, type and scope; deescalating policies – that is the development of strategies oriented to facilitate de-radicalization; organizational disbandment – as the dissolution of underground violent organizations; and individual de-capsulation – by which we mean the progressive coming out from isolation of militant individuals from the armed groups (Della Porta 2009, 2013; Bosi 2013; Alimi, Demetrious and Bosi 2015; Bosi and Della Porta 2015). While societal de-escalation and de-escalating policies worked in close concert with one another, they were also important in triggering organizational disbandment and individual de-capsulation.

Societal de-escalation

In Italy, left-wing political violence in the 1970s was rooted in the massive upsurge of the student movement and the workers' struggle of 1968–69, and their perceived failure to bring about broad social and political change. Political violence arose then on the Left, from the radicalization of networks of social movement activists that had felt peaceful protest had proved unsuccessful when confronted with state repression and right-wing violence. It was in this

tense socio-political atmosphere that the first left-wing armed groups were founded (Della Porta 1990).

After a period of high mobilization, between 1968 and 1977, Italy progressively experienced a decrease of political participation in conventional and unconventional forms of actions (Della Porta 1996). In conjunction with this decrease of mobilization in the entire Italian society, trade unions and the Italian Communist Party ran proactive campaigns aimed at cutting off any support for left-wing armed organizations (Naccarato 2015), with complex effects of radicalization on the one hand, and stigmatization of violence on the other. The context of the unfavourable socio-political environment (that is, the increasing stability of political alignments and government coalitions, minimal support from public opinion, and the absence of any potential ally in view of the end of the protest cycle), which became palpable in the early 1980s, clearly had an impact on left-wing armed groups, who started to assess that a "generational cycle is closing" (in Morucci 2004: 234). Renato Curcio, the former leader of the BR, in January 1987 issued a statement claiming that "the social battle of the 1970s is historically exhausted" and requested a "political and social way out of the cycle of violence of the 1970s" (in Gallinari 2006: 329). They sensed an increased isolation from Italian society and in particular from the constituency they aimed at mobilizing and from which they were gaining important resources for their own life. According to Caselli and Della Porta, "the collapse of the web of solidarity within the organization had a deleterious effect on the network of external supporters who had in the past supplied the important logistic support" (1991: 99). This is how a former PL armed militant recalls the decrease in support for the left-wing milieu:

> When this sort of character who, despite appearances, holds the life of the organization in his hands, starts to break away, you sense it, even if you dismiss it ideologically, you sense that people are quitting in the background, and in practice all the apparatus starts to stiffen up, so you end up with a large number of people hiding and you do not know where to keep them, you have to start to multiplying funding activities and by multiplying those you start to multiply incidents, deaths, injuries, arrests.
>
> *(Life History no 12:38, in Della Porta 2013: 268)*

In the same direction, Sergio Segio, former leader of PL, wrote later that "The world should have been going back to politics. The time of the arms was definitively behind, [an] irreversible instrument of a vintage at sunset" (2006:214). The failure to recruit new members to their groups was a direct outcome of this situation and posed new doubts over the effectiveness of the armed struggle project. Despite the clandestine nature of these groups, left-wing armed militants started to notice clear signs of defeat, described as "friends who started to drink," "heroin that penetrated the environment of the revolutionary left," and "increasingly frequent defections" (Della Porta 1990: chap 4).

De-escalating policing

Whereas previous legal provisions had aimed at raising the costs of joining left-wing armed groups, in the early 1980s new policy measures were enforced by the Italian state in order to facilitate the breaking of the associative pact within left-wing armed groups. The strategy behind these new measures was that of reducing the psychological costs of leaving through varying degrees of clemency: from creating "homogeneous areas" for prisoners serving sentences for terrorist offences, to softening prison conditions and reducing sentences for the

repented activists who collaborated with the authorities (Pentiti Law of 1980), to extending some reductions in sentences (Dissociazione Law of 1986) to all those who publicly declared that they would leave the "armed struggle" (Bull and Cooke 2013; Galfré 2014). This is how two of the leaders of the BR, respectively Enrico Fenzi and Prospero Gallinari, interpreted this passage retrospectively:

> Certainly there is a desire to get out of jail, there is the feeling of defeat and repulsion about what you have done. There is a different political opinion. There is the perception of a reality different from what you [had] thought.
>
> *(Zavoli 1995: 226)*

> It is certainly not new but it is not badly thought of either, the power strategy. Diverging treatment and prospects tears open the prison environment and subsequently encourage crises among political prisoners. Many comrades were already assailed with doubts and questions. The Ministry's prison policy required clear political horizons and impartial ethical motivations if it were to be handled with the necessary strength and patience. But this itself was increasingly lacking.
>
> *(Gallinari 2006: 302)*

Many armed militants benefited from the opportunities offered by these legislative measures, thereby breaking the pact of fidelity to the left-wing armed groups. According to data provided by the Ministry of Justice, upon expiration of the terms fixed in the law on *dissociazione* (120 days and then extended by another 120), 389 people had benefited from it: 78 as "great repenters," 134 as "repenters" and 177 as "dissolvers" (De Lutiis 1990). With few exceptions, activists of left-wing armed groups in prison successively and in various ways publicly declared the end of the "armed struggle" in Italy. This is what Alberto Franceschini, one of the leaders of the BR, wrote with regard to this phase of his militant trajectory:

> At that stage the revolution was not anymore on the agenda, we had to find a way of entering back in society … we were not demanding some favour, but only to be treated as common prisoners, not anymore as "pericoulos terrorists" in order to explain that we have changed in comparison with the past, that we want to go back to "a normal life" without selling at the same time our dignity.
>
> *(Franceschini and Fasanella 2004: 125)*

The facilitation of a collective disengagement was particularly relevant in the case of PL's militants. Most of them benefited in fact from the provisions around "homogeneous areas" and then collectively dissociated from the armed struggle (Novelli and Tranfaglia 2007; Segio 2006). In 1984 Marco Boato, a former militant of Lotta Continua, an extra-parliamentary organization, wrote in this way about the importance of the dissociation process:

> The historian, sociologist, politician, or also magistrate: anyone whom in the future would like to study and understand how Italy was able to gradually exit from the "years of lead", as the terrorist has been first of all defeated politically rather than at the military level … – that person will have necessarily to look at the "long march" of the movement for the political dissociation.
>
> *(in Galfré 2014: 99)*

Organizational disbandment

What brought many left-wing armed militants to disengage from political violence was the fact that they did not recognize anymore, as their own, the armed group that they had helped to establish or that they had joined early on. They did not agree with the usefulness of the increasingly brutal actions, and many militant activists started to dissociate (Jamieson 1990). This is how, for example, Alfredo Buonavita, one of the founders of the BR who was imprisoned in 1974, spoke of his "disgust as regards a practice that was no longer suitable for me in simple human terms," noting that "a part always continues to want to break with this thing and yet there is an inability and impossibility to reach an agreement" (Life history no. 5: 148–9). Yet another leader of the BR has referred to the transformation of the armed group in these terms: "It's as if the organisation followed an independent path of laws that are not its own and become at that moment the laws of defeat and are therefore also determined by rivals" (Life history no. 27: 4). The rise of violence, especially the killing in jail of an extremely young member alleged of being a collaborator; or the murder of two private guards carried out to highlight news of a presumed betrayal of one of their supporters, started to disgust the same activists as well, who were looking for possible ways out while in prison (Della Porta 2013).

'The struggle among the various factions fighting over the hegemony of the leftovers of the organization' (Caselli and Della Porta 1984: 102) further increased the level of violence adopted. These splits, the further radicalisation strategy of the armed group, and captures made interactions with other militants outside jail progressively more impersonal, breaking those affective ties that had been keeping activists in the organisations despite growing doubts over the future of armed struggle. In fact, "leadership failures, ideological competitions, physical exhaustion and availability of attractive paths out of violence weakened the cohesion within the underground left-wing groups and finally increased disagreements on ideology and strategy and burnout doubts among armed activists on their existence and worldview" (Della Porta 2013).

This mechanism was in particular accelerated by some precipitating events, often recalled by the militants. Valerio Morucci, leader of the Roman "Column" of the BR, claimed that "The last straw [for me] was the killing of Guido Rossa … I wrote that the murder of Guido Rossa had been a serious mistake. All of us in the BR thought so – except the people who killed him." The BR "just continued killing and we couldn't take it anymore" (2004: 203). Similarly, a former PL supporter would recall the killing of a presumed "informer" as "the element that makes me say I don't even see them anymore" (Life history no. 3: 73; for details on Life histories, see Della Porta 2013).

Individual de-encapsulation

Leaving armed groups is particularly painful since it means challenging previous strong commitment around which life had been structured. So, an activist recalls that "it was a devastating experience, to go back home, to give up, when at the same time some of our comrades, who were recognized as the most generous, the most available ones, they were instead imprisoned, or they were killing other people" (in Sommier 2005: 178). As Morucci wrote (2004: 193), his departure from the terrorist organization was delayed by the fact that "I couldn't yet leave the BR without also leaving behind my revolutionary faith. … And this is not an easy journey for a communist. Precisely because, going beyond the ideology, it has been a faith."

In leaving armed militancy Italian left-wing activists needed to avoid giving a drastically negative account about their experiences – which was therefore often assimilated to "the one of a generation". This allowed some degree of self-respect to be maintained, keeping a collective

identification of the groups of comrades. Let us cite just a few examples of a common position in most of the life histories collected:

> I believe that it would be very bad if, having reached this point, one simply said "I've done a lot of stupid things, I've always been wide of the mark, look how stupid I've been, now that's enough, turn the page, I don't want to hear any more about it."
>
> *(Life history no. 28: 98)*

As another militant noted:

> despite thousands of mistakes and contradictions, I disown absolutely nothing of those years; they were and are part and parcel of my life as a woman, I who has never succeeded in accepting things as they were but who has tried, through mistakes too, to contribute to changing them.
>
> *(Life history no. 24: 54)*

Left-wing armed activists also experienced breaking previous relationships with other militants as particularly costly. A sense of solidarity certainly slowed down the process of moving away from an organization, especially as long as the only possible option was to choose between "repentance" – and denouncing comrades – or unshakable loyalty to the organization. In the words of one former activist, "You knew that these weren't your BR anymore but this is disappointing and admitting disappointment is always hard if you've dedicated your life to something … It's a very difficult individual decision. I thought about killing myself twice" (Life history no. 7: 10-11). In fact, for a long time the widespread perception was that:

> Putting yourself in the hands of the state means two things: either being there as a poor lonely, isolated devil leading a horrible life forever because you're isolated from the other detainees – and the guards get their revenge for what happened to them before because you didn't have a very nice past. Or, instead you decide to send people to prison, to collaborate, to "repent" in inverted commas and then indeed you find a place where you can live and where you're protected. (…) So however many splits there were, on the one hand there's a solidarity and friendship that binds you together and the necessity to face things together to live in prison, and on the other hand the impossibility of a political departure from the organization.
>
> *(Life history no. 5: 120)*

As it did in keeping commitments, solidarity towards a small group of comrades from the organization also influenced the process of separation from the armed struggle in prison as disengagement became a collective process. Many interviewees claimed that "you don't leave alone," claiming that "they waited for the others" so as not to "tear apart internal relations with the other detainees," that they "waited for a process of collective maturity" in order to "reduce the weight of recognising mistakes" (quoted in della Porta 1990). With regard to his initial position of refusing all self-criticism, one PL supporter declared:

> It was very hard because substantially I thought that what was left of this element of cohesion and solidarity should hold firm. … I felt, yes, that I had to save this collective movement at all costs, had to save these relationships at all costs. … For me, they

> were relationships from '72 and '73, I mean, it was a life we had lived together, in all our choices.
>
> *(Life history no. 26: 31–3 passim)*

Following arrest, the prospect of a long prison sentence becomes much more dramatic when a person admits the failure of one's own life project and, consequently, ends the illusion that liberation can come from the outside:

> It is impossible for a person who was ready to undergo a long prison sentence or even death to construct a communist society, and when he realises that an irreversible reverse process is happening, i.e. when the political defeat is confirmed by the facts, to pay such a high price so easily.
>
> *(Life history no. 24: 59–60)*

However, slowly, the perception of breaking the bonds of solidarity due to growing, if limited "repentance" is added to the growing awareness of the crisis in the underground organization, accentuated by the impossibility of resisting arrests and recruiting from new social movements.

A sort of burn-out is also mentioned as the basis of a mechanism of individual de-incapsulation. A form of commitment that is increasingly demanding in terms of time or emotional investment is in fact cited as jeopardizing a self-critical reflection on one's own choice – the "impossibility not only for me but also I believe of the situation of being able to stop for a moment and say no" (Life history no. 21: 43). In a similar way, another militant recalled

> Incredible tiredness; at that time I injured my leg, I was hurt, I was in bed for two months and I seemed to see things clearly (…) I really had this impression that I could stop and look in from the outside (…) this self-nurturing mechanism.
>
> *(Life history no. 29: 45)*

These perceptions of spoiled energies were however also at the basis of a sort of relief at the forced arrest. As a militant recalled:

> We woke up at 5 o'clock … to do reconnaissance [obtaining information on a possible target] … then I couldn't go home, I had to meet people, so I had to be in Rome all day; then I went home in the evening, we had to do documents, type, do a load of other things, then we went to bed at about midnight. At that time, I was also having a relationship with the person living with me, we would chat a bit, do other things, this and that, it was one o'clock, at five I had to be up again. I got between three and four hours' sleep a night (…) when they knocked on my door that morning, my first thought was "I knew it"; the second was "thank goodness, more sleep."
>
> *(Life history no. 1: 75–6)*

Concluding remarks

The four mechanisms that we have highlighted combined to form the process of disengagement from political violence for left-wing armed groups in the Italian case. The societal de-escalation mechanism and de-escalating policies worked together as at the same time the two most consequential mechanisms and those from which the process of disengage-

ment started. While forms of peaceful protests became more accepted, the stigmatization of violence by progressive social movements and other actors on the Left contributed to the isolation of underground organizations. This meant fundamental changes in the forms of collective action (the societal de-escalation mechanism), with a growing stigmatization of the most violent forms. By the early 1980s, this started to interact with effective policies of facilitating disengagement through reduction of prison sentences and the creation of homogeneous areas in prisons (the de-escalating policies mechanism). While stigmatization produced further isolation among the left-wing groups, with the immediate result of an increase of the most brutal actions, this had the effect of triggering fractionalization and sectarianism (the organizational disbandment mechanism) that disappointed many left-wing armed activists who found in the new policies of facilitating departure a possible way out (the de-escalating policies mechanism) at the individual and collective levels (individual de-encapsulation mechanism).

Note

1 On the literature on the "years of lead" (*anni di piombo*) in Italy, see: Ceci (2013).

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52
SPAIN

Rogelio Alonso

Diversity of terrorist expressions

The four waves of terrorism in Spain

Spain has been one of the European democracies most affected by terrorism throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Terrorism perpetrated by ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*) has been the most intense one, but other groups have also perpetrated terrorist acts and even protracted terrorist campaigns. Rapoport's (2004) waves of modern terrorism provide the right historical framework for the main expressions of political violence in Spain to be placed in.

The first fatalities in Spain caused by political violence were recorded at the end of the nineteenth century within the anarchist wave ('Núñez', 1983; Avil's, 2004). From 1893 until 1923 anarchists carried out an intense campaign of violence in the country which combined indiscriminate attacks with more selective ones. By way of example in November 1893 an anarchist exploded two bombs at the Liceo Theatre in Barcelona killing 15 people and injuring more than 50. A tough repression from the authorities was triggered by this type of indiscriminate attacks, as well as by others against political and military figures such as the killing of C'novas del Castillo, President of the Council of Ministers in 1897, and that of Jos' Canalejas, President of the Government in 1912. Therefore, "propaganda by the deed" was very prominent during a period where Spanish king Alfonso XIII was also targeted on four occasions (Herrer'n and Avil's, 2010). This wave of anarchist terrorism in Spain also led to the first pieces of legislation in response to violent alterations of public order, which were the origin of the more thorough and complex counter-terrorist framework developed in the twentieth century.

ETA's terrorism throughout the third wave

Coinciding with Rapoport's third wave of terrorism, terrorism emerged in the country again in the 1960s during the crisis of Franco's dictatorship, which lasted from 1939 until 1975. ETA was born in 1959 as a radicalized expression of Basque nationalism and committed its first killing in 1968, although ETA's campaign intensified during the democratic period following the demise of Francoism. As of the end of ETA's campaign in 2011 the terrorist group was responsible for killing 858 people and injuring thousands (Alonso, Dom'nguez and Rey, 2010). ETA has espoused a nationalist ideology whose origins laid in a traditional doctrine elaborated in religious and racial

terms at the end of the nineteenth century (Eloraza, 2005). This extremist ideology embraced by Basque nationalists became the basis on which the terrorist group would justify its intense, decades-long campaign of killings. It became an important motivating factor for those who joined the Basque terrorist group, facilitating their mobilization (Reinares, 2001). ETA's activists found an endorsement for their violence in a set of nationalist ideals based on the exclusion of those not seen as nationalists and who opposed the nationalist aim of the creation of an entity called Euskal Herria. This is the ethno-linguistic unit claimed by Basque separatists as their homeland, which comprises the three Spanish provinces that make up the Basque Country, *Guipúzcoa*, *Álava* and *Vizcaya*, as well as another Spanish province and autonomous region, *Navarra*, and the French Departments of *Labourd*, *Soul* and the lower *Navarra* portions of *Pyr'n'es Atlantiques*.

The relevance of this extremist nationalist ideology explains why ETA's campaign continued in spite of the remarkable transformation of the country during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. The process of democratization brought in a process of administrative decentralization described as "unparalleled in the rest of Western Europe" and "tantamount to a revolution" (Conversi, 1993). Such a political transformation which resolved the democratic deficit in which ETA had emerged effectively contributed to the erosion of support for ETA's terrorism. The consolidation of democracy was aided by other important factors: the gradual professionalization and modernization of security agencies that had been seen with distrust by society because of their previous association with an authoritarian regime (Jaime, 2002); the release, between 1975 and 1977, of nearly 900 members and collaborators of ETA exiled or imprisoned under the dictatorship; the setting up in 1977 of the Spanish National Court, which constituted a fundamental jurisdictional change since from that moment onwards terrorist crimes would be dealt with by judges instead of military courts; and the social reinsertion measures based on individual pardons applied from 1982 to individuals prepared to distance themselves from the terrorist organization.

In spite of this radical transformation ETA continued with terrorism portraying violence as necessary in response to alleged grievances that had not been addressed by what nationalism regarded as "false" democratization. This view is in stark contrast with the widely held praise for the democratization process put in place by Spain after Franco's death. It must be stressed that new democratic political institutions and a new legal framework were put into place following the end of the dictatorship. In 1978 a new Spanish Constitution was endorsed by the electorate, opening the door for the decentralization of the State and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country, also approved by referendum. This framework allowed the PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*) to govern the Basque Country since 1980 with the exception of a brief period between 2009 and 2011, when a non-nationalist party, the PSE (*Partido Socialista de Euskadi*), was able to replace it. The wide autonomy also allowed for the setting up of a Basque police force – *Ertzantza* – and for the Basque vernacular – *Euskera* – to be recognized as one of its official languages. The flag and the anthem of the major nationalist party, the PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*), became the official symbols of the autonomous community known as Euskadi. Although this consolidated democratization and hegemony of democratic nationalism led some ETA members to move away from violence, support for terrorism remained among a significant minority of the population of the region.

Terrorism during the third wave

ETA's terrorism was not the only one present in Spain during the transition from dictatorship to democracy and throughout the consolidation of democracy in the country. Other terrorist expressions which were characteristic of the "third" and "fourth" waves of terrorism were also active. The transition years in the mid-1970s were particularly violent, with right- and left-wing

terrorism, anarchist violence and that of Catalan and Galician extremist nationalism, as well as Armenian and Arab nationalism, as Table 52.1 illustrates.

Although ETA has been by far the most lethal group, another terrorist group born within the third wave has been responsible for a high number of casualties. GRAPO (*Grupos Revolucionarios Antifascistas Primero de Octubre*), which espoused an extreme left–revolutionary ideology, ended up being the second most active group in Spain, causing the deaths of 85 people (Castro, 2002). This group appeared and disappeared throughout the 1980s and 1990s, gradually fading away to the extent that although they were still in existence at the turn of the century their activity was very limited, their four latest killings dating 1995, 2000 and 2006.

A similar ideology was also espoused by a less active group like FRAP (*Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota*). Their ideology varied from that of groups like ETA which emerged during the same wave, espousing an ideology in which revolutionary radicalism merged with nationalism. This was also the case of various pro-independence terrorist groups such as *Terra Lliure* (Free Land) in Catalonia, the *Exercito Guerrilheiro Do Povo Galego Ceive* (EGPGC – Guerrilla Army of the Free Galician People) in Galicia, and the *Movimiento para la Autodeterminaci'n e Independencia del Archipi'lago Canario* (MPAIAC – Movement for the Independence and Self-Determination of the Canaries Archipelago).

Another different case from the abovementioned ones is that of the *Frente Popular Revolucionario de Liberaci'n de Saguia El Hamra y R'o de Oro* (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hamra and Rio Oro), popularly known as the Polisario Front. Despite the fact that this group defined itself as a national liberation movement for the Saharaui people and was not included in the European list of terrorist groups (Common Position 2004/309/PESC of the Council of Europe), the Spanish Ministry of Interior has recognized over 70 Spanish victims from this group – most of them assassinated in the Canary Islands – as victims of terrorism.

However, it must be emphasized that during the "third wave" terrorism in Spain was not restricted to extreme left ideology and its pro-independence ultranationalist ideological supporters and associated entities. Similarly an extreme right ideology also inspired brutal terrorist

Table 52.1 Number of victims in Spain and terrorist group responsible (1968–2015)

Terrorist Group	*Number of Fatalities*
Eta	858
Islamist and Arabic Terrorism	222
Grapo	85
Popular Revolutionary Front of Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio Oro (polisario Front)	72
Extreme Right Terrorism	34
GAL	27
Anarchists	6
Frap	6
Armenian Groups	3
Basque Radical Left – Iraultza	2
Exército Guerrilheiro Do Povo Gallego Ceive	2
Popular Catalan Army	2
Movement of Liberation (mil)	2
Collective Group Hammer and Sickle	1
Front D'Allibermanent de Cataluña (fac)	1
Canary Islands self-determination and independence movement (m.p.a.i.a.c.)	1
Terra Lliure	1
Red Army of Liberation	1
TOTAL NUMBER OF FATALITIES	1326

group mainly active during the 1970s and 1980s. This was the case of the *Alianza Apost'lica Anticomunista* (AAA or Triple A – *Anti-Communist Apostolic Alliance*), the *Grupos Armados Espa'oles* (GAE – *Armed Spanish Groups),* the *Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey* (Warriors of Christ the King) and the *Batall'n Vasco Espa'ol* (BVE – *Basque Spanish Battalion*) causing the deaths of at least 34 people and injuring hundreds (Fern'ndez and Rodr'guez, 2001; Rodr'guez, 1994, 1997).

Another terrorist group was also active during the 1980s, the so-called GAL (*Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberaci'n*). From 1983 to 1987 a terrorist campaign was waged against suspected members and supporters of ETA by GAL, a shadowy organization which killed 27 individuals, many of whom had never belonged to any terrorist organization. This illegal group was secretly formed by police officials who recruited mercenary assassins from organized crime in France and Portugal. GAL's terrorism was used by ETA to justify "armed struggle" as a defensive response to alleged "State violence". Nonetheless, this type of terrorism was a pretext rather than the cause of ETA's terrorist campaign (*El Laberinto Espa'ol*, 2006). The involvement of representatives of the State in GAL didn't extend to the whole democratic system and the country proved to be a functioning democracy ultimately applying the law. The policemen, gangsters and Socialist Party political officials who were involved in GAL received severe jail sentences for their illegal activities. The families of their victims received monetary compensation from State budget funds, just as did those whose family members were those killed by other terrorist organizations, including ETA (for an analysis of GAL see Woodworth, 2001).

The fourth wave and jihadist terrorism

With regard to the "fourth wave" of terrorism, Spain was also affected by terrorism linked to and/or inspired in a radical interpretation of Islam since the 1980s. Throughout that decade and up until the 2001 September 11 attacks, it was common for intelligence services and political and judicial authorities to refer to "Islamist terrorism". This type of terrorism was somewhat different from the one that was going to emerge with the consolidation of Al-Qaeda at the turn of the century. The rationale of the attacks during the 1980s was also very different from that of the Madrid bombings in 2004. Most Islamic terrorist attacks perpetrated in Spain from the 1980s to the 11-M attacks in 2004 were the result of an internationalization of Middle East-related regional violence. Thus, not surprisingly, perpetrators came from countries like Iran, Lebanon and Palestine and victims came from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Lebanon and Palestine (Fontecha, 2004). As way of example Islamic Jihad in Lebanon claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack perpetrated on April 12, 1985 which killed ten people and injured hundreds in a restaurant frequented in Madrid by USA military.

The terrorist attacks on March 11, which killed 191 people and injured hundreds, was a turning point for Spain for they demonstrated the prominence that the jihadist movement had reached in the country. Spain, after having been described in 2001 by Italian judicial authorities as the "main base of al Qaeda in Europe" as a result of the activities of Islamist radicals during the previous decade (Irujo, 2002), had finally become a target of violence too. Although it is plausible to believe that Al-Qaeda ordered the terrorist attack perpetrated on March 11, the judicial and police investigations conducted by the Spanish authorities were unable to conclusively establish that the order to perpetrate the attack came directly from the leadership of the terrorist organization led then by Osama bin Laden. As Bruce Hoffman (2008: 649) has rightly concluded: "While both the 2005 London bombings and 2006 airline bomb have been conclusively linked to Core Al-Qaeda, its links to the Madrid attack— although suspected—have never satisfactorily been established." This is the case in spite of the fact that members of the jihadist terrorist cell that carried the attack had been closely linked to prominent Al-Qaeda leaders in the past.

The Al-Qaeda network in Spain had been involved in different terrorist activities since the mid and late 1990s that were mainly oriented toward other countries. Spain was initially regarded as a valuable base for logistical and infrastructure support, to the point of being described as "one of the favourite sanctuaries" of Islamist terrorists (Valenzuela, 2002), but not as a target of violence itself. As a result of those activities and of an intensification of the counterterrorist response in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, at the end of 2001 Spanish police dismantled what was regarded as the Spanish cell of Al-Qaeda. Following this investigation, in September 2005 a total of 18 men were sentenced by the Spanish National Court after magistrates found them guilty of membership and collaboration with Al-Qaeda. Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, nicknamed Abu Dahdah, the leader of the cell, was sentenced to 27 years in prison accused of leading a terrorist organization and conspiring to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001.[1] The judicial verdict stated that the men found guilty had engaged over a prolonged period of time, which in some cases went back as far as 1995, in activities of indoctrination and proselytizing, financing terrorist cells in different countries all over the world and recruiting *mujahideen* in order to send them to conflict spots in Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia and Afghanistan. Therefore, March 11 exposed a significant shift in the terrorist strategy, since Spain itself had for the first time become a target.

The fact that such a brutal terrorist attack took place three days before a Spanish general election lost by the party in government at the time of the attacks led to speculation about the likely intentions of the terrorists. No evidence has emerged yet to prove that those responsible for the March 11 attack aimed at influencing the nation's vote in order to damage the party in power at the time, which had supported the military intervention in Iraq (Alonso, 2013). Several factors provoked a "selective politicization of the crisis" that the terrorist attacks implied (Olmeda, 2005), triggering a deep political and social polarization in the country. These factors were: a) the Spanish government's handling of the crisis and alleging initially the attacks to be an ETA operation, failing to convincingly acknowledge the possibility of jihadist involvement even when this hypothesis emerged hours after the attacks; b) the accusations voiced by the main opposition party against the Spanish government for its management of the crisis and alleging the attacks to be a direct result of Spain's support for the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, also holding the then president directly responsible for the murder of 191 people; c) the questions raised by some observers over the legitimacy of the election outcome given the influence the tragic events could have had on voters; and d) the suspicions aired by some media and politicians concerning the rationale for and authorship of the attacks, attributing them to actors other than those who were ultimately convicted for them.

The management of the crisis distorted the reality of the situation regarding the nature of the terrorist threat. There is no doubt that Iraq was a factor that probably had some influence on the actions of the terrorists, but the alleged direct cause–effect between the Spanish support for the intervention in Iraq and the terrorists' attacks must be tempered. It is reasonable to argue that if the Spanish government at the time had responded differently, avoiding some of the mistakes that were made in the management of the crisis, the electoral results could have looked quite different (Alonso, 2005).

Countering an evolving threat: from ETA to jihadist terrorism

The decline and demise of ETA's terrorism

Although the threat of international terrorism inspired by Islamic fundamentalism differs from the one posed for so long by ETA, important similarities emerge when analyzing these

terrorist phenomena (Alonso, 2008). Therefore, the lessons learned throughout the years of dealing with ETA were not ignored when confronting a new terrorist challenge in the form of Al-Qaeda and inspired terrorism. In fact, to a great extent the experience of countering ETA's protracted terrorist campaign informed the Spanish response to the terrorist posed later on by jihadism. A similar counter-terrorist framework as the one developed over the years against ETA was also put into place against jihadism, albeit with important adaptations and improvements.

When jihadist terrorism emerged in full in Spain, ETA's containment and decline had been achieved through a comprehensive set of measures. The democratization of the country's political system was one of the most effective instruments against ETA, together with various political initiatives and pacts aimed at building up a consensus among the main political parties against terrorism (Alonso and Reinares, 2005; Reinares and Alonso, 2007). These political initiatives acted as very efficient anti-terrorist tools that progressively deprived the terrorist group of wide support. However, despite the decreasing support for terrorism over the years and the greater rejection of violence, when ETA's campaign ended in 2011 a minority but nonetheless significant section of the Basque population still lent some legitimization to terrorism (Alonso and Serrano, 2014). This evolution can be seen in the series of sociological surveys published every six months by the Euskobarómetro at the University of the Basque Country from 1981 until 2012 (http://www.ehu.es/euskobarometro/).

Political initiatives were complemented with other police, social and judicial counter-terrorist measures such as law enforcement efforts characterized by a gradual increase in international cooperation and the improvement of intelligence capabilities, together with the professionalization and enhancement of efficiency of the main counter-terrorist agencies (Jaime, 2002); judicial and legislative responses which included the introduction of new terrorist offences and the proscription of political and social organizations linked to the terrorist group (Alonso, 2010a); as well as social reinsertion and penitentiary provisions applied to activists who distanced themselves from violence although some of them did not de-radicalize and merely left the terrorist group (Escriv', 2006).

Throughout the years security forces improved their training, equipment and coordination gradually changing the levels of police efficiency. Accordingly, good intelligence increased and so did the percentage of prosecutions also diminishing the alienation that less selective police had caused in certain communities that had facilitated ETA's recruitment of supporters and sympathizers (Dom'nguez, 1998). Police efficiency greatly benefited from the strengthening of cooperation between Spain and France since the neighbouring country was seen for many years as a refuge for ETA's leadership. The social mobilization against terrorism from the mid-1990s onwards was also a key factor in the counter-terrorist framework. Victims of terrorism became an influential player that managed to influence the design and implementation of public policy vis-a-vis terrorism following the victimization of a large number of citizens and the support that the Spanish government lent to their demands (Alonso, 2016).

This combination of political, police, social and judicial measures managed to seriously weaken the terrorist group, not only at the operational level but also on the political front. This is illustrated by the decreasing support of ETA's political wing, Batasuna, which performed poorly in general elections over the years, although with a significant loyal vote: 1979: 15%; 1982: 14.8%; 1986: 17.8%; 1989: 16.8%; 1993: 14.6%; 1996: 12.3%.[2] It was precisely the banning of ETA's political wing in 2002 that struck a very serious blow to the terrorist movement by restricting the group's political and social control, as well as depriving it of a very useful source of income. This draconian measure, which was nonetheless judicially endorsed by national and international tribunals, including the European Court of Human Rights,[3] was

later complemented with the enactment of legal provisions that defined as terrorist offences the praise for or justification of terrorism and the humiliation of victims of terrorism.

Spanish counter-terrorism reached a very successful level at the turn of the century, as acknowledged by ETA's internal documentation at the time, which reveals how damaging the government's integrated strategy was to the group. It brought about a serious weakening of terrorist infrastructure, and there was private internal acknowledgment of the effectiveness of the State's policies to the point that ETA leadership even envisaged defeat.[4] This serious crisis led the group to call a truce in 2004 in the context of negotiations with the Spanish government led by the Socialist Party which took office in March of that year. The negotiation process raised high expectations in the terrorist movement and the truce broke down two years later when the group's main demands were not met. However, ETA's deterioration deepened on the operational front while the internal debates exposed the conflicting views about the continuation of violence. Finally, the movement split in 2009 and those in favour of calling an end to the armed campaign imposed their view. As it was expressed in one of the internal documents written by ETA's political representatives around that time (*Aclaraci'n Estrat'gica*, 2009), there were insurmountable obstacles that prevented the "political–military strategy" from being effective. The conflict between the "political" and the "military" strategy required important adjustments that in the end led to the conclusion of the terrorist campaign announced in October 2011.

Jihadist terrorism as the main threat

As ETA's campaign died out, jihadist terrorism became the main threat for Spain's security. The level of the threat is illustrated by the increasing number of police operations against this type of terrorism: around 70 antiterrorist operations have been recorded between 1995 and 2015.[5] Most of these operations took place after the Madrid bombings in 2004, inaugurating a period somehow different from the years until this attack. During the first of these periods various isolated operations were undertaken in response to several conspiracies and attacks carried out by Arab extremist groups.[6] Nevertheless, the first operation establishing a clear link with *jihadist-Salafism* was the arrest in Barcelona in 1995 of an Algerian citizen associated with the *Armed Islamic Group (GIA)*.[7] During this period individuals involved in terrorist activities were associated with so-called "superior groups" such as the *GIA (Algerian Islamist Group)*, its successor the *GSPC* (*The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat*), the *Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group* (*GICM, Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain*) and even *al-Qaeda-Central*. Jihadism in Spain used its links to large organizations, since taking any steps towards action required the support of the latter. Nevertheless, individual participation in such organizations was paradoxically carried out through informal ties based on friendship or kinship (Alonso, 2010b).

In the 1990 six operations relating to the Algerian *GIA* were carried out, all of them focusing on the logistical cells supporting the organization's bases in North Africa. No attack plans were observed in Spain. From 2000 onwards new developments were revealed throughout Europe, including Spain. This was mainly due to two reasons: the increased presence of Al-Qaeda-linked networks on European territory, and the global instruction of volunteers travelling to training camps in Afghanistan. Of particular significance was the influence of *GSPC* operatives who sought refuge in Bosnia and Chechnya after leaving Afghanistan, and who then went on to plan attacks in Europe as part of Al-Qaeda's strategy. Perhaps the most significant aspect of that first period was evidence of the existence of Al-Qaeda-Central-related networks in Spain and also the fact that they supported terrorist attacks outside Spain.

In the last years of that first period, there were several attempted terrorist attacks in Spain or against Spanish interests carried out by jihadist groups settled in Spain. Other remarkable events

were the Casablanca (Morocco) attacks in May 2003, one of whose main targets was the *Casa de Espa'a*'s restaurant, located in that Moroccan city. Links between jihadist groups in Spain, such as the one located in the Madrid neighbourhood of *Lavapi's*, with jihadist factions related to the *GICM* in Morocco[8] were strong, therefore raising suspicions that both networks had worked together in said attacks.

At the same time in Madrid, another Moroccan citizen with strong ties to Azizi, Mustapha Maymouni, began to assemble two terrorist cells, one in the capital city of Spain and another in Larache and Kenitra (Morocco). The aim was to recruit volunteers for Iraq and to plan terror attacks in the two countries. He was arrested in May 2003 in Morocco, while the group he had founded and led in Madrid began to make the plans which would eventually come to fruition in the March 11 attacks. His brother-in-law, Serhane Al Fakhet ("Serhane the Tunisian"), then assumed the group's leadership, therefore also becoming the network's head, building contacts and forging alliances with similar groups settled in Spain and linked to *GICM*, the Algerian groups which succeeded *GIA*, the *Libyan Islamic Fighting Group* and Al-Qaeda. The network exposed following the investigation into the Madrid attacks also revealed that there were links between individuals and groups settled in Spain, mostly to North African jihadist groups, with European and Asia-based jihadist networks.

Prior to March 11 a network recruiting and sending volunteers to Iraq headed by the Algerian Abderrazak Mahdjoub, who had German nationality and lived in Hamburg and was linked to Ansar al-Islam in Europe, was also dismantled. The network in Spain had funding structures in several towns located in the Basque country and Madrid and its contacts extended to Catalonia, with support networks in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. This network was the first to reveal the setup of the networks in Europe whose mission was to recruit and send volunteers to the Iraqi conflict.

During the second period of jihadist activity in Spain, following the Madrid 2004 attacks, the police response gave rise to a security crackdown that ended with more than 100 arrests. This was followed by new anti-terrorist initiatives over the successive years involving individuals or groups with minor roles in the 2004 plot and linked, primarily, to the networks overseeing the travel arrangements of volunteer jihadists to foreign conflicts.[9] Different measures were announced with the aim of meeting the objectives set out by the European Union's strategy for combating terrorism and the radicalization and recruitment of individuals: disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism, ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism, and promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all (Council of the European Union, 2005). The measures implemented by the Spanish authorities in order to fulfil these objectives have included a significant increase in intelligence capabilities; the improvement and enhancement of coordination and cooperation between security agencies and governments; legislative reforms; the implementation of a programme designed to enhance the protection of targets and the responses to terrorist attacks; and, finally, measures aimed at the prevention of radicalization and recruitment (Reinares, 2009; Alonso, 2015).

In analytical terms, there is a significant numerical difference between the police operations carried out in both the above periods, with more than twice the number of operations during the second period. Another remarkable feature is that, while larger organizations have continued to play an important role, individuals with no links to them have played a growing part over the past five years. As a general conclusion we can agree that police action in Spain against jihadist terrorism has mostly been aimed at attempting to prevent the growth of terrorist cells. It is well known that the formation process of any radical group preparing to take action follows a path that can be divided into three stages: the indoctrination phase, the preparation phase and the

action phase. Most police operations carried out in Spain have been rolled out and executed between the first and the second of these phases, those addressing the hiatus between the second and the third phases being, for the most part, an exception.[10]

Notes

1 In June 2006 the Spanish Supreme Court reduced this sentence to 12 years after qualifying that although Abu Dahdah was definitely a member of a terrorist organization he did not take part in the preparation of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the United States in 2001.
2 Results of the general elections held in the last decades bearing in mind that Batasuna called for abstention in 2000 and was outlawed two years later, thus being unable to contest further elections (Unzueta and Barber'a, 2003).
3 Judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) of June 30, 2009, which unanimously supported the banning of such parties and which rejected the appeals of June 19, 2004 by Batasuna and Herri Batasuna.
4 See for example ETA's internal documents *Zutabe 106*, November 2004; *Zutabe 104*, April 2004; *Zutabe 105*, June 2004; and *Zutabe 91*, June 2001. Also relevant is the Batasuna Newsletter distributed to militants in 2005, entitled *Batasuna aurrera* (*Batasuna going forward*).
5 Information extracted from media reports and the reports published yearly by the Spanish State Attorney's Office, and Jord'n (2014).
6 Like the attack in 1985 on a restaurant next to the American base in Torrejón, or the dismantling of a Hezbollah cell in Valencia in 1990 whose aim was to attempt an attack in Europe.
7 Ghebrid Messaoud was arrested with a suitcase full of weapons on March 11, 1995 when leaving Barcelona.
8 Jamal Zoughan had links with jihadist groups from his country of origin, especially with Mohamed Fizazi, a radical preacher also linked to the Hamburg cell, sentenced for the attacks in Casablanca in August 2003. See Alonso and Garc'a (2007).
9 This led to an outstanding increase in anti-terrorist cooperation between Spain and Morocco as analyzed in Barrenechea and Alonso (2015).
10 Examples of such operations include operation Queixalada in 2007 in Barcelona, where a number of people were arrested accused of planning attacks against symbolic buildings in that city; operation Gamo, launched in 2005 as a result of a so-called barter of explosives in exchange for narcotics; operation Cantata, directed against a group of individuals who between 2007 and 2008 were meeting in Barcelona under the auspices of Baitullah Mehsud's TTP (Tarek e Taliban Pakistan) to carry out an attack on the Barcelona metro. The line between the attempt and conspiracy is so very thin in these cases that, usually, an indictment for conspiracy to commit a crime fails to prosper before the Court (Ponte and Jord'n, 2014).

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53
RUSSIA

Cerwyn Moore

Introduction

On 7 May 2012 Vladmir Vladirmovich Putin was re-elected as President of Russia. Putin had a long history of involvement in the wider fields of politics and security, having trained as a member of the KGB in the 1970s. He rose to power – drawing on a small coterie of supporters from St Petersburg – in the 1990s, before succeeding Boris Yeltsin as Russian President from 2000 to 2008. Putin stayed in politics as Prime Minister from 2008 until 2012, consolidating his influence and links to Russian business and the power ministries, known as the *siloviki* – as a former KGB member, his rise to power and continued influence has done much to shape Russian approaches to terrorism in the last 20 years.

The history of Russia has been shaped by periods of political upheaval, conflict and social change. Russia itself covers a vast area. It includes cities – such as Moscow and St Petersburg – in the West, huge mountain ranges such as the Urals, and sparsely populated regions such as the Russian Steppe. Russia has large land borders with Kazakhstan, China and Mongolia, and it also has a considerable Artic 'coastline', presenting a range of strategic interests in East Asia. As part of the programme of economic reform – shaped by the Putin administration – the Russian authorities have sought to balance welfare and security, while also embracing a limited nostalgia as a "great power". There has been modernization and some economic stability – although corruption – especially combining business and security interests through the *siloviki* continues to blight Russia. The Putin administration has overseen an aggressive posture on external security issues – in order to maximize diplomatic leverage. But Russia has also witnessed a number of major terrorist incidents – including the 1999 Russian apartment bombings – which led to the re-invasion of Chechnya. More recently, Russia has suffered from attacks claimed by ISIL – including the bombing in Derbent (one of only a handful of attacks which they have claimed), and the downing of a Russian flight from Egypt.

As a nuclear-armed state and major power, Russia retains a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The Kremlin maintains considerable maritime capabilities and interests, and a sizeable navy. In recent years, however, Russia has sought to invest in a more streamlined military – as part of the programme of short-term re-armament: the recent involvement of Russian forces in the conflict in Ukraine (Feb 2014–present) and Syria (September 2015–present), and in an earlier guise in Georgia (2008), providing evidence of this move.

Russia has also sought to develop its capacity to use cyber-attacks to disable enemies as part of a broader campaign. Nonetheless, the Russian military is – with the political and security elites of *siloviki* – largely managing the economy, the legal apparatus of the state, industrial centres of power and the media. However, power and influence – and for that matter the capacity to counter terrorism – are all centred around Russia's foreign and federal security agencies, *Sluzhba vneshney razvedki* (SVR) and *Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii* (FSB). Despite liaising with the main intelligence directorate known as the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (GRU), the Russian military is now firmly controlled by the federal security agency. Institutional infighting and competition for resources between the GRU, SVR and FSB is commonplace. Nonetheless, the SVR and FSB, which are directly answerable to the Russian President, are the real powers behind the throne.

The chapter which follows seek to offer a general introduction to some major events, key individuals and important processes linked to terrorism both inside – and to a lesser degree, outside – Russia. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the post-Soviet milieu, which did much to shape terrorism in Russia in the last twenty years. Within this section I will touch on major instances of conflict-related hostage-taking, such as the raid on Budyonnovsk in 1995, linked to the conflicts in the North Caucasus. I will also draw attention to conflict-related suicide attacks, and campaigns of terrorism linked to the aftermath of the re-invasion of Chechnya in October 1999. In so doing, I will shed light on the significance of key figures – including Shamil Basayev, Ali Taziev and Doku Umarov – involved in the campaigns of terrorism. The second section offers a more detailed overview of the hostage-taking incident in Beslan in 2004, which remains the most significant instance of terrorism in the last 20 years.

The post-Soviet milieu

In the immediate post-Soviet period conflicts in the Caucasus, and further abroad, became the focal point for young activists. Some fighters became involved in clashes in the Prigorodny region in the early 1990s, while more extensive military confrontations occurred in parts of Georgia (Abkhazia 1992–1993), following the civil war, and in Nagornyy-Karabakh – an enclave – disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was rumored in some circles that Russian military intelligence had actually enabled some volunteers, including dozens of Chechens, to participate in these conflicts. Less than 18 months later, a number of these volunteers became militia leaders in hastily organized units fighting against Russian-backed pro-Kremlin Chechen loyalists and the Russian army in the separatist war (1994–1996) (Akhmadov & Lanskoy, 2010).

Acts of terrorism – including conflict-related mass hostage-taking, barricade-siege incidents, assassinations, campaigns of suicide attacks, sky-jacking and transnational hostage-taking outside of Russia – have occurred throughout the post-Soviet period, as various conflicts and clandestine groups deployed violence with devastating effects (see Tables 53.1 and 53.2 for examples of hostage-taking incidents). A number of these events, such as the 1995 barricade-siege in the maternity hospital at Budyonnovsk, in Stavropol, and the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye hostage-taking sortie in neighbouring Dagestan, in 1996, were significant in terms of scale – and impact: both incidents lasted for days, involved thousands of hostages, became templates for other instances of hostage-taking linked to the conflicts in the Caucasus (i.e. mass hostage-taking targeting vulnerable people) and ultimately played a role in the Russian withdrawal from Chechnya in l996. But these insurgency-related incidents were also significant insofar as they were linked to a generation of militia leaders, including Shamil Basayev, Abu Mosayev or Salman Raduyev, who would be responsible for further campaigns of terrorism in Russia in the years after the end of the first Chechen war.

Table 53.1 Hostage incidents in the First Chechen War

Date	*Type*	*Number of hostages*	*Number of attackers*	*Target/incident location*	*Group*	*Casualties*
Nov. 1991	Skyjacking	100+	3	Mineralniye Vody, flew to Ankara, Turkey and then to Grozny	Three-man Chechen group, including Shamil Basayev	0
14–19 June 1995	Conflict-related, yet opportunist mass hostage-taking/barricade siege	1,200–2,000	117+	Budyonnovsk town (Russia: Stavropol region) municipal hospital	Chechen group led by Shamil Basayev	100–200
9–20 Jan. 1996	Conflict-related, yet opportunist mass hostage-taking/barricade siege	500+	150+	Kizlyar airbase/ Pervomaiskoye village (Dagestan)	Chechen group, co-led by Khunkar 'Pasha' Israpilov and Salman Raduyev	100–200
16 Jan 1996	Ferry hijacking	188 passengers (144 Russian, 44 Turks) and 45 crew, different nationalities)	7+	Avrasya Ferry in Turkish Waters	Multi-ethnic pro-Chechen group, led by Mohammed Tockan	0

Table 53.2 Hostage incidents in the second conflict

Date	*Type*	*Number of hostages*	*Number of attackers*	*Target/incident location*	*Group*	*Casualties*
15 Mar 2001	Skyjacking	12 crew and 162 passengers	3	Russian airlines, departed from Istanbul, redirected to Medina, Saudi Arabia by hijackers	Chechen	3 dead, 7 injured
22 Apr 2001	Hostage-taking	104	12	Swiss Hotel, Istanbul	Multi-ethnic pro-Chechen group led by Mohammed Tockan	0
23 Oct 2002	Conflict-related mass hostage-taking	912	40+	Moscow Theatre/Dubrovka House	Chechen groups in joint operation of the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment and Islamic Battalions	128
1–4 Sept 2004	Conflict-related mass hostage-taking	1138	32+	Beslan School, North Ossetia	Multi-ethnic, including Chechen, Ingush and other volunteers	334+

Despite being planned independently, the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye barricade-siege coincided with a transnational example of hostage-taking, when a Black Sea Ferry, the Avrasya, was seized by pro-Chechen militants. This, again, was significant given the seizure of hostages on a vessel in international waters. Much like the Budyonnovsk raid, the timing of the hostage-taking incident meant that it was incredibly difficult for the Russian authorities to manage the 'event dynamics'. The federal authorities had to yield responsibility for the management of the incident to Turkey, given that the Avrasya was in Turkish territorial waters and heading to Turkey and the crew and hostages were largely Turkish. All of these incidents in the first war demonstrate considerable ingenuity, creativity and the innovative use of tactics which would be replicated by other groups, including some closely linked affiliates involved in the second conflicts in the North Caucasus, which erupted in Dagestan in the summer months of 1999.

Other campaigns of terrorism included the wave of assassinations and suicide attacks linked to "Operation Boomerang", sparked by the December 2002 suicide truck bombing against the heavily fortified government administrative building in Grozny, and culminating in the Beslan School siege in North Ossetia in September 2004. During this wave of terrorism, female suicide attackers were used in a sophisticated assassination attempt on the life of the pro-Kremlin Chechen leader, Akhmed Kadyrov, in 2003, and in attacks directed against the Duma and metro in Moscow, including the simultaneous downing of two domestic flights on 24 August 2004. In Chechnya itself, the FSB building was destroyed in a spectacular suicide attack, and although Kadyrov survived the 2003 assassination attempt, he was killed around a year later, in May 2004, when a landmine hidden in Grozny stadium was detonated (see Moore, 2012).

After Beslan, the insurgency began to develop a more regional character, as violence in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria became more commonplace. What continued to be a Chechen-led insurgency also became more of a regional 'jihad' (Moore and Tumelty, 2008). As part of this strategy, a spate of *nabeg*-type raids occurred, including the bold attack on the Ingush city of Nazran in June 2004, the seizure of checkpoints and buildings around Grozny in July 2004, and the raid on Nalchik, in Kabardino-Balkaria, in October 2005.

During the period after the death of Basayev in July 2006, the insurgency in the North Caucasus took on a new, regional form, following the proclamation of the Imarat Kavkaz in 2007. In each of the republics significant campaigns of localized terrorism took root as a younger generation of militants such as the Gakayev brothers in Chechnya, Said Buratsky in Ingushetia or the various offshoots of the Dagestani militant underground launched deadly campaigns of terrorism. The insurgency would be responsible for a series of major attacks on the Moscow metro (2010), on Domodedovo airport and again in Moscow, and also through Dmitry Sokolov a series of attacks in Volgorgrad in the build-up to the Sochi Games. The recent splits in the Imarat Kavkaz (see Youngman, 2016) illustrate how splintering and external events have shaped the regional insurgency. Meanwhile Russian-speaking 'foreign fighters' and 'transnational activists' (Moore, 2015) have also surfaced in Syria, and to a lesser degree, in Ukraine. Arguably the most notable act of terrorism in the last 20 years was also linked to the conflicts in the Caucasus and this will be discussed next.

Beslan, September 2004

Less than ten years after the attack on Budyonnovsk, and against the backdrop of a second Russo–Chechen conflict of the 1990s (launched in August 1999, Russia entered Chechnya in October), Shamil Basaev planned a second mass hostage-taking attack in the North Ossetian town of Beslan. On the morning of 1 September 2004 pupils, parents, relatives and teachers were gathering around the local school prior to the ceremonial opening of the new school

year, known as the "Day of Knowledge". At around 9.15 a.m., dozens of men approached the courtyard and main entrance of the school, holding assault rifles and firing in the air in order to shepherd the crowd of teachers, pupils and employees into the school gymnasium. Some attackers had decamped from a Gazelle van that appeared near the school courtyard. In the immediate chaos a number of people, including children, managed to flee the scene, while a handful of others hid in the school boiler room, adjoining the gymnasium. Most of the bewildered teachers, children and their relatives were herded into the school building. One man did challenge the attackers, but he was quickly shot as the hostage-takers moved through the school courtyard. As the attackers began to barricade themselves into the school buildings, it quickly became clear that this was another mass hostage-taking incident.

The hostage-takers, wary of the use of gas by the Russian Special Forces in the Moscow theatre siege, smashed some of the windows in the adjacent two-storey wing of the school, while others used chairs and tables to barricade parts of the building complex, including potential entry and exit points. Several attackers had moved through other parts of school complex, approaching the building from an alleyway which flanked another part of the main building. Over a thousand hostages, guarded by the attackers, including many young children and their parents, were held in the gymnasium.

One hostage-taker fired into the roof of the gym, before stating, "You have been taken hostage. Calm down. Stop the panic and nobody will be hurt. We are going to issue our demands and, if the demands are met, we will let the children out" (Chivers, 2007, p. 2). One of the hostage-takers then gave a number of instructions, which were repeated in Ossetian by a hostage, Ruslan Betrozov. According to Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008), Betrozov "made the mistake of publicly translating the terrorists' instructions for the other hostages into Ossetian, which was seen as a direct challenge to the terrorists, who had minutes ago explicitly ordered all hostages to speak only in Russian" (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008, pp. 278–279). Beretzov was shot and killed moments after this "challenge" to the hostage-takers. Two young boys (author interview, Beslan in 2005) stated that they were told to sit on the floor and not talk unless spoken to by the hostage-takers. They should also keep their heads down and not look at the hostage-takers. One parent refused to sit, thus again challenging the authority of the hostage-takers. He too was shot, and lay bleeding on the floor of the gym. A further three hostages from within the gymnasium told me that the hostage-takers demanded that all mobile phones were to be collected. At least two hostage-takers moved through the gym, collecting the phones. Meanwhile, other hostage-takers began to set up firing points in other parts of the building, while improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were used to mine the gymnasium and some of the surrounding buildings. The exact number of attackers remains unclear. In interviews in 2005, a number of ex-hostages indicated that upwards of 40 attackers had been involved in the initial assault. Whatever the exact number of the hostage-takers, it was clear that their actions mimicked those used by Shamil Basaev in Budyonnovsk. Some male hostages who posed either a direct threat or a challenge to the hostage-takers, including fathers of the school children, had been ordered to crouch in a hallway near the gym. Two men inside the gym were shot on the first day of the siege. The deaths served to ensure that the attackers could control a large number of hostages, and were judged to be necessary by the hostage-takers to eliminate those who would impede further negotiation or fundamentally alter the "event dynamics".

Interviewees from within the gymnasium, including children and their parents, told me that some of the attackers spoke with strong accents or communicated in a language which we "did not understand". Unlike the Budyonnovsk raid, the attackers in Beslan were smaller in number, and also multi-ethnic rather than all Chechen. One hostage said that some of the attackers spoke in "Ingush or Chechen". Many guarding the bulk of the hostages wore military-style combat

fatigues and balaclavas. The bodies of the two dead men were dragged from the gym. Further instruction was given to a number of the younger male parents and school employees, who were ordered to crouch, with their hands on their heads, in a hallway next to the gym. Some were taken to the second floor of the school building.

Reports suggest that the leader of the terrorists wrote down a set of demands, and allowed one of the hostages, Dr Larissa Mamitova, to take this to the federal authorities who had hastily set up a temporary cordon around the school (Dunlop, 2006, p. 52). Mamitova was also asked to treat the wounds of two of the hostage-takers. Thereafter, at around midday on the first day, the bearded leader of the hostage-takers, Ruslan Khuchbarov – known as the Colonel – asked her to take the note to the federal authorities and return to the school; otherwise her son would be shot. Khuchbarov, reportedly an ethnic Ingush, was referred to as Ali by the other hostage-takers, although he was only seen briefly in the gym on the first day, by those hostages interviewed by the author. He had established a headquarters in another part of the school building. According to reports, the first note actually contained further threats, along with a telephone number. In recent studies, it appears that the leadership of the hostage-takers had contact with commanders of the resistance in the region. However, as at Budyonnovsk, the political leader of the resistance movement had clearly not sanctioned the attack. In 1995, General Dudayev stated that the hospital raid was an independent operation undertaken by Basaev, while in Beslan in 2004 Aslan Maskhadov condemned the attack, planned by Basaev. In both cases, this impacted on the ability of the federal authorities to influence the negotiations with the hostage-takers.

Within the gymnasium the two young interviewees stated that they had seen a female hostage-taker, wearing a black or green burqa, standing in the doorway to the gym. While the same two interviewees stated they saw two different female hostage-takers on the first day of the siege, another emphatically stated that he had seen three women. All three hostages said they did not see the female hostage-takers in the last day of the siege. Meanwhile Aslan, one of the hostages who had been selected by the hostage-takers to crouch in the hall, was forced up the stairs to the second floor of the building. In an interview with him in North Ossetia in 2005, he told me that, upstairs, he had to stand outside a room. Interestingly, according to other hostages and parents interviewed in Beslan, the room was one of a number used to teach Russian. Some minutes later, Aslan was taken into the room where he and another hostage were ordered, by another armed hostage-taker already in the room, to pick up the bodies of men who had been executed. They were ordered to throw the bodies out of the window onto a pile of bodies of men who had already been interrogated and executed. According to Aslan, as they moved a second body, the hostage-taker in the room appeared to be focused on reloading his gun. Aslan said that, at that point, he leapt out of the window onto the pile of bodies below. He injured his ankle in the fall but managed to find cover near the railway tracks and road which ran adjacent to the School.

Throughout the latter part of the first day of the siege, the situation inside the gymnasium deteriorated. Frightened children and their parents had been ordered to sit behind the small walled area below the large windows in the gymnasium. This move, echoing the tactic employed by Basaev in Budyonnovsk, would complicate any attempt to storm the building. Further moves to organize negotiations with local officials had also been rebuffed by Khuchbarov. The hostage-takers also filmed the improvised bombs placed around the gymnasium, using a handheld recorder, while others guarding the hostages switched positions or took breaks and were replaced by others. It appeared, as at Budyonnovsk, that many of the hostage-takers were prepared to die, while reports have suggested that the meticulously planned nature of the Beslan siege included clear chains of command, with leaders and foot-soldiers fulfilling particular roles (conducting negotiations; guarding hostages). Similarly, in Beslan and Budyonnovsk only a small cadre of

commanders had knowledge of the target, deferring any in-group questions or discussion about the legitimacy of each incident. However, unlike Budyonnovsk, the "event dynamics" and crisis negotiations did not involve high-level political figures. The Putin administration ruled out any direct political negotiations and the security agencies explicitly took control of the incident. Adopting this hard-line stance effectively shaped the event dynamics of the Beslan siege, framing it as a military issue.

During the morning of the second day of the siege, the situation inside the school remained tense. Many of the children were starting to get dehydrated. By the late afternoon, it became evident that there had been some communication between Khuchbarov and the local federal authorities. Ruslan Aushev, the former President of Ingushetia and a respected former soldier in the Soviet Army had been granted permission by both Khuchbarov and the federal authorities to enter the school. Filmed by the hostage-takers, Aushev entered the school in order to negotiate with Khuchbarov. In the afternoon Aushev was allowed to leave the school with written details of the hostage-takers' demands. The written note handed to Aushev was signed by Basaev (BBC, 17 September 2004). Among other things, Basaev demanded the withdrawal of Russian soldiers from Chechnya. Furthermore, in the statement claiming responsibility, and in another interview broadcast on Channel Four in 2005, Basaev stressed that Beslan was part of a wave of attacks, designed to counter Russian military operations. In essence, however warped, the Beslan school siege served a strategic purpose in the eyes of Basaev. In Beslan, much like the reaction to the Nord Ost raid in 2002, the strategy adopted by the Putin administration was unequivocal through their refusal to make concessions or negotiate with the hostage-takers.

At this point in the latter part of the second day of the siege, the situation began to deteriorate further. The hostage-takers had only allowed the hostages water on the first day of the siege. The refusal to allow the hostages drinking water was used by Khuchbarov in order to place pressure on the federal forces. However, intimating that the hostages would be fed and given water if the authorities ceded to some demands created further tension. Similarly, in the late afternoon, some of the hostage-takers wanted to see the film recordings they had made earlier within the school broadcast on international news channels. Reportedly, the hostage-takers had passed on a tape to Ruslan Aushev, requesting that this be broadcast. The authorities claimed the tape they received was blank. Within the gymnasium, according to interviewees with the hostages, some of the hostage-takers became incensed when they learnt that the video had not been broadcast on satellite TV. Although the tension continued to escalate in the gymnasium, there is evidence that some preliminary contact, sanctioned by the federal authorities, was made between representatives of the moderate wing of the separatist movement and officials, namely Ruslan Aushev.

On the morning of the third day, tentative steps were taken to remove the bodies of the men, executed and thrown out of the school, during the first 36 hours of the siege. By this time, on the third day of the siege, hundreds of local people, many of them with relatives and friends in the school, waited for news in areas around the school. The Russian military presence had increased, and although areas had been cordoned off, the situation outside the school was tense and chaotic.

The events that followed are contested. Official reports stress that an accidental explosion occurred in the school, triggering a fire-fight and a secondary explosion in the gymnasium, leading to a fire and a partial collapse of the roof of the building. This was followed by an assault by the Russian Special Forces in order to rescue the hostages. Eyewitness accounts point to a host of events, including the role of local armed militia men and the use of heavy weaponry by the Russian army, as well as contrasting accounts of the end of the siege following the assault by the Special Forces. The events at Beslan left over 330 dead, including 186 children. Ten Special Forces soldiers were killed. Nearly 800 were injured (Dunlop, 2006, p. 17).

The Beslan school incident has a radically different character, both in its aims and in the fact that hostage-taking was directly linked to those aims and not a secondary fall-back. Unlike the barricade-siege raids and hostage-taking incidents in Budyonnovsk (1995) and Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye (1996), the context within which Beslan occurred is no longer a full-scale war but regional low-level insurgency. Beslan was part of the campaign designed by Basaev, called Operation Boomerang, whose aim was to escalate the pressure on the federal authorities throughout the North Caucasus, countering the move to normalize relations in Chechnya, and to broaden the regional insurgency beyond Chechnya. Beslan was at one level part of a barrage of *nabeg*-type raids, including the audacious raid on the Ingush city of Nazran in June 2004, and another raid on Grozny in July. There was a further degree of interconnection in that some of the initial demands apparently focused on the release of arrestees by the federal authorities following the Nazran raid, while a portion of the hostage-takers were Ingush. At this level, there is still an echo of the old *nabeg* tradition in which hostages functioned in exchange for other hostages from the other side.

However, Beslan went beyond a classic *nabeg* operation since the scale of hostage-taking and the longevity of the siege appear to have been built into the planning. Beslan also differed from Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar/Pervomaiskaya in a number of significant ways: the smaller number of attackers, the exclusive targeting of civilians rather than military bases and the sophisticated use of lines of communication to outside groups involved in coordinating the incident in Beslan are different from early attacks. This leaves the question of the Dubrovka House Theatre in Moscow, which preceded Beslan, taking place on 23 October 2002. It is argued here that Dubrovka House marked a break from Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar/Pervomayskoye and thus may rightly be considered the first strategic use of mass hostage-taking. However, the Dubrovka House attack was conducted by the remnants of the Islamic Battalions and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, along with other volunteers. Tellingly, it was poorly planned and executed, while the involvement of Basaev remains contested. It may indeed be that these organizational limitations led to mass hostage-taking being a primary objective, rather than generalizing a "fall-back" tactic.

Conclusion

Even though I have drawn attention to terrorism linked to the Caucasus, it is important to note that much of this violence was context-specific. Information regarding incidents is often almost impossible to verify, while the state is actively involved in a systematic campaign of disinformation, both to curb criticism and to mask the deficiencies in the capacity of the federal authorities to effectively deal with major acts of terrorism. The Russian approach to counter-terrorism has evolved against this background, and much of this is informed by a deeper sense of Russian identity. Corruption and a lack of transparency continue to shape Russian politics, while a range of semi-official institutions and the legislature are often employed in efforts to combat terrorism.

However, the Russian state has also been directly and indirectly implicated in various killings in Russia, coupled with a vigorous campaign of overseas assassinations, illustrating the renewed influence of covert units. In Turkey and the Middle East such assassinations include the killing of prominent Chechens such as Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in 2004, Musa Atayev, and most recently Edilgirayev, and also former pro-Kremlin militia leaders such as Sulim Yamadayev. In the North Caucasus high-profile instances include the death of Ibn Khattab (reportedly killed by a poisoned letter), the capture of Ali Tazayev (who had been heavily drugged prior to his arrest) and the death of Doku Umarov (also claimed to have been killed by poisoning). These deaths indi-

cate that a unit of the SVR have been actively using toxins delivered in a range of sophisticated ways as part of their counter-terror strategy.

In 2002, the FSB deployed nerve gas in the Moscow theatre siege, which ultimately led to the deaths of dozens of hostages. However, more specific instances of the use of toxins to undermine political rivals illustrates the widespread use of poisons by the SVR. Viktor Yushchenko, a Ukrainian political leader, was disfigured as a result of poisoning in 2004; and of course, Alexander Litvinenko was murdered in London in 2006, following polonium poisoning. Blood-feuds and vendettas, as well as turf wars between criminal groups and business rivalries, have all played a role in some acts of terrorism, illustrating the multi-faceted nature and cultural context within which acts of terrorism have to be understood.

In the analysis of the Beslan barricade siege I have sought to debunk the idea of Chechen mass hostage-taking as a stand-alone phenomenon masterminded by a single criminal mind (Shamil Basaev). It is important to distinguish between instances that involve the mere copying of tactics and those where tactics are linked to a strategic vision, as well as to distinguish between strategies. But there are also more general implications for our understanding and study of terrorism in Russia. Firstly, a qualitative case study approach overcomes the well-known problems of relying on the now proliferating government and non-government terrorist data sets. The qualitative approach adopted here seeks to supplement this literature by illustrating how research can focus on specific campaigns of terrorism.

Secondly, and following on from this, although a hostage crisis occurs over a short time frame, the historical behaviour of the same group in similar situations should not be ignored as it offers invaluable insight into the type of crisis negotiation undertaken. This includes studying the evolution of particular forms of political violence and of particular figures such as Shamil Basaev who have employed mass hostage-taking. Thus, research on mass hostage-taking undoubtedly benefits from a more nuanced and qualitative insight, analysing terrorist behaviour through interviews with both the hostage-takers themselves and their hostages. This is especially important in assessing a group's capabilities to better develop lessons learnt. For example, the Budyonnovsk raid highlighted the importance of the media, the ways in which mass hostage-taking and the use of "human shields" in barricade siege incidents hinder rescue attempts, as well as the application of sophisticated military tactics such as the use of firing positions, and the mining and barricading of building complexes, so as to create considerable problems for the federal authorities. The Beslan school siege re-affirms the importance of these themes, while also demonstrating the changing capability of Chechen-led groups. The attackers had clearly learnt from earlier mass hostage-taking incidents in Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar and Moscow (Dubrovka House).

Thirdly, the nuances of each attack and the resultant initiatives by the federal authorities demonstrate some fluidity throughout the life cycle of each incident. This resulted in part from the differing context in which these events occurred. Armed men from the local community remained in the vicinity of the hospital and school; each area was not cordoned off quickly; the negotiations were largely directed by elements within the Russia military or security services. Similarly, some of the attackers clearly articulated their willingness to die in what they perceived to be military operations, while a number of them also clearly had no knowledge of the target or nature of the operation. The attackers, many of whom had experience of combat operations, had clear chains of command. The dynamics of each incident included the execution of hostages, particularly those deemed to be legitimate military targets or who could threaten the attackers. This served a secondary purpose to control large groups of hostages. The incidents were directed against vulnerable human targets (elderly, infirm, children); the building complexes were used to great effect; the attackers attempted to use novel forms of media and to garner news coverage,

including holding press conferences, using live broadcasts and filming their own attacks; and the hostage-takers established communication to external groups, complicating the negotiation process.

Finally, attempts to combat terrorist attacks drawing on the Russian experience in the post-Cold War world provides valuable insight and complexity of alternative situational dynamics and policy initiatives implemented by non-Western governments. Russia's policies towards hostage-taking incidents highlight the predominance of a militaristic response with a highly visible use of force. In most incidents this has had an adverse effect: the military has either been humiliated (Budyonnovsk/Kizlyar) or has been accused regionally and internationally of disregarding the well-being of hostages in favour of punishing terrorists (Dubrovka House, Beslan school siege).

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Counter-terrorism pre-9/11

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Since the attacks of 9/11, political, public, media and academic focus on terrorism and counter-terrorism has proliferated. According to Crenshaw (2004, p. 82), '[t]he attacks of September 11 propelled terrorism from obscurity to prominence in the wider field of international relations and foreign and security policy,' adding that '[s]cholars who had previously ignored terrorism now acknowledged it as a major national security concern'. According to Silke (2008, p. 47), prior to 9/11, the study of terrorism was peripheral in academia, but '[s]ince the terrorist attacks of 9/11, interest in – and funding for – terrorism related research has increased enormously'. Yet, he argues that there has been an over-emphasis on al-Qaeda and a lack of historical research (Silke, 2009). In fact, when 9/11 occurred it became difficult for many to remember a time when it was someone other than a Muslim perpetrator. In addition to this, much literature, media attention and counter-terrorism since 9/11 has focused on international terrorism and foreign actors, sources and threats, as opposed to domestic ones. The events of 9/11 not only served to determine the terms of terrorism and counter-terrorism, but also overwrote, if not erased, the collective and institutional memory of pre-9/11 terrorism. According to Singh (2003, p. 52), 9/11 'heralded a dangerous and unprecedented chapter in the "American experiment". 9/11 represented the end of what remained of America's post-1991 innocence about the severity of global threats'. Former Director of the CIA R. James Woolsey (2002, p. v) argued that '[i]f the world did not change on September 11, 2001, at least most people's perception of it did'.

In *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda*, Hewitt (2003, p. 12) shows that this is not the first time that this has occurred. Describing the shock and surprise the media expressed following 9/11, as if it were without precedent in America, he cites *Newsweek*'s response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh on 19 April 1995, previously the largest attack on American soil, having killed 168 and injured approximately 680: 'This doesn't happen here …. It looked like Beirut. But the devastated building was deep in America's heartland, ending forever the illusion that here at home we are safe.' He also cites *Newsweek*'s response to the first World Trade Center (WTC) attack by Ramzi Yousef on 26 February 1993 (prior to Oklahoma and also within the period of 'innocence'), which 'rattled the country's confidence, dispelling the snug illusion that Americans were immune, somehow, to the plague of terrorism'. Hewitt (2003)

attributes this to historical ignorance, the ideological diversity of the terrorists, and their fragmented organizational forms.

The tension, if not contradiction, between overdetermined representations of individual events and selective memory, historical amnesia or even ignorance is not restricted to the media. The first WTC attack had enough of an impact to associate the location with terrorism and lead then New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani to approve placing the Office of Emergency Management headquarters there, not considering the impact if it were to be targeted again. The first attack was remembered post-9/11 because of this dangerous mistake and the failure to recognize or act on the threat posed by al-Qaeda to both the WTC and America itself. Yet the link also served to emphasize the role of al-Qaeda and the threat of international/foreign terrorism and make people forget the Oklahoma City bombing and the longer history of terrorism involving domestic anti-government activists, such as Timothy McVeigh, and white supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan, both of which have experienced a revival and renewed attention following Obama's election. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, formed in the wake of 9/11, issued the report *Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment*. The report warned of a resurgence in right-wing extremism and potential for violence in the context of Obama's election and the economic downturn, similar to that seen with the anti-government militia movement and Oklahoma City bombing in the 1990s (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, it not only challenged the view that all terrorism is Islamic and international, but also used historical examples and lessons learnt from previous periods, such as not only the bombing, but warnings from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and others of the threat posed by anti-government militias threat prior to it.

As counter-terrorism is, by its very nature, a response to current, ongoing or future predicted threats, it must adapt to respond to new forms of terrorism and the changing nature of threats. These changes reflected the emergence of new movements and groups, ideologies, strategies and tactics in different contexts, as well as changes to strategies and tactics in response to new counter-terrorism measures themselves. Thus, while a focus on past manifestations, experiences and frameworks may be ill suited to the demands of counter-terrorism, one that focuses only on current threats risks presentism and missing the longer-term lessons of history. A historical examination of terrorism and counter-terrorism, such as this chapter presents, can help map and analyze changes, patterns, mistakes and failures over time (e.g. Giuliani's decision and the government's failure to address warnings about anti-government militias pre-Oklahoma City and al-Qaeda pre-9/11). This can help to address not only the lack of historical knowledge that Silke and Hewitt note, but highlight the problems of and challenge contextually specific, reactive, presentist and ahistorical approaches, as well as politically or ideologically motivated counter-terrorism policy, and assumptions or stereotypes, often racialized, about the profile of the 'terrorist' and creation of 'suspect communities', such as that experienced by Muslims post-9/11.

This chapter examines the history of counter-terrorism and the terrorism and terrorist threats to which it responds in the United States pre-9/11. Part 1 will provide an overview of the different types of domestic and international terrorism and movements that have affected or targeted America historically and been the focus of counter-terrorism. Part 2 will examine the history of counter-terrorism in the United States, looking at different developments, policies and approaches, and examine the ways in which counter-terrorism has changed in response to both threats and attacks, political and ideological agendas and interests, and pressure and criticism, as well as challenges, mistakes and failures.

Terrorism pre-9/11

It is not only that knowledge and understanding of terrorism in or involving America in the pre-9/11 era is challenged by a collective amnesia or a reading of terrorism largely determined by the 9/11 case, but there is a lack of consensus amongst experts about when terrorism began and what or who may be included in a history of terrorism. This may, as we will explore later, be a product of how the state, security and law enforcement define and deal with threats based on factors such as political pressure, interests or expediency, high-profile events, the changing nature, character or source of threats, the scope and remit of existing laws, and jurisdictional issues, as well as a lack of consensus on the definition. The U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, which was established in 1985, stated that 'terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe than define' (Alexander, 2006, p. 13). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) did not formalize their definition of terrorism until 1986 as 'the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives', and there was no requirement that local law enforcement accept and abide by this definition (Alexander, 2006; Hewitt, 2003). It was only in 2001 that the State Department came up with its definition: 'the term "terrorism" means premediated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience' (U.S. Code title 22, section 2656f[d]; Alexander, 2006).

It is important to note that for a variety of reasons, historically not all terrorism has been dealt with through counter-terrorism policy and legislation; some has been dealt with through criminal law, and not all threats or attacks that are dealt with by counter-terrorism are, on the face of it, terrorism. Some may be cases of vandalism, robbery or harassment that are committed by groups designated as terrorist, based on labelling, their political intentions or wider repertoire of tactics. Other cases may be ones in which the state sees counter-terrorism policy and legislation as the most effective or expedient way to deal with the actions of an individual or political group because it allows them to increase resources or legal powers.

Terrorism and terrorist groups that are covered by American counter-terrorism can be divided into two types based on the perpetrator and target: domestic and international. In the 1980s, the FBI made the distinction between domestic terrorism perpetrated by 'a group or individual based and entirely operating within the United States or its territories without foreign direction' and international terrorism acts, those that 'occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum' (Alexander, 2006). The CIA, with international jurisdiction, defined international terrorism as 'terrorism conducted with the support of foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments' (Alexander, 2006). Terrorism in and against the United States has come from both left- and right-wing movements, has operated based on a variety of causes and identities, often overlapping, including racial–ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, revolutionary and single issue, and has been anti-state and oppositional, as well as state-sponsored and state- or system-supportive.

While the focus on much discussion and strategy post-9/11 has been international and 'Islamist' terrorism, most literature on American counter-terrorism places the origins of terrorism in and involving America with domestic terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s, and the perpetrators and period that played a role in the emergence of federal counter-terrorism, most notably the 3rd-era Ku Klux Klan in the 1950s and 1960s and New or Revolutionary Left of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While there are some examples from earlier, such as the

post-Civil War 1st-era Ku Klux Klan who opposed Black emancipation and reconstruction in the 1860s and early 1870s, the Molly Maguires, who targeted anti-Irish Catholic Scots, Ulster, Welsh and English Protestants in the 1870s (Alexander, 2006), and anarchists such as Leon Czolgosz who killed President William McKinley in 1901, leading to the formation of the Secret Service protection detail, what is often left out of the story is the role of terrorism against the British in the American Revolution. As terrorism is largely identified and understood through its labelling and response by counter-terrorism and other state measures, it would be difficult to expect an American response to terrorism that occurred in its name, before it existed as a sovereign country. Yet, it is important to acknowledge because it was the first example, part of America's celebrated founding mythology, and provided a source, influence and reference in future extreme-right terrorism, including the Minutemen of the 1960s, Patriots of the 1980s, militias of the 1990s, and the Oklahoma City bombing itself, which took place on the 220th anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, the first of the American Revolution (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). Moreover, it can be used to shine a light on the selective and at times hypocritical application of the term to delegitimize, demonize or hold to collective account certain social groups or political movements, but not others.

Because of issues defining terrorism, such as the lack of a single shared definition, the reluctance of law enforcement agencies to label acts where there is no individual or group claiming responsibility as 'terrorism' and complex jurisdictional issues (which also impact record keeping), as well as wider problems with official statistics, data on terrorism in American history must be treated with critical caution. Hewitt attempted to address these challenges and traced the history of domestic and foreign terrorism *in* America from the 1950s to 9/11. While the FBI makes a clear distinction between domestic and international terrorism, in which foreign operatives occupy the latter category, for Hewitt domestic terrorism, which is defined as terrorism *in* America, includes attacks within America by international operatives. They are placed under the 'foreign' sub-category of 'domestic' along with émigrés (e.g. Cuban) and Puerto Rican independence groups due to the fact that central to the modus operandi of the latter is the rejection of American possession of the territory and thus their designation as 'American' (Hewitt, 2003). Al-Qaeda would be an example of a group that would straddle both domestic (under foreign) and international, because they represent an international perpetrator and domestic targets, but more generally they would be placed in the international category due to their non-American origins, bases of operation and wider targets. However, Gus Martin (2016) designates Cuban groups (Omega 7), Jewish–Zionist groups (Jewish Defense League/JDL) and Irish ones (e.g. Provisional IRA/PIRA) who were based in the United States as 'domestic', with al-Qaeda as 'international'.

Hewitt found that between 1954 and 2000, there were over 3,228 attacks and over 661 fatalities in the United States and Puerto Rico. According to Hewitt (2003), during this period 31.2% of terrorist incidents and 51.6% of fatalities have been committed by 'White Racist/Rightist' perpetrators, including the Oklahoma City bombing. Following 'White Racist/Rightest' are the 'Revolutionary Left' with 21.2% of incidents and 2.0% of fatalities, 'Black Militants' at 14.7% of incidents and 25.0% of fatalities, anti-abortion terrorists at 6.2% of incidents and 0.9% of fatalities, 'Jewish Terrorists' at 3.6% of incidents and 0.8% of fatalities, and 'Other domestic/unknown' at 2.8% incidents and 8.1% fatalities. Under 'foreign' terrorism, Hewitt has 'Puerto Rican' at 11.9% of incidents and 4.3% of fatalities, 'Cuban émigrés' at 5.2% of incidents and 1.5 of fatalities, 'Other foreign' at 2.1% of incidents and 4.1% of fatalities, and 'Islamic' the lowest at 1.1% of incidents and 1.7% of fatalities.

Hewitt argues that there have been nine waves of American domestic terrorism. Each wave was constituted through and defined or represented by a particular and dominant political

movement, cause, ideology and perpetrator profile which emerge and mobilize in response (as defines or opposition) to developments, conflicts and other circumstances in a given context (e.g. desegregation and civil rights, Vietnam, abortion law), although many overlapped in the volatile 1960s and 1970s. Each wave, associated movements and attacks went into decline or ended due to a number of factors, including counter-terrorism and other forms of state intervention (e.g. legislation, arrests and killings) which, according to Gurr and Ross, destroy terrorists' 'coercive capabilities'. There is also movement dynamics (e.g. leadership battles and power struggles, splits and burnout) and public response (e.g. backlash) which affect their 'political capabilities', as well as changes to the context or social–political terrain that provided their raison d'etre and conditions for mobilization (Crenshaw, 2011; Ross and Gurr, 1989).

The first wave occurred between 1954 and 1969. It centred around white supremacist opposition to desegregation and civil rights in the South, and was dominated by the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Party. During this period, which peaked in 1964, there were approximately 588 incidents, including bombings to shootings, assaults and intimidation, with 65 fatalities. The targets were largely black people, protestors, civil rights activists and places of worship (Hewitt, 2003). The most notorious cases included the bombing of the Hebrew Benevolent Congregation Temple in Atlanta, Georgia on 12 October 1958, the assassination of NAACP field secretary Medgar Evers on 12 June, 1963, the 16th St. Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama which killed four young black girls on 15 September, 1963 and the June 1964 murders of civil rights workers James Earl Chaney, Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner in Mississippi, the latter committed by Klansmen, who included amongst their ranks law enforcement officials (Webb, 2010; Winter, 2010, 2015). Another group in the 1960s was the more oppositional Minutemen who made attempts to assassinate Arkansas Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright, poison the United Nations (UN) and bomb the Hollywood Bowl during a speech by Martin Luther King, Jr. (Ridgeway, 1990).

The second wave occurred in the mid-1960s and involved those labelled Black Separatists, such as the Nation of Islam, Death Angels and the Mau Mau, and Black Nationalists, such as the Black Panthers, George Jackson Brigade and the Black Liberation Army (Hewitt, 2003; Martin, 2016). During this period, there were approximately 475 incidents, 72% of which were shootings, and 400 people killed or injured (Alexander, 2006). In one of the biggest cases, the Black Panther Party was alleged to have been involved in a failed plot to bomb police stations, department stores and public buildings, as well as kill police officers in New York City in 1969. Thirteen members were brought to trial, but all were acquitted.

The third wave occurred in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s and centred around groups identified as part of the Revolutionary Left, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), New World Liberation Front, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), United Freedom Front (UFF) and The Weather Underground. The latter were involved in bombing military and business targets, as well as robberies, shootings and kidnappings, with approximately 500 incidents (Hewitt, 2003), including the June 1974 bombing of the Gulf Oil Building in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Alexander, 2006). In an example of different waves coming together, there was the May 19 Communist Organization (M19CO), including members of the BLA, Black Panthers, Republic of New Africa and Weather Underground. They were involved in prison breaks, including that of Assata Shakur and FALN leader William Morales, and an October 1981 Brinks robbery (Martin, 2016).

The fourth wave involved the Puerto Rican independence movement from 1969 to the late 1970s, following an earlier period of activity in the 1950s. The movement was active in both Puerto Rico and the mainland United States. During the first incarnation, in 1954,

independencistas attempted to assassinate President Truman in Washington, D.C., and wounded five members of the House of Representatives in a gun attack on the House (Martin, 2016). Groups included the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), Macheteros and Armed Forces of Popular Resistance. FALN targeted banks, corporations and symbols of U.S. capitalism and imperialism, and the Machetertos targeted U.S. soldiers and police. There were approximately 365 incidents, including bombings, shootings, robberies and rocket attacks, and 18 people died (Hewitt, 2003). In 1980, more than a dozen members of FALN members were convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related crimes.

The fifth wave involved Jewish Zionist groups, such as the JDL and splinter groups Jewish Armed Resistance, Thunder of Zion and Save Our Israel Soil. The JDL had been around since 1968 and was active into the 2000s, but the peak and period of this wave was between 1969 and 1989. The JDL bombed Soviet and Arab embassies and Arab-American organizations in and around New York City. There were 115 bombings, leaving five dead, as well as shootings and assaults (Hewitt, 2003). In an intersection of two terrorist threats, linked by intergroup and international conflicts, JDL leader Meir Kahane would be assassinated by an Egyptian terrorist in New York in 1990.

The sixth wave centred around anti-Castro Cuban emigres and took place between 1968 and 1980 (Hewitt, 2003). Groups included Omega 7 Cuban Nationalist Movement, Cuban National Liberation Front, Alpha 66, El Pondor Cubano (Ross, 2006). Many of them were supported, through training or funding, by the U.S. government and targets within the United States included Cuban exile community members, and there were 168 incidents and ten murders. Omega 7 is said to have been responsible for 50 attacks, including on the Venezuelan Consulate and Lincoln Center in New York, a Soviet ship in New Jersey and the Cuban Mission to the UN (Martin, 2016).

The seventh wave centred around anti-abortion terrorism, beginning following Roe vs. Wade in 1973 and experiencing revivals in the 1980s and 1990s (Hewitt, 2003; Winter, 2013). Perpetrators included groups that advocate or perpetuate violence such as the Missionaries of the Preborn, Pro-Life Action Network and the Army of God, websites such as the Nuremburg Files and so-called 'lone wolf' terrorists such as James Kopp. Their tactics included murder, bombings, arson, acid and anthrax attacks, assault, intimidation, and harassment. The first recorded incident was an arson attack on an Oregon clinic in March 1976 (Winter, 2013). The year 1984 saw a significant increase in attacks, with 25 bombings and arson attacks, and was named the 'Year of Fear and Pain' by the Pro-Life Action Network (Clarkson, 1998), while 1994 saw the highest number of murders (four) and attempted murders (eight) for any year (National Abortion Federation, 2008).

The eighth wave was represented by a revival of the extreme-right in the 1970s–1990s, including white separatists, neo-Nazis, anti-government patriots and militias. The period ('5th era') was initiated by former Klansman Louis Beam Jr. with the call to arms 'Where ballots fail, bullets will prevail' and paramilitarization of the Klan (Winter, 2010). The most notorious groups were the Christian Identity-affiliated Aryan Nations and The Order, the latter of which were responsible for a wave of terror including the bombing of a synagogue in Boise, Idaho in March 1984 (Ridgeway, 1990), and the murder of radio DJ Alan Berg in Denver Colorado on 18 June 1984. The 1990s saw government (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms/ATF and FBI) sieges at the Ruby Ridge, Idaho home of anti-government activist Randy Weaver in August 1992, that left his wife, son, dog and two marshals dead, and at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco Texas in February–April 1992, where 76 died. These informed the emergence of Beam's call for 'Leaderless Resistance' and the emergence of the militia movement (Winter, 2010; Berlet and Lyons, 2000). There were approximately 60 right-wing plots during

the decade, which peaked with the Oklahoma City bombing, followed by the bombing of Centennial Park, Atlanta Olympics in 1996 by Eric Rudolph.

Although not constitutive of a wave, other movements and groups emerged during these periods. The 1980s saw the emergence of eco and animal rights activism, such as the Evan Meecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy, Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, some of whom would continue into the 1990s (Alexander, 2006).

The ninth and final wave involved Islamists, most notably al-Qaeda. Within the United States, this wave began in the early to mid-1990s with the first WTC attack in 1993, killing six and injuring 1,042 (Hewitt 2003). There were also al-Qaeda attacks on American targets and allies abroad, including U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000. These followed Osama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad against the United States and Saudi government, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri endorsing a fatwah calling on Muslims to kill Americans anywhere in 1996, and bin Laden's second-in-command Mohammed Atef's endorsement of a fatwah calling for jihad against the U.S. 'Ulema Union of Afghanistan' internationally in May 1998 (Alexander, 2006).

While the focus on and discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the United States starts in the 1950s and 1960s with domestic terrorism, international terrorism became a major concern for the United States following a series of events beginning in 1969 and continuing into the 1970s. America has the distinction of being the favoured target of international terrorism in the post-1960s 'modern' era of international terrorism (Wilkinson, 2001). According to the State Department, there were 1,617 attacks on American targets abroad between 1970 and 1989 (Alexander, 2006). The most popular targets were diplomatic/political, military, corporate (financial, energy, chemical, communication, technology) and perpetrators included state-sponsored agents (e.g. Libya and Iran) and groups with a range of ideologies and causes, most notably Marxist (Red Army Faction), Islamist (Hezbollah), Palestinian Nationalist (Abu Nidal) and 'ideological mercenaries' (Japanese Red Army), as well as others. Like with domestic terrorism, international terrorism and the particular movements and perpetrators that emerge are informed by developments and social–political context (e.g. foreign policy, military actions, etc.) and go into decline based on both changes to that context, as well as counter-terrorism, movement dynamics and public response.

The first event that brought international terrorism to American attention was the 1969 TWA hijacking and hostage-taking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, quickly followed by the 1970 hijacking of a TWA flight from Frankfurt and a Pan American flight from Amsterdam, and then the murders of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics (Alexander, 2006). The 1969 TWA hijacking was also one of many in a peak year, and period. Between 1969 and 1972, almost half of all hijackings originated in the United States, and in 1969, 37 out of 82 (Wilkinson, 2001). The 1970s also saw a series of attacks on U.S. embassies and officials: Khartoum in 1973, Athens in 1974, Kuala Lumpur in 1975, Beirut in 1976 and Tehran in 1979 (Wilcox, 2002). The 1970s also saw the emergence of foreign nationalist groups active in the United States. Examples include the assassination of Turkish consulate officials by the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia in Los Angeles in 1973. That same year, the PLO-affiliated Black September killed an Israeli Air employee in Washington, D.C. (Alexander, 2006). In 1976, Otpor hijacked TWA Flight 727 from New York to Paris in a campaign to gain Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. In 1978, they took over the West German Consulate in Chicago in an attempt to secure the release of a member held by the state in Cologne. The decade ended, and the next stage in international terrorism (Rapoport's fourth 'religious' wave) and counter-terrorism began with the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian Revolutionaries. They held the embassy and 60 hostages (although released some) for 444 days

in an attempt to have the United States hand over the Shah, who had been backed by the Americans and was in the country for medical treatment, for trial.

Despite the activities of the anti-abortion movement and extreme-right during the 1980s, the decade would see a decline in overall domestic terrorism compared with the 1970s, but an increase in international attacks, most notably by Arab and Muslim groups in the Middle East. Hezbollah was particularly active with attacks on U.S. bases and embassies, hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping and murder during the 1980s. In April 1983, they launched an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut which killed 49 and injured 120. In October 1983, they attacked the U.S. Marine base and barracks in Beirut, killing 241, and later that year launched an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. In September 1984, they bombed the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Berlin, and later that year, they kidnapped and murdered CIA station chief William Buckley in Beirut. This would be followed by further kidnappings and murders into the early 1990s, including that of Lieutenant Colonel William Richard Higgins USMC in 1991. In June 1985, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad hijacked TWA Flight 847 on route from Cairo to San Diego and the Palestinian Liberation Front hijacked the Achille Lauro and, in October that year, killed Leon Klinghoffer by throwing the Jewish-American wheelchair-bound pensioner overboard (Alexander, 2006). In 1986, the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, which was frequented by American soldiers, was attacked by Libyan-sponsored terrorists in retaliation for American military intervention in Libya. The attack killed three, including two servicemen (Wilcox, 2002). There was also the Libyan-sponsored bombing of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie attack in 1988. It killed 270 people, mostly Americans. In addition to this, there were examples of suspected state supported or perpetrated terrorism by Iran, most notably the 1989 pipe bomb attack on the car of the wife of Captain Will Rogers of the USS Vincennes, which shot down an Iranian plane the previous year (Alexander, 2006). The decade was not limited to Arab-, Muslim- or Middle East-related terrorism. In 1985, the National Front bombed a nightclub in Greece injuring 69 Americans, and the car bombing of the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany by the Red Army Faction and French Direct Action, killing two and injuring 15. There was also the attempted attack on an Air India plane in New York by Sikh terrorists and gun running in and through the United States by PIRA.

The 1990s saw an increase in international terrorism, attributed partially to the Gulf War and the emergence of al-Qaeda. In 1990, there were 32 incidents and in 1991, between January and March, there were 104. The year 1991 also saw calls for Jihad against the United States, and 1993 saw a threat to assassinate President Bush during a trip to Kuwait (Crenshaw, 2011). In terms of al-Qaeda, there was the first WTC attack in 1993, the same year as an ambush of U.S. soldiers in Somalia. These were followed by the 13 November 1995 car bombing of the U.S.-run Saudi National Guard training Center in Riyadh and the 26 June 1996 attack on Khobar Tower, Saudi Arabia where coalition forces were based, killing 19, and for which Iran and Hezbollah were eventually held responsible (Alexander, 2006). Then there were two bombings outside U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998, killing 234, including 12 Americans, and wounding thousands, and the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbour, Yemen, killing 17 and wounding 39 American soldiers. The period also saw attacks linked to Iraq and the Gulf War on U.S. embassies and consulates in Frankfurt, Berlin, Sydney, Dhaka, Mexico City, Istanbul and Kuala Lumpur, and on the U.S. military in Jeddah, Ankara and Izmir, as well as U.S. businesses such as Ford, Coca-Cola and others. Despite all this, and particularly the 1993 WTC attack, belief that this was a closed case and the activities of the anti-government movement led to a focus on domestic terrorism, compounded by Oklahoma City in 1995. This is alleged to have led to missed opportunities to pursue and consolidate information about al-Qaeda (Alexander, 2006), leading to the issue of counter-terrorism.

Counter-terrorism pre-9/11

Counter-terrorism serves a number of (sometimes overlapping) functions, including prevention, deterrence, control, retaliation, security and symbolism, as well as addressing wider risks and consequences, and can be based on a number of competing and complementary theories. It can address terrorist targets, such as security for political, military and private institutions and civil society populations and infrastructure, and target a wide variety of causal sources, including political and socio-economic inequality, international conflict, ideology and psychology, or terrorist resources, such as financing, support, state sponsors and weapons. It can make use of a number of its own resources and powers to stop or limit terrorist capabilities, opportunities and impact, such as military, security, intelligence, diplomacy, foreign policy, foreign aid, peacekeeping, legislation, criminal law, police/law enforcement, emergency responders, international bodies, conventions and cooperation, and media. It can target perpetrators with everything from de-radicalization, repression, arrest, prosecution and sanctions to killing (during arrest attempts or as assassination) and military retaliation (Ross, 2006; Silke, 2011; Wilkinson, 2001). It can be proactive or reactive, preventative or retaliatory, and responds to threats, events and political agendas, as well as mistakes and failures. The record of counter-terrorism programmes and strategies is mixed, not only in terms of failure to stop an attack, but in terms of its wider social and political implications. While it is intended to prevent, control or stop terrorism and save lives, it can also have a negative impact on 'suspect communities', civil liberties, human rights and democracy where counter-terrorism and security are placed above consideration of these issues, and used to justify repressive policies and tactics, as well as aggressive military actions.

While the types and definition of terrorism, and what is included in the latter, can change, as we have seen in the previous section, so does counter-terrorism. Alexander argues that while post-9/11 we have come to see terrorism as a national, federal issue and combatting it involving a relatively centralized, coherent approach, previously the United States did not see terrorism as a 'major strategic challenge to the very survival of the Republic' and 'spoke with a bewildering variety of voices on the definition of terrorism' (Alexander, 2006, p. 11). The tendency, according to Alexander, was to treat terrorism based on acts as individual incidents, 'without political pattern or strategic dimension'. While generally true, there were exceptions, most notably the political use of the FBI through their counter-intelligence programme COINTELPRO in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to address a wide variety of so-called 'subversives', including the Ku Klux Klan, New Left and Black Panthers. The wider lack of consistency and coordination was the norm and partly a product of the lack of national centralized definition and approach.

As stated earlier, it was not until the 1980s that the FBI, acting as a domestic federal law enforcement agency within the Department of Justice (DoJ), created a clear official operating definition of terrorism. Other federal executive agencies developed their own definitions in line with their own mandates and jurisdictions, such as the CIA's definition, which focused on the international (Alexander, 2006). This lack of a federal, centralized approach was a product of and exacerbated by the fact that in the United States, terrorism has historically been defined and dealt with by state and federal law enforcement as a criminal matter, and in the U.S. federal system, individual states have the power to determine what is an offence under its criminal code. As such it has been defined, pursued, or not pursued, and dealt with differently between and within different states, as well as differences in how coordination and cooperation with federal authorities works (Hewitt, 2003). State laws addressing terrorism have appeared under nine headings: civil defence (interstate compacts and state emergency management plans), anti-terrorism provisions, destructive devices, terrorist threats, enhanced criminal penalties, victim compensation, street terrorism, ecological terrorism and taxes.

Another factor in the lack of coordination has been the lack of major national domestic events, such as 9/11, to bring these together or apply pressure. One impact of this lack of national priority and coordinated approach, and multitude of voices, is gaps in fragmented intelligence and approach. However, the lack of centralization and resulting unevenness, while allowing excesses in some areas and jurisdictions, can help to mitigate against these nationally. On this point, a concerted, centralized national priority, as was the case following 9/11, is not an inherently positive or constructive thing; it led to the invasion of Iraq, which was not involved, and Guantanamo Bay, as well as surveillance and profiling that targeted Muslims and threatened wider rights, civil liberties and trust. The other impact of this lack of coordinated focus and strategy is a somewhat reactive approach in which strategy and policy are developed in response to threats and events as opposed to being done with a pro-active, wider, long-term view in mind. This is something that a history of counter-terrorism can provide an illustration of and lesson for.

While most histories of U.S. counter-terrorism begin in the late 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of international terrorism, or even later in the 1980s (Crenshaw, 2004), the domestic U.S. story starts in the mid-1950s and 1960s with the Ku Klux Klan, but can be located earlier in 1860s and 1870s when the Klan first emerged. The Klan, which formed in Pulaski, Tennessee in 1865 (Chalmers, 1965; Berlet and Lyons, 2000), was dissolved in 1871 following efforts by the federal government, whose reconstruction efforts were being challenged. In 1870 a federal grand jury labelled the Klan a 'terrorist organization' (Trelease, 1995), leading to hundreds of indictments and, in 1871, Congress passed an anti-Klan Act which suspended habeas corpus in order to bypass the Posse Comitatus Act and allowed President Ulysses S. Grant the power to send federal troops to suppress armed combinations, night riding, harassment and other Klan violence (Ridgeway, 1990). This pattern would be repeated in response to the 3rd era Klan in the 1960s. In response to Klan opposition to the civil rights and violence, the FBI deployed its counter-subversion programme COINTELPRO, which was created in 1956 to 'neutralize' an expanding list of subversives, starting with communists and moving to 'White Hate Groups', the 'New' or 'Revolutionary' Left and 'Black Extremist' organizations (de Graaf, 2011; Cunningham, 2004).

Widely viewed as extremists and terrorists today, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Klan had been defending laws and institutions such as segregation and white supremacy, and opposing threats to these (desegregation, civil rights and voting rights), and not only supported local and state law enforcement and elected officials, but received support from them and included such figures amongst their ranks. While state laws about racism were being changed, Klan violence and the inability to address it was seen to present a barrier to the safe implementation and enforcement of desegregation, civil rights and later voting rights, much as it had to reconstruction. Three cases around the time of the Civil Rights Act not only increased pressure to pass the act, but led the Federal Government to this conclusion and to take action. These included the assassination of Medgar Evers and the 16th St. Baptist Church bombing and the murders of Schwerner, Chaney and Goodman (Chalmers, 2005; Webb, 2009; Winter, 2010). In 1964, under pressure from President Lyndon Johnson and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the FBI launched the COINTELPRO 'White Hate Groups' programme, targeting the Klan (Chalmers, 2005). In 1965, the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities conducted hearings into the *Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States* (1965–1966), most notably terrorism, and produced the report *The Present Day Ku Klux Klan Movement* (1967).

COINTELPRO would continue into the 1970s, but from 1969 the focus would turn from the white supremacist racist right to Black Power, with the FBI declaring the Black Panthers the most dangerous internal threat (Crenshaw, 2011), as well as the revolutionary left. Within

a year of the FBI's announcement, all senior leaders of the Black Panthers would be on trial, in prison, on the run or dead and by 1972, Huey P. Newton would announce the end of their 'militant self-defence' programme. In terms of the left, in his 1969 'Campus Unrest Speech', President Nixon called student and anti-war demonstrations and occupations, as well as arson attacks by protestors, the 'next to last step along the road to terrorism' (de Graaf, 2011, p. 73). In 1970, Nixon and FBI head J. Edgar Hoover focused on what was termed 'revolutionary terrorism', allegedly being perpetrated by 'determined professionals'. The government amended the Organized Crime Control Bill in order to label bombings of 'buildings, vehicles, or other property of any federal assisted institution or organization' a federal crime (de Graaf, 2011, p. 78), and re-established the DoJ's Internal Security Division and Special Litigation Section, which had not been active since the discredited McCarthy era and pursued conspiracy investigations. In June 1970, the Nixon administration extended intelligence activities through a presidential mandate, as opposed to attempting to pass new legislation that would require oversight and approval. On 25 June, the President established a special Interagency Committee on Intelligence, led by Hoover. Its Huston Plan justified the extension of state authority to acquire evidence (e.g. electronic surveillance, mail checks, 'surreptitious' entry, underage campus informants and military undercover agents), and a DoJ unit was created to coordinate law enforcement and save and process all info about terrorist bombings. Yet between 1970 and 1972, the Pentagon Papers revealed the extent to which espionage by COINTELPRO, CIA and military was conducted on and gathered intelligence on Americans. In 1974, the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) investigated COINTELPRO and, in 1975, declared it illegal and unconstitutional. In addition to this, there has been relative consensus that COINTELPRO was politically motivated and undemocratic, used to suppress, criminalize and delegitimize political protest and speech (Berlet and Lyons, 1998; Cunningham, 2004; de Graaf, 2011).

COINTELPRO was an example of the government expanding the definition of terrorism (possible without an official definition) and using counter-terrorism discourses and tactics to deal with social movements and political protests, particularly progressive ones, that challenged the state using counter-terrorism discourse and tactics. But while COINTELPRO focused on organized movements who threatened or engaged in violence, such tactics were not limited to these. In response to so-called 'race riots' in the 1960s and 1970s, the government set up the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which put out the 1976 *Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism*. The report referred to riots as 'a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes' (Alexander, 2006, p. 26), thereby linking more diffuse and constitutionally protected protest to organized terrorism and criminalizing it.

International terrorism became a major concern for the United States beginning in 1969, with the 1969 TWA hijacking and hostage-taking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 1970 TWA and Pan Am hijackings and Munich Olympics in 1972. These events led to the establishment of three bodies: 1. President Nixon established a cabinet-level committee to coordinate counter-terrorism; 2. the State Department, Interagency Group on Terrorism; and 3. the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The State Department became the lead national agency for dealing with terrorism. In 1971, the Organization of American States, to which the United States is a member, became the first regional international organization to respond formally to terrorism, including kidnappings, with the 1971 Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance (Crenshaw, 1989). Following Munich, the United States put forward a draft UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of

International Terrorism, leading to concerns from the developing or so-called 'Third World' that this would be used to deny legitimacy to anti-colonial movements and national liberation struggles. This was reflected in the 1972 resolution (Guelke, 1998).

In response to the number of hijackings, in 1972 Director of Aviation Security Lieutenant-General Benjamin Davis proposed legislation that when passed in 1973, made boarding gate security measures mandatory (Wilkinson, 2001). That year, U.S. hijack attempts fell from 31 to three, and searches led to the seizure of 3,500 lbs of explosives, 2,000 guns and 23,000 knives. Research by Enders, Sandler and Cauley in 1990 found that while metal detectors had a significant long-term impact, there was a displacement effect onto other tactics, such as kidnapping and assassinations (Silke, 2003). Despite the success of metal detectors and international agreements for their introduction, over the years, we would still see cases such as Lockerbie in 1988 and 9/11 which showed that different points of origin have less safeguards in place, and that U.S. airport security was not always updated with recent technology (and could even be degraded). In 1976, there would also begin an attempt to fortify U.S. Embassies which, while reducing attacks, also had a displacement effect, with an increase in assassinations. In addition to security, the United States would sign agreements with other countries, such as the Memorandum of Understanding with Cuba that would provide for the return of hijacked aircrafts and extradition of prosecution of perpetrators (Crenshaw, 1989).

There were also pieces of anti-terror legislation passed by Congress during the 1970s, including the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Section 303). It focused on state-supported terrorism, which had become a central issue, calling for cutting off of U.S. support for 'any government which aids or abets terrorism, by providing sanctuary from prosecution, to any group or individual which has committed an act of international terrorism' (Alexander, 2006, p. 26). In October 1977, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs Senator Abraham Ribicoff introduced the bill: An Act to Combat International Terrorism. Amongst other issues, its definition of terrorism linked it to the international context, crimes under existing international conventions, states and international organizations as targets, and exempted military operations from being labelled terrorism. Following from the focus on state-supported terrorism in the 1976 Act, in 1979, Congress developed a blacklist of countries supporting terrorism, including Libya, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and, added later as developments in the international arena occurred, Afghanistan, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan and Iran. The 1979 Iranian hostage crisis highlighted the lack of a coherent American policy. While admirable for not using force, President Carter blocked Iranian assets, sought UN sanctions and used the International Court of Justice, without success, then launched a failed rescue mission in April 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, an aborted second mission, Operation Credible Sport, and then returned to negotiations. This failure eventually led to the creation of U.S. Special Operations Command and, with other attacks on embassies, a focus on embassy and personnel security (Wilcox, 2002). It also played a pivotal role in the 1980 election campaign, where Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan and the more aggressively militaristic tone, rhetoric and policy of the Reagan era. The fact that the hostages were released the day of Reagan's inauguration and led to him getting credit over Carter's negotiations was indicative of this shift. The year 1979 did see the introduction of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Crenshaw, 1989).

The 1980s saw a continuing focus on international terrorism and the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Base in Beirut let to the formation of two new commissions and the development of a new approach to combatting international terrorism. The first was the Department of Defense's (DoD) Long Commission, which called for the replacement of the reactive approach to terrorism in favour of a proactive one, and for treating international terrorism as a form of warfare. The DoD defined international terrorism as 'unlawful use or

threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization …. Considered criminal under local law or acts which violate the law of Armed Conflict', and the Beirut attack as being 'tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terrorism' (Alexander, 2006, p. 12). This link was reasserted in June 1984 when U.S. representative to the UN, Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, stated that '[t]errorism is a form of war against a society and all who embody it'. This link to war made international terrorism a top security concern for America, and set the stage for its eventual consolidation of the war discourse and approach in the post-9/11 war on terror.

In terms of security, this was the focus of the second post-Beirut development. CIA Director Bobby Inman was appointed to head a new commission focused on security for U.S. embassies, bases and personnel abroad. This included structural improvements to increase security at facilities and personnel protection, as well as the appointment of an Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism within the DoD to oversee this (Alexander, 2006). This was also partly in response to a series of kidnappings of Americans by Hezbollah. This development also led to elements in the National Security Council to embark on Iran-Contra, bringing the administration and efforts into disrepute (Wilkinson, 2001). Support for the right-wing rebel Contras in Nicaragua as well as UNITA in Angola in the 1980s (Laqueur, 1987), while labelling left wing groups and governments 'terrorists', also led to charges of American hypocrisy on the issue of terrorism. Another case that demonstrated American inconsistency, if not selectiveness, in its response to terrorism, was the 1984 case of PIRA member Joe Docherty, whom the United States refused to extradite to Britain following a court decision. It led to a 1985 Extradition Treaty, passed in 1986 by Reagan, in response to U.K. support for the bombing of Libya that year (Guelke, 1998).

In response to terrorist attacks and international-focused counter-terrorism mandates, the period also saw a number of other developments, including the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Anti-terrorism Act of 1984, which would see aspects of its proposed definition of terrorism in the 1986 FBI definition discussed earlier. The year also saw a series of specific acts: The Act of Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts (98th Congress, 2nd Session, HR 5612) and 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism (98-533), which established a counter-terrorism rewards programme administered by the Diplomatic Security Service, as well as the Prohibition Against the Training and Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984 (Alexander and Kroft, 2008).

Despite the linking of international terrorism to war, Congress had a narrower focus in relation to specific crimes: Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Crimes Against Aviation and Crimes Against Taking of Hostages. In addition to this and the fact that the 1977 An Act to Combat International Terrorism exempted military operations from being labelled terrorism, authorization for military operations were not sought as the challenge was still identified officially as a criminal and not military matter (Alexander, 2006). This gap between rhetoric and policy would continue throughout the decade, and the rhetoric would become increasingly dramatic as the Cold War stepped up.

On 4 February 1985, Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz stated that '[t]errorism poses a direct threat not only to Western strategic interests but to the very moral principles that undergird Western democratic society' (Alexander, 2006, p. 13). He claimed that the 'enemies of the West are united' and called for democracies to be 'united in a common defence against terrorism', similar to George W. Bush's post-9/11 call for a coalition of the willing in the war on terror. Yet, the U.S. still had not developed a unified official definition for the term 'terrorism' in relation to conflict. It was only, as stated earlier, in 2001 that the State Department came up with a definition of terrorism in U.S. Code title 22, section 2656f(d).

Following the 1985 hijackings of TWA and the Achille Lauro, Reagan made his now famous statement that 'America will never make concessions to terrorists' (Alexander and Kroft, 2008, p. 61), and established the U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, appointing Vice President Bush as Chair. In its December 1985 report, it recommended greater coordination of agencies, a role on the National Security Council and the establishment of a consolidated intelligence centre, and establishment of the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI) Counterterrorist Center (CTC) bringing together different tasks spread out throughout the CIA and intelligence community, as well as operations officers, analysts, reports officers, technical experts and other specialists in a 'one-stop' shop (Pillar, 2004). In their February 1986 report, they set out U.S. policy on negotiating with terrorists, contrasting clearly with that of the Carter administration's attempts in Iran and affirming Reagan's speech: 'The United States has a clear policy of no concessions to terrorists as the best way to protect the greatest number of people' (Alexander, 2006, p. 28). They also concluded that 'judicious employment of military force' might serve as an effective deterrent, but warned of the implications of 'gunboat diplomacy' (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 138). The criminal approach was reasserted with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which made it a federal crime for terrorists to threaten, detain, seize injure or kill an American citizen outside the U.S. borders. This allowed American law enforcement authorities to conduct investigations outside the U.S. and led to legal attaches being stationed in U.S. embassies. There was also increased funding, over $2.4 billion, for embassy security in 1986, but research has shown that this had no deterrent effect (Silke, 2003). At the same time, military retaliation was also used, most notably the U.S. bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi 'Operation El Dorado Canyon' following the 1986 Berlin Disco bombing linked to Libya, which killed 37, including Muammar Gaddafi's adopted daughter. According to Enders, Sandler and Cauley, military retaliation in the form of El Dorado Canyon, while popular with Americans, led to negative responses from the international community, including allies, and was not a significant deterrent, leading to a short-term increase in terrorism targeting the United States and some of its allies (Silke, 2003). Military retaliation was only used two more times prior to 9/11, in response to the assassination attempt on President Bush in 1993 and attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 (Hoyt, 2004). The 1988 Lockerbie case which ended the decade, while in Scottish as opposed to U.S. jurisdiction, led to American sanctions and Federal Aviation Administration work to improve security (Alexander, 2006).

While the focus of counter-terrorism in the 1980s was primarily on international terrorism, there were developments domestically, mostly focused on the right and centred around Christian Identity-affiliated groups such as Aryan Nations and The Order. In addition to charges against The Order for their crimes, in April 1987, a federal grand jury in Fort Smith, Arkansas, brought seditious conspiracy charges against senior leaders of Aryan Nations and ten surviving members of The Order. The charges included conspiracy to overthrow the federal government, assassinate an FBI agent and a federal judge, bomb federal buildings, utility pipelines, and electrical transmission lines, poison water supplies, and sabotage railroads. Yet, in April 1988, the accused were acquitted of all charges (Associated Press, 1988; Winter, 2011).

Despite the focus on international terrorism in the 1980s under Reagan, and terrorist threats and attacks occurring in the wake of the Gulf War, including the first WTC attack and threat against Bush in 1993, which led to cruise missile strikes against Iraqi intelligence agencies in Baghdad (Hoyt, 2004), initially the Clinton administration did not see terrorism as a major national security issue, nor part of foreign policy planning. According to David Tucker, former Foreign Service officer, U.S. policy on terrorism was in a 'strategic vacuum' post-Reagan and

post-Cold War (Crenshaw, 2004, p. 81). Clinton inherited an existing counter-terrorism policy based on four principles:

1 No concessions to terrorist demands;
2 Imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions against state sponsors;
3 Enforcement of rule of law to bring terrorists to trial;
4 Multilateral cooperation (Crenshaw, 2011).

For Reagan, it had been central to the Cold War and to Bush, the post-war 'clash of civilizations', but Clinton did not have a coherent focused framework for international terrorism, however flawed and ideological these were. According to Crenshaw (2011) the Clinton administration rejected the 'clash of civilizations' approach and saw terrorism as part of a grouping of 'modern' global problems, including organized crime, disease epidemics and environmental disasters, as a feature of the globalized world. Domestic terrorism did become an increasing focus though, albeit inconsistently (Michael, 2003). This was primarily in response to right-wing anti-abortion and anti-government groups, with 60 right-wing plots and major events such as the Oklahoma City bombing during the decade. There were also 60 actual attacks by the right and wider movements, killing 182 and injuring over 1,932. Yet, this was actually the continuation of a long-term decline overall that began in the 1980s, attributed to the FBI working with other law enforcement agencies, including the discredited COINTELPRO, more prosecutions and a loss of revolutionary fervour seen in the 1960s and 1970s (Alexander, 2006).

The first major piece of legislation passed under Clinton was the Freedom of Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 which prosecuted any protest that impeded clinic access, to deal with harassment and threatening behaviour, as well as protect the legal right to abortion (Hewitt, 2003). That same year, the Attorney General Janet Reno established the Task Force on Violence Against Abortion Providers to investigate whether there was a conspiracy to commit acts of violence against abortion and reproductive health providers (Winter, 2013). At the same time, the extreme-right, and more specifically anti-government, activism and threats had been on the rise, but the response was mixed. In response, in 1995, the SPLC's Morris Dees issued a warning letter to Attorney General Janet Reno urging her to 'alert all federal law enforcement authorities to the growing danger posed by the unauthorized militias that have sprung up in at least eighteen states' (Dees with Corcoran, 1996, pp. 104–105). Only nine days prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, Kenneth Stern, former director of the National Organization against Terrorism and representative of the American Jewish Committee, issued the report *Militias: A Growing Danger* (Stern, 1996). Yet, there was no response. It is likely that the experience of Ruby Ridge and Waco, and their role in the mobilization of the anti-government movement, led to greater caution or fear on the part of federal authorities.

The Oklahoma City bombing was not only on an anniversary of the American Revolution, but that of the final day of the Waco siege. In fact, McVeigh referred to his attack as a 'retaliatory strike' for Ruby Ridge and Waco, and targeted a federal building housing the ATF. The response to the bombing included the establishment of an FBI counter-terrorism taskforce in the Pacific Northwest (Morlin, 1998), and five Senate sub-committee hearings held between May and November 1995. The hearings included: *Combating Domestic Terrorism*, *The Militia Movement in the United States* (1995), *The Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America* (1995), *The Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID.* (1995), and *The Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians* (1995). The latter two represented an acknowledgement of the link between the two sieges and anti-government activism and terrorism.

In response to Oklahoma City, and delayed response to the 1993 WTC attack, Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, which came into force in June 1995 and focused on both domestic and international terrorism. PDD 39 made 'terrorism a top national security priority', designated terrorist attacks both a criminal act *and* a national security threat, and justified the use of force (Michael, 2003, p. 55). It also made the FBI the lead government agency for terrorism investigation and prevention and led to the establishment of the FBI Counter-Terrorism Center, which focused on three areas: domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and countermeasures. The FBI would also see their counter-terrorism budget increase from 78 to 609 million and a staff increase of 224%, from 550 in 1993 to 1,669 in 2000. PDD 39 also made FEMA the lead authority for consequence management and created the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).

The Oklahoma City bombing also provided Congress with the impetus to pass the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a version of which had been proposed following the 1993 WTC attack, but was opposed on grounds that it could pose a threat to civil liberties and negatively impact Arab and Irish communities (Cole and Dempsey, 2002). The 1996 Act earmarked one billion for federal counter-terrorism and new initiatives would be introduced, such as chemical tagging of explosive material, a crackdown on financing, streamlining of execution and removal procedures for foreign terrorists, procedures to make it easier to withhold aid to countries that support terrorism, an increase in penalties for conspiracy, allowing victims to sue state sponsors of terrorism, and expanding the use of funds from the Victims of Crime Act for victims of terrorism (Alexander, 2006).

At the same time as the Oklahoma bombing, in 1995 Clinton and the U.S. Attorneys established local task forces to coordinate law enforcement efforts to deal with abortion clinic violence (Winter, 2013; United States Department of Justice, 2000). Following the October 1998 murder of Dr Barnett Slepian, Attorney General Reno established the National Task Force on Violence Against Health Care Providers, which would issue their *Report on Federal Efforts to Prevent and Prosecute Clinic Violence 1998–2000* at the end of the decade.

Other developments at this time included the more internationally focused Executive Order 1015 in 1996, which established a Commission on Aviation Safety and Security led by Vice President Al Gore. In its 1997 report, the Commission warned of threats to air travel, including Operation Bojinka, a failed plot to bomb 12 American flights. There was also the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996: Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY97, which provided for training of first responders in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. This was followed by a joint report on crisis management submitted to congress by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and FBI (Alexander, 2006). The year 1996 also saw the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the Helms-Burton Act (focusing on Cuba), requiring the United States to sanction foreign companies that engage with these countries (Wilcox, 2002).

Following the al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, Clinton launched cruise missile attacks at a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which was believed to be producing nerve gas, and sanctions against Sudan, as well as attacking bin Laden's base in Afghanistan. The attack on Sudan, and particularly on an unsubstantiated target that destroyed medical supplies, led to a backlash against the United States (Crenshaw, 2011). They also indicted bin Laden and Mohammed Alef in absentia, tightened economic and diplomatic sanctions on Afghanistan and placed pressure on Pakistan to end its support for the Taliban. In addition to this, there was also a renewed focus on embassy security (Wilcox, 2002). The year 1998 also saw PDD 62 and the establishment of the Office of National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator was placed within the National Security Council, reporting to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and dealt with infrastructure, counter-terrorism, WMDs, preparedness and consequence management (Michael, 2003).

In 1999, there was fear of both millenarian movements and millennial violence and al-Qaeda. Fear of the former, and memories of Ruby Ridge, Waco and Oklahoma, led to the FBI's (2000) *Project Megiddo*. Its report, released in 1999, analyzed the potential for extremist activity by white supremacists, militias, Christian Identity, Black Hebrew Israelites, apocalyptic cults and others around the millennium, and warned law enforcement. Yet none of the predicted threats or attacks occurred. Fear of al-Qaeda led to extra security measures, including the FBI suspending all tours of its headquarters in Washington, D.C., the closure of selected diplomatic posts and sanctions against the Taliban (Alexander, 2006). A 1999 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction recommended a shift from threat assessment and prevention to response and combatting terrorism, and the creation of an Office for Combatting Terrorism, with increased training for response.

In preparation for challenges of the next century in 1999, the Twenty-first Century Commission led by former Senators Warren B Rudman and Gary Hart was established. In their 2000 report, they predicted a nuclear, chemical and/or biological WMD attack in the next 25 years and called for the creation of a cabinet-level agency to take responsibility for defending the United States against attack. They also recommended that the National Guard be changed to form a 'Homeland Security Agency' with U.S.-based troops. In 1999 the National Commission on Terrorism was formed. It was chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer, who would later go on to be posted in post-invasion Iraq. The Commission issued the report 'Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism' in 2000. It argued that international terrorism posed a dangerous and complex threat and that the United States needed to make greater effort to counter it, and, in an assertion of the proactive-preventative model, put prevention (including intelligence gathering) as the first priority, but called for the United States to prepare for a WMD attack. It also called for states that support terrorism to be targeted, private sources of financial and logistical support to be subjected to U.S. and international law, and the President and Congress to review, reform and fund counter-terrorism in order to ensure that all programmes and activities are part of a comprehensive plan (Alexander, 2006). In 2000, the U.S. Government Interagency of Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) was formed to coordinate federal, state and local agencies in response to WMD threats (Michael, 2003).

The October 2000 al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Yemen led to the end of using the Suez Canal and the state department issuing warnings to U.S. civilians from traveling in certain regions, a high alert in the Middle East and the end of joint exercises with Jordan in Bahrain. Despite this and calls for greater coordination, the 14 December 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressam of Algerian Armed Islamic Group who was found with explosives in his car – allegedly for a New Year's attack on LAX while crossing the border at Washington State – FAA warnings about hijackers in July 2001, FBI concern about flight school students and the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota in August 2001, and CIA reports to the FBI about al-Qaeda members in the U.S., America was not prepared for 9/11. These failures were raised in media reports and 9/11 commission hearings, and in the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

This brings the history of U.S. counter-terrorism to the end of the pre-9/11 period. Far from showing a clear and consistent strategy, the history of counterterrorism in the U.S. is one of responses and reactions, changes and adaptations, different political interests and initiatives, selective applications, caution and overreach, successes and failures. For Singh (2003, p. 52),

9/11 not only represented an end of innocence and heralded in an unprecedented chapter, but 'confirmed the many prior warnings that the question of mainland terror was one of when, not whether, it would occur'. So as much as 9/11 appears to have changed the terms of discussion, debate and policy, it was a paradigm shift that was produced by a failure to recognize the signs of a threat that led up to the event that 'changed everything', as well as some selective forgetting of the past. Hopefully this overview can aid in our understanding and analysis of counter-terrorism past, present and future, highlight the continuities and discontinuities, contextualize it and challenge uncritical support and expectations.

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Domestic counterterrorism since 9/11

Joshua Sinai

The shooting rampage by Omar Mateen at the Pulse club in Orlando, Florida, on June 12, 2016, in which he killed 49 people and wounded 53, was the latest in a series of high-profile attacks by Islamist terrorists in the United States. It followed the shooting rampage by the husband-and-wife team of Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik at a holiday party for County employees at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, CA, on December 5, 2015, killing 14 and injuring 22 others. Previous high-profile shooting or bombing attacks by American Islamists included Major Nidal Hasan's shooting rampage at Ft. Hood, Texas, in November 2009, Faisal Shahzad's attempted bombing of Times Square on May 1, 2010, the Tsarnaev brothers' bombing of the Boston Marathon in mid-April 2013, and the shootings by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez on two military installations in Chattanooga, Tennessee, on July 16, 2015. In all of these attacks, the perpetrators were known (to a certain extent) as Islamist-inspired extremists by their family members or associates, yet these home-grown or immigrant perpetrators were able to slip through the seams of the relatively effective counterterrorism (CT) surveillance programs the United States had established following the catastrophic 9/11 attacks to track and thwart the suspicious activities of Islamist operatives in the country to carry out their attacks.

An estimated 82 Islamist terrorist plots were attempted at various pre-incident phases in the United States in the aftermath of al-Qaeda's catastrophic September 11, 2001 attacks through June 2016, with most of these plots being thwarted by law enforcement authorities and 15 of them becoming attacks that caused fatalities and injuries (Walters, 2016; Garcia, 2015). Thus, with the estimated 67 successful attack pre-emptions, and large-scale arrests of Islamist operatives during their pre-incident plot phases, to demonstrate that, since the 9/11 attacks (which were conducted by foreign operatives who had succeeded in easily entering U.S. entry points), the American counterterrorism response measures have been relatively successful in preventing such foreign-based terrorists from entering the country to conduct large-scale attacks. Most of the domestically originating plots were thwarted due to tightened surveillance and tracking of the operatives to pre-empt them from carrying out their terrorist attacks during their formative pre-incident phases.

Nevertheless, the fact that several mass fatality terrorist attacks did succeed, despite these substantial upgrades in U.S. counterterrorism capabilities, demonstrated that further improvements in the government's CT measures were still required. Although the United States also faced terrorist plots and attacks by far-right wing terrorist operatives, such as 21-year-old Dylann

Roof's shooting rampage on June 17, 2015 at an African-American church in Charleston, North Carolina, which killed nine people and injured one person, this chapter focuses on the threats posed by Islamist extremists because their plots and attacks have been much more prevalent since 9/11 and are part of a wider insurgency by like-minded Islamists worldwide.

To examine the effectiveness of America's domestic counterterrorism program since 9/11, this chapter begins with an account of the successful thwarting of Najibullah Zazi's plot to bomb the New York City subway system in 2009, which had been timed to coincide with the 8th anniversary of 9/11. The chapter then progresses to examine five high-profile terrorist attacks which were perpetrated, respectively those by Nidal Hasan, Faisal Shahzad, the Tsarnaev brothers, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, and Omar Mateen. In considering both thwarted and actual terrorist attacks, the chapter sheds light on the operation of counterterrorism in the United States in the post-9/11 era, how the nature of the threat has evolved and the challenges which face effective counterterrorism efforts.

Najibullah Zazi's plot to bomb New York City's subway system, 2009[1]

The successful prevention of the Najibullah Zazi plot was the result of a paradigm shift in the approach of U.S. counterterrorism agencies in responding to these types of terrorist threats. In the plot, Zazi and two of his high school friends had planned to strap explosives to their bodies and head for the Grand Central and Times Square stations, where they would board packed trains at rush hour and blow themselves up to inflict maximum fatalities (Marzulli, 2010). In addition to his two associates, Zazi's plot also involved links to high-ranking al-Qaeda operational managers in Pakistan who directed the operation, as well as those of fellow operatives in Britain and Norway who were in the process of carrying out their own attacks in those countries.

Najibullah ("Najib") Zazi was born in Afghanistan's Paktia province, a middle child with two sisters and two brothers. The violence of Afghanistan's civil war and the long struggle to oust the Soviets eventually drove Zazi's family in the early 1990s to settle to Pakistan's Peshawar area. Around 1992, Najib's father Mohammed Wali Zazi moved to America and found employment as a taxi driver (Burke *et al.*, 2009), eventually becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. This enabled him in 1999 to arrange for his family, including 14-year-old Najibullah, to settle in New York City, where they became legal residents.

Beginning around late-2007, Zazi became intensely angry over the U.S. war in Afghanistan and began thinking about taking action. Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay, two of his friends who also attended Flushing High School, had similar sentiments, and the three of them began discussing their opposition to the war in Afghanistan. Like Zazi, Ahmedzay was also born in Afghanistan. In 2007, he took a civil service test to become a New York City firefighter, but became a cab driver instead. Medunjanin was a Bosnian immigrant who came to the United States in 1994, was naturalized in 2002, and was a student at Queens College, majoring in Economics.

Years later, Zazi recounted that his friends "were bitter over the deaths of civilians in his homeland" (Susman and Serrano, 2010). The three friends who worshiped together at a mosque in Queens were further radicalized by recordings of Anwar al-Awlaki, the extremist imam who was based at the time in Yemen (Secret, 2012). As they crossed the threshold from radicalization into violent action, they came up with a plan "to join the Taliban – to fight alongside the Taliban against the United States" in Afghanistan. In 2008 the three travelled to Pakistan (United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 2009). Court records of the Zazi case indicate that the three associates underwent military training at one of al-Qaeda's training camps in the

mountains of Pakistan's Waziristan region. In November 2008, Zazi was taken aside and given special bomb-making training because of his knowledge of the New York City subway system (Marzulli, 2010).

While Zazi may have been under some sort of surveillance by U.S. authorities while in Pakistan—this is unconfirmed—his actual plot may have been initially uncovered by Scotland Yard in early 2009 as part of "Operation Pathway," when it intercepted an e-mail from a senior al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan to Zazi, instructing him how to implement his attack. Scotland Yard then notified the FBI, which began its surveillance operation against Zazi, including listening to his phone conversations.

While tracking Zazi and his associates in what became known as Operation Highrise (Silber, 2011), the U.S. government's counterterrorism agencies worked seamlessly and in an integrated manner to physically and electronically place them under surveillance and pre-empt their operation. Unlike the pre-9/11 law enforcement-dominated paradigm, intelligence gathering was given greater consideration. Zazi's conspiracy was allowed to proceed through its later stages to enable the authorities to uncover and then apprehend the entire network.

One of the first times Zazi's name (and likely those of his associates) reportedly drew the attention of federal authorities was due to the potentially suspicious nature of his travel in August 2008, when he took off from Newark to Pakistan. His name was entered into the Passenger Name Record (PNR) database. PNR data includes a passenger's itinerary, payment method, and contact information, so such data would have provided valuable information about Zazi's travel arrangements. It surely came to their notice again when he returned on January 15, 2009 at Kennedy Airport. But had this information not been shared, important signals of the plot could have been missed.

In terms of federal–local counterterrorism relations, the FBI worked closely with local law enforcement agencies. On September 9, when Zazi started driving his rental car from Denver to New York City, the FBI obtained the cooperation of a Colorado State Patrol trooper to pull him over "purportedly" for speeding, in order to inquire about his destination, with the same cooperation extended by New York State troopers as he was crossing the George Washington Bridge into New York (Burnett, 2011). Although journalistic accounts claim that the NYPD's detectives' interview with a New York imam, Afzali, tipped off Zazi that the authorities were on to him (Burke *et al.*, 2009), perhaps it actually was part of a coordinated plan with the FBI and NYPD to "smoke out" other potential associates, such as the imam, Zazi's father, and others. It ended up working because both were eventually arrested as co-conspirators, with other members of Zazi's family not only implicated, but ending up as government witnesses against them. In any case, it is fortunate that Afzali's tipping off Zazi was not sufficient to give him enough time to destroy evidence that revealed how close he had come to building his bombs and leading his team to carry out the operation.

The FBI's role in the investigation also demonstrated how it had transformed its domestic law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, becoming more of a combination of Britain's vaunted MI5 and Scotland Yard. The FBI's field offices in Denver and New York City, which are part of the Bureau's 56 field offices nationwide, were involved operationally in countering Zazi and his associates by sifting through information and then disseminating it locally and nationally, including to the more than 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) nationwide, and a National JTTF at FBI Headquarters with 40 member agencies. As explained by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano in praising the investigation of Najibullah Zazi, "several FBI field offices and their JTTFs (including the New York JTTF) contributed to efforts in identifying Zazi, conducting surveillance of him, and arresting Zazi before he could execute his attack, while also identifying Zazi's associates (Department of Homeland Security, 2011).

According to Robert Mueller, the FBI's Director at the time, the Bureau had adopted a threat-based, intelligence-driven framework that tracks networks of associates over appropriate lengths of time, noting in his congressional testimony that "the new approach prioritizes the collection and utilization of intelligence to develop a comprehensive threat picture, enabling strategic disruptions of terrorist networks before they act" (Mueller, 2011). The case also illustrated the critical importance of intelligence sharing between the FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies. Countering the Zazi case was successful, according to Senator Susan Collins, because it "underscore[d] the incredible value of information sharing," as well as coordination among agencies with their law enforcement and intelligence counterparts (Collins, 2011). A key component of this information sharing involved the Colorado Information and Analysis Center (CIAC), which provided analytic support to the Denver FBI and DHS, including personnel to assist the Denver FBI in the investigation and support the field operations. According to the DHS website, "CIAC analysts also assisted in the review and analysis of the evidence obtained during the execution of the search and arrest warrants. CIAC leadership addressed media inquiries regarding the investigation, the threat to Colorado residents, and the threat to national security" (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). In this particular investigation, the Colorado fusion center's databases were used by the FBI's Denver office to quickly assess information obtained through an FBI search warrant on Zazi (Priest and Arkin, 2011).

The FBI had also established partnerships throughout the intelligence, law enforcement, and allied nations' security communities, where FBI legal attachés maintain liaison relationships with foreign counterparts, which must have been the case in Zazi's investigation. Other FBI divisions likely involved included the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), established in December 2003, which maintains the U.S. Government's consolidated Terrorist Watchlist, a single database of identifying information about individuals known or suspected of being involved in terrorist activity; the Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS), which tracks terrorist financing, including, when possible, utilizing such information to identify previously unknown terrorist cells; and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF), established in 2003, which provides—once an investigation is authorized—a spectrum of new or confirming information generated from government and public databases about individuals with a nexus to terrorism who may be operating in the United States. Once identified, leads on such terrorists and their associates are provided to appropriate law enforcement agencies to initiate or sustain investigatory and judicial actions against them.

Although not considered a domestic counterterrorism agency, the National Security Agency (NSA) was also likely involved in the Zazi investigation. The NSA collects overseas signals intelligence (SIGINT), which in counterterrorism consists of intercepting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information derived from electronic communications and other signals employed by terrorist groups, their associates, and state sponsors. The NSA works closely with the FBI on cases involving Americans and foreign counterparts.

Also involved in helping to pre-empt Zazi's operation was the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (Agence France Presse, 2009). This was set up following the September 11, 2001 attacks, after it emerged that vital data on the pending strikes was not shared swiftly between various U.S. intelligence agencies. Its mission is to synchronize the fight against terrorist threats within the United States and abroad, and to coordinate and share data on individuals with a nexus to terrorism and pending strikes with U.S. government departments and agencies and U.S. foreign partners, including the coordination of intelligence collection and analysis efforts between federal, state, and local government agencies. The NCTC's role in the Zazi investigation was recognized by President Barack Obama, who stated, "You [NCTC] stitched together

the intelligence. You worked together, across organizations, as one team. And then – arrests in Denver and New York" ('Remarks by President Obama at the National Counterterrorism Center', 2009).

Working with these and other intelligence and law enforcement partners enabled the FBI to deploy a discreet, yet robust, physical and electronic surveillance of Zazi once he returned to the United States in January 2009, ensuring that he and his associates never posed, at any point, an immediate threat. This was also due to British intelligence's interception of his e-mails early on and sharing them with the FBI, and the FBI's tapping of his calls and reading his e-mails before he began building bombs. As soon as he attempted to leave Denver for New York City to carry out his operation, he was placed under constant surveillance along the route by the FBI and local law enforcement agencies. As in other cases, such as Faisal Shahzad's aborted attempt to bomb Times Square in early May 2010 (see below), Zazi was inept—constantly e-mailing his al-Qaeda contacts to plead for advice in constructing the bombs. Moreover, publicly declaring personal bankruptcy and even buying bomb materials with maxed-out and stolen credit cards must have sent numerous early warning red flags through the counterterrorism financial tracking system.

Major Nidal Hasan's November 2009 attack

In his attack, on November 5, 2009 Major Nidal Hasan, aged 39, a U.S. Army Medical Corps psychiatrist, killed 13 people and injured more than 30 others at his military base in Fort Hood, Texas. In August 2013 he was convicted in a court martial and sentenced to death. Numerous early warning red flags were missed by U.S. government and military authorities prior to Major Hasan's shooting rampage. First, in 2007, at his fellowship program at the military's medical school, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, in Bethesda, Maryland, Major Hasan's supervisors reportedly were "'derelict in their duties" by failing to take 'appropriate action' against him by reporting to the base's security officer his extremist Islamist statements in class and to his student colleagues" (Zwerdling, 2010).

Secondly, Major Hasan's more than several dozen e-mail exchanges in December 2008, and January and May 2009 with Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent al-Qaeda cleric (and, reportedly, an operational planner as well) based in Yemen, were known to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in San Diego, California, which was tracking Awlaki's communications at the time (Blake, 2013). Although Major Hasan was on active military duty and was listed as a "Comm. Officer" at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., this e-mail exchange was considered to constitute "academic research on Islamic beliefs regarding military service," but not sufficiently suspicious to raise warning flags of a possible radicalization that could lead to a terrorist attack (Blake, 2013).

Finally, after Major Hasan was transferred to Fort Hood in June 2009, where he was responsible for counseling soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, he purchased an FN Herstal semi-automatic tactical pistol and ammunition at the Guns Galore gun store in Killeen, Texas. At the time this did not raise any suspicions with the FBI background check that was conducted under the National Instant Background Check System when Major Hasan purchased the pistol. However, a suspicion would have been raised if that information had been shared with the JTTF in Washington, D.C., which was also tracking him and was aware that he had repeatedly contacted an extremist cleric with ties to al-Qaeda (Thomas, 2009). Reportedly, when Major Hasan was informed in October that he would be deployed to Afghanistan it triggered the set of risky behaviors that led to his walking into a deployment processing center at Fort Hood on November 5 to conduct his shooting rampage against his fellow soldiers.

Faisal Shahzad's plot to attack Times Square, New York City, 2010

On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad, aged 30, a Pakistani-American citizen, attempted to detonate a bomb inside a Nissan Pathfinder car in Times Square, New York. After Shahzad fled from the scene, the bomb failed to detonate and its smoke was noticed by a local street vendor, who alerted authorities who succeeded in disarming the bomb. Approximately 53 hours after his attempted bombing, Shahzad was arrested by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport, after boarding Emirates Flight 202 to Dubai, with his final destination Islamabad, Pakistan. After pleading guilty to the 10 counts against him, in October 2010 Shahzad was sentenced to life in prison.

U.S. authorities were reportedly unaware of Shahzad's suspicious activities during his visit to Pakistan from July 2009 until early February 2010 where he underwent training in bomb-making and the use of weapons at a camp run by the Pakistani Taliban in the Waziristan, along the Afghan border. Nevertheless, immediately following the attempted bombing, FBI investigators had quickly discovered his name while checking the identity of the Nissan Pathfinder's Vehicle Identification Number's (VIN) ownership, which they had matched to a telephone number Shahzad had provided when he returned to the United States from Pakistan in early February (Baker and Shane, 2010). It is reported that since he was returning from Pakistan, a "country of interest," he was pulled aside at the airport's arrival area for secondary screening by CBP agents, with a report generated about his travel, including his telephone number. Investigators then were able to sufficiently track his activities to determine that he had purchased an airline ticket for his flight, which enabled them to place his name on a "no-fly" list that ultimately led to his arrest on board the aircraft (just in time for it to be recalled to the gate).

The Tsarnaev brothers' bombing of the Boston Marathon, 2013

On April 15, 2013, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, aged 26, and his younger brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, aged 19, detonated two pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three persons and injuring an estimated 264 others. This was followed by subsequent related shootings in nearby Watertown, Massachusetts, on April 19, in which an MIT policeman was killed. While the elder Tsarnaev brother was killed in the ensuing gunfight with the police, the younger Tsarnaev was wounded and arrested later that evening. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death at his trial in Boston in April 2015.

The ability of the Tsarnaev brothers to conduct the bombing attack is considered a significant domestic counterterrorism failure. First, in March 2011, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly provided the FBI with detailed information that Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his mother Zubeidat Tsarnaeva were adherents of radical Islam and that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was preparing to travel to Russia to join unspecified "bandit underground groups" in Dagestan and Chechnya (Zalkind, 2014). Secondly, although this led to an FBI agent of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)—an interagency group that includes federal, state and local law enforcement representatives—interviewing Tamerlan Tsarnaev in March 2011, the question of his possible overseas travel plans was not raised. Instead, after interviewing Tamerlan, the Boston JTTF closed the assessment, "having found no link or 'nexus' to terrorism" (Zalkind, 2014). A member of the JTTF entered a memo about Tsarnaev into a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) database called TECS, which was supposed to automatically trigger an alert on a so-called "Hot List" of about 100 names, if at any time Tsarnaev left or re-entered the country. It was not triggered, however, when he left the United States on January 21, 2012 through JFK Airport on board an Aeroflot flight to Moscow, then to Dagestan, his ultimate destination, where he stayed for

six months and received jihad training, according to U.S. authorities (Winter, 2014). Tsarnaev was able to slip through undetected because either someone had misspelled his last name in a security database (Winter, 2014) or his name was not considered "high priority" on the TECS "Hot List" (Cooney, 2014).

Following the bombing, David Rubincam, at the time, the FBI's legal attaché in Russia, described Tamerlan's trip as "huge" and said that if he had known about it, "he would have reported the information to CTD [the FBI's Counterterrorism Division] and the Boston Field Division for them to take any actions they deemed appropriate" (CBS News, 2014). He also stated that the FBI would have reconsidered its assessment of Tsarnaev and sought additional information on his activities in Russia (Zalkind, 2014).

In September 2011, the FSB sent another memo to the CIA, restating the same warnings (Cooney, 2014). The CIA then alerted the FBI, DHS, and the NCTC, which placed Tsarnaev on a watch list. The NCTC then added Tsarnaev's name to the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, which is used as a source for watch lists such as TECS (Winter, 2014).

The NCTC also referred Tsarnaev's records to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)—which had been highly successful in identifying and pre-empting Najibullah Zazi's plot to bomb New York City's subway system in 2009—but when "an FTTTF analyst reviewed Tsarnaev's information," it was "determined that the Boston JTTF previously had conducted an assessment of Tsarnaev based on the same information from the Russian government," so there was apparently no need for a follow-up (Zalkind, 2014). On July 17, 2012, Tsarnaev returned to the United States, landing at JFK Airport. However, he was able to pass through the airport's customs check, reportedly due to a misspelling of his name—Tsarnayev instead of Tsarnaev (Winter, 2014).

In another example of how Tamerlan Tsarnaev was able to evade detection, around February 2013 he succeeded in purchasing the "biggest and loudest" fireworks kit, consisting of three pounds of black powder, from a Seabrook, New Hampshire, fireworks store (which had also provided him a second set for free) (Marcius and Hutchinson, 2013). This fireworks kit, which its company had advertised as "barely legal" under federal law for fireworks, was then used to build one of the two pressure-cooker bombs that were detonated at the Boston Marathon.

Finally, in March 2013, based on information provided in al-Qaeda's *Inspire* magazine (Durante, 2013), the Tsarnaev brothers built their pressure cooker bombs in Tamerlan's apartment in Cambridge, MA, which were "filled with nails, ball bearings and black powder," with the devices triggered by "kitchen-type egg timers" (Parker and Bidgood, 2015), while reportedly unbeknownst to any of their friends and associates in a position to report such suspicious activities to the appropriate authorities.

Syed Rizwan Farook's and Tashfeen Malik's attack in San Bernardino, California, 2015

On December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook, aged 28, and Tashfeen Malik, aged 29, a married couple, carried out a shooting rampage at a holiday party for County employees at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, CA. With approximately 75–80 people in attendance, they killed 14 and injured 22 others. Farook, a County employee, had worked there as an environmental health specialist since January 2012, and was at the party, but had left to bring his wife to carry out the joint shooting. Farook and his wife were killed several hours later, following their escape from the scene of the incident in a shootout with police.

Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik first met on an online Muslim matrimonial website, which was followed by a meeting during his pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in October

2013. After they were engaged on the day of their meeting, Farook filled out a U.S. K-1 fiancée visa application to enable him to bring her to his home in Riverside, California, and marry him the following summer (Bennett, Serrano and Parvini, 2015). Following their religious wedding ceremony at the Masjid al-Haram, in Mecca, after Malik's six-month visa was approved, she flew to America, with her entry visa stamped at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago on July 27, 2014. Three weeks later the couple obtained a marriage certificate from Riverside County. Malik then applied for a lawful permanent residency visa, with a conditional green card granted in July 2015 (Medina *et al.*, 2015).

With both Farook and Malik reported to have separately radicalized on the Internet as early as 2011, Malik is reported to have sent private messages to her friends on Facebook in 2012 and 2014 expressing support for jihad (Bennett, Serrano and Parvini, 2015). Despite their ongoing radicalization, and the fact that the F.B.I. had uncovered evidence that Farook had communicated with domestic and foreign Islamist extremists in the past (Medina *et al.*, 2015), the couple did not appear on any U.S. government terrorism or criminal watch lists that would have led to greater scrutiny by law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

During the period leading up to their early December 2015 attack, it was reported that they had stockpiled thousands of rounds of ammunition and a dozen homemade pipe bombs in their home, but, while their neighbors had told investigators they had witnessed "suspicious activity" at the couple's home, they did not report it to the authorities (Medina *et al.*, 2015). It was also reported that to evade detection, Farook had used his friend Enrique Marquez to purchase two of the guns used in the San Bernardino attack. Marquez was subsequently arrested for these activities on December 17, 2015

With Farook and Malik arriving at the Inland Community Center at 11:00 a.m. to start their shooting rampage armed with four guns and wearing ski masks, as well as "tactical vests," it took the responding police officers four minutes to arrive at the incident. After firing between 65 and 75 bullets, Farook and Malik managed to escape during the next few minutes, right before the responding police had arrived (Keneally, 2015). With their vehicle eventually spotted by the pursuing police some four hours later, they were killed in a five-minute shootout.

Omar Mateen's attack in Orlando, Florida

In what became the deadliest mass shooting by a single individual in U.S. history, on the night of June 12, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 29-year-old Omar Mateen carried out a shooting rampage at the Pulse night club in Orlando, Florida, killing 49 persons and wounding 53 others. He was killed in a shootout at the club with a police SWAT team at around 5:00 a.m. after barricading himself with hostages for about three hours. Mateen had used a SIG Sauer MCX semi-automatic rifle and a 9mm Glock 17 handgun to shoot his victims.

Mateen was born in New York City to Afghan immigrants in 1986. In 1991, his family moved to the Port St. Lucie area, near Florida's east coast. They later moved to nearby Fort Pierce where he attended high school. He was a problematic student, with numerous suspensions for fighting with other students (Binder, Robles, and Perez-Pena, 2016). He later attended the Indian River State College, near his home. He was fascinated with law enforcement, graduating with a degree in criminal justice technology in 2006. He then started working as a private security guard. Mateen was married twice, and, with his second wife, had a 3-year-old boy at the time of his attack. Interestingly, like Najibullah Zazi, whose father was a Taliban supporter at the time of 9/11, Mateen also grew up in a politically extremist family, with his father, Seddique Mir Mateen, active in the Afghan expatriate community where he expressed pro-Taliban sentiments in his YouTube channel (Reals, 2016).

Although still under investigation at the time of writing, Mateen's motivation for his shooting rampage at the Pulse nightclub (which he had reportedly frequently visited) was reportedly a combination of several factors. In general, as explained by Clark McCauley, he fit the pattern of terrorists and other mass killers who believe their targeted adversary had wronged them in a way that merited a violent response (Taub, 2016). Politically, these included posting messages on Facebook pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State (IS), and vowing that there would be additional attacks in the coming days by the group in the United States to "taste the Islamic state vengeance" for "the filthy ways of the west" (Binder, Robles and Perez-Pena, 2016). He repeated his pledge of allegiance to IS during his attack. Psychologically, it is reported that he had specifically targeted the gay club because of his conflicted sexual orientation as gay or bisexual and that throughout his life he was psychologically unstable, bipolar, and that he was physically abusive in his personal relationships, including with his first wife.

As an example of an Islamist extremist who somehow slipped through the government's surveillance system, it was reported that there were several early warning signs pointing to a trajectory of such a violent attack that should have been better picked up by the FBI and local law enforcement, which had been monitoring his activities for at least three years. In May 2013, Mateen, who was working as a security guard at the time, had boasted to his co-workers of ties to Hezbollah and al-Qaeda (Apuzzo and Lichtblau, 2016). This was reported to the local sheriff, who alerted the FBI, which initiated a preliminary investigation, including an interview, with the investigation lasting about a year. It also led his security firm, G4S, where he had worked for nine years, to transfer him from the St. Lucie County Courthouse in Fort Pierce, FL, to a residential golfing community. In July 2014, the FBI investigated him for links to 22-year-old Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha, a Palestinian American, also from Fort Pierce, who had joined Islamist insurgents in Syria, and on one of his return visits had attempted to recruit others to join him in Syria (Vinograd, 2016). Later, in May 2014, Abu-Salha became the first American foreign fighter to carry out a suicide bombing attack on behalf of Islamist insurgents in Syria. Reportedly, Mateen was acquainted with Abu-Salha, who also worshipped at the same mosque. In both investigations, however, although the FBI had nominated him for inclusion on the terrorist watch list, his name was removed from it after its case against him was closed.

It is reported that, some five or six weeks prior to his attack, Mateen had attempted to purchase high-grade body armor and at least 1,000 rounds of ammunition from the Lotus Gunworks store in nearby Jensen Beach, FL, but was rebuffed by one of its co-owners, who had notified the FBI of the incident, although at the time he was not aware of his identity (Stacey, 2016). Nevertheless, Mateen, who possessed his security and firearm licenses, was still able to legally purchase his guns a week prior to the attack at the St. Lucie Shooting Center in Port Saint Lucie, Florida (Vinograd and Thorp, 2016).

Conclusions

As discussed in this chapter, the cases of Nidal Hasan, Faisal Shahzad, the Tsarnaev brothers, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, and Omar Mateen represented a paradigm shift in the nature and magnitude of terrorist threats the United States faced from foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. These cases involved American residents who became radicalized and mobilized into Islamist violent extremism and conducted terrorist operations on their behalf in their own country, as opposed to the 9/11 model of a hierarchical foreign terrorist group dispatching its own fighters to conduct operations in America.

In another paradigm shift, in the case of Major Nidal Hasan his mobilization into terrorism did not involve suspicious foreign travel to a "country of concern," where such recruits are

trained in terrorist warfare (although he had maintained contact with an Islamist terrorist group operating in Yemen via Anwar al-Awlaki). In the case of Omar Mateen, like Hasan, he also did not travel to a "country of concern"—although he had at least a minimal degree of contact with Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha, who had attempted to recruit others to join him as a foreign fighter in Syria (Goldman, Zapotosky, and Berman, 2016). What is also significant about the cases of Major Hasan, the Tsarnaev brothers, the San Bernardino husband-and-wife team, and Omar Mateen is that they were largely self-radicalized lone wolf operatives, although, perhaps with the exception of Mateen, they had reportedly exchanged e-mails with prominent extremist Islamist clerics overseas.

As such, these cases suggested that the overseas networks of groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State could still project their terrorist violence into the United States, with their extremist websites and forums providing them with a means to virtually cross physical border entry points to radicalize and mobilize their adherents in Western (and other) countries.

These cases also demonstrated how responding to such types of threat required a high degree of information and intelligence sharing across an array of federal, state, and local agencies, as well as transnationally in close coordination with allied government counterparts, such as in these cases, with British, Canadian, Pakistani, Saudi Arabian, and Russian intelligence and security services.

As a result of this paradigm shift, the United States now faced threats from new prototypical home-grown terrorists: legal U.S. residents who are radicalized, motivated, and capable of executing terrorist attacks. The consolation is that these attacks have not approximated the catastrophic magnitude of 9/11, primarily because of the lone wolf nature of most operations, and the lack of backing from a large organization which could assist with training, command-and-control, and resourcing.

Nevertheless, other types of terrorist threats persist. There are continuous attempts by foreign terrorists to enter the United States to conduct operations against the homeland, such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en route from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009. In this case, despite the failure of U.S. counterterrorism agencies to "connect-the-dots" in following-up on the reporting about his pre-incident intentions (for example, the information provided by his Nigerian father to the U.S. embassy in Lagos, and his suspicious travel to Yemen where he was trained to detonate his explosive device), it was fortunate that his bomb failed to detonate when his airplane was on its final approach. In a more successful case of pre-emption, U.S. counterterrorism agencies were reported to have assisted their British counterparts in thwarting an August 2006 plot by a British al-Qaeda cell to simultaneously explode several passenger planes bound from London's Heathrow Airport en route to the United States (Robertson, Cruickshank, and Lister, 2012). Thus, attempts by foreign Islamist groups to dispatch their operatives to the United States to conduct major terrorist attacks have become much more difficult to achieve than instructing radicalized American adherents to use their own resources to conduct their own attacks.

The plots assessed in this chapter demonstrate that al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and the Islamic State (IS) have been forced by the effectiveness of America's domestic counterterrorism measures since 9/11 to make a strategic decision to launch smaller-scale attacks inside the United States to achieve at least some tactical success in inflicting tens or hundreds of casualties. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Mateen's shooting rampage, and the IS-inspired terrorists in Paris and Brussels, mass casualty attacks were still likely being considered by IS operational planners. As explained by former FBI agent Jack Cloonan, such groups "want to see bodies, blood sprayed all over the place. They want to punish us …. It accomplishes a number of things aside from body count. It reaffirms that they are alive and well" (Thomas, 2010).

Further, the "do-it-yourself" aspects of these six cases underscored the kinds of strategic effects al-Qaeda and IS needed to promote among their Western adherents in order to remain relevant terrorist threats. To some degree, therefore, even failed plots, such as Zazi's and Shahzad's, are still likely seen as advantageous by al-Qaeda's and IS's leaders. With minimal investment in their operatives' plots, they continued to remain on the radar screen of powerful Western countries like the United States and demonstrated an ongoing capability to inspire others to lethal action. From this perspective, it is likely to expect that these types of terrorist plots would become prevalent in the foreseeable future.

Finally, the radicalization and mobilization paths of the Tsarnaev brothers and the husband-and-wife team of Farook and Malik were similar to some extent with their counterparts who, in one of the latest trends in Islamist mobilization since early 2011, have decided to become foreign fighters in the Syrian civil war. Unlike in Belgium and France, returning foreign fighters have not yet attempted to conduct terrorist operations in the United States. It is possible, however, that Tamerlan Tsarnaev's visit to Dagestan, and Farook's visit to Saudi Arabia (and, perhaps even Mateen's pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia in 2011 and 2012), intensified their Islamist radicalization. Thus, the threat posed by returning foreign fighters inevitably remains an important consideration for U.S. counterterrorism planners looking to the future.

Note

1 The account of the Najibullah Zazi case study draws from a previous paper of the author: Sinai, J. (2013). 'Najibullah Zazi's plot to bomb the New York City Subway System: A case study of how U.S. domestic counterterrorism operates.' In J. Forest, R. Howard and J. Moore (eds.), *Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations, 2nd Edition*, pp. 116–131. New York: McGraw-Hill. The relevant sections are reprinted here with permission.

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